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This thesis investigates the evolution of macroprudential policy, its objectives and 
effects on the financial sector with emphasis on the differences between advanced 
countries and emerging market economies.  Firstly, we examine the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policy in reducing the build-up of financial imbalances in the wider 
economy.  We focus on the aggregate credit-to-GDP gap, which besides being 
recommended to trigger the Basel III countercyclical buffer, is also widely seen as a 
key indicator of financial imbalances and a predictor of financial crises.  This approach 
has not been done elsewhere.  We find a number of tools to be effective including 
loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratio regulations, notably when the credit gap is 
positive.  Secondly, we extend the research to look at the cross-border spill over 
effects of macroprudential policies, which can help in the understanding of the 
interconnectedness of financial markets via international banks’ claims (lending 
activities).  We consider this of particular relevance for understanding the concept of 
financial stability given the rapid spread of the 2007-2008 financial crisis to 
international markets.  Our approach is unique because the panel vector 
autoregressive approach has not been used so far to investigate potential 
macroprudential instruments spill over effects between countries.  Our results show 
some macroprudential measures spillovers, notably in emerging market economies, 
but the impact is negligible in term of affecting a country’s financial stability or the build-
up of financial imbalances.  Thirdly, we study the costs that are incurred when 
macroprudential policy are employed in the financial sector as well as the relationship 
with monetary policy.  We contend that although the aim of macroprudential policy is 
to prevent or limit financial instability across the broad financial system, the currently 
suggested macroprudential regulations target the banking sector narrowly.  This can 
be seen as an added cost to banks which in turn can affect banks’ profitability and 
hence their ability to lend and potential economic growth.  There are very few micro 
data studies of macroprudential policy and no previous studies on the impact on banks’ 
profitability.  Our findings suggest that although macroprudential instruments can 
achieve its objective of preventing the build-up of financial system imbalances, as 
measured by the credit-to-GDP gap, yet it has significant and negative effects on 
banks’ profitability.  Also, we found that there is positive/ negative interaction between 
macroprudential and monetary policies. 
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Introduction and Overview 
 
 
1.1. Research motivation 
 
The potential risk of the U.S. subprime mortgage market was discussed in many 
Financial Stability Reports prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank of England (BoE), European Central 
Bank (ECB), etc., (see the survey by Davis and Karim (2008b)), and the initial opinion 
was that the risk has been contained to certain portions of the subprime market and 
was not likely to pose a serious systemic threat (see BIS (2008)).  Davis and Karim 
(2008b) noted that IMF Global Financial Stability Report for April 2007 suggested that 
there is a ‘strong foundation for global financial stability and any spill over financial 
effects of the U.S. subprime market could be contained. 
 
At the time, the paradox was that many countries had a macroprudential surveillance 
programme, which should have given warning (early warning indicators (EWI)) of an 
impending financial instability (Čihák (2006), Čihák et al (2012)).  The BIS1  has 
analysed and monitored such early warning indicators of domestic banking distress 
and these indicators, e.g. the credit-to-GDP gap, capture financial overheating and 
signal potential banking distress over medium-term horizons.  However, Davis and 
Karim (2008b) noted that none of the main surveillance reports identified the 
weaknesses in the subprime market and special purpose vehicles as a systemic threat 
nor did they foresee the collapse of the interbank market.  They suggested that even 
if the pending financial instability was identified, macroprudential surveillance came 
with no recommended policy tools to deal with the build-up of financial sector 
imbalances or the risk of a financial crisis.  A possible exception is the Spanish 
dynamic provisioning tool (see Jiménez et al (2012)). 
 
 
1 See BIS website, https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/early warning indicators.htm.  
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Therefore, in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, the consensus 
among regulators, policymakers and researchers was that there needs to be a shift in 
focus on how the financial system is regulated and monitored.  Many observers argued 
that systemic risk was insufficiently understood and financial regulation focused 
excessively on preventing individual financial institution failure (microprudential policy) 
(Hanson et al (2011)). 
 
Yet, it is important to note that, this does not mean that microprudential policy and the 
macroprudential surveillance programme are ineffective and have become 
insignificant in the regulatory framework.  What the 2007-2008 global financial crisis 
has shown is that there were shortcomings in the existing regulatory framework and 
that microprudential policy, the surveillance programme (financial stability) and other 
macroeconomic policies needed to be supplemented with a more comprehensive 
policy that looks at the welfare of the entire financial system.  Regulators and policy 
makers needed to adopt a holistic approach to financial system regulations and 
monitoring, as the stability of the entire financial system is important for a country’s 
economic performance.  Crockett (2000) 2  suggested that there needed to be a 
marrying of two aspects of prudential regulation (microprudential and macroprudential 
dimensions) in order to build on past achievements in the pursuit of financial stability.    
 
Accordingly, the 2007-2008 global financial crisis led to the introduction of several new 
regulatory policies in the financial sector with the intended goals of 1) strengthening 
existing supervisory policy especially microprudential policy 3 ; and 2) introducing 
macroprudential policy as the focal policy for looking at systemic risks, both in the time 
and cross-sectional dimensions (we discussed this further in Chapter 2), as distinct 
from microprudential policy which looks at risks from an individual bank perspective.   
 
Lim et al (2011) noted, following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, using data from 49 
countries (the first IMF survey (2010)4), that the use of macroprudential instruments 
 
2 Andrew Crockett, General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements (1994-2003).  
3 Basel III: International regulatory framework for banks saw the introduction of new banking standards 
for capital and liquidity requirements, disclosure and risk management and governance, etc.  See BIS 
website, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm.  
4 IMF (2010), “Financial Stability and Macroprudential Policy Survey: A Stock Taking”, December.  The 
survey was sent to 63 countries and the European Central Bank (ECB), including all countries in the G-
20 and those subjects to mandatory Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs). 
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was growing and countries have introduced them with the objective of reducing 
systemic risk either over time or across institutions and markets.  Also, they suggested 
that, over time, instruments used were associated with reducing procyclicality in the 
credit markets and leverage.  It should be noted that these instruments were 
commonly used in emerging market countries prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
normally as part of an IMF/World Bank restructuring programme as a result of the 
country experiencing an economic and financial crisis. 
 
Further, Cerutti et al (2015a), a few years later, (the second IMF survey5) provided 
evidence of the rapid growth in the development of macroprudential policy framework 
and usage of macroprudential instruments in over 119 counties.  They noted that 
usage is generally aimed at dampening credit demand, notably in household credit.  
Examples of macroprudential instruments used are time-varying/dynamic loan-loss 
provisioning (DP), loan-to-value ratio (LTV), debt-to-income ratio (DTI), limits on 
foreign currency loans (FC) and concentration limits (CONC), etc. 
 
However, the nature of macroprudential policy to date as reflected in many countries’ 
policy framework is that it commonly affects mainly the domestic banking and 
household sectors (via lending and house prices).  In line with this, most research 
studies of the effectiveness of macroprudential policy tend to focus on the effects on 
domestic operating deposit-taking-institutions (DTIs), which are typically commercial 
banks.  Nevertheless, a large number of macroprudential tools have been proposed 
and there is no clear agreement on which tool should play a primary role in 
macroprudential regulation, e.g. countercyclical capital requirement (CTC), cap on 
loan to value ratio (LTVCAP), debt-to-income ratio (DTI), etc.  For emerging markets, 
some central banks have applied reserve requirement and have set specific 
requirements as well as capital controls as part of their macroprudential regulation 
framework.  Although capital controls are not macroprudential tools, they do have a 
macroprudential effect.  We would expect that macroprudential regulation would be 
tailored to each country or region circumstances and “one size does not fit all”. 
 
5 Analysis from the IMF Global Macro-Prudential Policy Instruments (GMPI) survey (2013-2014). The 
IMF surveys the central banks/national authorities of 125 member countries and the Central Bank of 
West African States (BCEAO) and respondents provided responses to more than 100 detailed 
questions on about 17 key macro-prudential policy tools. 
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Furthermore, as with any new regulatory framework, there are costs associated with 
its implementation, although it has been argued that economic benefits far outweigh 
the costs (see Davis et al (2018), Barrell et al (2009), etc.).  Popov and Smets (2012) 
argued that the goal of financial regulation must be to reduce systemic risk without 
eliminating the financial sector’s contribution to long-term economic growth.  The 
policymaker’s objective becomes one of distinguishing ‘good’ from ‘bad’ booms, and 
of reducing the contribution of financial markets to “tail risk” without eliminating their 
contribution to growth.  Popov and Smets (2012) recommended that macroprudential 
tools should be employed forcefully during costly booms driven by excessive debt and 
characterised by no fundamental contribution to long-term growth, while reacting more 
cautiously during low-cost booms driven by equity finance.  Yet, the question remains 
of how effective macroprudential regulation is in a national financial system and what 
is the potential cost for the financial sector.  
 
1.2. Thesis objectives 
 
In this context, the main objective of this thesis is to contribute to the growing body of 
empirical research on macroprudential policy, its objectives, effectiveness and the 
potential costs to the financial sector and economic activities, with a particular 
emphasis on looking at the differences between advanced countries and emerging 
market economies.  First, we seek to assess the concept of macroprudential policy 
and explore the growth of it over the years, especially considering the period since the 
2007-2008 global financial crisis when adoption has become more general.  We review 
the background history of macroprudential policy, the development of macroprudential 
policy as a financial sector regulatory tool as well as its suggested operation, structure 
and benefits.  We highlight inter alia that the adoption of a macroprudential approach 
implicitly corrects the error in thinking, especially prior to the 2007-2008 global financial 
crisis, that only inflation mattered and not assets prices – against the background of 
the Great Moderation (see Hulseman and Detmeister (2017)). 
 
Second, we provide empirical evidence on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy 
and its instruments in reducing the build-up of financial imbalances in the wider 
economy.  Much of the research literature such as Carreras et al (2018), Cerutti et al 
(2017), Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015), Claessens et al (2014), Dell’Ariccia et 
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al (2012) has focused on analysing the effect of macroprudential instruments on credit 
growth and house prices and the mitigation of the build-up of imbalances in the 
housing market.  Yet, we contend it is as or more appropriate to examine the 
effectiveness of macroprudential policy and its instruments in reducing the build-up of 
imbalances in the credit market using the credit-to-GDP gap.  Besides being 
recommended to trigger the Basel III countercyclical buffer, it is also widely seen as a 
key indicator of financial imbalances and predictor of financial crises.  Also, the credit-
to-GDP gap uses a broader definition of credit, including commercial property lending 
and non-bank debt financing, etc., which is generally ignored in existing research but 
which have been crucial in the build-up to many past financial crises (Davis (1995)). 
 
Third, we highlight a gap in the literature, where the focus tends to be on the domestic 
financial market, and with limited emphasis on the interconnectedness of international 
financial markets and how domestic policies can spill over into other countries.  Thus, 
an important issue is the extent to which macroprudential measures generate spill over 
effects between countries and whether this can affect financial stability positively or 
negatively or there is no effect.  Avdijev et al (2017) indicated that when a country 
enacts prudential policy, three types of effects may occur, firstly, domestically owned 
banks’ activities in the same country such as credit expansion are affected (see Lim 
et al (2011) and Cerutti et al (2017)).  Secondly, foreign banks may change their 
lending to the country that enacted the policy (see Aiyar et al (2014a and b).  Thirdly, 
similar to foreign banks, domestic-owned banks may alter their foreign lending to the 
rest of the world (see Damar and Mordel (2017) and Auer et al (2017)).  The last two 
effects are international in nature and these are the international transmission effects 
between countries. 
 
We contend that by analysing the potential spill over effects of macroprudential 
policies, this will help in the understanding of the interconnectedness of financial 
markets via international banks’ claims (lending activities).  We consider this of 
particular relevance for understanding the concepts of financial stability in light of the 
rapid spread of the 2007-2008 financial crisis to international markets.  Additionally, it 
is important to understand the potential impact prudential measures could have on 
international banks’ lending and their ability to avoid any costs associated with the 
implementation of these instruments. 
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Finally, another objective of the thesis is to look at the costs incurred when new 
regulations are placed on the banking sector, as in this case of macroprudential policy.  
Van den Heuvel (2008) and Tchana (2012) suggested that although capital 
requirements limit moral hazard on the part of banks and hence are beneficial for 
financial stability, they are costly since they reduce the ability of banks to lend, and 
thus can hamper economic growth.  However, Barrell et al (2009) noted that the cost 
of tighter regulation is small in the long run and if the costs of crises are potentially 
high, then tighter regulation would be appropriate, as the benefit of reduced probability 
of crisis outweighs the cost of the loss of economic output.  Equally, Davis et al (2018) 
suggested that if macroprudential measures had been introduced prior to the subprime 
crisis, this might have reduced the incidence of the crisis and improved 
macroeconomic performance.   
 
We again contend that there is a gap in the literature on effects of macroprudential 
policy.  The focus is on the benefit of limiting financial sector disruptions, and notably 
the effects on aggregate credit and house prices.  In contrast, there is limited emphasis 
on the effects on banks as measured by the impact on their profitability, structure and 
activities, etc.  Also, there is limited research using micro banking data in analysing 
the use of macroprudential policy (for an exception, see Claessens et al (2014) which 
focused on asset growth). 
 
1.3. Research method and data 
 
The empirical analysis in this thesis is based on various research techniques, with a 
combination of statistical description, different economic models and econometric 
tests.  Various traditional financial system, banking sector and economic terms as well 
as theories on financial stability and regulations and macroprudential policy have been 
applied throughout the thesis in the understanding of the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policy, the cross-border spill over effects between countries and the 
effects on banks’ profitability. 
  
Micro- and macro- panel econometric techniques such as Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) method, Panel-vector Autoregressive (PVAR) analysis and Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) model are used to explore the different research questions.  
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These methods have been employed in the research literature to address similar 
research questions.  The empirical results, tables and figures are prepared using 
Microsoft Word and Excel, EViews and STATA. 
 
The periods of analysis in the thesis for Chapters 3 and 5 are divided over three 
periods, the full sample period 2000-2013, the pre-crisis period 2000-2006, and the 
post-crisis period 2007-2013.  In Chapter 4, the period of analysis is the full sample 
period 2000-2014, the pre-crisis period 2000-2006, and the post-crisis period 2007-
2014.  We selected these periods as they reflect the sample period of the 
macroprudential policy instruments datasets (see Cerutti et al (2015a) and Cerutti et 
al in IBRN (2017)) while contrasting the results prior and after the financial crisis is 
important for testing the effects of macroprudential policy under different economic 
and financial conditions.  
 
The datasets used in the thesis are considered to be comprehensive and of high 
statistical quality and standards, produced by organisations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the European Union (EU) and 
various countries, central banks and national statistical agencies.  The main bank-
specific data are sourced from Fitch Connect (Fitch Solutions) database, which 
provides annual financial information for banks in many countries around the world.   
 
The two macroprudential policy instruments datasets used in the thesis are produced 
using information from the IMF Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments (GMPI) 
survey (2013-2014) and central banks reports (see Cerutti et al (2015a) and Cerutti et 
al IBRN (2017)).  The dataset on the credit-to-GDP gap is produced by the BIS6, which 
was first released in September 2016 as time-series quarterly data covering 43 
developed and developing countries and one economic region, the Euro currency 
area, starting at the earliest in 1961.  In our model testing, the Euro area is excluded 
from the panel analysis as many individual countries in the Euro area are already 
included in the data.   
 
6 See BIS website, https://www.bis.org/statistics/credit-to-GDP gap.htm.  
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Another important dataset produced by the BIS that is used in the thesis is the 
International Banking Statistics (IBS).  The IBS track internationally active banks’ 
foreign positions and provides a comprehensive picture of total cross-border banks 
claims.  The data are organised in two datasets – locational and consolidated banking 
statistics.  The locational banking statistics were introduced in 1964 to monitor the 
development of international deposit, more so, the Eurocurrency markets.  The 
consolidated banking statistics developed in response to the expansion of 
international banking activity in the Caribbean and other offshore financial centres in 
the 1970s.  Both datasets are collected under the auspices of the Committee on the 
Global Financial System (CGFS). 
 
1.4. Thesis structure 
 
The organisation of the thesis is as follows.   
 
1.4.1. Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the evolution of macroprudential policy, its objective and the 
regulatory framework (structure).  We commence the chapter with a review of the 
background history of the development of the concept of macroprudential policy and 
the changing macroeconomic environment and headwinds faced by many countries, 
which account for the growth of macroprudential policy as a financial system regulatory 
policy tool.  Secondly, we discuss the growth of macroprudential policy and its 
instruments since the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  We review the theoretical rationale 
for the importance of macroprudential policy in the context of financial crises and their 
attendant economic costs and benefits.  We look at the development of 
macroprudential policy framework and what should be some of the key objectives and 
features of an effective framework.  Most of the information in this section will reference 
the policy guidance of the IMF-FSB-BIS (2016) and to some extent the ESRB (2014a) 
which has been prepared specifically in light of the global financial crisis.  Secondly, 
we explore the concept of financial stability and its meaning, including the underlying 
financial stability, definitions, concepts and key principles of financial stability.  Thirdly, 
we provide a review of the agency and organisational structure that is responsible for 
reporting on financial stability (instability) in a country’s financial system.  In this 
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context, we highlight that the definitions of financial stability (instability), which typically 
focus on the domestic financial system and often do not include reference to 
international financial markets or the role of international banks specifically.  Finally, 
we review the theory and empirical studies of macroprudential policy and the overall 
benefit to the financial sector. 
 
1.4.2. Chapter 3: The Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policy 
 
In Chapter 3, we start to look at the effectiveness of macroprudential policy and its 
instruments in reducing the build-up of financial system imbalances as measured by 
the credit-to-GDP gap.  Firstly, we highlight the rather narrow focus of macroprudential 
policy in research literature in analysing the financial system imbalances, which is 
credit growth and house prices.  Secondly, we review the credit-to-GDP gap and the 
prominent role given to it in Basel III as a signalling tool (early warning indicator (EWI)) 
for policymakers in identifying looming build-ups of imbalances in the financial market 
and in setting the countercyclical capital buffers. We also point out the wider scope of 
credit that it captures over what is used in most empirical tests of macroprudential 
instruments.  We go on to discuss empirical research on the credit-to-GDP gap and 
early warning indicators (EWIs).  Thirdly, we present our empirical analysis and results 
of the effectiveness of the macroprudential instruments in reducing the credit-to-GDP 
gap, which is to our knowledge the first such test in the literature.  This measure is 
highly relevant since it incorporates a broader definition of credit and captures credit 
in sectors, e.g. commercial property and non-bank debt financing, which are generally 
ignored in existing research but which have been highly relevant for past crises.  Our 
results show that a number of tools to be effective including loan-to-value and debt-to-
income ratio regulations, notably when the credit gap is positive, which is consistent 
with the research literature. 
 
1.4.3. Chapter 4: Financial Stability and Macroprudential Policy: Are there 
cross-border effects? 
 
In this chapter, we look at the interconnectedness of international financial markets 
and assess whether domestic macroprudential policies can spill over into other 
countries.  We believe this is a further gap in the literature, where the focus tends to 
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be on the domestic financial market, and with limited emphasis on the 
interconnectedness of international financial markets.  Firstly, we look at the 
interconnectedness of global financial markets, the growth of international banking and 
the role international banks play in the transmission of credit and other financial 
services between countries.  Secondly, we explore the role of international banking in 
financial stability issues.  In the final section of the chapter, we examine how 
international banks’ claims impact total domestic lending (measured by the domestic 
credit-to-GDP ratio), banks’ regulatory capital ratio (a measure of banks’ strength and 
stability) and economic activities.  Then we look at the spill over effects of 
macroprudential policy between countries and what potential effects these policies can 
have across borders.  Our results show some spill over effects of prudential measures, 
notably in emerging market economies, but overall, we consider that the impact is 
negligible in term of affecting a country’s financial stability or the build-up of financial 
imbalances. 
 
1.4.4. Chapter 5: Macroprudential Policy, Banks’ Profitability and Monetary 
Policy 
 
The purpose of this chapter is, firstly, to present empirical research on the potential 
effects of macroprudential policies on banks’ profitability and activities which will also 
help in the understanding of how banks react to macroprudential regulations and thus 
the “transmission process”.  Secondly, we look at the relationship between 
macroprudential policy and monetary policy using a banks’ profitability model and a 
net interest margin (NIM) model.  Despite the increased trend toward bank 
disintermediation, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 underlines just how important the 
banking sector is to the financial system and the economy.  Firstly, we look at the role 
of banks in the financial system and the research literature on the factors affecting 
banks’ profitability.  Secondly, we look how banks are regulated (financial system 
regulatory and supervisory framework) and the impact regulations have on banks’ 
costs and lending activities.  Thirdly, we present an empirical analysis of the impact 
macroprudential policy has had on banks’ profitability (return on average assets 
(ROAA) and return on average equity (ROAE) as well as the relationship with 
monetary policy using the net interest margin profitability model (NIM).  We contend 
that although the aim of macroprudential policy is to prevent or limit financial instability 
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across the broad financial system, the currently-suggested macroprudential tools and 
new regulations target the banking sector narrowly, which can be seen as an added 
cost to banks which in turn can affect banks’ profitability and hence their ability to lend.  
Our findings suggest that although macroprudential instruments can achieve its 
objective of preventing the build-up of financial system imbalances, yet it has 
significant and negative effects on banks’ profitability, which can reduce the ability of 
banks to lend, and thus hamper economic growth.  Also, we found that there is 
positive/ negative interaction between macroprudential and monetary policies. 
 
1.4.5. Chapter 6: Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
In chapter 6, we summarise the main empirical findings of the thesis and discusses 
what are the policy implications of the research.  We conclude the chapter by 
suggesting some areas for future research that may rewarding for macroprudential 











In this chapter we outline the existing theoretical and empirical literature in relation to 
macroprudential policy, which is key background for the rest of the thesis.  More 
specifically, Section 2.2 presents the background history of macroprudential policy.  
Section 2.3 looks at the development of macroprudential policy as a financial sector 
regulatory tool as well as its suggested operational structure and benefits.  Section 
2.4 explores the concept of financial stability and its meaning, including the underlying 
financial stability definitions, concepts and key principles of financial stability.  In 
Section 2.5 we review the theoretical and empirical literature of macroprudential 
policy.  Finally, Section 2.6, we conclude. 
 
2.2. Background history of the development of the concept of 
macroprudential policy 
 
Before laying the groundwork for developing the concept of macroprudential policy, 
we review the macroeconomic environment of the 1970s.  Clement (2010) noted that 
it is difficult to pinpoint the exact time the term macroprudential was used yet it is 
important to discuss the 1970s macroeconomic environment in order to comprehend 
the background history of the term “macroprudential”.  Where did it all start?  As such 
this section looks at the chronological history of macroprudential policy starting from 
1970s up to the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  
13 
 
2.2.1. The history of the term “macroprudential” policy 
 
I. The 1970s macroeconomic environment and the genesis of the concept 
of “macroprudential” 
 
The 1970s was characterised as a period of great economic challenges and changes 
in the financial landscape after a long period when no major financial crises had taken 
place since the end of World War II.  The Bretton Woods system of managed exchange 
rates came to an end and many major world currencies started to float from 1973.7  
Inflation and unemployment were rising and the first oil shock in 1973 added to the 
economic slowdown in many countries as well as rapid inflation.   
  
The financial sector had already witnessed the growth of the euro-markets and 
international capital markets in the 1960s and early 1970s largely following regulatory 
restrictions in the US, discussed in more detail later.8  In the United Kingdom (UK), the 
removal of credit controls on all banks – the Competition and Credit Control (CCC) 
reform (1971-1973)9, sharply increased competition in the banking sector.  This led to 
a rapid increase in lending, a stock market and property boom.  But, by the middle of 
the 1970s, many developed countries were fighting rapid inflation by rising interest 
rates to reduce demand and tightening fiscal policy.  In the UK, the push to control 
inflation led to a sharp fall in share and property values and the reimposition of credit 
controls on all banks.  This in turn weakened the balance sheet of secondary banks 
and led to the UK secondary banking crisis in 1973 (see Davis (1995)).  
 
 
7  The system dissolved between 1968 and 1973. In August 1971, U.S. President Richard Nixon 
announced the "temporary" suspension of the dollar's convertibility into gold.  While the dollar had 
struggled throughout most of the 1960s within the parity established at Bretton Woods, this crisis 
marked the breakdown of the system. An attempt to revive the fixed exchange rates failed, and by 
March 1973 the major currencies began to float against each other.  See IMF website, 
https://www.imf.org/external/about/histend.htm. 
8 Some factors that contributed to the growth of this market are the following, the imposition of maximum 
rates of interest in the US (Regulation Q), US withholding taxes regime, listing and disclosure regulation 
requirements, etc. as well as the growth of multi-national financial institutions. 




After the collapse of Bretton Woods, many banks incurred large foreign currency 
losses and the collapse of Herstatt Bank10 (1974) had two major consequences, 1) the 
effects on international banks through the international interbank market and 2) the 
action of regulators, which had international supervisory and regulatory implications 
(Mourlon-Druol (2015)).  The Herstatt collapse had a cross border effect on the 
settlement of foreign exchange positions, which severely affected several international 
banks especially United States (US) based banks.  The German supervisory 
institutions closed the bank due to insolvency before the clearing of several foreign 
exchange transactions.  The same year, Franklin National Bank of New York also 
closed its doors after incurring large foreign exchange losses (Davis (1995)).   
 
In response to the financial turmoil and other disruptions in the international financial 
markets as discussed in the above paragraph, the central bank governors of the G1011 
countries established a Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices 
(the predecessor of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)) at the end 
of 1974.12  The Committee was designed as a forum for regular cooperation between 
its member countries on banking supervisory matters.  Its aim is to enhance financial 
stability by improving supervisory know how and the quality of banking supervision 
worldwide as well as to serve as a forum for regular cooperation between its member 
countries on banking supervisory matters.13  There were concerns about the stability 
of international financial markets and the threats it can pose to the world economy.   
 
Prior to the BCBS, the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), formerly 
known as the Euro-currency Standing Committee (ECSC), was established in 1971 
with a mandate to monitor international banking markets, as mentioned grew rapidly 
 
10 Herstatt Bank (Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt K.G.a.A.) was a privately owned bank in the German city of 
Cologne and was a significant participant in the foreign exchange market.  It went bankrupt on 26 June 
1974 and led to the formulation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
11 Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden United Kingdom, and the 
United States.  See BIS website, https://www.bis.org/list/g10publications/.  
12 The Basel Committee - initially named the Committee of Banking Regulations and Supervisory 
Practices - was established by the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries at the end of 
1974 in the aftermath of serious disturbances in international currency and banking markets (notably 
the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt in West Germany).  See BIS website, 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm. 
13 There was a focus on three key areas for banking supervisors - liquidity, solvency and foreign 
exchange positions.  The focus on banks’ capital came in the 1980s.  Report on the supervision of 




in the 1960s.  The initial focus of the ECSC/ CGFS was on the monetary policy 
implications of the rapid growth of offshore deposit and lending markets, but attention 
increasingly shifted to financial stability questions and to broader issues related to 
structural change in the financial system, which will be discussed throughout the 
thesis.  Reflecting this change in focus, the G10 Governors decided on 8th February 
1999 to rename the Committee and to revise its mandate.  As of January 2010, the 
Chairman of the CGFS reports to the Global Economy Meeting, which comprises a 
group of 31 central bank Governors as members.14 
 
By the end of the 1970s and with the second major oil shock, a link between prudential 
regulation and macroeconomic issues were being discussed concerning the 
implications of rising oil prices for banks international lending and the stability of the 
international financial system.  As global banks, spurred on by US deregulation in the 
1960s (Houpt (1999)), saw an opening for international expansion and profit 
opportunity from international banking, lending the surplus profits from oil producing 
countries.   W. P. Cooke, Associate Director of the Bank of England and chairman of 
the BCBC, in 1979 highlighted the issues of micro-economic problems merging into 
macro-economic problems which will have consequences for banking regulation 
where microprudential problems can lead to macroprudential issues, which can affect 
the entire financial system (Clement (2010), Maes (2010)). 
 
Further in late 1979, a working group chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy, at the time, 
the BIS Economic Adviser and Chairman of the ECSC, examined the use of prudential 
measures as one of several alternative ways to constrain international bank lending, 
and a contrast between microprudential and macroprudential measures was 
highlighted (see Clement 2010)).  Specifically, it was noted that microprudential 
measures are primarily concerned with sound banking practice and the protection of 
depositors at the level of the individual bank.   However, there may be a need to have 
prudential measures with a wider perspective, which consider problems that affect the 
market as a whole.   Five groups of (micro-) prudential measures to constrain the 
growth of international bank lending were suggested.  These are control of banks’ 
foreign exchange exposure, control of banks’ country risk exposure, capital ratios,  
 
14 See BIS website, http://www.bis.org/cgfs.  
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controls on maturity transformation, and controlling the “entry” of new market 
participants. 
 
As summarised in Maes (2010), the Lamfalussy working group paper emphasised 
three elements of prudential supervision for the growth of banks’ international lending, 
1) there is a need for effective supervision of the international banking system, 2) the 
reduction of inequalities in competitive conditions between domestic and international 
banking, and 3) the monitoring of international banking developments. 
 
II. The 1980s Latin American debt crisis and financial innovation 
 
Through the 1970s and into the early 1980s, inflation remained one of the major 
problems facing many developed countries.  Also, financial crises continued to 
generate financial instability in financial markets.  Of particular interest in the early 
1980s was the Latin American Debt crisis which had a major impact on many global 
banks, especially in the US and on the economic performance of Latin American 
countries during the decade.   
 
The Latin American Debt crisis had its origin in the 1970s as the two large oil price 
shocks created current account deficits in many Latin American countries.  In order to 
finance these deficits, Latin America countries turned to the international banking 
market and borrowed from oil-exporting countries, who had large current account 
surpluses (Sim (2013)).  The intermediaries for these syndicated loans were mainly 
US money-centre banks, as international banking grew very quickly in the 1970s and 
their primary goals were market expansion and profitability.  Latin American borrowing 
in US dollars from US commercial banks and other creditors increased dramatically 
and by 1982, the debt level reached US$327 billion (estimated as 55% of Latin 
American countries total GDP, see Bertola and Ocampo (2012))  and these loans 
carried relatively low floating interest rates (FDIC (1997)).  
 
There was a change in monetary policy in the US and Europe towards disinflation that 
was led by US tightening which starting in October 1979, with the fed funds rate 
peaking at 17.6% in April 1980.  Across the developed world priority was given to 
lowering inflation, which led to the increase in interest rates in many advanced 
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countries.15  Nominal interest rates rose globally and Latin American countries soon 
found it difficult to service their debts.  In August 1982, Mexico indicated that it could 
no longer meet interest payments and by the end of 1982, approximately 40 nations 
were in arrears in their interest payments.  A year later 27 nations including the four 
major Latin American countries of Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina were in 
negotiations to restructure their existing loans (FDIC (1987)), which resulted in major 
losses for banks.  
 
At the same time, the issue of international banking financial innovation was attracting 
the attention of G10 countries central banks governors such as the US, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan and the UK, etc.  A Study Group (Cross Report) was set up 
to examine the issue (see BIS (1986)).  The purposes of the Study Group were to 
improve central-bank knowledge of these (innovative) instruments such as derivative 
products (currency and interests swaps, options, etc.) and note issuance facility 
(NIFs), and their markets as the situation existed in the second half of 1985, and to 
provide a foundation for considering their implications for the stability and functioning 
of international financial institutions and markets, for monetary policy, for banks' 
financial reporting and the statistical reporting  of international financial developments.  
 
The Cross Report highlighted the change in the process of international financial 
intermediation as a result of financial innovation and the decline of comparative 
advantage of large international banks to international securities markets as a channel 
for credit intermediation.  There was 1) a trend towards securitisation (growth of the 
securities market for lending activity), 2) increasing used of off-balance-sheet items 
(derivatives instruments), and 3) the global integration of financial markets.  This new 
development had important consequences for the functioning of the banking and 
financial systems, which led to greater risk taking by financial institutions to 
compensate for the loss of high-quality borrowers.  Furthermore, the report saw that 
financial innovation may heighten financial vulnerabilities in many ways and may 
contribute to systemic vulnerabilities.  This would then require authorities to consider 
substantial adjustments to regulation and other policies, including addressing issues 
 
15 Paul A. Volcker, chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1979–1987) 




relating to macroprudential policy that is, the safety and soundness of the broader 
financial system and the payments mechanism. 
 
The Cross Report raised several issues for macroprudential policy (supervision).  The 
Report suggested in order to deal with the concerns of financial innovation and the 
macroeconomic consequences of financial system fragility, firstly, supervisors will 
have to overcome the problem of knowing who is conducting these transactions.  
Some of these transactions were being completed by subsidiaries and branches of 
banks in other countries.  Therefore, “consolidated” supervisors of the parent banks 
will have to take account of these transactions wherever they take place. 
 
Secondly, the report highlighted a blurring of the line between banks and securities 
houses for these innovative transactions.  Banks are becoming less important in 
financial intermediation and questions arose who is responsible for supervising the 
securities houses, which are becoming increasingly important part of the financial 
structure.  Macroprudential policy would need to overcome this issue and there need 
to be a clear supervisory framework on who is responsible for supervising these 
securities houses.  Additionally, the Cross Report saw an opportunity for international 
cooperation and co-ordination between supervisory agencies in different countries as 
the interconnectedness of financial markets were growing. 
 
In term of monetary policy and financial reporting and statistics, the Cross Report 
suggested that monetary policy is being influenced, in some countries (such as US, 
Japan and the UK) more than others by the effects of these innovative products, 
deregulation and structural changes.  And the growth of off-balance sheet transactions 
and the unbundling of different types of risks (credit, liquidity, currency, etc.) rendered 
the analysis of financial statements more complex. 
 
Subsequently, the vulnerabilities of financial innovation were emphasised in the stock 
market crash in 1987 (Black Monday).  One of the reasons for the stock market crash 
was the extensive use of portfolio insurance and innovative products such as options 
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and derivatives which accelerated the crash (Carlson (2006)).16  Also in the USA, the 
Savings and Loans (US thrifts) institutions crisis, which started in the early 1980s, due 
to interest rate mismatch and high risk lending resulted in the failure or insolvency of 
several thrift institutions, an example of the danger of deregulation and inadequate 
supervision.  Other instances of financial fragility can be noted in several countries, 
such as in Canada, the Canadian Regional Banking Crisis (1985) where loans loss 
provisioning wiped out several banks’ capital which resulted in banks failures and in 
Australia (1989), where loans losses saw several banks fail (Davis (1995)). 
 
In response to these many international financial disruptions, banking regulation was 
strengthened with the introduction of the Basel I (Capital) Accord (1988)17 by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).  The Basel I, at the time focused mainly 
on applying common minimum capital standards to the banking sector and addressed 
credit risk, which was the main risk faced by banks.  The minimum capital ratio of 
capital to risk-weighted assets of 8% was the standard set by the BCBS and this was 
to be implemented by the end of 1992 for banks in G10 countries.  Yet, many other 
countries (Non G10) also adopted or incorporated the Basel Accord into their 
regulatory framework.  The Basel I Accord was further modified in the 1990s to 
address different aspects of banks risks (market and operational risks).  Another two 
new versions of the Basel Accord (Basel II (2004), Basel III (2010)) were introduced 
to further address banks’ fragility.  The Basel Accords placed a lot of emphasis on 
microprudential policy (individual bank regulation), it was a bottom-up approach to 
banking regulation, as macroprudential policy was still in an embryonic stage of 
development.   
  
 
16 On October 19th, 1987, a chain reaction of market distress which started in Hong Kong sent global 
stock exchanges crashing.   
17 The onset of the Latin American debt crisis heightened the BCBS's concerns that the capital ratios of 
the main international banks were deteriorating at a time of growing international risks.  Backed by the 
G10 Governors, Committee members resolved to halt the erosion of capital standards in their banking 
systems and to work towards greater convergence in the measurement of capital adequacy. This 
resulted in a broad consensus on a weighted approach to the measurement of risk, both on and off 
banks' balance sheets.  See BIS website, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm#basel_i.  
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III. Headwinds in the early 1990s 
 
At the end of the 1980s, the fear of rising inflation returned and the tightening of 
monetary policy (increases in interest rates) resulted in the end of the 1980s-economic 
boom (driven by rising credit and assets prices) and a recession in the early 1990s.  
Idiosyncratic shocks such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and reunification of Germany, along with a spike in oil prices due to the Gulf War, as 
well as the decline in borrowing played a role in lower GDP growth (Davis (1995)).  But 
financial deregulation in several countries (e.g. Scandinavian countries, Jamaica, etc.) 
in the late 1980s also resulted in excessive credit and asset prices boom in these 
countries that left them vulnerable to the global economic turbulence. 
 
In the UK, the recession of 1991 was primarily caused by high interest rates, falling 
house prices and an overvalued exchange rate.  In an attempt to reduce and control 
inflation, the UK joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1990.  In 
order to keep sterling within its ERM bands, high levels of interest rates needed to be 
maintained and this severely exacerbated the effects of the recession and by 
September of 1992 (Black Wednesday)18, the UK exited the ERM (Bonefeld and 
Burnham (1996)).  In the US, Walsh (1993) suggested that a decline in consumers’ 
confidence, debt accumulations in the 1980s, the rise in oil prices due to the Iraq 
invasion of Kuwait (1991), and the rising interest rates by the US Federal Reserve in 
attempt to low inflation are cited as the causes of US recession between 1990 and 
1991. 
  
As detailed below, the early 1990s recession and financial deregulation in some 
countries led to several financial crises and these crises had major macroeconomic 
significance for those countries (see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)).  
Nevertheless, as the same authors stress, there are still many benefits to financial 
deregulation (liberalisation) and crisis risk is reduced when the institutional 
environment is strong.  Hoggarth et al (2002) suggested that output losses during a 
financial crisis for a country can be large, roughly 15–20%, on average, of annual 
 
18 Wednesday 16th September 1992, the day the UK withdraw the pound sterling from the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
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GDP.  Moreover, the losses can be even higher in developing countries.  The following 
are examples of financial crises in the 1990s. 
 
• The banking crises and economic slowdown in Scandinavian countries (1990-
1991) due to financial deregulation and banks excessive credit lending which 
contributed to higher property prices (Sandel (2004)). 
• In Japan, the collapse of the asset price bubble (1991-2003) rendered most of 
the banking sector insolvent and resulted in economic slowdown for more than 
10 years (Horioka (2006)).   
• The Latin America “tequila crisis” (1994) which started in Mexico with the 
devaluation of the Mexico peso (Musacchio (2012)).   
• The Asian financial crisis (1997-1998), which was due to currency over 
devaluation and asset-liability currency mismatch by banks (Lindgren et al 
(1999)). 
 
Late in the decade, due to the Asian financial crisis, the IMF stressed that effective 
bank supervision and financial system stability would only be achieved with both 
micro- and macro- prudential measures (Lindgren et al (1999)).  As such, after the 
Asian financial crisis, a number of Asian countries started using macroprudential policy 
such as Hong Kong (1999), Singapore (2000), Thailand (2002), and China (2004).  
Nevertheless, the highlighted financial crises in the 1990s further underlined the 
danger of banking sector fragility and the need for macroprudential measures. 
 
In 1999, as a policy response succeeding the Asian financial crisis, a more formal 
approach, the IMF19  in conjunction with the World Bank developed the Financial 
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) program, to formally assess a country’s financial 
stability, its regulation framework and development.20  A FSAP provides an in-depth 
examination of a country’s financial sector and its regulation, however it does not 
 
19 Also, the IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department produces the Global Financial Stability 
Report (GFSR), which provides an assessment of the global financial system and markets and 
addresses emerging market financing.  See IMF website, http://www.imf.org/en/publications/gfsr.  
20 See IMF website, http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fssa.aspx.  
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evaluate the health of individual financial institutions and cannot predict or prevent 
financial crises, though it identifies the main vulnerabilities that could trigger one.21,22    
 
FSAP assessments 23  are the joint responsibility of the IMF and World Bank in 
developing economies and emerging markets and of the IMF alone in advanced 
economies.  There are two main components of the FSAP programme, firstly the 
assessment of financial stability in a country’s financial system, which is the 
responsibility of the IMF, and the second component, assesses financial system 
development in developing countries and emerging markets which is the responsibility 
of the World Bank.  Although FSAP assesses a country’s financial sector stability 
(instability), regulation and development, the program is voluntary and there is no 
requirement that countries must take part in the assessment.  Also, the 
recommendations of the assessment are just advisory and it is up to the country to 
accept and implement the recommendation.  Yet, the program gives the IMF/ World 
Bank more leverage in such cases for a country to adopt some of their 
recommendations.  At the onset of the program in the 1999, macroprudential policy 
was not emphasized in assessment reports but since the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
the FSAP reports include recommendations of a micro- and macro-prudential nature, 
tailored to country-specific circumstance. 
 
With existence of the FSAP program24, which give the IMF/ World Bank an additional 
source of information to identify potential financial sector fragility, many countries also 
developed a macroprudential surveillance program, defined as monitoring the 
conjunctural and structural trends in the financial markets as to give a warning of 
financial instability.  This became a core activity for many central banks (Davis and 
Karim (2009)). 
 
21 The IMF also collected Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) from the early 2000s.  The FSIs were 
developed by the IMF with the aim of supporting analysis and assessing strengths and vulnerabilities 
of financial systems.  See IMF website, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi/eng/fsi.htm.  
22 As of September 2010, in response to the 2007/2008 financial crisis, FSAP becomes mandatory part 
of the Article IV Surveillance for members’ country with systemically important financial sectors.  See 
IMF website, https://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/mandatoryfsap.htm.  
23 Since the launch in 1999, after the Asian crisis, 142 countries have completed the programme (many 
more than once).  See IMF website, https://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/faq/index.htm#q6.  
24 The IMF also conduct Article IV consultations with member countries once a year, which now include 




IV. Financial stability and macroprudential policy 
 
Accordingly, by the early 2000s, there was a growing focus on financial stability by 
central banks and regulators, seen with the increase publication of financial stability 
reports, as the frequency of financial crises increased.  Caprio and Klingebiel’s (2003) 
crises chronologies suggested that 117 systemic banking crises (defined as much or 
all of bank capital being exhausted) had occurred in 93 countries since the mid-1970s. 
 
Čihák (2006), who surveyed 47 countries financial stability reports, saw that by the 
mid-2000s many central banks and regulators had started to publish regular reports 
on financial stability with frequency either quarterly, semi-annually or yearly, which 
mainly focus on system-wide issues (macroprudential surveillance) rather than issues 
with individual institutions.  The main reasons given for the increased focus on financial 
stability are the high cost of financial crisis (see Hoggarth et al (2002), Barrell et al 
(2008 and 2010)), the increase in frequency of financial crisis (see Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003)) and the growth in the volume of financial transactions and 
complexity of these new financial instruments.  Also, the growing interconnectedness 
of international financial markets was seen as an important reason for such 
surveillance.  Čihák (2006) noted as well, that the emphasis on financial stability can 
be seen in the organisational structure of central banks, where new financial stability 
departments or divisions were being created.  For example, Hong Kong started early 
with macroprudential policy and its institution arrangement was put in place in 2003 
(see HKMA (2006)) but prior to this they used macroprudential instruments in 1999.   
 
In this context, BIS General Manager, Andrew Crockett (2000) singled out two 
characteristics of the macroprudential approach to effective banks supervision and 
financial system stability.  Firstly, macroprudential approach looks at the financial 
system as a whole with the objective of limiting the costs of financial distress in terms 
of output in the macroeconomy.  This can be seen as limiting systemic risk in the wider 
financial system, which is explain further below.  Secondly, macroprudential approach 
recognises the interconnectedness of financial institutions and the risk of correlated 
failures.  In turn, the macroprudential approach had two dimensions, a time dimension, 
also known as the pro-cyclicality of the financial system, which focus on risks resulting 
from the fluctuation of financing activity over the business cycle, and a cross-sectional 
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dimension, where the emphasis is on the interconnections between financial 
institutions with a particular focus on systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs) (Borio (2003)).  Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) are 
financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, 
complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the 
wider financial system and economic activity. 
 
Borio (2003) then outlined the terms and concepts of what is meant by a 
“macroprudential” perspective in the supervision and regulation of the financial 
system.  He indicated that the objective of the macroprudential approach is to limit the 
risk of financial distress which could result in significant losses in terms of the real 
output for the economy, whereas microprudential approach is to limit the risk of 
episodes of financial distress at individual institutions, regardless of their impact on the 
overall economy.   He indicated that macro- and micro- prudential perspectives differ 
in terms of their objectives as shown in Table 2.1.   
 
Table 2.1: Summary analysis of macro vs. micro prudential perspectives 
  
 Macroprudential  Microprudential 
 
Proximate objective limit financial system-wide 
distress 
limit distress of individual 
institutions 
Ultimate objective avoid macroeconomic 





Characterisation of risk “endogenous” (dependent 
on collective behaviour) 
“exogenous” 
(independent of individual 
agents’ behaviour) 




Calibration of prudential 
controls 
in terms of system-wide 
risk; top-down  
in terms of risks of 
individual institutions; 
bottom-up 
 Source: Borio (2003) 
 
As well, Borio (2003) argued why macroprudential perspective is useful in 
understanding financial instability, which is discussed later in this chapter.  Firstly, he 
argued that macroprudential perspective include the basis for microprudential 
perspective due to the possible high costs of financial instability.  Secondly, there is a 
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better balance between market and policy-induced discipline, as strengthening 
macroprudential can lead to better economic performance.  Thirdly, microprudential 
perspectives is less likely to deliver a safe and sound financial system since the origin 
of financial crises with a large macroeconomic effect suggest that macroprudential 
perspective is important. 
 
Similarly, the Bank of England (2009) argued that there is a role for macroprudential 
policy in the stable provision of financial intermediation services to the wider economy 
- payment services, credit intermediation and insurance against risk.  Macroprudential 
policy should seek to avoid the type of boom and bust cycle in the supply of credit and 
liquidity and counterparty risk from individual financial institution as seen in the 2007-
2008 financial crisis.  See Section 2.3.2 below for a taxonomy of macroprudential 
policy instruments. 
 
Despite the benefits of macroprudential policy, in most countries it was not developed 
as a policy framework and incorporated in financial regulations prior to the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis.  The history of the term, as we summarised above, has shown 
that the macroprudential concept was discussed in different committees and forums 
and there was little interest in developing tools further prior to the crisis.  Davis and 
Karim (2009) indicated that it was a “missing policy pillar” in the financial system 
regulatory framework.  One can argue that the period of low unemployment rate, 
increasing asset prices, low interest rates, risk but steady GDP growth, low inflation 
(Goldilocks period) and delusion that financial crises are really just individual  
institutional crises led to excessive optimism about financial instability up to 2007.  The 
2007-2008 global financial crisis, however, changed the fortunes of macroprudential 
policy as discussed further below.  
 
We now move on to Section 2.3. The development of macroprudential policy, 
where we look at the growth of macroprudential policy and its instruments since the 





2.3. The development of macroprudential policy 
  
This section looks at the growth of macroprudential policy and its instruments since 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  We review the theoretical rationale for the importance 
of macroprudential policy in the context of financial crises and their attendant 
economic costs and benefits.  We look at the development of macroprudential policy 
framework and what should be some of the key objectives and features of an effective 
framework.  Most of the information in this section will reference the policy guidance 
of the IMF-FSB-BIS (2016) and to some extent the ESRB (2014a) which were 
prepared specifically in light of the global financial crisis. 
 
2.3.1. Macroprudential policy 
 
In the literature, (such as Carreras et al (2018), Galati and Moessner (2013), 
Dell’Ariccia et al (2012), Lim et al (2011), Davis and Karim (2009), etc.), there are 
robust arguments for the use of macroprudential policy as an essential tool to forestall 
crises or at least offer a buffer to soften the impact of financial crises in the financial 
system.  Yet, the literature on macroprudential policy is far from complete and 
continues to evolve, and also, there is no common agreement on the objectives of 
macroprudential policy.  Many international organisations (IMF, FSB, and BIS, etc.), 
regional economic institutions (ECB, ESRB, etc.) and researchers have been 
advocating for countries’ financial system regulators and policy makers to develop a 
macroprudential policy framework.  This is because there are strong arguments for the 
use of it as an essential tool to avert systemic failure of the financial system, as one 
needs to consider the wellbeing of the entire financial system and not just focus on the 
welfare of each financial institution, that is not just “institution by institution” stability. 
   
In addition, with the aim of encouraging countries to develop a macroprudential policy 
framework as part of their financial system reforms, the IMF-FSB-BIS has published 
guidelines on elements of an effective macroprudential policy and handbook (IMF-
FSB-BIS (2016), IMF (2014)).  The ESRB has also published its organising guidelines 




Countries have responded to these international agencies’ advice and following the 
2007-2008 global financial crisis, several countries have used macroprudential 
instruments to address financial system instability or prevent the build-up of 
imbalances in the financial system.  Čihák et al (2012) and Jeanneau (2014) noted 
that after the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, there was a renewed policymakers’ 
interest in improving the policy framework for financial stability driven by the new role 
of the central bank in macroprudential policy objectives and the coordination of 
responsibilities between the various supervisory agencies.  Further below we will 
review the operational framework of macroprudential policy. 
 
Lim et al (2011)  noted from the first IMF survey (IMF (2010)) that two-thirds (34 or of 
51) of respondents, had used various instruments for macroprudential objectives since 
2008.  Additionally, Cerutti et al (2015a), using the results of the second IMF survey a 
few years later (2013-2014), highlighted the growing use of macroprudential 
instruments in 119 countries.  Both surveys show that element of macroprudential 
policy framework existed prior to the 2007-2008 global financial crisis in some 
advanced countries and more so, many emerging market economies.  See Appendix 
2A.2 discussing the use of macroprudential policy instruments prior to the financial 
crisis.  It is important to note that the use of macroprudential policy can vary 
substantially between countries as large number of macroprudential tools have been 
proposed and it is not a case where “one size fits all” (Darbar and Wu (2015)).   
 
I. Definition and objectives of macroprudential policy 
 
IMF-FSB-BIS (2016) defined macroprudential policy, in light of the financial crisis, as 
the use of primarily prudential tools to limit systemic risk.  A key aspect of the definition 
is the concept of systemic risk, which is the widespread disruption of the provision of 
financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system 
and this disruption can cause serious negative consequences for the real economy.  
Systemic risk is generally recognised as having two dimensions, either vulnerabilities 
during boom-bust financial cycles (time dimension) or vulnerabilities associated with 
the distribution of risk within the financial system due to the interconnectedness of 




IMF-FSB-BIS (2016) identify the following key objectives and scope of 
macroprudential policy.  Firstly, macroprudential policy should increase the resilience 
of the financial system to deal with aggregate shocks, that is, help maintain the ability 
of the financial system to function effectively, even under adverse conditions.  This 
involves the build-up of countercyclical buffers in periods of boom and releasing of 
these buffers in periods of economic downturn.  The countercyclical buffers’ aim is to 
ensure that the banking sector has enough capital to protect against potential future 
losses in a period of economic decline (see BIS (2010)).   
 
A second objective of macroprudential policy is to contain the build-up of systemic 
vulnerabilities when there is an upswing in the business cycle (time dimension) and 
where there is a distortion in the feedback between asset prices and credit.  There are 
times when during a boom, in the presence of imperfect information and a very 
competition environment, there are incentives for financial institutions to lower their 
risk standards and at the same time maintain unsustainable increases in leverage, 
debt stocks, and volatile funding.  In the presence of such vulnerabilities, 
macroprudential policy seeks to increase the resilience of the financial system to asset 
price shocks by reducing the procyclical feedback between asset prices and credit. 
 
Thirdly, macroprudential seek to control structural vulnerabilities within the financial 
system that arise through interlinkages, that is risk within the financial system due to 
the interconnectedness of financial institutions (cross-sectional or structural 
dimension).  Financial institutions operate in an interconnected system where there is 
a potential for the failure of one institution to have a spill-over (contagion) effect on 
other entities and the macro-economy.  Financial institutions can reduce contagion 
risk as a result of hedging and diversification strategies but they can’t totally eliminate 
it due to the interconnection of the system that they can’t control (De Nicolò et al 
(2012)).  Contagion can be relatively strong among systemically important financial 
institution (SIFIs) operating in the financial system.  Many national regulators and 
central banks have initiated research programmes to study the issue of 
interconnectedness especially among systemically important financial institution.  
Also, as seen with the rapid spread of the 2007-2008 financial crisis to international 
markets, there is a need to understand the interconnectedness of global financial 
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market, the linkages between international financial flows to/from an economy’s 
financial system to the rest of the world.  
 
2.3.2. Macroprudential policy instruments 
 
As noted above, in the research literature (such as Lim et al (2011), Bennani et al 
(2014), Cerutti et al (2015a, 2017) and Carreras et al (2018)), a large number of 
macroprudential tools have been proposed to address financial system instability or 
prevent the build-up of imbalances in the financial system.  In general, these 
instruments seek to address three types of probable imbalances – capital, assets and 
liquidity, many of which we shall test in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 empirical sections.  Also, 
we discuss further the utilization of these instruments by a number of countries in 
Appendix 2A.2 (prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis). 
 
Firstly, the aim of capital-related instruments is to encourage financial institutions to 
build up a capital buffer above the minimum requirement which can be drawn down 
during period of stress.  Capital related instruments are for example, 
countercyclical/time-varying capital requirements, time-varying/ dynamic provisioning 
and the leverage ratio. 
 
Secondly, there are assets-related instruments which in most cases aim to contain 
excessive credit growth in the financial sector and can target specific type of loans, a 
particular group of borrowers, a specific region or loans dominated in foreign 
currencies, etc.  There is also focus on growth of financial institutions’ assets other 
than loans.  Credit related instruments are for example, loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, debt-
to-income (DTI) ratio and concentration limits. 
   
Thirdly, liquidity-related instruments’ objective is to discourage financial institutions 
excess reliance on short-term funding, and these instruments are designed to ensure 
that financial institutions have the necessary liquidity buffer to deal with any short-term 
liquidity disruptions.  Liquidity-related instruments are for example, reserve 




Table 2.2 below shows the definition of the principal macroprudential instruments.  
Following the above, the table shows the instruments that address three types of 
probable imbalances – capital, assets and liquidity.  We cover all these types of 
instruments in our research in this thesis but find asset-type instruments are 
particularly effective.  As noted by Darbar and Wu (2015), each country will have to 
choose the ones that is most appropriate for their financial system. 
 
Table 2.2: Description of macroprudential instruments 
 




DP Requires banks to hold 
more loan-loss provisions 
during upturns. 
General Countercyclical Capital  
Buffer/Requirement  
CTC Requires banks to hold 
more capital during 
upturns. 
Sectoral capital requirements 
 
SCR Additional capital 
requirements on 
exposures to specific 
sectors that pose a risk to 
the system as a whole. 
Sectoral risk weights SRW Additional risk weights on 
exposures to specific 
sectors that pose a risk to 
the system as a whole. 
Capital Surcharges on SIFIs SIFI Requires Systemically 
Important Financial 
Institutions to hold a higher 
capital level than other 
financial institutions. 
Leverage Ratio LEV Limits banks from 
exceeding a fixed 
minimum leverage ratio. 
Systemic risk buffer SYRB Requires banks to hold 
additional capital that can 
be used to prevent and 
mitigate long term non-
cyclical macroprudential or 
systemic risks not covered 
by the capital 
requirements regulation. 
Assets 
Loan-to-Value Ratio LTV Constrains highly levered 
mortgage down payments 
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by enforcing or 
encouraging a limit or by 
determining regulatory risk 
weights. 
Debt-to-Income Ratio DTI Constrains household 
indebtedness by enforcing 
or encouraging a limit. 
Limits on Interbank Exposures INTER Limits the fraction of 
liabilities held by the 
banking sector or by 
individual banks. 
Concentration Limits CONC Limits the fraction of 
assets held by a limited 
number of borrowers. 
Levy/Tax on Financial Institutions TAX Tax on revenues of 
financial institutions. 
Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps LTVCAP Restricts to LTV used as a 
strictly enforced cap on 
new loans, as opposed to 
a supervisory guideline or 
merely a determinant of 
risk weights. 
Liquidity 
Limits on Foreign Currency Loans FC Reduces vulnerability to 
foreign-currency risks. 
Reserve Requirement Ratios RR Limits credit growth; can 
also be targeted to limit 
foreign-currency credit 
growth. 
Limits on Domestic Currency Loans CG Limits credit growth 
directly. 
FX and/or Countercyclical Reserve 
Requirements 
RRREV Restricts to RR which i) 
imposes a wedge on 
foreign currency deposits 
or ii) is adjusted 
countercyclically  
Systemic liquidity surcharge 
 
SYLS Requires banks to hold 
additional market-liquid 
assets to cover systemic 
liquidity difficulties that can 
arise in the financial 
system. 
Liquidity coverage ratio 
 
LCR Requires banks to hold 
enough market-liquid 
assets to cover their 
assumed net cash 




Net stable funding ratio (NSFR) 
 
NSFR Requires banks to finance 
long-term less liquid 
assets with long-term 
stable liabilities on a 
constant basis. 
Source: Lim et al (2011), Bennani et al (2014), Cerutti et al (2015a), Carreras et al (2018). 
 
2.3.3. Taxonomy of macroprudential policy 
 
As suggested above, Crockett (2000) and Borio (2003) indicated that a 
macroprudential approach to regulation has two dimensions, a time dimension, also 
known as the pro-cyclicality of the financial system, which focus on risks resulting from 
the fluctuation in the business cycle, and a cross-sectional dimension, where the 
emphasis is on the interconnections between financial institutions with a particular 
focus on systemically important financial institutions.  Table 2.3 below shows a 
taxonomy of the macroprudential instruments in the time and cross-sectional 
dimensions. 
 
Table 2.3: Summary analysis of the macroprudential instruments in the time 








Capital • Time-Varying/Dynamic Loan-
Loss Provisioning 
• General Countercyclical 
Capital Buffer/Requirement 
• Sectoral capital requirements 
• Sectoral risk weights 
• Capital Surcharges on 
SIFIs 
• Leverage Ratio 
• Systemic risk buffer 
Assets (credits) • Loan-to-Value Ratio 
• Debt-to-Income Ratio 
• Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps 
• Limits on Interbank 
Exposures 
• Concentration Limits 
• Levy/Tax on Financial 
Institutions 
Liquidity • Limits on Foreign Currency 
Loans 
• Limits on Domestic Currency 
Loans 
• FX and/or Countercyclical 
Reserve Requirements 
 
• Reserve Requirement 
Ratios 
• Systemic liquidity 
surcharge 
• Liquidity coverage ratio 
(LCR) 
• Net stable funding ratio 
(NSFR) 
Source: Adapted from Bennani et al (2014), Carreras et al (2018). 
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Table 2.3 above shows that there are instruments that target the time (procyclicality) 
and cross-sectional dimensions.  These instruments can target capital, assets (credits) 
and liquidity as shown in the table.   
 
A second taxonomy considers phases of the cycle.  Claessens et al (2013) suggested 
that some instruments are aimed at dampening risks arising from the expansionary 
phase of the business cycle and others look at risks arising from the 
interconnectedness of financial institution, that is, contagion between systemic 
institutions.  Table 2.4 shows the macroprudential instruments toolkit outlining the 
instruments use at different phase of the business cycle, that is the expansionary and 
contractionary phases (time dimension) and the interconnectedness of financial 
institutions (cross-sectional dimension). 
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 Enhancing resilience 
 Dampening the cycle 
 Dispelling gestation of the cycle 
Source: Claessens et al (2013). DTI – Debt to Income, LTI – Loan to Income, RR – Reserve 
Requirements, CCR is countercyclical capital requirement, CS – Capital Surcharges, LEV - Leverage, 
NSFR – Net Stable Funding Ratio, LCR – Liquidity Core Ratio.  
 
Table 2.5: Externalities and macroprudential policies 
 














X  X  
Fire sale X X  X 
Interconnectedness X  X X 
Source: De Nicolò et al (2012) 
 
A third taxonomy looks at market failures and the use of macroprudential policy to 
correct externalities that lead to systemic risk.  Table 2.5 above show the externalities 
map with the macroprudential instruments.  The instruments in the table may affect 
more than one externality especially capital requirements.  De Nicolò et al (2012) 
classified three type of externalities that can lead to systemic risk, these are 
externalities related to strategic complementarities, fire sales and interconnectedness.  
They noted that strategic complementarities arise from the strategic interaction of 
banks (and other financial institutions) and cause the build-up of vulnerabilities during 
the expansionary phase of a financial cycle.  Fire sales arise from a generalized sell-
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off of financial assets causing a decline in asset prices and a deterioration of the 
balance sheets of intermediaries, especially during the contractionary phase of a 
financial cycle.  Interconnectedness caused by the propagation of shocks from 
systemic institutions or through financial networks. 
 
2.3.4. Rationale for macroprudential policy as a policy tool 
 
I. Financial stability 
 
A main area of focus for macroprudential policy is that it should contribute to financial 
system stability or, as some researchers would see it, provide a tool to identify and 
prevent periods of financial instability (systemic risks).  The 2007-2008 global financial 
crisis showed clearly that there is a need for macroprudential policy.  However, it is 
critical to note that macroprudential policy is not the only desirable policy for financial 
system stability, rather it works in coordination with other policy instruments such as 
microprudential, monetary and macroeconomic policies to maintain financial system 
stability and even competition policy (Crockett (2000), Borio et al, (2007), and BoE 
(2009), etc.).  
  
As discussed above, many researchers have attempted to define financial stability, 
yet there is no single and widely acceptable definition of financial stability.  Additionally, 
some researchers prefer to define financial instability or systemic risk (such as Davis 
(1995, 2001), Chant (2003), and Allen and Wood (2006)).  Gadanecz and Jayaram 
(2008) indicated that financial stability is difficult to define and measure given the 
interdependence and the complex interactions of different elements of the financial 
system among themselves and with the real economy.  It is even more difficult to 
measure when one includes the international market interaction with the domestic 
economy.  Largely, any attempt to define financial stability or instability requires taking 
a broad view of the financial system and the role its play in the performance of the 





II. Complement to other policies 
 
There are considerable debates on the interaction of macroprudential policy with a 
range of other policies such as monetary policy, fiscal and structural policy, 
microprudential policy, competition policy and even crisis management and resolution 
policy if financial crisis occurs.   
 
a) Monetary policy 
 
Constâncio (2015)25 argued that macroprudential policy is essential in any economy 
as the business and financial cycles are not synchronised while monetary policy 
simultaneously affects all sectors of the economy and can therefore be an ineffective 
tool to cope with specific imbalances in the financial sector.   Independently addressing 
financial stability concerns, macroprudential policy provides monetary policy with 
additional room for manoeuvre to better focus on ensuring price stability. 
 
N’Diaye (2009)  saw that countercyclical prudential policy can help reduce output 
fluctuations and lessen the risk of financial instability, which can allow monetary 
authorities to achieve the same output and inflation objectives but with smaller 
adjustments in interest rates.  In some instance, there could be a supporting role of 
macroprudential policy to monetary policy. He used a standard multi-country 
macroeconomic model for monetary policy analysis for the period.  The macro side, 
model includes an IS curve, a Phillips curve, an Okun’s law relationship, a monetary 
rule, a yield curve, a modified uncovered interest parity, a labour income relationship, 
and several identities.  On the financial side, the model includes the 6 macro side 
model, tailored to three sectors: corporate, households, and banks. The model is set 
up to accommodate up to 4 economies. 
 
Further, Beau et al (2012), using a DSGE model incorporating financial frictions, 
heterogeneous agents and housing, analysed the interactions between monetary and 
macroprudential policies and the circumstances under which such interactions call for 
 
25  Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Financial stability risks, 
monetary policy and the need for macro-prudential policy, Warwick Economics Summit, February 2015. 
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their coordinated implementation.  They saw that conflicts between both policies were 
rather limited, on average, over the business cycle during the period under review 
1985 to 2010. These conflicts depend on the nature of the shocks impacting the 
economy. 
   
However, Agur and Demertzis (2015), using a bank-based model (profitability and 
leverage), looked at the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies.  
They noted that bank-based models highlight the various types of channels through 
which monetary policy affects the financial sector such as through the incentives of 
banks to monitor, the screening of borrowers by banks, the skewness of bank returns, 
the impact on information asymmetries, the incentives of bank loan officers or asset 
managers whose incentives deviate from profit maximization, the impact on nominal 
contracts between banks and creditors that cannot be made state-contingent, and 
moral hazard when policy rates are used as a bailout mechanism.  They saw that with 
the presence of macroprudential policy, there is at times a partial offsetting of 
monetary policy (expansionary interest rate policy) and at the same time, monetary 
policy can affect financial stability (e.g. Latin debt crisis and loose monetary policy in 
the 2000s cited above).  
 
Researchers have presented arguments showing where both policies can co-exist as 
well as work in conflict to each other.  In these conflicting cases, policy makers may 
have to determine which policy is more effective in achieving the financial and 
economic objective of policy makers at the time.  Yet, there is a strong appetite by 
policy makers for the development and incorporation of macroprudential policy in the 
regulatory framework.  Additionally, there may be cases where both monetary and 
macroprudential policies may have to be suppressed to allow fiscal policy to be more 
effective in a declining economy.  Fiscal policy may be the most effective policy in an 
economic downturn, which would bring us to the debate of having both policies 
accommodating fiscal policy, yet political consideration of the government should not 
undermine financial stability for political gains as the cost of financial sector failure can 
be very high.  We will develop the concept of macroprudential policy and its 





b) Fiscal and structural policies 
 
The build-up of financial imbalances and systemic risk can be a result of 
macroeconomic imbalances and shocks.  Inappropriate fiscal and structural policies 
can create biases that contribute to systemic risks.  IMF (2013) noted that, firstly, 
corporate taxes can encourage the use of debt rather than equity financing, as interest 
paid is tax deductible. Thus, this could produce a debt crisis. For example, the 
European sovereign debt crisis which started in 2008, spread primarily to Greece, 
Iceland, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Spain in 2009.  Secondly, households can be 
more vulnerable to shocks, if taxes provide generous relief for mortgage interest, 
which can lead to excesses credit growth.  Taxes can also affect asset prices as a tax 
relief on asset returns can lead to excess asset price growth. 
 
Generally, macroprudential policy makers have no control over fiscal and structural 
polices but they can help analyse the underlying macroeconomic risks and imbalances 
and raise concerns where appropriate action can be taken, if there is case of economic 
overexpansion by inappropriate fiscal policy.  It is important to highlight once again 
that political consideration of the government, temptations for monetary policy to ease 
before elections, should not undermine financial stability for political gains as the cost 
of financial sector failure can be very high.  
 
c) Microprudential policy 
 
Micro- and macro- prudential policies should work very well together as both look at 
the supervision of the financial system from two difference aspects.  Microprudential 
policy looks at the welfare and soundness of the financial system from a “bottom-up” 
approach, that is looking at the health and stability of the individual institutions that 
operate in the system.  Macroprudential policy on the other hand adopts a “top-down” 
approach, where it looks at the overall welfare and soundness of the entire financial 
system.  In wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the BCBS has placed a strong 
emphasis of macroprudential perspective in supervision.  Supervisory agencies of 
financial institutions are tasked with not just ensuring the financial safety and 
soundness of individual institutions but to also contribute to the stability of the financial 
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system as a whole (see Section 2.4.2 below for a discussion on countries approach 
to financial stability analysis and operating framework).  
 
However, Osiński et al (2013) suggested that conflict may arise between micro- and 
macro- prudential policies.  This conflict can occur because of overlapping policy 
mandates and the way in which policies are applied.  They saw this as happening 
especially at different point of the credit cycle, where in “good times” microprudential 
supervisors may agree that there is a build-up of countercyclical buffer although non-
preforming loans are low and profits are high.  Yet, in “bad times”, conflicts may arise 
as macroprudential policy may call for a relaxation of regulatory requirements and the 
release of the buffer. But microprudential supervisors may seek to retain and tighten 
these requirements to protect the interest of depositors of individual banks and deposit 
insurance.  They suggested in order to ease the potential tensions, microprudential 
and macroprudential authorities should establish a credible joint communication 
strategy to bolster investor confidence during turbulent periods and certain institutional 
mechanisms such as a coordination committee if the two policy mandates are held by 
different regulatory entities. 
 
d) Competition policies 
 
Although competition in the financial sector can result in higher efficiency in the sector, 
and stability implications of concentration are ambiguous, this could also contribute to 
systemic risk (Davis and Karim (2018)).  This can lead to conflicts between competition 
agencies and macroprudential regulators especially when there is a concern about the 
build-up of systemic risk.  Therefore, competition policy for the financial sector should 
include a macroprudential perspective of the financial sector.  In addition, there should 
be information coordination and consultation between competition agencies and 
macroprudential regulators. 
 
e) Crisis management and resolution policy 
 
Crisis management and resolution policy can be seen as being complementary to 
macroprudential policy, and properly designed regimes can strengthen market 
discipline and reduce incentives to take excessive risks, thus mitigating the need for 
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macroprudential intervention.  If there is appropriate macroprudential policy that is 
effective in reducing the risk then activation of crisis management and resolution policy 
would not be necessary.  Crisis management and resolution policy requires close 
coordination among all financial sector authorities. 
 
III. Cost of financial crises 
 
The costs of financial distress can be substantial as such macroprudential policy has 
been seen as tool to help prevent costly financial crises.  Hoggarth et al (2002) 
suggested that measuring the costs of financial crises is not in any way straightforward 
and most of the time there is a focus only on the fiscal cost of the crisis resolution.  
Resolution costs may not always be a perfect measure of the general costs of a crisis 
to the economy but rather it is a transfer cost.  They noted that economic output losses 
during a financial crisis in developed countries are typically substantial and higher on 
average than those in emerging market economies.  In addition, in emerging market 
economies, banking crises appear to be costly only when accompanied by a currency 
crisis.  They measured cost by comparing actual output with its trend or potential.  
They assumed that output would have grown at some constant rate based on its past 
performance (i.e. to estimate the shortfall relative to past trend growth).  They 
estimated the output trend or potential using a short (3 years and long (10 years) 
window.  Hoggarth et al (2002) noted as well that it is not straightforward to define the 
beginning and end of a crisis in order to measure its cost which is important for the 
determine the overall cost of a crisis.     
 
Furthermore, to understand the costs, there needs to be a clear understanding of the 
macro-financial linkages, that is the interaction between the financial sector and the 
domestic economy (Claessens and Kose (2013)).  Costs should include an 
assessment for the damage incurred to different economic regions (Claessens et al 
(2012)).  The 2007-2008 global financial crisis have highlighted the costs that can 
occur to the world economy due to the interconnectedness of global financial markets.  
Several researchers have studied the transmission of shocks from one country banks' 
balance sheets to lending activity in various economic regions (Cetorelli and Goldberg 




Likewise, the speed and way crisis resolution plans are implemented by authorities 
can impact the overall cost of the financial crisis on the economy.  For example, in the 
US, during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP)26, which was designed to restore liquidity to the markets by using US$700 
billion to buy up mortgage backed securities was quickly passed, yet the plan did not 
address the solvency of several financial institutions, as they were still exposed to 
insolvency.  In the UK, the British government provided capital support and 
nationalised most of the banks in order for the financial system to remain solvent and 
reduce the level of uncertainty. 
 
The IMF estimated that the 2007-2008 global financial crisis resulted in an estimated 
2 per cent decline in world per capita GDP in 2009.27   Furthermore, Claessens and 
Kose (2013) noted that the most notable effect on the world economy was the rationing 
of credit from banks and other financial institutions as there was an adverse reaction 
to taking on additional risks.  Both advanced and emerging market economies 
experienced the phenomenon of “creditless recoveries”, recoveries that occur in the 
absence of credit growth.  Creditless recoveries are more common after banking crises 
and credit booms (Abiad et al (2013)).  In addition, real output in the world economy 
declined as there was a fall in consumption, investment, industrial production, 
employment, etc.  See Appendix 2A.1 for a list of selected major financial instability 
and economic shocks and policy responses (from 1970). 
 
2.3.5. Macroprudential policy: an operational framework 
 
The acceptance of macroprudential policy and its instruments as part of a country’s 
regulatory framework has been relatively swift in the years immediately after the 2007-
2008 financial crisis.  IMF-FSB-BIS (2016) noted that although emerging market 
economies had been using these instruments well before the global financial crisis, 
their broader use is more recent especially in advanced countries.  It is suggested that 
 
26 TARP is the Troubled Asset Relief Program, created to implement programs to stabilize the financial 
system during the financial crisis of 2008.  It was authorized by Congress through the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) and is overseen by the Office of Financial Stability at the 
United States Department of the Treasury.  See United States Department of the Treasury website, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/Pages/default.aspx.  
27 IMF, World Economic Outlook, Rebalancing Growth, April 2010. 
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82 countries used macroprudential instruments prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  
Most of the countries using these instruments were emerging and developing 
countries, that is 65 such countries, while 17 advanced countries had used 
macroprudential instruments (Lim et al (2010), Cerutti et al (2015a)).  See Appendix 
2A.2 discussing the use of macroprudential policy instruments prior to the financial 
crisis. 
 
In addition, the establishment of dedicated macroprudential policy frameworks has 
often been prompted by the crisis experience and the wide range of institutional 
arrangements and policies being adopted across countries suggests that there is no 
“one-size-fits-all” approach.  The IMF-FSB-BIS and the ESRB, for its member 
countries, have published guidelines on elements of an effective macroprudential 
policy and the purpose of this section is to review and highlight of the key objectives 
and features of an effective framework, the requirements for operating a framework 
and the choice of instruments. 
 
I. Key features of a macroprudential policy framework 
 
In the development of macroprudential policy as a regulatory framework for the 
financial sector, the IMF-FSB-BIS and ESRB macroprudential policy guidelines have 
suggested that some of the key aspects of a macroprudential policy framework are the 
following. 
 
a) Clear objectives and goal 
 
There should be clear objectives and goals of macroprudential policy as such 
authorities need to develop the capacity to analyse risks (systemic), measures 
financial instability, identify the build-up of risks in the business cycle (time dimension) 
and through the interconnectedness within the financial sector.  IMF-FSB-BIS (2016) 
noted that setting out clear objectives can enable policymakers to use their policy tools in 
the pursuit of financial stability and forms the basis for a framework to hold the designated 





b) Mandate and institutional arrangements 
 
A strong institutional arrangement is important for macroprudential policy to operate 
effectively.  There should be a responsible authority or committee that has the 
mandate to carry out the objectives of macroprudential policy. Yet, institutional 
arrangements need to suit country-specific circumstances and institutional backgrounds. 
The ESRB (2014a) noted that macroprudential policy requires complete independence 
from political pressures and an independent agency, such as the central bank or a 
financial authority, may therefore be appropriate for macroprudential policy rather than the 
ministry of finance.  However, there is still a role for the government in the institutional 
arrangements of macroprudential policy as they have the legislative authority in passing 
laws and finance bailouts.  Adequate arrangements for democratic accountability are 
always important. 
 
IMF-FSB-BIS (2016) noted the following macroprudential policymaking models 
existing in various countries. 
 
• Model 1: The macroprudential mandate is assigned to the central bank, with 
macroprudential decisions ultimately made by its Board (as in the Czech 
Republic). 
 
• Model 2: The macroprudential mandate is assigned to a dedicated committee 
within the central bank structure (as in the U.K.). 
 
• Model 3: The macroprudential mandate is assigned to a committee outside the 
central bank, with the central bank participating on the macroprudential 
committee (as in Mexico). 
 
Some models also include independent external experts as voting members in the 
decision-making structure (France, UK), or in the form of an advisory committee to the 
main body (European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)).  Also, the macroprudential policy 
authority should have the necessary legislative powers to carry out its functions 
effectively, which can only be granted by the government, who has the legislative 
authority in passing laws. 
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These macroprudential policymaking models tend to reflect the financial supervisory 
framework existing in many countries such as sectoral, integrated twin peaks and two 
agency supervisory models.  It is a situation where most countries integrated 
macroprudential policy as well as financial stability framework in the existing financial 
supervisory framework, thus minimising the need for legislative changes.   We develop 
the financial supervisory framework further in Chapter 5.  
 
c) Selection of a set of macroprudential instruments 
 
Authorities need to select and assemble a set of macroprudential instruments that can 
be used to address systemic risk and other risks in the system (see Table 2.2 above).  
The selection of instruments should reflect the underlying sources of risk in the 
financial system.  ESRB (2014a) noted the selection of instruments must account for 
possible cross-border spill over effects, both positive and negative, and unintended 
effects (e.g. “leakages”).  We will investigate this further in Chapter 4. 
 
d) Calibration of macroprudential instruments 
 
The authorities need to calibrate the instruments in a manner that takes account of 
their likely benefits and costs, and clearly communicate the basis for policy judgments 
to the public and the markets.  
 
The Bank of Slovenia (2015) identified the following core principles for the selection 
and calibration of instruments. 
  
• Effectiveness in reducing or eliminating market failures and their contribution 
to the ultimate and intermediate objectives of the macroprudential policy.  
 
• Efficiency. Capability of achieving ultimate and intermediate goals with 
minimum costs and minimum side-effects.  
 
• Proportionality. The burden on individual institutions should be in line with 
their contribution to systemic risk.  
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• Straightforwardness and simplicity in the definition of the instrument, its 
requirements and external communication in order to achieve better 
understanding of instruments, their functioning and objectives.  
 
• Avoiding regulatory arbitrage in both the definition and selection of the 
instrument.  
 
• Avoiding negative cross-border spill-overs. Negative cross-border spill-
overs will be considered in the process of the selection of the instrument and 
minimised.  
 
e) Monitoring and Closing Regulatory Gaps 
 
There should be a comprehensive framework for monitoring the risks in the system as 
it is important for operationalising macroprudential policy.   Authorities should also 
have the ability to closing any regulatory gaps especially in the shadow banking sector, 
where macroprudential instruments are effective on banks but not in the shadow 
banking sector and securities markets, etc.  We note that shadow banking is a term 
used to describe bank-like activities (mainly lending) that take place outside the 
traditional banking sector.  It is now commonly referred to internationally as non-bank 
financial intermediation or market-based finance. Shadow bank lending has a similar 
function to traditional bank lending.  However, it is not regulated in the same way as 
traditional bank lending.28 
  
IMF-FSB-BIS (2016) noted that to assess the build-up of risks over time (“time 
dimension”), authorities should examine a number of areas, including: (1) economy-
wide vulnerabilities from an excessive growth in total credit or asset prices; (2) sectoral 
vulnerabilities arising, for example, from growing credit to the household sector or from 
increasing exposures to the corporate sector; and (3) vulnerabilities from a build-up of 
maturity and foreign currency mismatches in the financial sector.  In term of 
vulnerabilities related to the cross-sectional or structural dimension, authorities should 
 





monitor risks from linkages within and across key classes of intermediaries and market 
infrastructures, as well as the impact of the failure of any of these institutions on the 
system as a whole. 
 
f) Evaluation and effectiveness 
 
There should be a system where macroprudential policy action can be evaluated, as 
this is key for the recalibration or if additional measures are needed.  Ex-post 
evaluation should seek to assess, (i) the extent to which measures have had the 
desired impact, the transmission mechanism; and (ii) effects on behaviour and the 
impacts on the risk that may have prompted the policy intervention. 
 
g) Closing Data and Information Gaps 
 
Data and information gaps can hinder the early detection of risks, increase uncertainty, 
impede the design and enforcement of macroprudential instruments and complicate 
the policing of the regulatory.  This can also impede the effectiveness of 
macroprudential instruments.  Authorities should close any gaps by improving on the 
collection and statistical and supervisory data. 
 
We now move on to Section 2.4. Financial stability theory where we explore the 
concept of financial stability and its meaning.  Macroprudential policy should contribute 
to financial system stability or provide a tool to identify and prevent periods of financial 
instability (systemic risks) as such we believe it is important to discuss the theory of 
financial stability in the thesis. 
 
2.4. Financial stability theory 
 
A main area of focus for macroprudential policy is that it should contribute to financial 
system stability or as some researchers would see it, provide a tool to identify and 
prevent periods of financial instability (systemic risks).  Generally, we believe financial 
stability concepts are based on defining financial stability from a domestic perspective 
(in some aspect a closed economy) and there is a limited emphasis on defining 
financial stability which include international markets.  National regulators tend to 
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define stability according to their needs and perspectives, in light of what they can 
mainly control and influence, that is the domestic financial system.  Yet, any 
international systemic risks are normally taken into consideration in identifying 
potential threats to domestic financial stability.  
 
In this context, the purpose of this section is to explore the concept of financial stability 
and its meaning.  It explores the theory behind financial stability, definitions, concepts 
and key principles of financial stability.  We provide a review of the agency and 
organisational structure that is responsible for reporting on financial stability 
(instability) in a country’s financial system.  Also, we explore the concept of financial 
stability and the role of international banking.  None of the definitions of financial 
stability focus on the role of international banks specifically, yet in the literature links 
have been made between currency crisis, balance of payments problems, and banking 
crisis (see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)).  
 
2.4.1. Theoretical review of the definition and key principles of financial stability 
 
In the literature, there are two discernible schools of thought, i) researchers who prefer 
to define financial stability, and ii) researchers who attempt to define financial instability 
or systemic risk.  Yet there is no single and widely acceptable definition of financial 
stability or instability.  Moreover, any attempt to define financial stability or instability 
requires largely taking a broad view of the financial system in light of the role it plays 
in the performance of the economy, the experience from the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
and the role of macroprudential policy. 
 
I. Definition of financial stability 
 
Crockett (1996, 1997) suggested that financial stability refers to the smooth functioning 
of the financial institutions and markets that make up the financial system.  He 
indicated that financial stability applies to, 1) key institutions and 2) markets that make 
up the financial system.  Firstly, he indicated that stability requires that key institutions 
in the financial system are stable, in that there is a high degree of confidence that they 
can continue to meet their contractual obligations without interruption or outside 
assistance.  Crockett (1997) indicated that stability in key financial institutions means 
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the absence of stress and possible failure that have the potential to cause measurable 
economic harm beyond a strictly limited group of customers and counterparties.  He 
implies occasional failures of smaller institutions and losses at larger institutions are 
part of the normal functioning of the financial system and it should return to stability 
without outside assistance.  However, Crockett (1997) failed to provide clarity on the 
definition or how to identify key institutions, ‘too big to fail’, that are important for 
financial stability.  As well as the important of market infrastructure in the 
understanding of financial stability, yet his definition of financial stability accounts for 
interconnectedness of financial institutions and markets.  The Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) has since identified a set of global systemically important financial institutions 
(G-SIFI) while country policy makers have determined additional domestic-SIFIs 
operating in their financial systems.   
 
Secondly, key markets are stable in that participants can confidently transact in them 
at prices that reflect fundamental forces and that do vary substantially over short 
periods when there have been no changes in fundamentals.  Crockett (1997) indicated 
that markets are stable when prices moves to reflect changes in fundamentals and 
there is the absence of large price movements that can cause economic damage.  
Large price movements in financial markets that are greater than what can be account 
for by fundamentals could be interpreted as possible financial instability or a crisis in 
the financial system.  Price level stability is significant for financial stability, but it is 
also important for systemic risk.  Yet, the focus of financial stability is on the domestic 
financial market and there is little mention of stability in international market.  
 
Laker (1999) indicated that financial system stability should be defined in broad terms.  
He defined it as the avoidance of the disruptions to the financial system that are likely 
to cause significant costs to real output.   In addition, he saw that disruptions might be 
caused by difficulties facing financial institutions or the disturbances in financial 
markets.  Laker (1999) acknowledged that focusing on financial institutions failure in 
order to determine whether there is stability in the financial system is likely to be 
insufficient as in some circumstance, a failure of one or a few institutions might be part 
of normal market mechanism.  It is a question of whether the failure is systemic or not. 
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Accordingly, Padoa-Schioppa (2002) defined financial stability as a condition where 
the financial system is able to withstand shocks without giving way to cumulative 
processes which impairs the allocation of savings to investment opportunities and the 
processing of payments in the economy.  He saw that the concept of financial stability 
should refers to the preservation of the core economic functions of the financial 
system.  The emphasis in the definition is on the ability of the financial system to 
absorb shocks or the resilience of it, so as to continue to carry out its core functions of 
resource allocation and the provision of an efficient payment system.    
 
Foot (2003) suggested that monetary stability, the stability in the value of money, is an 
essential part of financial stability.  He defined financial stability where there is, i) 
monetary stability, ii) employment levels close to the economy’s natural rate, iii) 
confidence in the operation of key financial institutions and markets in the economy, 
and iv) where there is no relative price movements if either real or financial assets 
within the economy that will undermine monetary stability and employment levels.  
Similar to Crockett (1999), he provided no clarity on the definition or identification of 
key financial institutions as in some cases authorities prefer discretion.  Nevertheless, 
Foot (2003) provided a close linkage between the real economy, monetary stability 
and confidence of financial institutions and markets operations.  Large (2003) 
suggested that financial stability is about maintaining confidence in the financial 
system. 
  
Schinasi (2004), also taking a broad view of the financial system, defined financial 
stability as a financial system is in a range of stability whenever it is capable of 
facilitating (rather than impeding) the performance of an economy, and of dissipating 
financial imbalances that arise endogenously or as a result of significant adverse and 
unanticipated events.  He implies broadly that financial stability should be defined in 
terms of ability to facilitate and enhance economic performance with the efficient 
allocation of resources, manage risks, and absorb shocks, that is, maintain its ability 
to function efficiently in a period of disruption as self-corrective measures are made.  
Also, financial stability is considered a continuum rather than a static state, changeable 
over time and operating in a range as the economy grow.  This suggests that financial 




Allen (2014) combined the two approaches of defining financial stability and instability 
- where financial stability is not merely the absence of crisis but also the ability to 
absorb (rather than amplify) shocks.  Allen (2014) defined financial stability as a state 
of affairs wherein, i) financial institutions and markets are able to facilitate capital 
intermediation, risk management, and payment services in a way that enables 
sustainable economic growth;  ii) there is no disruption to the ability of financial 
institutions or markets to operate that might cause harm to customers, counterparties 
or participants in the financial markets; and iii) financial institutions and market are 
able to withstand economic shocks or a chain of significant loses so that there is no 
disruptions to their functions.  The definition looks at the role and state of financial 
institutions and markets during periods of stability and the value added to broader 
economic prosperity.  There is a focus on the functions and operation of institutions in 
the financial system and not necessary on the institution itself. 
 
a) Definition of financial instability 
 
As suggested above, there is a school of thought that define financial instability or 
systemic risk.  The following are some definitions of financial instability or systemic 
risk from a few researchers.  
    
• Davis (2001) defined financial instability or systemic risk as a major collapse of 
the financial system, entailing inability to provide payments services or allocate 
credit to productive investment opportunities. 
 
• Chant (2003) argues that that financial instability refers to conditions in financial 
markets that harm, or threaten to harm, an economy’s performance through 
their impact on the working of the financial system.  
 
• Ferguson (2003) proposed that financial instability can be characterized by 
three basic criteria, i) some important set of financial asset prices seem to have 
diverged sharply from fundamentals; ii) market functioning and credit 
availability, domestically and perhaps internationally, have been significantly 
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distorted; iii) aggregate spending has deviates (or is likely to deviate 
significantly, either above or below, from the economy’s ability to produce. 
 
• Haldane et al (2004) suggested that financial instability could be defined as any 
deviation from the optimal saving-investment plan of an economy deriving from 
imperfections in the financial sector. 
 
• Allen and Wood (2006) defined financial instability as episodes in which a large 
number of parties, whether there are households, companies, or (individual) 
governments, experience financial crises which are not warranted by their 
previous behaviour, and where these crises collectively have seriously adverse 
macro-economic effects.  
 
• IMF-BIS-FSB (2009) defined systemic risk as a risk of disruption to financial 
services that is, i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system 
and ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real 
economy. 
 
• ECB (2009) described systemic risk as the risk that the provision of necessary 
financial products and services by the financial system will be impaired to a 
point where economic growth and welfare may be materially affected. 
 
II. Key principles of financial stability 
 
Although, there is no single or widely acceptable definition of financial stability 
(instability), there is some common ground on the key principles concerning it (Davis 
(2001), Schinasi (2004), Allen and Wood (2006), etc.).  Firstly, Laker (1999) and 
Schinasi (2004) noted that financial stability should be seen from a broad point of view, 
as it includes different aspects of the financial system infrastructure, encompassing 
the different aspects of the financial system infrastructure such as the payment 
system, institutions and markets.  Yet there is some disagreement on the meaning of 
the word “broad”.  Allen and Wood (2006) have argued that some commentators have 
suggested that financial stability (instability) is related to institutions in the financial 
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system.  However, they see this view as being too narrow and it should include non-
financial institutions since episodes of non-financial institution instability could have a 
bearing on economic performance and function of the economy and stability of the 
financial system. 
 
The second principle relates to the efficient allocation of resources.  Researchers such 
as Davis (2001) and Padoa-Schioppa (2002) suggested that a role of financial stability 
is that it allows the financial system to efficiently allocate saving into productive 
investment opportunities as well as has a central role in the payment system 
infrastructure.  Schinasi (2004) also implied that financial stability allows the financial 
system to adequately transforms and manage risks allowing for wealth accumulation 
and growth.   
 
Thirdly, Fell and Schinasi (2005) saw that the concept of financial stability not only 
relates to the absence of financial crisis but recognises that instability often arise from 
unseen shocks, yet the financial system should be resilient to effectively deal with the 
threat before it develops into system-wide risks.  Padoa-Schioppa (2002) and Allen 
(2014) noted that the financial system should be resilient and should be able to 
continue its core functions of resource allocation and the provision of an efficient 
payment system when there is an economic shock.  Crockett (1997) noted that the 
financial system should be able to withstand the occasional failure and losses of 
financial institutions and return to stability without outside assistance. 
 
Fourthly, Schinasi (2004) noted that the importance of financial stability in the context 
of the potential impact it may have on the performance of the economy and the 
financial intermediation process.  Similarly, researchers such as Chant (2003), Allen 
(2014), etc. and IMF-BIS-FSB (2009) highlighted the importance of financial stability 
in the performance of the real economy and the cost of financial crises.  The question 
becomes, what is the cost to the economy in the absence of financial stability, if there 
is a disruption to the efficient allocation of financial resources?  The cost and impact 
of financial instability can be sizable and as indicated by the IMF, it is estimated that 
the 2007-2008 global financial crisis resulted in a 2 per cent decline in world per capita 




Lastly, Schinasi (2004) noted that financial stability is considered a continuum rather 
than a static state, changeable over time. This reflects the different possible 
combinations of measurable variables that can be used to model financial stability and 
how well the economy is performing.  Allen and Wood (2006) said that financial stability 
should be measurable and observable so that those who are responsible for financial 
stability can know whether they are succeeding or failing.  In addition, financial stability 
should not be strictly measured so as it is difficult to identify any changes as evidence 
of instability.  There needs to be some flexibility in observation of financial stability in 
order to adapt to the changing financial structure and the grow of the economy.   
 
Yet again, there is little emphasis on the role of international banking and cross-border 
activities in the understanding the key principles of financial stability as the focus is on 
the domestic financial system.  Chinazzi et al (2013) noted that it is critical to 
understand financial-market interconnectedness to explain systemic risk, stability and 
economic dynamics.  The 2007-2008 financial crisis revealed that the 
interconnectedness of international markets was poorly understood as such there was 
an appearance that domestic financial markets were stable, yet the downside risks 
from external markets were misrepresented.  We discussed this further in Chapter 4. 
 
2.4.2. Countries’ approach to financial stability analysis and operating 
framework 
 
As discussed above, Section 2.2.1, by the early 2000s, there was a growing focus on 
financial stability by central banks and regulators as the frequency of financial crises 
increased and after the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, there was a renewed 
policymakers’ interest in improving the policy framework for financial stability.  This 
renewed effort was driven by the new role given too many central banks in 
macroprudential policy and the coordination of responsibilities between the various 




BIS (2011), which is based on a Study Group29, noted that similar to macroprudential 
policy framework (discussed above), it is also not a case where “one size fits all” for 
the design and implementation of a financial stability framework.  Although, the Study 
Group was based on a very small pool of central banks (13), the report suggested that 
prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, central banks that were heavily involved in 
banking supervision were seen to be better suited to address broader financial stability 
issues (see Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) as well).  They advised that central 
banks must be involved in the formulation and execution of financial stability policy if 
such policy is to be effective as their responsibilities in the framework need to be 
compatible with central banks’ monetary policy responsibilities.   
 
The Study group noted that since the 2007-2008 financial crisis, new financial stability 
governance and arrangements have been passed into law in some countries such as 
the United States with the Dodd-Frank and Consumer Protection Acts of 2010, the 
European Union created the European Supervisor Authorities (ESAs) and the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and in the United Kingdom, the Bank of 
England was given banking supervision authority and the Financial Conduct Authority 
was created.   
 
In Canada, the Department of Finance is responsible for financial stability and 
supported by federal agencies such as Bank of Canada, the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions and Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation.  
In some emerging markets such as Argentina and Brazil, the role of the central bank 
was strengthened to include financial stability, in Mexico, the financial stability council 
was created to coordinate the roles of the Bank of Mexico, the Ministry of Finance and 
the other country’s other principal regulatory agencies, and in the Philippines, central 
bank laws were amended to formalise and extend the financial stability functions of 
the central bank.   
 
Although, countries have adopted different financial stability institutional arrangements 
and framework, which are based on their macroprudential policy framework, the Study 
 
29 A report by a Study Group chaired by Stefan Ingves, Governor, Sveriges Ribsbank, Central Bank 
governance and financial stability. May 2011.  Thirteen (13) central banks participated in the study 
group, which looked that their roles and functions pre- and post- financial crisis of 2007/2008. 
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Group suggested that there are several issues to be considered in designing the 
governance of new financial stability responsibilities.  Even though the Study Group 
focused on central banks, these issues can be applied to all agencies involve in a 
country’s financial stability framework.   
 
Firstly, the role and responsibilities should be explicitly stated for all agencies and it is 
seen by the public to have such a responsibility.  Secondly, all agencies should have 
access to the available data and information, has the authority to collect the necessary 
data and information, the analytical capacity to process and perform the mandate in 
the framework, as well as the suitable tools to foster financial stability.  Thirdly, there 
must be a collective effort to maintain synergies and avoid conflict in the assignment 
of functions between agencies in the financial stability framework and at the same time 
deal with any possible trade off or fall out of any conflict with monetary policy.  This 
include any possible financial and political risks arising from emergency actions 
undertaken.  Fourthly, agencies must be taken the authority for decision making as 
part of their crisis management process.  Finally, there should be a level of autonomy 
and accountability for the agencies in the financial stability framework.   
 
IMF-FSB-BIS (2014, 2016) and ESRB (2014a) have suggested that setting out clear 
objectives can enable policymakers to use their policy tools including macroprudential 
tools, in the pursuit of financial stability, and forms the basis for a framework to hold 
the designated authority accountable for achieving its objective, thereby reducing the 
risk of inaction.  Similarly, to macroprudential policy, countries approach to financial 
stability framework is influence by the financial supervisory framework that exist in the 
country such as sectoral, integrated twin peaks and two agency supervisory models. 
Once again, it is a situation where most countries integrated macroprudential policy 
as well as financial stability framework in the existing financial supervisory framework, 
thus minimising the need for legislative changes.   We develop the financial 
supervisory framework further in Chapter 5. 
 
Accordingly, Fell and Schinasi (2005) suggested that an effective financial stability 
framework requires three important standards.  Firstly, there must be rigorous 
definitions and understanding of key concepts such as what is meant by the terms 
financial system, financial stability and instability, and systemic risks, etc.  Secondly, 
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the framework’s concepts and definitions must be measurable or assessment can be 
completed to determine the degree of financial stability or instability.  González-
Páramo (2007) noted the main objective of assessment is the early identification of 
risks and vulnerabilities that could threaten the financial system (see also Borio and 
Lowe (2002)).  Also, Laker (1999) indicated that the many episodes of financial crises 
suggest that there is a wealth of indicators that can be used to identify possible 
financial fragility.  Thirdly, the definitions, concepts and organising principles as well 
as the assessment tools of financial fragility must serve the purpose of ensuring 
consistency in the identification of sources of risks and vulnerabilities and in addition 
the design and implementation of polices aimed at revolving any potential financial 
fragility. 
 
We now move on to Section 2.5. Literature Overview of macroprudential policy, 
where we discuss the theoretical and empirical literature of macroprudential policy.  
Overall, various aspect of the macroprudential policy literature will be discuss 
throughout the thesis in Chapter 3, 4 and 5. 
 
2.5. Literature overview of macroprudential policy  
 
In this section of the chapter, we review the theoretical literature of macroprudential 
policy with a brief discussion on the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policy.  As well, we outline the critical issues and shortcomings that 
need to be addressed as macroprudential policy continues to develop.   
 
2.5.1. Discussion of macroprudential policy 
 
As with any financial crisis, the 2007-2008 financial crisis did not happen overnight, 
but as a precursor, imbalances built up over a period of time.  Barrell and Davis (2008) 
saw that in the period leading up to the financial crisis, at least for more than five years, 
the world economy experienced an environment of low interest rates and a build-up of 
large investment surpluses especially in China and thus international liquidity which 
resulted in a rapid credit expansion and a growing risk appetite.  In some aspect, we 
will argue that some of these imbalances and elevated risks did not go unnoticed as 
the regulatory frameworks were adjusted by regulators and policy makers to reflect 
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the changing risk environment.  Yet, the focus of regulators and policymakers 
remained on microprudential policy (e.g. Basel Accords) as they considered that the 
stability of the financial system will continue to be depend on the health of individual 
financial institution.  It should be notably mentioned that the concept of financial 
stability and macroprudential surveillance were slowing taking roots because of the 
Asian financial crisis (1997-1998) (see Davis (1999)). 
 
We note that the 2007-2008 financial crisis did not only introduce macroprudential 
policy as financial sector regulatory policy, but other changes were made to 
microprudential policy as well.  Basel III, which introduced the countercyclical capital 
buffers for the banking industry, provide a comprehensive set of reform measures, 
which aims to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the 
banking sector.  These measures aim to: 
• improve the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and 
economic stress, whatever the source. 
• improve risk management and governance. 
• strengthen banks' transparency and disclosures. 
 
The reforms target: 
• bank-level, or microprudential, regulation, which will help raise the resilience of 
individual banking institutions to periods of stress. 
• macroprudential, system wide risks that can build up across the banking sector 
as well as the procyclical amplification of these risks over time. 
 
Accordingly, one can then ask the question, why was macroprudential policy 
overlooked especially since macroprudential surveillance was well developed?  
Additionally, why did the 2007-2008 financial crisis change the fortunes of 
macroprudential policy?  Firstly, to answer these questions, one must look at 
background of the concept of the term macroprudential.  Although the term 
macroprudential (policy) perspectives to regulation was discussed in many 
committees and forums since 1979 (see above, Section 2.2.1), there was no clarity 
on what is meant by a “macroprudential” perspective in the supervision and regulation 
of the financial system.  Only in the last 15 years, researchers (such as Crockett (2000) 
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and Borio (2003)) have provided a clearer idea of what is meant by macroprudential 
perspective in financial system supervision and regulation.  Further, there were no 
recommended policy tools to use in period of financial crises. 
 
Also, over the years prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis, there was no clear 
agreement on what the objectives of macroprudential policy should be, and even 
today, there are still many debates by researchers and policy makers on this issue.  
However, several international agencies (such as IMF-FSB-BIS (2014, 2016), ESRB 
(2014a)), who have been encouraging countries to develop a macroprudential policy 
framework as part of their financial system reforms, have identified key objectives and 
scope of macroprudential policy.  And these key objectives and scope can be used by 
countries as the starting point for the development of their macroprudential policy 
framework.  Additionally, these international agencies have taken the lead in proposing 
key features of a macroprudential policy framework countries can adapt to their 
economic and financial situation.  We noted that there is no pressure from these 
international agencies for countries to adopt the same framework, it is not a one size 
fits all, but countries need to use the framework that is appropriate to their situation.   
 
Secondly, we saw that macroprudential policy is hindered by definition challenges and 
measurement.  Much of the literature and concepts of macroprudential policy are still 
being developed and research in the area is slowly emerging as quality data become 
available (Galati and Moessner (2013)).  Lim et al (2011) and Cerutti et al (2015a) 
have highlighted two IMF’s surveys which provide information on the use of 
macroprudential instruments by member countries.  The information from these 
surveys have been very useful to researchers, as well as the research in this thesis, 
to assess the objectives of macroprudential policy.  However, to further develop 
macroprudential policy research literature, the information from these surveys needs 
to be updated as the information from these surveys are up to 2014.  
 
Further, one of the key objectives of macroprudential policy is that it should contribute 
to financial system stability or a tool to identify and prevent periods of financial 
instability (systemic risks).  But, similarly to macroprudential policy, there is no clarity 
in the definition of financial stability and measurement (see above, Section 2.4).  As 
a result of there being no clear definition of financial stability and measurement, 
59 
 
assessing whether macroprudential policy is achieving its financial stability aim is a 
challenge. 
 
Thirdly, as noted by Davis and Karim (2009), even if the pending 2007-2008 financial 
instability was identified, macroprudential surveillance (policy) came with no 
recommended policy tools to deal with the build-up of financial sector imbalances or a 
financial crisis.  Čihák (2006), Čihák et al (2012) suggested that many countries had 
a macroprudential surveillance programme which should have given warning (early 
warning indicators (EWI)) of an impending financial instability.  As we noted above, 
the BIS analysed and monitored early warning indicators of domestic banking distress. 
These indicators capture financial overheating and signal potential banking distress 
over medium-term horizons, e.g. credit-to-GDP gap, which is recommended by the 
BIS.  The credit-to-GDP gap is widely seen as a key indicator of financial imbalances 
and predictor of financial crises (Borio (2003), Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014)).  As 
such, it is recommended as an early warning indicator to trigger the Basel III 
countercyclical buffer.  We discuss the credit-to-GDP gap further in Chapter 3.  
 
Currently, several tools (see Section 2.3.2 above) have been recommended, but 
although research has shown some tools are more effective than others against 
certain financial imbalances such as credit (as we will discuss further in Chapter 3), 
researchers and policy makers are still unsure on the strength and effectiveness of 
these tools in their financial system and especially in a period of financial crisis.  
Furthermore, advanced countries may worry about disintermediation of the policy, and 
in emerging market economies, they may be concerned about protecting the exchange 
rate (see Cerutti et al (2015a, 2017)).  As such, Galati and Moessner (2014) suggested 
that one of the problems of the empirical research on macroprudential policy is how to 
measure the effectiveness of the policy tools on macroeconomic and financial 
variables, that is, which requires to assess the difference between correlation and 
causation. 
 
Also, there is no actual/ recent financial crisis (history) where macroprudential policy 
and its tools have been deployed at a global level, thus making measurement of its 
effectiveness difficult.  Furthermore, some of the macroprudential policy tools at have 
been proposed or being used were initially part of microprudential and monetary 
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policies objectives (such as loan-to-value ratio (LTV), debt service-to-income ratio 
(DSTI), concentration limits (CONC), dynamic provisioning (DP) and reserve 
requirements (RR), etc.) long before the 2007-2008 financial crisis (Galati and 
Moessner (2014)) especially in emerging market economies.  In the literature, it has 
been highlighted that there is some “successful history” in the use of macroprudential 
tools, for example Hong Kong’s utilisation of macroprudential tools (LTV, DSTI) in the 
1990s to address risks in the property sector (Durbar and Wu (2015)) and in France 
in the 2000s (Dietsch and Welter-Nicol (2014)).  As well, in Spain, an early adopter of 
macroprudential policy, dynamic provisioning helped smooth credit supply cycles and 
in bad times, preserve financial firms’ ability to extent credit and their performance 
(Jiménez et al (2012)). 
 
Finally, although organising guidelines (IMF-FSB-BIS (2016), IMF (2014), ESRB 
(2014a)) have been suggested and published, (see above, Section 2.3.4), countries 
are slowly developing a macroprudential policy framework or in some cases, they are 
only adopting features of the policy in their regulatory framework that can implemented 
without the need for government legislative approval, mostly in emerging market 
economies.  Nevertheless, regulators (central banks) in most cases, have created 
financial stability department to monitor and research financial stability issues in their 
financial system and have introduce some macroprudential tools. 
 
In some countries, legislations are now in place (UK, USA, Euro area) to give effect to 
the macroprudential frameworks and governance structures (see Haldane (2013), 
Jenkins and Longworth (2015)), which outline the operating framework and 
coordination especially when multiple agencies have a macroprudential policy 
responsibility.  In many other countries, these macroprudential legislations are not a 
priority in the government legislative agenda. 
 
2.6. Chapter summary  
 
Despite the benefits of macroprudential policy, the history of the term has shown that 
the macroprudential (policy) concept was discussed in different committees and 
forums and there was little interest in developing the policy further prior to the 2007-
2008 global financial crisis.  As we mentioned earlier, one can argue that the period of 
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low unemployment rate, increasing asset prices, low interest rates, risk but steady 
GDP growth, low inflation (Goldilocks period) and financial crises really being 
institutional crises led to excessive optimism about financial instability being less of a 
problem up to 2007.   
 
The 2007-2008 global financial crisis changed the fortune of macroprudential policy 
as there is a rapid growth in the development of a macroprudential policy framework 
and the usage of macroprudential tools in many countries.  There is some developing 
clarity in the scope and objectives of macroprudential policy, the benefits have been 
identified and debated. Although the literature and research are still developing, a 
number of countries’ regulators have been given the legislative authority to formally 
develop a macroprudential policy framework and there is a rapid growth in the usage 
of macroprudential instruments in many countries.   
 
A number of macroprudential tools have been proposed, yet there is no clear 
agreement on which tool should play a primary role in macroprudential policy, e.g. 
countercyclical capital requirement, leverage ratio, cap on loan to value ratio, reserve 
requirements, etc.  Nevertheless, it is no longer a case of “one size fits all” and each 
country need to have the flexibility to develop the macroprudential policy framework 
including its tools that are most appropriate to their country’s financial system 
requirements.   
 
We believe the most important hurdle has been overcome, that is, many countries 
have “bought into” and accepted the concept, benefits and justification for 
macroprudential policy.  This augurs well for future and the further development of 
macroprudential policy and it is becoming a key aspect of a country’s regulatory 




2A. Appendix Chapter 2 
 
2A.1. Selected major financial instability and economic shocks and policy 
responses from 1970 
 
Appendix Table 2A.1 below highlights some of the major episodes of financial 
instability and economic shocks.  The table outsides the main features of the financial 
instability, the policy responses and the estimated cost that was incurred.  
 
Appendix Table 2A.1: Selected episodes of major financial instability and 
economic shocks from 1970 
  




















































Collapse of market 
liquidity and issuance of 
commercial paper 
because of Penn Central 
bankruptcy. (Commercial 












1. Elimination of 
exemptions for rail and 
motor carriers from the 
Federal securities laws.  
2. Increased regulatory 
restrictions on dividend 
policy. 
3. Extraterritorial 
application of the Federal 
securities laws. 
4. Restrictions on 
interlocking directorates. 
5. Insulation of 
commercial banking 
functions from bank trust 
departments. 
6. Improved legislative 
and regulatory control 
over diversification of 
transportation companies. 
US$750 million 
























international balances in 
dollars, and US dollars 
were convertible to gold at 
a fixed exchange rate of 
$35 an ounce. The United 
States had the 
responsibility of keeping 
the price of gold fixed and 
had to adjust the supply of 
dollars to maintain 
confidence in future gold 
convertibility. The Bretton 
Woods system was in 
place until persistent US 
balance-of-payments 
deficits led to foreign-held 
dollars exceeding the US 
gold stock, implying that 
the United States could 
not fulfil its obligation to 
redeem dollars for gold at 
the official price. 
With inflation on the rise 
and a gold run looming, 
President Richard Nixon's 
team enacted a plan that 
ended dollar convertibility 
to gold and implemented 
wage and price controls, 
which soon brought an 
end to the Bretton Woods 
System. 
Floatation of major 
currencies against each 
other. 
  







Members of the 
Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting 
Countries proclaimed an 
oil embargo, a decision to 
boycott America and 
punish the west in 
response to support for 
Israel in the Yom Kippur 
war against Egypt.  Oil 
price shocks contributed 
to recession and higher 
inflation in many non-oil 
producing countries. 
Led to a resurgence of 
interest in other forms of 
energy such as solar.  




1973 UK Secondary 
banking crisis 
of 1973–75 
UK Bank failures following 
loan losses and liquidity 
problem because of rising 
inflation, rising oil prices, 
a pay and prices freeze, 
strict credit limits and 
companies running 
desperately short of cash.  
Twenty-six financial firms 
needed financial support.  
The Bank of England's 
regulatory powers over 
lenders were increased in 
the 1979 Banking Act to 
prevent a repeat of the 
crisis. 
Life-support 
funds, up to 
£1,285 million 




1974 Herstatt Bank Germany Cross border effect on the 
settlement of foreign 
exchange positions, which 
affected several 
international banks 
especially United States 
(US) based banks. 
Establishment of the 
Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision by 
the central bank 
Governors of the Group of 
Ten countries  
Loss of US$620 






oil price shock 
Iran The Iranian Revolution 
began in early 1978 and 
ended a year later and in 
conjunction, Iranian oil 
output declined by 4.8 
million barrels per day (7 
percent of world 
production at the time) by 
January 1979. Also, the 
Iranian disruption may 
have prompted a fear of 
further disruptions and 
spurred widespread 
speculative hoarding.  Oil 
price shocks contributed 
to recession and higher 
inflation in many non-oil 
producing countries. 
Led to a resurgence of 
interest in other forms of 























The inability of several 
countries to service its 
outstanding debt to U.S. 
commercial banks 
and other creditors.  Many 
countries felt into deep 
recession. 
Brady Plan where 
countries undertake 
structural reforms of their 
economies, financial 
liberalisation, and to 
eliminate budget deficits 
in return for debt 
forgiveness. Also, 
regulatory forbearance 
was granted to the large 
banks with respect to the 
establishment of reserves 




















Bank failures following 
loan losses as the rates 
they had to pay to attract 
deposits rose sharply, but 
the amount they earned 
on long-term fixed-rate 
mortgages didn’t change.  
More than 1,400 savings 
and loan institutions and 
1,300 banks failed. 
In 1989, Congress passed 
the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act of 
1989 that instituted a 
number of reforms of the 
industry. The main S&L 
regulator (the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board) 
was abolished, as was the 
bankrupt Federal Savings 
and Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC). In 
their place, Congress 
created the Office of Thrift 
Supervision and placed 
thrifts’ insurance under 
the FDIC. In addition, the 
Resolution Trust 
Corporation (RTC) was 
established and funded to 
US$180 billion 
or 3% of GDP. 
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resolve the remaining 
troubled S&Ls. 




Price volatility after shift in 
expectations, with high 
margin calls on market 
liquidity and market 
operation, program 
trading especially portfolio 
insurance impact, and 
uncertainty and herding 
behaviour 
Regulators overhauled 
trade-clearing protocols to 
bring uniformity to all 
prominent market 
products and developed 
new rules, known as 
circuit breakers, allowing 
exchanges to temporarily 
halt trading in instances of 
exceptionally large price 
declines in some indexes. 
Federal Reserve provided 
liquidity to the financial 
system by conducting 
open market operations, 
aimed at supporting 
market confidence. 




































Bank failures following 
loan losses due to 
financial deregulation and 
banks excessive lending 
to the housing market. 
In Norway, the three 




In Finland supported the 
banking system as the 
savings bank group was 
taken over by the 
government.  
The government of 
Sweden offered blanket 
insurance for claims on 
Swedish commercial 
banks, nationalized the 
two clearly insolvent 
banks, and set up asset 
management corporations 
to take over bad assets of 
the remaining commercial 
banks. 
Monetary policy was 
changed as he pegged 
exchange rate regime of 
the three countries were 
abolished. 
In Norway, the 
gross fiscal cost 
of crisis 
resolution was 2 







gave a 7.1 








Sweden spent 4 
percent of its 
gross domestic 
product, or 65 
billion kronor, 






Japan Bank failures following 
loan losses; Japan 
experienced a rapid rise 
in asset prices, the 
overheating of economic 
activity, as well as an 
uncontrolled money 
supply and credit 
expansion prior to the 
financial crisis. 
Bank of Japan review of 
how monetary policy is 
conducted, importance of 
conducting monetary 
policy in such a forward-
looking manner.  
The development and 
understanding the risk 
profile of the economy in 
term of output gap, money 
supply and credit and 
assets prices, the 
behaviour of financial 
institutions and the 
interaction of risks. 




















Collapse of market 
liquidity and issuance due 
to uncertainty created by 
Denmark and France "no" 
vote referenda concerning 
the Europe Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) 
led to heavy selling in the 
market in mid-1992. 
European countries 
governments’ 
commitment to provide 
liquidity to the markets, 
via their own issues  
and the desire to shift or 
retain ECU business in 














Price volatility after shift in 
expectations due to 
currency speculators.  
The ERM demanded that 
currencies stayed within a 
band set in relation to 
other currencies in the 
club. To maintain the 
currency values relative to 
each other, countries with 
the most valuable 
currencies had to sell their 
own and buy the weakest.  
This drove interest rates 
up the UK as the 
government struggled to 
control inflation. 
The United Kingdom 






1994 Mexican peso 
crisis (Tequila 
crisis) 
Mexico Liquidity crisis in the peso. 
The government 
responded to the liquidity 
crisis by devaluing the 
peso, thereby unleashing 
financial turmoil in the 
global currency market. 
Floatation of the Mexican 
peso and fiscal discipline 
Mexico GDP felt 
by 5%.  
Approximately 
US$60 billion in 
financial bailout, 






Asia Currency and financial 
crisis in Thailand, soon 
spread to other Southeast 
Asian countries-including 
Malaysia, Indonesia and 
the Philippines. By the fall 
of 1997, the contagion 
extended its reach to 
South Korea, Hong Kong 
and China.  
IMF loans with the 
conditions of fiscal 
discipline, banking and 
financial structure reform 







Russia Currency and debt crisis 
with the Russia devaluing 
of the ruble, defaulting on 
his domestic debt and 
declared a moratorium on 
repayment of foreign debt. 
Russia bounced very 
quickly mainly due to 










L.P. (LTCM)  
United 
States 
Debt and liquidity crisis 





Creation of a supervisory 
board to oversee 
operation and regulatory 
requirements.  
Federal Reserve 
Bank of New 
York organized 









Argentina Debt and currency crisis 
due to fiscal indiscipline, 
overvalued currency and 
large-scale foreign 
currency borrowing. 
Fiscal and structural 
reform, with the 























































































Asset prices boom and 





























Lenders were asked to 
rework payments and 
other terms on troubled 
mortgages or to refinance 
“underwater” mortgages 
(loans exceeding the 
market value of homes) 
rather than aggressively 
seek foreclosure.  
Congress passed the 
temporary tax credits for 
homebuyers that 
increased housing 
demand and eased the 
fall of house prices in 
2009 and 2010. As well 
as, Congress greatly 
increased the maximum 
size of mortgages that 
FHA would insure. 
The Federal Reserve 
lowered short-term 
interest rates to nearly 0 
percent by early 2009, 
took additional steps to 
lower longer-term interest 
rates and stimulate 
economic activity. 













































liquidity and credit crunch 
crisis because of the 
subprime banking crisis. 
The Dodd–Frank Act to 
promote financial stability 
in the United States 
Basel III capital and 
liquidity standards were 
adopted by countries 
around the world. 
Macroprudential policy. 
About 2% fall in 









 Irish banking 
crisis 
Ireland Banking insolvency 
following loan losses.  
Government guarantee of 
Irish domestic banks 
under the Credit 
Institutions (Financial 
Support) Act 2008. 
























Iceland nationalized its 


















Debt crisis because of 
high risks borrowing and 
lending, fiscal indiscipline 
and large trade 
imbalances. 
Economic structural and 
fiscal reform. 
Estimated bail 
out to date is 
US$544 billon. 
Source: Davis (1998) and author's extension   
 
2A.2. Utilisation of macroprudential policy instruments prior to the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis  
 
Following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, several countries have used 
macroprudential policy and its instruments to address financial system instability or 
prevent the build-up of imbalances in the financial system.  However, two surveys by 
the IMF, (Lim et al (2011) and Cerutti et al (2015a), have shown that some element of 
macroprudential policy framework existed prior to the 2007-2008 global financial crisis 
in some advanced economics and more so, many emerging market economies.  The 
IMF surveys provided information on the use of macro-prudential policy from 2000 but 
some countries used macro-prudential policy much earlier (see, for example, Kuttner 
and Shim 2016).  The purpose of this case study is to highlight the use of 
macroprudential policy prior to the global financial crisis. 
 
I. Early adopters of macroprudential policy instruments 
 
The concept of macroprudential policy existed since the 1970s and despite the 
benefits of macroprudential policy, it was not developed as a policy framework and 
incorporated in financial regulations prior to the 2007-2008 global financial crisis in 
most countries.  Furthermore, many international agencies did not advance the 
development of macroprudential policy prior to the crisis as the focus of regulators and 
policy makers were on microprudential policy (e.g. Basel Accords) as they saw that 
the stability of the financial system will continue to be depend on the health of individual 
financial institution. 
  
Nonetheless, the IMF surveys have shown they were early users of macroprudential 
policy instruments prior to the 2007-2008 global financial crisis in several countries.  
As an example, Spain introduced countercyclical dynamic provisioning in 2000.  The 
concept of dynamic provisioning is to build up countercyclical loan loss reserve in good 
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times and then using it to cover losses as they arise in bad times.  It is suggested that 
dynamic provisioning can greatly smooth provisioning costs over the cycle and thus 
insulate banks’ profits and losses (Wezel et al (2012)). 
 
Subsequently, time varying/ dynamic provisioning requirements were adopted in 
Uruguay, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.  Meanwhile, countries like Mexico and Chile 
switched to provisioning based on expected loan loss, which is broadly in line with the 
Basel II principles.  Expected loss provisioning requires a specific provision on newly 
originated loan that reflects expected loss over the life of the loan.  This brings the 
benefit of explicitly incorporating individual borrower characteristics that drive loan 
performance.  That is, each loan carries an individual specific provision from the outset 
based on the borrower’s characteristics, even though no loan impairment has occurred 
as yet.  Similarly, Brazil has used a formula to smooth capital requirements for interest 
rate risk in times of extreme volatility, China introduced a countercyclical capital 
requirement similar to the countercyclical buffer under Basel III, and India has made 
countercyclical adjustments in risk weights and in provisioning (Wezel et al (2012)).  
This shows that countries are tailoring the design and calibration of the instruments to 
suit their specific circumstances.   
 
Also, in emerging market economies, Lim et al (2011) suggested that macroprudential 
instruments were part of a broader macroprudential stability framework which was 
developed after many of these economies experienced financial crises in the 1990s.  
Therefore, elements of macroprudential instruments were used to address systemic 
risk after these crises.  Also, Claessens et al (2014) noted emerging markets have had 
much greater experience with macroprudential policy due to the more volatile business 
and financial cycles.  There is greater cyclicality due to their larger exposure to 
international capital market flows, commodity prices shocks, etc.  They noted that 
emerging countries use macroprudential policies more frequently, especially foreign 
exchange policies, suggesting the dual objective of stabilising the country’s foreign 
exchange market, in contrast to advanced countries, which typically use borrower-





In the 1990s, the financial crises in emerging market were primarily due to combination 
of unsustainable current account deficits, excessive short-term debts and weak 
domestic banks.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) responded with substantial 
packages of financial support and with the imposition of wide-ranging requirements of 
domestic economic reforms (Feldstein (2003)).  Of significance were the Mexican 
(1994) and Asian financial crises (1997-1998), which has contagion effects in many 
Latin America and Asia countries, where unhedged currency, fixed exchange rate 
system and interest rate exposures played a central role in theses crises.  Another 
factor in these crises was the weakness in the regulatory framework for the financial 
systems in these countries.  Claessens et al (2014) noted that emerging countries 
mostly used macroprudential instruments such as loan-to-value ratio (LTV), debt-to-
income ratio (DTI), foreign currency loan limits (FC) and reserve requirements (RR).  
In many emerging and lower income developing countries, reserve requirements are 
also use as a monetary policy instrument, and as such there may be some difficulty in 
interpreting the effectiveness of this prudential instrument (see Izquerido et al (2013)). 
 
II. Countries with macroprudential policy prior to the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis 
 
As detailed in Lim et al (2011), the first IMF survey (2010) identified 10 instruments 
that have been frequently used to achieve macroprudential objectives, that is to limit 
the risk of widespread disruptions to the financial system.  Cerutti et al (2015a) 
expanded on the list of instruments and the number of countries using macroprudential 
policy and they saw that these instruments seek to address three types of probable 
imbalances - credit, liquidity and capital.  This is also discussed in Section 2.3.2 
above. 
 
Appendix Tables 2A.2 and 2A.3 below show the credit related instruments which aim 
is to contain excessive credit growth in the financial sector and can target specific type 
of loans, a particular group of borrowers, a specific region or loans dominated in 
foreign currencies, etc.   
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Appendix Table 2A.2: Advanced countries used of credit related instruments 
prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis  
 
  Macroprudential Policy Instruments 
Advanced 
countries 

















Austria 2003 ✔     
Belgium 2000      
Cyprus 2003  ✔    
Hong Kong 1999  ✔ ✔   
Iceland 2001 ✔     
Italy 2000  ✔    
Singapore 2000  ✔    
Slovakia 2000  ✔    
South Korea 2002  ✔  ✔ ✔ 




 ✔    
Sources: Lim et al (2011), Cerutti et al (2015a) and author’s extension. IMF WEO country classification 
(April 2017). 
 
Appendix Table 2A.3: Emerging market economies use of credit related 
instruments prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
 





















Algeria 2000      
Argentina 2000 ✔ ✔    
Bahamas 2000  ✔  ✔  
Bangladesh 2004  ✔    
Bulgaria 2004  ✔    
Chile 2000  ✔    
China 2004  ✔    
Colombia 1999 ✔ ✔    
Costa Rica 2005  ✔    
Croatia 2003  ✔ ✔ ✔  
Curacao 2000  ✔    
Haiti 2000 ✔     
India 2000  ✔    
Jordan 2000 ✔     
Malaysia 1995  ✔ ✔   
Moldova 2000 ✔     
Morocco 2000 ✔     
Pakistan 2000 ✔ ✔    
Paraguay 2000 ✔     
Poland 2000 ✔   ✔  
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Romania 2000 ✔ ✔  ✔  
Serbia 2004 ✔   ✔  
Thailand 2002  ✔  ✔  
Ukraine 2001 ✔     
Sources: Lim et al (2011), Cerutti et al (2015a) and author’s extension. IMF WEO country classification 
(April 2017). 
 
Secondly, Appendix Tables 2A.4 and 2A.5 show the liquidity related instruments, 
which objective is to discourage financial institutions excess reliance on short-term 
funding and these instruments are designed to ensure that financial institutions have 
the necessary liquidity buffer to deal with any short-term liquidity disruptions. 
 
Appendix Table 2A.4: Advanced countries used of liquidity related instruments 
prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
 
  Macroprudential Policy Instruments - Liquidity 
Advanced 
countries 

















Australia 2000    ✔  
France 2000    ✔  
Italy 2000    ✔  
Singapore 2000  ✔    




 ✔  ✔  
Sources: Lim et al (2011), Cerutti et al (2015a) and author’s extension. IMF WEO country classification 
(April 2017). 
 
Appendix Table 2A.5: Emerging market economies used of liquidity related 
instruments prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
 























Argentina 2000  ✔   ✔ 
Armenia 2000  ✔   ✔ 
Azerbaijan 2005  ✔    
Bahamas 2005     ✔ 
Bahrain 2000  ✔    




 ✔    
Brazil 2004 ✔ ✔    
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Bulgaria 2004  ✔    
Brunei 2000  ✔    
Bulgaria 2005  ✔    
Burundi 2000  ✔    
Cambodia 2000  ✔    
Colombia 1999  ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Costa Rica 2000     ✔ 
Croatia 2000  ✔  ✔  




    ✔ 
El Salvador 2001  ✔    
Fiji 2000  ✔    
Georgia 2000  ✔    
India 2004  ✔ ✔   
Kazakhstan 2000  ✔    




    ✔ 
Lebanon 1997  ✔ ✔   
Lao PDR 2000     ✔ 
Macedonia 2000  ✔    
Malaysia 1995  ✔    
Mexico 1997 ✔   ✔  
Moldova 2000  ✔    
Mongolia 2000  ✔    
Morocco 2000     ✔ 
Mozambique 2000  ✔    
Nepal 2000  ✔    
Pakistan 2000  ✔   ✔ 
Paraguay 2000     ✔ 
Peru 2000  ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Philippines 2000  ✔    
Poland 2006  ✔    
Romania 2000  ✔   ✔ 




 ✔    
Sri Lanka 2000  ✔    
Sudan 2000  ✔    
Thailand 2002   ✔   




    ✔ 
Tonga 2000  ✔    
Uganda 2004     ✔ 




 ✔   ✔ 
Uruguay 1990s  ✔ ✔ ✔  




Thirdly, the aim of capital related instruments, which are shown in Appendix Tables 
2A.6 and 2A.7, is to encourage financial institutions to build up a capital buffer above 
the minimum requirement which can be drawn down during period of stress.   
 
Appendix Table 2A.6: Advanced countries used of capital related instruments 
prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
 
  Macroprudential Policy Instruments – Capital  
Adv. 
countries 
































Belgium 2000       ✔ ✔ 
Canada 2000        ✔ 
Ireland 2003 ✔        
Norway 1998 ✔        
Portugal 1999   ✔ ✔     




       ✔ 
Sources: Lim et al (2011), Cerutti et al (2015a) and author’s extension. IMF WEO country classification 
(April 2017). Adv – Advanced countries, Reg. – requirement. IMF WEO country classification (April 
2017). 
 
Appendix Table 2A.7: Emerging market economies used of capital related 
instruments prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
 
  Macroprudential Policy Instruments – Capital  
EME and 
DEV 

































Bahrain 2000        ✔ 
Bangladesh 2000       ✔  
Brazil 2005  ✔       
Bulgaria 2004    ✔ ✔    
Burundi 2000  ✔       
Chile 2000         
China 2003  ✔       
Colombia 2007  ✔       
Croatia 2003  ✔       
Croatia 2002         
Ecuador 2001       ✔ ✔ 
Georgia 2002   ✔      
Ghana 2000       ✔  
75 
 
India 2004 ✔    ✔    




 ✔      ✔ 
Malaysia 2005 ✔        
Nepal 2000  ✔       
Pakistan 2002       ✔  
Paraguay 2000        ✔ 
Peru 2001  ✔       
Philippines 2002       ✔  
Poland 2006 ✔     ✔   




       ✔ 




       ✔ 
Tajikistan 2000  ✔       





      ✔  
Uruguay 2001 ✔ ✔       
Zambia 2000        ✔ 
Sources: Lim et al (2011), Cerutti et al (2015a) and author’s extension. IMF WEO country classification 
(April 2017). EME – Emerging Market Economies, DEV – Developing countries, Reg. – requirement.  
 
III. Overall use of macroprudential instruments prior to the 2007-2008 
financial crisis 
 
In the table below (Appendix Table 2A.8), 82 countries used macroprudential 
instruments prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  Most of the countries using these 
instruments were emerging and developing countries, that is 65 such countries, while 
17 advanced countries had used macroprudential instruments.  Most of the countries, 
that is 59 countries, have used some form of liquidity related instruments, with reserve 
requirements (RR) being used by most countries.  As suggested previously, in many 
emerging and low developing countries reserve requirements are also used as a 
monetary policy instrument.  Capital related instruments were used in 39 countries, as 
several different instruments were employed.  Credit related instruments were used 





Appendix Table 2A.8: Overall use of macroprudential instruments prior to the 
2007-2008 financial crisis 
 








Credit related instruments 
Caps on foreign currency lending 14 12 2 
Caps on loan-to-value (LTV) ratio 23 15 8 
Lending ceiling 3 2 1 
Caps on the debt-to-income (DTI) 
ratio 7 6 1 
Loan-to-deposits ratio 1 0 1 
Subtotal by classification 35 24 11 
Liquidity related instruments 
Limits on currency mismatch 2 2 0 
Reserve requirements 44 41 3 
Limits on net open currency 
positions (NOP) 7 7 0 
Liquidity limits/ requirement 3 3 0 
Limits on Interbank Exposures 21 17 4 
Limits on maturity mismatch 2 2 0 
Subtotal by classification 59 53 6 
Capital related instruments 
New risk weights for loans and 
non-performing loans, etc. 8 5 3 
Time-varying/ dynamic 
provisioning 11 10 1 
General Countercyclical Capital 
Buffer/Requirement  1 1 0 
Increase capital requirement 3 2 1 
Increase provisioning for general/ 
households’ loans 4 3 1 
Restrictions on profit distribution 2 2 0 
Levy/Tax on Financial Institutions 10 8 2 
Leverage Ratio 12 9 3 
Subtotal by classification 39 32 7 
Total by country classification 82 65 17 
Source: Lim et al (2011), Cerutti et al (2015a) and author’s extension. IMF WEO country classification 
(April 2017), ADV is advanced country, EME is emerging market economy. 
 
We now move on to Chapter 3: The Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policy, 
where we present our empirical results testing the effectiveness of macroprudential 
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policy and its instruments in reducing the build-up of imbalances in the credit market 











In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, the growing consensus of 
regulators, policymakers and researchers was that there needs to be a shift in focus 
on how the financial system is regulated and monitored.  This was because the 
systemic risk was insufficiently understood and financial regulation focused 
excessively on preventing individual financial institution failure (microprudential policy) 
(Hanson et al (2011)).  In light of this, policymakers sought not to only focus on 
improving microprudential policy but introduce macroprudential policy, which would 
strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector.   
 
The main underlying purpose of macroprudential policy is the use of primarily 
prudential tools to limit systemic risk, which is the widespread disruption of the 
provision of financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the 
financial system and this disruption can cause serious negative consequences for the 
real economy (IMF-FSB-BIS (2016).  However, the literature on macroprudential is far 
from complete and continues to evolve, and also, there is no common agreement on 
the objectives of macroprudential policy. 
 
As such, the purpose of this chapter is to assess the effectiveness of macroprudential 
policy in reducing imbalances in the financial sector.  We will focus on the credit-to-
GDP gap which is considered to be a good predictor of instability (e.g. by the BIS) as 
well as having a recommended link to the Basel III countercyclical buffer (CCB).  Borio 
and Lowe (2002a and b) of the BIS indicated that a combination of sustained rapid 
growth in credit and asset prices can indicate an impending financial crisis, and 
contended that the gap between the total non-financial private sector credit-to-GDP 
ratio and its trend (the credit-to-GDP gap) is a key indicator of financial imbalances 
and system wide risk.  These results were underpinned by an assessment of 
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performance of the credit-to-GDP gap over the subprime crisis in Borio and Drehmann 
(2009). 
 
IMF-FSB-BIS (2016) noted that macroprudential policy should, 1) increase the 
resilience of the financial system to deal with aggregate shocks, that is help maintain 
the ability of the financials system to function effectively even under adverse 
conditions, 2) contain the build-up of systemic vulnerabilities when there is an upswing 
in the business cycle (time dimension) and where there is a distortion in the feedback 
between asset prices and credit, and 3) seek to control structural vulnerabilities within 
the financial system that arise through interlinkages, that is risk within the financial 
system due to the interconnectedness of financial institutions (cross-sectional or 
structural dimension).  See Chapter 2 for further discussion on macroprudential policy.  
 
Many international agencies and researchers support the view that countries should 
adopt and develop a macroprudential regulatory framework for their financial sector.   
As such, Lim et al (2011) and Cerutti et al (2015a) noted that following the 2007-2008 
financial crisis many countries have used macroprudential instruments, with the 
objective of reducing systemic risk either over time or across institutions and markets.  
They established that the usage of the instruments is generally aimed at dampening 
credit demand, notably in household credit.  Examples of macroprudential instruments 
used are time-varying/dynamic loan-loss provisioning (DP); loan-to-value ratio (LTV); 
debt-to-income ratio (DTI); limits on foreign currency loans (FC); reserve requirement 
ratios (RR) and concentration limits (CONC). 
 
As the usage of macroprudential instruments continue to grow, the effectiveness of 
these instruments is being analysed.  In the last few years since the publication of the 
first IMF survey (2010) (Lim et al (2011)), there have been many empirical studies on 
the use and effectiveness of macroprudential policy and its instruments, such as, 
Carreas et al (2018), Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015), Cerutti et al (2015a), 
Claessens et al (2014), Dell’Ariccia et al (2012), etc., with many of these studies 
focusing on analysing the effect of macroprudential instruments on credit growth and 
house prices at a macroeconomic level and the mitigation of the build-up of 




In this chapter of the thesis, we will review and assess the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policy in reducing imbalances in the financial sector.  We will focus 
on the credit-to-GDP gap, as Basel III has given it a prominent role as a signalling 
agent (early warning indicator (EWI)) for policymakers in identifying looming build-up 
of imbalances in the financial market and in setting the countercyclical capital buffers.   
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follow.  Firstly, Section 3.2. Empirical studies 
on the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments provide an overview of the 
focus of macroprudential policy and summarises some of the existing empirical 
research on macroprudential policy effectiveness.  Secondly, Section 3.3. BIS’ credit-
to-GDP gap reviews the research literature of the gap and discuss the empirical 
analysis of the effectiveness of the gap in identifying periods of potential financial 
sector instability and the build-up of imbalances.  Section 3.4. Empirical analysis of 
the effectiveness of macroprudential policy provides a quantitative assessment of 
the effectiveness of macroprudential policy in reducing imbalances in the financial 
sector as measured by the credit-to-GDP gap.  The empirical analysis looks at, 1) the 
effectiveness of macroprudential policy instruments in reducing the credit-to-GDP Gap 
and 2) determines which instrument(s) would be more effective as per the structure of 
the country’s economy.  Dynamic panel regression is conducted on 43 countries, of 
which 27 are advanced countries and 16 emerging market economies, using quarterly 
data from IMF, World Bank, OECD, and the BIS.  Section 3.5. Robustness checks 
provide a check on the model results.  Finally, Section 3.6. Chapter Summary, we 
conclude. 
 
3.2. Empirical studies on the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments 
 
Before reviewing the empirical research on the effectiveness of macroprudential 
instruments, firstly, we look at the focus of macroprudential policy, the area of the 
financial sector where there is potential for the build-up of financial sector imbalances, 
that is, the credit market and the housing sector. Then, we review some of the existing 





3.2.1. The focus of macroprudential policy 
 
In the last 10 years since the introduction of macroprudential policy as a regulatory 
policy, there have been many empirical studies on the use and effectiveness of 
macroprudential policy and its instruments, such as, Carreas et al (2018), Akinci and 
Olmstead-Rumsey (2015), Cerutti et al (2015a, 2017), Claessens et al (2014), 
Dell’Ariccia et al (2012), etc., with many of these studies focusing on analysing the 
effect of macroprudential instruments on credit growth and house prices and the 
mitigation of the build-up of imbalances in the housing market, the area of the financial 
sector, mostly the banking sector, where there is the most potential for systemic risk 
to develop.  In hindsight, the study of the effectiveness of macroprudential policy 
follows many countries’ policy framework, where there is a narrow focus of the policy 
on the banking sector and housing market in many advanced countries and emerging 
market economies.  
 
That said, the focus of the policy and research on the housing and credit markets 
related and the banking sector is not surprising.  Concerning credit and asset prices, 
Borio and Lowe (2002) suggested that although it is difficult to predict financial 
instability before it happens, there are some circumstances where it is appropriate for 
policymakers to respond to certain imbalances.  They saw that historically a 
combination of sustained rapid growth in credit and asset prices can indicate an 
impending financial crisis.  Also, while low and stable inflation can promote financial 
stability, it can increase the likelihood of a surge in credit and asset prices growth 
rather than the demand for goods and services.  As regards the banking sector, Caprio 
and Klingebiel’s (2003) crises chronologies suggested that 117 systemic banking 
crises (defined as much or all of bank capital being exhausted) had occurred in 93 
countries since the mid-1970s (see Laeven and Valencia (2018) as well).  
 
Further, with the introduction of the countercyclical capital buffer in the Basel III Accord 
framework (2010), policymakers have been further focusing on the bank credit 
markets.  Basel III has placed a prominent role on the credit-to-GDP gap (see BIS 
(2010)) to act as a signalling guide (early warning indicator (EWI)) for policymakers in 
setting the countercyclical capital buffers (see BIS (2011)).  We will discuss this further 
in the chapter Section 3.3 below.   
82 
 
3.2.2. Some empirical research on the effectiveness of macroprudential 
instruments 
 
The empirical literature on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy and its 
instruments are still preliminary and in its developmental stage as countries formulate 
and implement their macroprudential policy framework.  Also, there are limited data 
sets that can be used to conduct empirical analysis.  Carreras et al (2018) suggested 
there are three publicly available datasets for research, one from the BIS and two from 
the IMF (see Kuttner and Shim(2016), Cerutti et al (2015a, 2017) used in this Chapter 
and Chapter 5, and Cerutti et al in IBRN (2017), used in Chapter 4).  Yet, there are 
several studies that have mostly focus on the area of the financial sector where there 
is considered to be the most potential for systemic risk to develop, that is the credit 
and housing markets and the banking sector.   
 
In looking at cross-country analysis, Lim et al (2011), using the first IMF survey (2010) 
database, suggested that macroprudential instruments have an impact on the 
procyclicality of credit and leverage.  Using a system generalized method of moments 
model (SGMM), ten instruments were tested to see their effects on the procyclicality 
of credit and leverage, the impact on four measure of systemic risk, credit growth, 
systemic liquidity, leverage and capital flows.  The ten instruments were caps on the 
LTV, caps on the DTI, caps on foreign currency lending, ceilings on credit or credit 
growth, reserve requirements, countercyclical/time-varying capital requirements, time-
varying/dynamic provisioning, restrictions on profit distribution, limits on net open 
currency positions (NOP) and limits on maturity mismatch.   They argued that 
procyclicality in the business cycle is captured by analysing the correlation between 
growth in credit and leverage with the growth in the GDP.  They suggested that this 
specification has the advantage of showing the effect of the instruments in both the 
expansionary and recessionary phases of the financial and business cycles.  The 
regression analysis used data from 49 countries for the period 2002 – 2010.   
 
Building on the work of Lim et al (2011), Cerutti et al (2015a, 2017), using the second 
IMF survey database (2013-2014) which covered 119 countries over the period 2000 
– 2013, describes the usage of macroprudential instruments and its effect on the credit 
and housing markets.  The survey covers 18 different instruments but the focus was 
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on 12 specific instruments (see Table 3.2 and related discussion below).  Using a 
panel generalized method of moments (GMM), they tested the impact of the 
instruments on real credit growth or real house prices credit growth in a number of 
countries.  They saw that the macroprudential index (MPI), summing all the different 
types of instruments used over the period, is correlated with lower credit growth 
especially in emerging markets.  Cerutti et al (2017) concluded that emerging markets 
use macroprudential policies more frequently than advanced countries.  Emerging 
markets focus on foreign exchange policies, suggesting the dual objective of 
stabilising the country foreign exchange market.  Advanced countries use more 
borrower-based policies which specifically target consumer spending and the real 
estate market.  Also, there is a weaker effect in more developed and more financially 
open economies, suggesting some avoidance and/or disintermediation of the policy. 
 
Continuing on the topic of testing a macroprudential index, Akinci and Olmstead-
Rumsey (2015) of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, developed several 
macroprudential indexes for 57 advanced and emerging countries covering the period 
2001 to 2013 to use in a dynamic panel data model (GMM) to investigate the 
effectiveness of macroprudential policy in restraining the growth in credit and asset 
prices, measured by real domestic bank credit.  They focus on the domestic banks’ 
housing credit growth and house prices as they suggested that in the literature these 
variables are often linked to boom-bust in the financial cycle.  Their empirical study 
concluded that macroprudential policies have been used more actively since the 2007-
2008 global financial crisis in both advanced and emerging market economies.  They 
saw that tightening macroprudential actions outweighed the easing actions and these 
policies targeting specific credit growth in certain sectors are more effective than on 
average credit growth and house prices inflation in the countries in the study. 
 
Carreras et al (2018) analysed the transmission of macroprudential policies and its 
effectiveness in reducing asset prices, credit growth and financial instability.  The focus 
of the study was up to 19 OECD countries during the period 2000-2014 using the three 
datasets from the IMF and BIS.  They estimated panel error correction models for 
house prices and households sector credit, before testing the additional impact of 
macroprudential policies.  They focused on the OECD countries which allow for the 
greater access to a wider range of control variables whose omission could bias the 
84 
 
results.  They highlighted that some policies are shown to be more effective than 
others in the 19 OECD countries.  These include, in particular, taxes on financial 
institutions, general capital requirements and strict loan-to-value ratio limits.  Limits on 
foreign currency lending, debt-to-income ratio limits, limits on interbank exposures and 
concentration limits are also shown to be effective in some estimates.   
 
Crowe et al (2011) and Dell’Ariccia et al (2012) looked at the use of policies that will 
mitigate general booms and bust cycles in the real estate and credit markets 
respectively.  Firstly, Crowe et al (2011) found that macroprudential measures appear 
to be the most effective policy to achieve the objective of curbing real estate prices 
and leverage because of their ability to attack the problem directly and the added 
benefit of increasing the resilience of the banking system.  They concluded that 
policies such as LTV limits have a better chance to curb a boom and the narrower the 
focus of such a policy, the better the effectiveness and performance of 
macroprudential policy.   
 
Dell’Ariccia et al (2012) conducted analysis on credit (total credit to the private non-
financial sector) booms and busts with the aim of assessing the effectiveness of 
macroprudential measures in reducing the risk of a crisis or at least limiting its 
consequences.  They identify a credit boom episode by analysing the country’s credit-
to-GDP ratio and classify an episode as a boom if either of the following two conditions 
is satisfied, (i) the deviation from trend is greater than 1.5 times its standard deviation 
and the annual growth rate of the credit-to-GDP ratio exceeds 10 percent; or (ii) the 
annual growth rate of the credit-to-GDP ratio exceeds 20 percent.  They argued that 
credit booms are often a result of financial reform and periods of strong economic 
growth.  Booms tend to be more frequent in fixed exchange rate regimes with weak 
banking supervision.  Yet not all booms are bad or end up in a financial crisis and it is 
difficult to tell a good boom from a bad one that ends up in a crisis.  They found that 
macroprudential instruments have proven to be effective in containing booms and 
more often in limiting the consequences of busts.  Yet, there are some trade-offs which 
entail costs and distortions in the macro economy if these instruments are not carefully 
design, coordinated with other policies and with close supervision to ensure the 




In one of the only micro-level studies, Claessens et al (2014) conducted analysis on 
the use of macroprudential policy to reduce banking systems vulnerabilities.  They 
assessed the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in 48 countries, 1,650 banks 
in 23 advanced countries and 1,170 banks in 25 emerging markets and some 18,000 
observations.  They grouped the macroprudential policies according to whether they 
are borrower specific (caps on debt-to-income (DTI) and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios), 
specific to banks’ assets or liabilities (limits on credit growth (CG), foreign currency 
credit growth (FC) and reserve requirements (RR)), and policies that encourage 
counter-cyclical buffers (counter-cyclical capital (CTC), dynamic provisioning (DP) and 
profits distribution restrictions (PRD)).  There was a final group of miscellaneous 
policies (which have some overlap with the three groups).  The miscellaneous 
instruments are countercyclical provisioning, countercyclical capital, restrictions on 
profit distribution and restrictions on treatment of profits in regulatory capital.  The 
Claessens et al (2014) grouping was similar to Cerutti et al (2015a, 2017). 
 
Using panel, GMM regressions and relating these policies to changes in individual 
banks’ assets, Claessens et al (2014) found that policies aimed at borrowers are 
effective in (indirectly) reducing the build-up of banking system vulnerabilities.  They 
suggested that measures aimed at banks’ assets and liabilities are also very effective.  
Countercyclical buffers as a group show less promise, yet these measures are recently 
introduced as such they have not be used regularly.  The group of miscellaneous 
policies is also very effective.  Also, when distinctions were made between upswings 
and downswings in the overall credit cycle in the countries, all the measures except 
buffer-based policies directly help reduce asset growth during upswings.  And policies 
aimed at banks’ asset and liabilities and miscellaneous measures again are very 
significant.  During a contractionary period, the borrower-based measures help reduce 
asset growth to a lesser degree.  They stop declines in bank asset growth in 
contractionary periods.  Measures aimed at banks’ asset and liabilities side and the 
miscellaneous measures also have positive impact in contractionary periods and 
measures aimed at building banks’ buffers are not productive in downswings. 
 
There are also case studies which often focused on specific risks or markets 
segments.  Jiménez et al (2012) saw that in Spain, countercyclical capital buffers such 
as dynamic provisioning help smooth credit supply cycles and in bad times, preserve 
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financial firms’ ability to extent credit and their performance.  They noted that their 
results are consistent with the concept that dynamic provisioning generates 
countercyclical bank capital buffers, mitigates bank procyclicality in credit supply, and 
in turn generates net positive real effects at the firm-level.  The buffers contract credit 
availability (volume and cost) in good times but expand it in bad times. Dynamic 
provisions are forward-looking provisions and before any credit loss is individually 
identified on a specific loan, there is a buffer build-up of bank own funds from retained 
profits in good times that can be used in bad times to cover the realized losses. 
 
In a regional empirical study, Bruno et al (2015) provided a comparative assessment 
of the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in 12 Asia-Pacific economies, using 
comprehensive databases of domestic macroprudential policies and capital flow 
management (CFM) policies.  They considered both macroprudential policies that 
have a domestic credit focus, such as loan to value (LTV) and debt service to income 
(DTI) caps, as well as CFM policies that address the spill-over of financial conditions 
through banking sector and bond market capital flows.  The data sets include 152 
distinct CFM measures on banking and bond inflows and 177 domestic 
macroprudential measures taken by 12 Asia-Pacific economies for the period 2004-
2013.  Bruno et al (2015) concluded that banking sector CFM polices and bond market 
CFM policies are effective in slowing down banking and bond inflows, respectively.  
However, macroprudential policy is not introduced in a vacuum and it is a complement 
with other policies such as monetary policy. 
 
In Latin America, Gambacorta and Murcia (2017) 30 , using confidential bank-loan 
(credit registry) data for five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) 
in the region, firstly saw that macroprudential tools, such as reserve and deposits 
requirements regimes (Brazil, Colombia) and foreign currency net global position, to 
limit currency mismatches (Argentina), used to dampen the credit cycles (reduce credit 
growth) were effective, even in the short-term (within three months).  The effects of 
capital-based tools such as dynamic provisioning (Colombia, Mexico, Peru) and 
 
30 The paper produced as part of the BIS Consultative Council for the Americas (CCA) research project 
on “The impact of macroprudential policies: an empirical analysis using credit registry data” 




capital buffer and profit reinvestment (Argentina), are less rapid, taking up to a year.  
Secondly, macroprudential policy acts as a complement to monetary policy, and is 
more effective if both policies are used for the same objective of dampening credit 
cycles.  They noted that due to the high confidentiality of the credit register data, it was 
not possible to pool country-level data, instead regression models were used for each 
country and then compare the results.  The regression models follow that of Jimenez 
et al (2012). 
 
Finally, Vandenbussche et al (2012) analysed the relation between macroprudential 
policies and house price inflation in Central, Eastern, and South-eastern European 
countries, using panel error correction estimation data techniques.  Several countries 
in the region used macroprudential policies actively in response to credit and housing 
boom and bust cycles in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  They saw that capital ratio 
requirements and non-standard liquidity measures (marginal reserve ratio on foreign 
funding or linked to credit growth) reduce house price inflation. 
 
From the empirical literature, there is no focus on the non-bank sector credit, debt 
securities or non-housing credit (commercial lending) but these forms of lending are 
included in the calculation of the credit-to-GDP gap.  
 
We now move on to Section 3.3. BIS’ credit-to-GDP gap where we review the 
theoretical and empirical literature of the gap. 
 
3.3. BIS’ credit-to-GDP gap 
 
Unlike the existing literature which assesses macroprudential policy impact on credit 
growth and rising house prices, the focus of our empirical analysis is the BIS’ credit-
to-GDP gap and our empirical analysis will explore the effect of macroprudential 
instruments on the credit-to-GDP gap.  However, before pursing that question, in this 
section of the chapter we review the research literature on the BIS’ credit-to-GDP gap 
and discuss the empirical analysis of the effectiveness the gap in identifying periods 




3.3.1. Definition and calculation of the BIS’ credit-to-GDP gap 
 
The credit-to-GDP gap (Gapt) is defined as the difference between the credit-to-GDP 
ratio (ct/yt) and its long-term trend (tt) (see BIS (2010), (2016)).  The gap is calculated 
as follows. 
 
Gapt = (ct/yt) - tt    (3.1) 
 
In the determinant of the credit-to-GDP ratio, GDP is domestic GDP and credit is a 
broad measure of credit to the private, non-financial sector in the period, that is, it 
captures all sources of debt funds (including debt securities) for the private non-
financial sector as well as funds raised abroad.  This is the sum of credit to households 
and non-financial corporate sectors (see Dembiermont et al (2013)).  As such it would 
be less vulnerable to distortion by disintermediation and innovation than the narrower 
measures such as bank credit (Detken et al 2014).  Both variables, GDP and credit 
are in nominal terms and on a quarterly frequency.  The ratio is calculated as follows. 
 
Credit-to-GDP ratiot = creditt / GDPt * 100% (3.2) 
 
The trend is derived from using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (see Hodrick and 
Prescott (1997)).  The HP filter is a mathematical tool used in macroeconomics to 
establish the trend of a variable over time.  The HP filter is based on assumptions that 
the credit-to-GDP ratio: (ct/yt) can be decomposed into two components: the trend (tt) 
and the cycle (ct), which means yt = tt + ct. 
 
By using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) technique, the BIS proposed that obtaining 




where λ (lambda) is the smoothing parameter. The first term in the loss function 
penalises the variance of the cyclical component, while the second imposes a penalty 
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on the lack of smoothness in the trend.  Hence, the solution to the problem is a trade-
off between the smoothness of the trend and how well it fits the original series. 
 
There are three technical features that are important when calculating the BIS’ credit-
to-GDP gap.  Firstly, the trend (tt) is calculated by means of a one-sided (backward-
looking) filter.  This means, the filter is run recursively for each period over an 
expanding sample.  This is done to capture data constraints in day-to-day 
policymaking.  Secondly, a larger smoothing parameter λ (lambda) is employed.  The 
parameter equals 400,000.  It is assumed that the credit cycles are on average is about 
four times longer than standard business cycles.  Thirdly, the BIS credit-to-GDP gap 
required 10 years of data as the starting point for estimating the trend can have a 
measurement impact on the gap if there is a smaller data time series. 
 
The credit-to-GDP ratio is then compared to its long-term trend.  If the credit-to-GDP 
ratio is significantly above its trend (that is there is a large positive gap) then this is an 
indication that credit may have grown to excessive levels relative to GDP, implying 
financial imbalances, which in BIS’ research (we discuss further below) often 
foreshadows a crisis.  A negative gap suggests that credit growth has not grown in line 
with GDP growth and there is excess capacity in credit expansion.  The lower and 
upper threshold of the gap as prescribed by the BCBS is 2 and 10 percentage points 
deviation from its trend (see BCBS (2010b)).  Yet each country will have to determine 
what is their acceptable level for the credit-to-GDP (positive) gap, that is the critical 
threshold for triggering the countercyclical buffer.  See Section 3.4.1 and Appendix 
3A.1 for the credit-to-GDP gap discussions for specific countries.31 
 
3.3.2. BIS empirical research on the credit-to-GDP gap 
 
I. Early warning indicators 
 
As mentioned previously, the 2007-2008 financial crisis did not happen suddenly, but 
as a precursor, imbalances built up over a period of time.  The same can be said of 
 




the many financial and banking crises that have taken place throughout history (see 
Laeven and Valencia (2013)).  Bordo (2000) noted that the frequency of financial 
crises has increased since 1973, the end of the Bretton Woods period (1945 to 1971). 
 
Early econometric work on banking crisis determinants such as Hardy and 
Pasarbasioglou (1998) analysed lagged determinants of financial crises for 38 
countries 1980-97 using logit estimation; relevant variables included GDP growth; 
boom-bust cycles of inflation, credit expansion and capital inflows; rising real interest 
rates and an increasing incremental capital output ratio; declining bank deposits; a 
sharp fall in the real exchange rate, declining imports and an adverse terms-of trade-
shock.  Davis and Karim (2008a) highlighted that the literature was divided between 
signal extraction methods that generate single (possibly composite) early warning 
variables and multivariate logit methods.  They suggested that logit is the most 
appropriate approach for global early warning systems (EWS) and signal extraction 
for country specific EWS. 
 
Further, using the available background information on the many banking crises, Borio 
and Lowe (2002) highlighted some features of banking crises that can be used in 
developing forward looking EWIs.  Firstly, they noted that banking crises tend to arise 
primarily from deteriorating economic conditions, particularly declines in asset quality.  
Secondly, banking crises with significant economic costs in terms of overall output 
often arises from exposure of several institutions to common risks (factors) such as 
real estate and equity.  Thirdly, vulnerabilities or imbalances tend to build up over time, 
reflecting the macro-financial linkages between the financial sector and the real 
domestic economy (see Caprio, Jr. (2011).  Finally, although it is difficult to predict 
financial instability before it happens, it is possible to detect the build-up of financial 
imbalances using credit-to-GDP as discussed below. 
 
Yet, Davis and Karim (2008a) noted that the practical use of early warning systems 
(EWSs) (indicators) by policy makers are limited but due to the changing nature of 
banking risks, as more economies liberalise and develop their financial systems, and 
with the growth of financial innovation, the use of EWSs are still very important for 
informing policies aimed at preventing crises.  They noted as well, an effective EWS, 
which highlight growing risks of a banking crisis, could facilitate policy action that could 
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help head off a potential crisis or limit its effects (costs).  But for the EWS to be 
effective, Davis and Karim (2008a) suggested that it is essential that the EWS gives 
advance warning as policy actions take time to be effective. 
 
II. Empirical tests of credit-to-GDP as an early warning indicator 
 
In the initial empirical test of credit-to-GDP gap as an early warning indicator, Borio 
and Lowe (2002 a and b) attempted to determine whether the build-up of vulnerabilities 
can be spotted in time to take preventive action.  They saw that sustained rapid credit 
growth combined with large swings in asset prices appear to increase the probability 
of an episode of financial instability.  In addition, while low and stable inflation promotes 
financial stability, it also increases the likelihood that excess demand pressures show 
up first in credit aggregates and asset prices, rather than in goods and services prices.  
As such focusing on the growth in asset prices can be a good early warning indicator 
for determining the build-up of imbalances in the financial sector.    
 
Borio and Lowe (2002b) suggested that a small set of variables should be sufficient to 
capture the build-up of vulnerabilities as focusing on few variables can improve the 
reliability of indicators.  Thus, they consider three core variables (indicators) that could 
capture information on the behaviour of credit, asset prices and the exchange rate, 
which should contain useful information about the development of financial 
imbalances.  The three variables were (1) credit-to-GDP; (2) equity prices (deflated by 
the price level); and (3) the real effective exchange rate.  They indicated that in order 
to determine the build-up of imbalances or a boom, they employed a measure that 
look at the derivation of the variables (level) from its trend.  The trend is estimated 
using a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter.  Therefore, the expectation is that if the credit-
to-GDP gap, real equity prices and/or the real effective exchange rate move 
“sufficiently above” their trend (i.e. exceed some critical threshold), then financial 
imbalances are emerging, signalling the risk of subsequent financial distress.  They 
noted that good early warning indicators have two important properties.  These 
properties are, (1) the indicator should predict a high percentage of crises that do 
occur; and (2) the indicator should have a low false negative, meaning the indicator 
should not signal a crisis that does not materialise.  Tests were also performed on four 
different combinations of the variables, (1) credit and asset prices; (2) credit and the 
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exchange rate; (3) credit and either asset prices or the exchange rate; and (4) credit 
and asset prices and the exchange rate.   
 
Borio and Lowe (2002b) concluded that their test results were promising as the credit 
and exchange rate gaps tended on average to rise one period (year) before and to 
peak in the crisis year, respectively.  But the equity price gap is consistently positive 
until the crisis year yet peaks well before a crisis.  They indicated that the composite 
indicators performed well also.  Their empirical tests included 40 crises spread over 
27 of the 34 countries, with 16 such episodes occurring in industrial countries and 24 
in emerging market economies. 
 
In an update to their earlier work, Drehmann et al (2011) analysed the use of the credit-
to-GDP gap in 36 countries from 1960 onwards using a criterion of the noise to signal 
ratio.  They suggested that across countries and crisis episodes, the variable exhibits 
very good signalling properties, as rapid credit growth lifts the gap as early as three or 
four years prior to the crisis.  In addition, the gap typically generates very low “noise,” 
that is not producing many false warning signals that crises are imminent.  The credit-
to-GDP gap, however, is not a reliable coincident indicator of systemic stress in the 
banking sector, credit spreads may be better. 
 
Subsequently, Drehmann and Juselius (2014) conducted empirical research on 10 
indicators for 26 economies, covering quarterly time series starting in 1980, using 
criteria derived from the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, (the ROC curve 
is a mapping of the false positive rate (Type II errors) to the true positive rate (the 
complement of Type I errors).  The 10 indicators were, debt service ratio (DSR), credit 
growth, credit-to-GDP gap, non-core deposit ratio, credit growth, property price gap, 
property price growth, equity price gap, equity price growth, GDP growth and history.  
They saw the area under the curve (AUC) as a summary measure, credit-to-GDP gap 
performed well over long horizons and the Debt Service Ratio is better in the shorter 
horizons. 
 
Detken et al (2014) of the ESRB also found favourable results for the indicator 
properties of the credit-to-GDP gap in the European Union countries.  They found that 
in univariate signalling, the gap is the best single leading indicator for systemic banking 
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crises associated with excessive credit growth.  Meanwhile, multivariate analysis 
showed that when the gap is combined with other variables (such as debt service to 
income, the current account/GDP and real equity price growth) in a multivariate 
signalling approach, a discrete choice model or a decision tree, the overall signalling 
performance improves. 
 
In recent related work, Grintzalis et al (2017) present estimates of finance-adjusted 
output gaps which incorporate the information on the domestic and global credit cycles 
for a sample of emerging market economies (EMEs), with a state-space 
representation of an HP filter augmented with a measure of the credit gap to estimate 
finance-adjusted output gaps.  They measure the domestic and global credit gaps as 
the deviation of private-sector real credit growth and net capital flows to EMEs from 
long-term trends, using the asymmetric Band-Pass filter. They find financial cycle 
information is associated with cyclical movements in output. 
 
III. Critics of the credit-to-GDP gap 
 
In light of the positive and encouraging empirical results, Basel III recommends using 
the credit-to-GDP gap as a guide for setting the countercyclical capital buffer.  Yet, it 
has faced criticism in context of its role as a warning indicator in the countercyclical 
capital buffer framework and the identification of costly credit boom or banking crisis.  
Borgy et al (2014) of the Banque de France, for example, mentioned in their study of 
asset-price booms and banking crises, that existing macroprudential regulations may 
have given too strong a role to the credit-to-GDP gap as in their analysis it does not 
perform particularly well in the identification of costly asset-price booms or systemic 
banking crises relative to other indicators such as real interest rates and the real stock 
price.  
 
Barrell et al (2010a) in a logit analysis of precursors to banking crises in OECD 
countries, found that house prices were key indicators, along with aggregate banking 
sector leverage and liquidity. Subsequent work found the current account/GDP ratio 
(Barrell et al 2010b) and a measure of off-balance-sheet activity (Karim et al 2013) to 
be also relevant.  However, in all their estimations they did not find measures related 
to credit growth to be significant once a simplification search had taken place. 
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Repullo and Saurina (2011) argued that the credit-to-GDP gap could exacerbate the 
inherent procyclicality of risk-sensitive bank capital regulation.  GDP growth is seen as 
a better indicator for these purposes. In addition, as the credit-to-GDP gap 
corresponds to the deviation from a filtered trend, its real-time use depends mostly on 
the reliability of the end-of-sample estimates of credit and GDP. Some authors argue 
that subsequent revisions of macroeconomic statistics could be as large as the gap 
itself (Edge and Meisenzahl, 2011), which can raise concerns about the robustness of 
the credit-to-GDP gap if used as the sole indicator for CCB implementation. 
 
Giese et al (2014) of the Bank of England, in looking that the performance of the credit-
to-GDP gap in the UK, saw that it provided timely signals for policy tightening in past 
episodes of banking system distress.  Yet, they are still cautious on performance of 
the gap in the future and they suggested complementary indicators such as household 
debt-to-income ratios, leverage ratio, etc.  Similarly, Bennani et al (2014) saw that 
credit-to-GDP gap as well as real credit growth variables perform well in signalling a 
boom early in the case of France but other indicators such as measures of property 
prices, of private sector debt sustainability or of bank balance sheets could also 
usefully complement the credit-to-GDP gap.  As with the case of macroprudential 
policy, it is not a case of “one size fits all” and no single indicator can be used to identify 
asset-price booms and banking crises.  As Bank of England (2014) suggested it is 
therefore important to complement the credit-to-GDP gap measure with other 
indicators, a point acknowledged in the Basel III Accord guidance and in EU 
legislation. 
 
As a response, Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014) of the BIS identified three areas of 
criticism of the credit-to-GDP gap.  These areas are (i) the credit gap is not a good 
measure for setting the buffer because it can lead to decisions that conflict with the 
countercyclical capital buffer objective; (ii) the credit gap is not the best early warning 
indicator for banking crises, especially in the case of emerging market economies; and 
(iii) the credit gap has measurement problems.  They acknowledged there are relevant 
measurement issues with the credit-to-GDP gap, particularly the starting point for the 
calculation and how to deal with structural breaks in the data series.  Yet they 
suggested that the data should be properly adjusted to deal with structural breaks and 
the gap should be develop using at least ten years of data.  Additionally, in their 
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research, they saw that the credit-to-GDP gap performs better in providing 
policymakers with reliable signals about when to raise the buffer but this does not 
mean that the credit-to-GDP gap should solely be used, notably during a bust when 
more rapid release of buffers may be required. 
  
Indeed, Detken et al (2014) suggested that multivariate analysis of other variables 
when combined with the credit-to-GDP gap, can reduce the false alarms and improve 
on the signalling performance of the credit-to-GDP gap.  Yet, judgement may have to 
play an even greater role, as empirical results are less robust and that complementary 
market-based indicators (such as overnight swaps or covered bond spreads, etc.) are 
found to display the best performance of coincident or near-crisis indicators to be used 
to signal that the CCB should be reduced or released. 
 
We now move on to Section 3.4. Empirical analysis for testing the effectiveness 
of macroprudential policy which provide a quantitative assessment of the 
effectiveness of macroprudential policy in reducing imbalances in the financial sector 
as measured by the credit-to-GDP gap. 
 
3.4. Empirical analysis for testing the effectiveness of macroprudential 
policy 
 
This section of the chapter looks at the empirical analysis for testing the effect of 
macroprudential policy on the credit-to-GDP gap.  However, before presenting our 
empirical results, we will, firstly outline the key datasets used in the analysis.  
Secondly, we discuss the model specifications and methodology. 
 
3.4.1. Datasets for modelling the impact of macroprudential policy 
 
Our data modelling used two key datasets, one from the BIS for the credit-to-GDP gap 
(denoted CGDPGAP) and the other, the IMF GMPI survey data on macroprudential 
instruments (where macroprudential instruments are denoted MAPP) (Cerutti et al 
(2015a)). 




I. BIS’ credit-to-GDP gap data 
 
In September 2016, the BIS released time-series quarterly data on the credit-to-GDP 
gap covering 43 countries and one economic region, the Euro area, starting at the 
earliest in 1961.  In our model testing, the Euro area is excluded from the panel 
analysis as many individual countries in the Euro area are already included in the data.  
There are 27 advanced countries and 16 emerging market economies in the BIS’ 
credit-to-GDP gap dataset.  The following Table 3.1 shows the list of countries in the 
panel analysis and the sample period of their credit-to-GDP gap. 
   
Table 3.1: List of countries included in the empirical analysis 
 
Country ISO Code Credit-to-GDP Gap1 IMF category 
Argentina ARG 2000q1 EME 
Australia AUS 2000q1 ADV 
Austria AUT 2000q1 ADV 
Belgium BEL 2000q1 ADV 
Brazil BRA 2005q1 EME 
Canada CAN 2000q1 ADV 
Switzerland CHE 2000q1 ADV 
Chile CHL 2000q1 EME 
China (People's Republic of) CHN 2000q1 EME 
Colombia COL 2006q4 EME 
Czech Republic CZE 2003q1 ADV 
Denmark DEN 2000q1 ADV 
Germany DEU 2000q1 ADV 
Spain ESP 2000q1 ADV 
Finland FIN 2000q1 ADV 
France FRA 2000q1 ADV 
United Kingdom GBR 2000q1 ADV 
Greece GRC 2000q1 ADV 
Hong Kong SAR HKG 2000q1 ADV 
Hungary HUN 2000q1 EME 
Indonesia IDN 2000q1 EME 
India IND 2000q1 EME 
Ireland IRL 2000q1 ADV 
Israel ISR 2001q1 ADV 
Italy ITA 2000q1 ADV 
Japan JPN 2000q1 ADV 
Korea KOR 2000q1 ADV 
Luxembourg LUX 2012q1 ADV 
Mexico MEX 2000q1 EME 
Malaysia MYS 2000q1 EME 
Netherlands NLD 2000q1 ADV 
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Norway NOR 2000q1 ADV 
New Zealand NZL 2000q1 ADV 
Poland POL 2002q1 EME 
Portugal PRT 2000q1 ADV 
Russia RUS 2005q1 EME 
Saudi Arabia SAU 2003q1 EME 
Singapore SGP 2000q1 ADV 
Sweden SWE 2000q1 ADV 
Thailand THA 2000q1 EME 
Turkey TUR 2000q1 EME 
United States USA 2000q1 ADV 
South Africa ZAF 2000q1 EME 
Source: BIS credit-to-GDP gap statistics (Version: March 2017).  IMF WEO country classification (April 
2017), ADV - advanced country, EME - emerging market economy. 1 Sample beginning period. 
 
Appendix 3A.1 shows the credit-to-GDP gap for a number of countries.  Appendix 
Figures 3A.1 to 3A.5 show the credit-to-GDP gaps for a number of advanced 
countries and emerging market economies in Europe, Asia, the Americas and 
Southern hemisphere.  A positive credit-to-GDP gap indicates that credit growth 
relative to GDP growth may have reached excessive levels in relation to its trend, 
implying financial imbalances and in BIS’ research often foreshadows a crisis.  A 
negative gap suggests that credit has not grown in line with GDP growth and there is 
excess capacity in credit markets (see Section 3.3 above for discussion on the credit-
to-GDP gap). 
 
Of particular interest (Appendix Figure 3A.1), Germany has been reporting a 
negative gap since 2003Q4, suggesting that there is excess capacity in credit 
expansion.  In France, there was a continuous rise in the (positive) gap from 2003Q4 
until the effects of the global financial crisis in 2007-2008 started to take a hold in 
2009Q4, whereas the gap trended downward but remained positive.  Italy experienced 
a greater fall in their gap, moving from positive to negative, after the financial crisis, 
which was also influenced by the European Sovereign Debt Crisis (see Lane (2012)).  
In Spain and Ireland, the gaps were excessively high in the quarters leading up to the 
financial crisis.  Spain’s gap reached a high of 40 percent and Ireland peaked at 88 
percent on account of a housing sector credit boom (see Norris and Byrne (2015)).  In 
2015q1, the Irish data was affected by a change in the reporting of financial institutions.  
Institutions’ off-balance sheet items are being captured in the data from the on, and 
as a result there was a large jump in the Ireland’s gap in the quarter.  In the UK, the 
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gap had been relatively stable leading up to the crisis.  The chart shows that all three 
countries’ gap fell after the financial crisis (Appendix Figure 3A.2). 
  
In the South American countries, the gap in Argentina had been mostly negative after 
their sovereign debt crisis which started in 2001 (see Hornbeck (2013)).  The gap in 
Chile started to fall at the same time as Argentina’s sovereign debt crisis, which 
suggest they could have been negatively affected by the crisis.  Brazil’s gap, which is 
available from 2004q4, shows a gradual increase and then a decease later in the 
sample period (Appendix Figure 3A.3).  In the US, the starting point for the 2007-
2008 global financial crisis, shows the steady rise in the gap before a declining as the 
crisis took hold.  Canada reported a decline in their gap on account of the financial 
crisis but the gap stayed positive post-crisis period and has since returned to the pre-
crisis level.  Mexico recorded a gradual increase in their gap over the sample period 
(Appendix Figure 3A.4).  
 
In the southern countries of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa (Appendix 
Figure 3A.5), the gaps increased relatively in the same pattern and fell when the 
financial crisis started to take hold.  New Zealand experienced the largest decline in 
the post-crisis period.  In Asia (Appendix Figure 3A.6), China and Singapore have 
recorded strong positive gaps since the 2007-2008 financial crisis, with Japan being 
relative stable. 
 
Overall, most of the countries experienced a fall in their credit-to-GDP gap as a result 
of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis after a period of continuous growth between 
2000 to 2006.  In addition, a country’s credit-to-GDP gap tends to fall after a country 
experienced a crisis, such as in the case with Argentina in 2001.   
 
II. Macroprudential instruments dataset 
 
The IMF dataset on macroprudential instruments (which we denote MAPP) covers 119 
countries for the period 2000 to 2013.   The data are from the IMF’s Global 
Macroprudential Policy Instruments (GMPI) survey.  There are 12 macroprudential 
survey instruments and 2 additional derived instruments and 3 groups summary 
instruments in the publicly available dataset.  This macroprudential database is used 
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as it is one of the most comprehensive databases on the actual usage of 
macroprudential instruments by countries over the sample period 2000-2013, which is 
publicly available.32  Furthermore, it is based on survey data collected from official 
reporting agencies to the IMF such as central banks and financial sector regulatory 
authorities. 
 
An alternative is the International Banking Research Network (IBRN) dataset on 
macroprudential instruments, which covers sixty-four (64) countries for the period 
2000 to 2014 (see Cerutti et al IBRN (2017)).33  We will discuss IBRN further in 
Chapter 4.  This dataset is quarterly frequency, the same frequency of the credit-to-
GDP gap but it is not used in this chapter since it omits some categories of 
macroprudential instruments included in the IMF macroprudential dataset such as 
debt-to-income ratio (DTI), taxes, dynamic loan-Loss provisioning (DP), etc. as 
discussed in Cerutti et al IBRN (2017).  In addition, for comparison to the research 
literature, the IMF macroprudential dataset provides a more comprehensive list of 
macroprudential instruments.   
 
This IMF macroprudential dataset is also used in Chapter 5, with the IBRN 
macroprudential dataset being used in Chapter 4.  We are testing a subset of the 
instruments listed in Chapter 2.  For a discussion on the description and taxonomy of 
the macroprudential instruments see Chapter 2.  Table 3.2 below shows the 
instruments in the IMF macroprudential dataset.   
 
Table 3.2: Description of macroprudential instruments dataset 
 
Instrument Abbreviation 
Survey Instruments   
Loan-to-Value Ratio LTV 
Debt-to-Income Ratio DTI 
Time-Varying/Dynamic Loan-Loss Provisioning DP 
General Countercyclical Capital Buffer/Requirement  CTC 
Leverage Ratio LEV 
Capital Surcharges on SIFIs SIFI 
 
32 The data can be downloaded and available in Excel on the IMF website at:  
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/Data/wp1561.zip.  
33 The data can be downloaded and available in Excel on the IBRN web page at: 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/ibrn/prudential_ind_3.xlxs. The data is also described 
in Cerutti et al (2016). 
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Limits on Interbank Exposures INTER 
Concentration Limits CONC 
Limits on Foreign Currency Loans FC 
Reserve Requirement Ratios RR 
Limits on Domestic Currency Loans CG 
Levy/Tax on Financial Institutions TAX 
Derived Instruments   
Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps LTVCAP 
FX and/or Countercyclical Reserve Requirements RRREV 
Groups of Instruments  
Total macroprudential instruments MPI 
Macroprudential instruments focused on the borrower MPIB 
Macroprudential instruments focused on the financial 
institution 
MPIF 
Source: Cerutti et al (2015a) (Version February 24th, 2015).  Notes: each variable is a dummy that takes 
on two values: 0 for no policy and 1 for policy in effect. The database covers a sample from 2000 to 
2013 with annual data.  The groups instruments are the aggregate of the survey instruments.   
 
Table 3.3 below shows the usage of the macroprudential instruments by the 43 
countries in the panel data.  The data is compiled by first use and not by instances.  
The table shows countries employ various macroprudential instruments and from the 
survey, the ones being used the most are LTV, CONC, INTER and DTI (Cerutti et al 
(2015a)). 
 
Table 3.3: Summary statistics on the usage of macroprudential instruments 
 





Loan-to-Value Ratio LTV 25 13 12 
Debt-to-Income Ratio DTI 14 7 7 
Time-Varying/Dynamic Loan-Loss 
Provisioning 
DP 3 1 2 
General Countercyclical Capital 
Buffer/Requirement  
CTC 1 1 0 
Leverage Ratio LEV 8 4 4 
Capital Surcharges on SIFIs SIFI 4 3 1 
Limits on Interbank Exposures INTER 14 9 5 
Concentration Limits CONC 24 13 11 
Limits on Foreign Currency Loans  FC 8 2 6 
Reserve Requirement Ratios RR 6 2 4 
101 
 
Limits on Domestic Currency 
Loans 
CG 2 0 2 
Levy/Tax on Financial Institutions TAX 12 7 5 
Derived Instruments 
Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps LTVCAP 17 9 8 





Total by country classification  43 27 16 
Source: Cerutti et al (2015a) (Version February 24th, 2015). IMF WEO country classification (April 2017) 
and author’s extension.  IMF WEO country classification (April 2017). ADV is advanced country, EME 
is emerging market economies. 
 
Additionally, Table 3.4 shows the usage of the macroprudential instruments by the 43 
countries in the IMF dataset over the sample periods, pre-crisis 2000-2006 and post- 
crisis 2007-2013.  The table shows countries employ various macroprudential 
instruments and from the survey, preceding the 2007-2008 financial crisis, emerging 
market economies used macroprudential instruments the most and have a longer 
history in using some of these instruments (see Appendix 2A.2 as well).  Also, the 
table shows that since the crisis, advanced countries have increased the use of these 
instruments.  
 
Table 3.4: Summary statistics on the usage of macroprudential instruments 
over the sample periods, pre-crisis 2000-2006 and post- crisis 2007-2013  
 









Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV) 6 13 6 12 
Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps (LTVCAP) 4 10 5 8 
Debt-to-Income Ratio (DTI) 2 7 4 7 
Time-Varying/Dynamic Loan-Loss 
Provisioning (DP) 
1 1 1 3 
General Countercyclical Capital 
Buffer/Requirement (CTC)  
0 1 0 0 
Leverage Ratio (LEV) 2 4 2 4 
Capital Surcharges on SIFIs (SIFI) 0 3 2 1 
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Limits on Interbank Exposures (INTER) 5 9 4 5 
Concentration Limits (CONC) 12 13 11 11 
Limits on Foreign Currency Loans (FC) 0 2 2 6 
Reserve Requirement Ratios (RR) 2 2 
 
3 5 
FX and/or Countercyclical Reserve 
Requirements (RRREV) 
0 0 2 3 
Limits on Domestic Currency Loans (CG) 0 0 
 
2 3 
Levy/Tax on Financial Institutions (TAX) 1 7 3 5 
Source: Cerutti et al (2015a) (Version February 24th, 2015). IMF WEO country classification (April 2017) 
and author’s extension.  ADV - advanced country, EME - emerging market economies. 
 
Due to the coverage of the IMF dataset, the period for the analysis will be from 2000q1 
to 2013q4 and the IMF GMPI survey data is converted from yearly to quarterly data 
frequency.  The measures were coded from the beginning of the year they are actually 
in place and subsequently all quarters after that starting year until the period they were 
discontinued.  Quarterly data for the measures is the most appropriate approach since 
we are testing the macroprudential policies’ effectiveness against the lowering of the 
credit-to-GDP gap, which is a quarterly measure, it is appropriate to have a quarterly 
frequency for the measures.  Please see Chapter 2 for a discussion on the taxonomy 
of the macroprudential instruments. 
 
Our main focus is on macroprudential instruments that are expected to have a 
negative and significant effect on the credit-to-GDP gap especially when it is positive 
over the sample period.  We expect that macroprudential measures which target banks 
assets (credit activities) as defined in Section 2.3.2 above will have the greater effect 
on reducing the credit-to-GDP gap since the gap is a credit measure.  Accordingly, we 
expect that debt-to-income ratio (DTI), loans-to-value measures (LTV and LTVCAP) 
and concentration limits (CONC), etc., should have a greater effect on the credit-to-
GDP gap.  This is also supported by empirical research by Lim et al (2011), Dell’Ariccia 
et al (2012), Jiménez et al (2012), Vandenbussche et al (2012), Akinci and Olmstead-
Rumsey (2015), Kuttner and Shim (2016), Cerutti et al (2017), Carreras et al (2018) 
using macro data.  They found various macroprudential instruments to be effective in 
reducing the financial system imbalances (credit and house price growth).   Similarly, 
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Claessens et al (2014) using bank-by-bank data found that policies aimed at borrowers 
are effective in (indirectly) reducing the build-up of banking system vulnerabilities.  
They suggested that measures aimed at banks’ assets and liabilities are also very 
effective. 
 
3.4.2. Model specification 
 
I. Baseline model 
 
The starting point for our empirical analysis is the work of Cerutti et al (2015a, 2017) 
as noted above, who look at how the macroprudential index and its various sub-
indexes relate to the growth in countries’ credit and house prices.  Also, relevant is the 
work of Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015), who as notes using quarterly data, 
investigated macroprudential policies’ effects on total bank credit, housing credit and 
house prices using their own calculated macroprudential index.  We note that both 
used a GMM specification (Arellano and Bond 1991) which they considered most 
appropriate to deal with the lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects.  Lags 
of the tools should mitigate potential endogeneity. 
 
The specification we used in our analysis extends from the work of Cerutti et al (2015a, 
2017) and the literature where firstly, we are using the credit-to-GDP gap (CGDPGAP) 
as our dependent variable, instead of the underlying credit and house prices series.  
This will identify which macroprudential instrument (MAPP) will have an effect in 
reducing the build-up of imbalances in the credit market using the credit-to-GDP gap.  
Secondly, by using the credit-to-GDP gap as the dependent variable this will provide 
policy makers with a list of macroprudential instruments are most effective in reducing 
the gap, if there is a need to respond to a credit market imbalance.   
 
The empirical reduced-form regression model used in the analysis is as follows: 
 
CGDPGAPi,t = αCGDPGAPi,t-1 + ßBCRISISi,t-1 + ÞXi,t-1 + Ųi + ɛit (3.4) 
 
where i denotes the countries, t indicates time period.  The dependent variable, 
CGDPGAPi,t denotes the quarterly credit-to-GDP gap.  The lagged credit-to-GDP gap 
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variable (CGDPGAPi,t-1) included in the model is expected to have a positive effect on 
future credit-to-GDP gap values.  In terms of control variables (see Table 3.5 below) 
BCRISIS variable is a vector capturing the presence of a banking crisis during the 
period a country experienced a banking crisis as defined by Laeven and Valencia 
(2018).  This is included because credit activities are normally affected during a crisis 
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4).  It is a dummy variable and it is coded in the quarter 
the crisis starts until the period it was over.  Additional macroeconomic control 
variables denoted by Xc,t, are the unemployment rate (UNEMPLRATE), the real GDP 
growth rate (REALGDPRATE), the inflation rate (INFLATRATE) and the monetary 
authority bank rate (BANKRATE).  Finally, similar to Cerutti (2015a, 2017), we include 
cross-section fixed effects to allow for country specific conditions which are invariant 
over time, which should allow for economic and financial development, the relative mix 
of bank and market-based intermediation, financial structure in terms of institutional 
concentration, and various other institutional characteristics.  This is represented by 
the variable Ųi.  The error term is ɛit.  
 
We did consider other possible control variables such as fiscal policy, confidence 
variables and monetary growth.  However we do not consider fiscal policy to be a first-
choice control variable since its link to credit is not evident (other recent papers in the 
field such as Kuttner and Shin (2016), Carreras et al (2018), Cerutti et al (2017) and 
Akinci and Olmstead Rumsey (2018) did not include it).  Meanwhile, there is a 
subjective bias if using confidence variables to capture economic activities while 
generally, monetary growth is likely to be very highly correlated with credit growth. 
 
Among the control variables, we expect that real GDP growth rate will have a negative 
effect  (inverse relationship) on the credit-to-GDP gap since GDP is the denominator 
in the credit-to-GDP ratio formula (see Section 3.3 above).  Similarly, we expected 
that if central bank rate increases, this should have a negative effect on credit 
expansion and on the credit-to-GDP gap.  The banking crisis dummy variable is 
expected to have a negative effect on the credit-to-GDP gap since in a crisis, banking 
credit activities are affected more than GDP, yet the strength of the effect would 
depend on how long the crisis lasts and the response of the fiscal and monetary 
authorities to the crisis (once again see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4).  We expect that a 
rise in unemployment rate should have a negative effect on credit expansion relative 
105 
 
to GDP and the credit-to-GDP gap.  The effect of inflation on the credit-to-GDP gap is 
expected to positive or negative depending on which part of the credit-to-GDP ratio 
formula is affected more by inflation.  The nominator (credit) and denominator (GDP) 
in the credit-to-GDP ratio formula are in nominal terms.  On balance since credit is 
usually by definition fixed in nominal terms while prices of goods and services 
comprising GDP would usually rise with inflation, we would expect a negative effect. 
 
The data for the control variables are collected from the IMF’ International Financial 
Statistics, the OECD database and International Labour Organisation (ILO).  The 
control variables will be tested for significance.  In this we follow Cerutti et al (2017) 
but include unemployment and inflation as additional controls. 
 
Table 3.5: Control variables data source 
 
Variable Source 
Banking crisis dummy (BCRISIS) Laeven and Valencia (2018) 
Central bank rate (BANKRATE) IMF International Financial Statistics and 
Bank for International Settlement 
Real GDP growth rate 
(REALGDPRATE) 
IMF International Financial Statistics 
Unemployment rate (UNEMPLRATE) IMF International Financial Statistics and 
International Labour Organisation 
Inflation rate (INFLATRATE) IMF International Financial Statistics 
Notes: For some countries, data for certain variables were collected from their central bank and/or 
national statistical agency.  In addition, some data were derived by the author.  
 
II. Descriptive statistics of the model variables 
 
Table 3.6 and 3.7 show below some descriptive statistics of the variables in the model 
for all countries, advanced countries and emerging market economies over the period 
2000q1 to 2013q4.  Table 3.6 shows that for the sample countries, the credit-to-GDP 
ratio is above its long-term trend as the mean is not zero.  Yet, there is large variation 
in the credit-to-GDP gap ranging from -51 percent to 81.10 percent and a standard 
deviation of 15.17 percent.  The maximum value of 88.10 percent is Ireland (see 
Appendix 3A.1), where their gap peak in the first quarter of 2010 before declining as 
Ireland experienced the effects of the global financial crisis and subsequent an 
economic recession.  The minimum value of -51 percent is Thailand (2001q4), which 
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shows the slowdown in credit growth most likely due to the after-effects of the Asian 
financial crisis (1997-1998). 
 
Table 3.6: Descriptive statistics of the variables in the model for the period 













 Mean  2.94 4.42 2.85 7.23 3.56 
 Median  3.60 3.25 2.86 6.11 2.60 
 Maximum 88.10 82.46 18.86 30.40 70.32 
Minimum -51.00 0.00 -16.34 0.47 -6.11 
Standard 
Deviation 15.17 5.87 3.69 4.57 5.00 
Observations 2,255 2,303 2,357 2,408 2,408 
Number of 
countries 43 43 43 43 43 
Note: The values are in per cent except for the observations and the number of countries, which is a 
number.  The data are quarterly values.  The variables are in level.  ADV – Advanced countries, EME 
– Emerging market economies. 
 
The central bank rate has a minimum value of zero, supporting the fact that during the 
financial crisis many advanced countries lowered their rate to virtually zero to increase 
economic activity and reduce the impact of the subsequent economic recession.  
Argentina recorded the highest central bank rate of 82.46 per cent in 2001 as the 
country experienced a debt and financial crisis.  Real GDP growth is mainly influenced 
by the strength of the Asian countries such as China, Singapore, Thailand, India and 
the Middle East country of Saudi Arabia.  Singapore reported the largest real GDP 
growth of 18.86% in 2010Q2 and with Argentina recording a decline of -16.34% in 
2002Q1, which is around the same time of their sovereign debt and financial crisis 
which started in 2001 (see Hornbeck (2013)). 
 
Further, Table 3.6 shows that the mean unemployment rate is 7.23 percent with the 
maximum rate of 30.40 percent, which is reported in South Africa.  During the period, 
South Africa reported very high unemployment rates, averaging 25.26 per cent.  
Thailand reported the lowest unemployment of 0.47 and their average during the 
period was 1.67 percent.  The low employment rate is the result of high economic 
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growth as well as the benefits from the economic expansion in neighbouring countries 
in Asia as indicated above.  Turkey reported the highest inflation rate of 70.32 per cent 
on account of political instability and a financial crisis in 2001, which is in line with the 
high central bank rate which was used to control inflation.  In Ireland inflation rate fell 
to -6.11 per cent as result of the financial crisis. 
 
Table 3.7 below that the credit-to-GDP gap is higher in advanced countries, 
suggesting the higher rate of credit growth relative to GDP in these countries, while 
GDP growth is higher in emerging market economies.  This highlights the relationship 
between credit growth (demand side) in advanced countries and economic growth in 
emerging market economies (supply side).  Intuitively, it follows that with higher 
economic growth in emerging markets, the central bank rate is also higher as there is 
a need to control higher inflation and cool the overheating economy in emerging 
markets.  However, the unemployment rate is higher in emerging markets than in 
advanced countries, which could suggest excess labour capacity although emerging 
markets experienced an economic boom during the period.   
 
Table 3.7: Descriptive statistics of the variables in the model for advanced 










rate Inflation rate 
 ADV EME ADV EME ADV EME ADV EME ADV EME 
 Mean 5.42 -1.43 2.65 8.39 2.00 4.50 6.69 8.49 2.07 6.20 
 Median 5.10 1.30 2.50 6.50 2.15 4.84 5.90 7.22 2.12 4.73 
 Maximum 88.10 39.90 9.90 82.46 18.86 16.24 27.80 30.40 7.47 70.32 
 Minimum -41.10 -51.00 0.00 0.25 -10.73 -16.34 1.67 0.47 -6.11 -3.29 
Standard 
Deviation 15.41 13.62 1.89 8.13 3.16 3.92 3.51 5.88 1.54 7.18 
Observations 1,447 804 1,512 896 1,512 896 1,512 896 1,512 896 
Number of 
countries 27 16 27 16 27 16 27 16 27 16 
Note: The values are in percent except for the observations and the number of countries, which is a 
number.  The data are quarterly values.  The variables are in level.  ADV – Advanced countries, EME 




It is important to mention that some of the large maximum and minimum values for the 
model variables are the result of political and financial crises in a number of countries 
(e.g. Argentina, Turkey, Greece, Ireland, Russia, Spain, etc.) and these values can be 
seen as outliers during the period.  Note however that we have not chosen to winsorise 
the data, in line with studies such as Carreras et al (2018). 
  
III. Correlation matrix for the variables in the model 
 
Table 3.8 below shows that for all countries, none of the variables are highly correlated 
except for the central bank rate and inflation, which are high positively correlated 
(Pearson’s correlation coefficient) (see Hinkle et al (2003)).34   
 
Table 3.8: Correlation matrix for the variables in the model for the period 















Gap 1.00     
Central bank 
rate -0.02 1.00    
Real GDP 
growth rate -0.20 0.09 1.00   
Unemployment 
rate 0.12 0.13 -0.20 1.00  
Inflation  
rate -0.00 0.76 0.08 0.10 1.00 
Note: The variables are in level.   
 
The high positive correlation between the central bank rate and the inflation rate is 
because a number of countries such as Argentina, Russia and Turkey, etc., which at 
some point experienced a political and financial crisis, reported higher central bank 
and inflation rates during the period.  Also as noted above, emerging market 
economies were experiencing higher economic growth than advanced countries as 
such interest rates were used to dampened economic growth and higher inflation 
 
34 The rule of thumb for interpreting the size of a correlation coefficient is the following: 0.90 to 1.00 (-
0.90 to –1.00) very high positive (negative) correlation; 0.70 to 0.90 (-0.70 to -0.90) high positive 
(negative) correlation; 0.50 to 0.70 (-0.50 to -0.70) moderate positive (negative) correlation; 0.30 to 0.50 
(-0.30 to -0.50) low positive (negative) correlation; 0.00 to 0.30 (0.00 to -0.30) little if any correlation. 
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growth rate.  As expected, we found there is a low negative correlation between the 
central bank rate, GDP growth rate and credit-to-GDP gap.  The correlation between 
credit/GDP gap and inflation is virtually zero, the relationship is -0.003.  However, there 
is a positive correlation between the credit-to-GDP gap and the unemployment rate 
but there is a negative correlation between unemployment rate and GDP growth.  
There is a positive correlation between inflation and economic growth. 
 
Once again, in Table 3.9 below, none of the variables are highly correlated except for 
the central bank rate and inflation, which is high positively correlated in emerging 
markets (0.75).  As discussed above, this is due to the higher reported central bank 
and inflation rates in emerging markets. 
  
Table 3.9: Correlation matrix for the variables in the model for the period 





























Central bank  












rate 0.12 0.22 -0.22 0.15 -0.34 -0.21 1.00 1.00  
 
Inflation  
rate 0.18 0.08 0.28 0.75 0.14 -0.11 -0.09 0.09 1.00 1.00 
Note: The variables are in level. ADV – advanced countries, EME – emerging market economies. 
 
IV. Unit Root Tests 
 
An important issue is how to enter variables into the model.  We would prefer to have 
stationary variables for the regression, in line with the existing literature.  A set of 
results for panel unit root tests is given in Table 3.10 below.  We see that over 2000q1-
2013q4, all the control variables are stationary both according to the Levin-Lin-Chu 
test (2002) (which assumes a common unit root process for all countries) and the Im-
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Pesaran-Shin test (2003) (which allows for individual unit root processes between 
countries). 
 
Table 3.10: Summary statistics of the unit root tests 2000q1-2013q4 
 
Variable Levin-Lin-Chu Im-Pesaran-Shin 
BANKRATE -4.88 (0.00) -4.1 (0.00) 
REALGDPRATE -4.3 (0.00) -12.7 (0.00) 
UNEMPLRATE -3.42 (0.00) -5.04 (0.00) 
INFLATRATE -3.90 (0.00) -11.88 (0.00) 
CGDPGAP 2.3 (0.98) 4.6 (1.0) 
CGDPGAP (WITH TREND) -3.03 (0.00) 2.25 (0.99) 
CGDPGAP (NO CONSTANT) -5.81 (0.00) n/a 
DIFFERENCE OF CGDPGAP -22.1 (0.00) -23.7 (0.00) 
CGDPGAP FULL SAMPLE FROM 1951 -1.21 (0.11) -2.81 (0.00) 
CGDPGAP SAMPLE FROM 1970Q1 -1.22 (0.11) -2.74 (0.00) 
CGDPGAP SAMPLE FROM 1980Q1 -1.74 (0.04) -2.39 (0.01) 
CGDPGAP SAMPLE FROM 1990Q1 -0.14 (0.44) -0.12 (0.45) 
Note: P-value in parentheses 
 
The outstanding issue is how to deal with the credit-GDP gap.  The logic of a Hodrick 
Prescott filter is that the difference between the variable and its trend tends to be 
stationary. This is borne out in practice by the longer runs of data shown in the table, 
where the full dataset and the data from 1970 and 1980 onwards are stationary. On 
the other hand, the data from 1990 and 2000 onwards fail the stationarity tests, unless 
the variable is first differenced. We considered that the a priori considerations and the 
results from the longer term still justified the inclusion of the level of the credit gap as 
if it were stationary. Accordingly, we have it as a level and lagged level in the chosen 
specification.  In Section 3.5 we show an alternative GMM-difference estimate with 
the first difference of the gap as a robustness check. 
 
3.4.3. Estimation methodology 
 
Similar, to Cerutti et al (2017) and Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015), we undertook 
a dynamic panel data regression using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
method (Arellano and Bond (1991)) in differences using quarterly data from 43 
countries.  The period sample begins in 2000q1 and ends in 2013q4.  Instruments 
were lagged levels of the independent variables and two further lags of the dependent 
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variable.  In each case, the insignificant variables were eliminated.  Including lagged 
levels of the variables are consistent with the literature as well as it should help with 
addressing endogeneity concerns. 
 
Notably, we decided to estimate the baseline model using difference35 GMM (Arellano 
and Bond (1991)) instead of Ordinary Least Squares, in line with the literature, such 
as Davis et al (2019), Cerutti et al (2017) and Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015) 
and Claessens et al (2014).  Also, an OLS specification could lead to biased results 
due to the presence of lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects.  
Therefore, as noted above we used GMM method as our primary modelling technique.  
OLS estimation with country fixed effects will be used as one of the robustness checks.  
 
The baseline model was estimated over three periods, full sample 2000q1-2013q4, 
pre-crisis 2000q1-2006q4, post-crisis 2007q1-2013q4 as well as by country 
classifications, all countries, advanced countries and emerging market economies.  
This was done to understand the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments in 
different periods, especially before the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  The country 
classifications models give an idea of which macroprudential instruments are more 
effectiveness based on the economic structure of a country not least since that 
emerging market economies has been using macroprudential instruments longer than 
advanced countries (Cerutti et al (2017)).   
 
3.4.4. Main regression results of the effectiveness of the macroprudential policy 
(all countries) 
 
I. Baseline equation regression results (all countries) 
 
The baseline models were tested for goodness of fit using the Sargan test (J-
Statistics).  The J-Statistics results indicate that the null hypothesis of over-identifying 
restrictions is not rejected and there is first-order autocorrelation but no second order 
autocorrelation in line with the expectation for GMM (see the Arellano-Bond (AB) test 
 
35 Furthermore, we wish to retain comparability with the existing literature such as Akinci and Olmstead-




for autocorrelation, AR1 and AR2).    The initial estimates for the all countries baseline 
models are shown in the following Table 3.11. 
 

























































Observations 2,167 986 1,181 
Sargan (J-Statistic) (p-value) 0.42 0.42 0.30 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) p-value 0.49 0.34 0.14 
Periods included 54 26 28 
Cross sections included 43 41 43 
Notes: The coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below each 
estimated coefficient.  The Sargan tests' null hypothesis of over-identifying restrictions are not rejected. 
Arellano-Bond (AB) test for AR(1) in first differences are rejected, but not for the AR(2) test.  *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
The baseline model coefficients signs are correct and expected except for the short-
term monetary policy interest rate (BANKRATE) as a higher cost of credit should 
reduce credit expansion and the bank crisis (BCRISIS) variable in the period 2007-
2013.  One would expect the BANKRATE sign to be negative and inversely related to 
the CGDPGAP variable.  However, many advanced countries lowered their monetary 
policy rate to almost zero percent in the period 2007 to 2013 in order to reduce the 
effect of the financial crisis and looming economic recession, thus creating a high 
liquidity environment to encourage credit and economic growth.  This may have 
resulted in a positive relationship with the CGDPGAP variable.  In addition, 
BANKRATE is not the only measure of monetary policy in some countries especially 
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in emerging markets; other monetary policy tools have been employed, such as 
reserve requirements, which are not captured in the model (see Cerutti et al (2017) as 
well). 
 
The result for the bank crisis (BCRISIS) variable, that it is insignificant, for the period 
2007-2013 is surprising but we argue that, as a result of the financial crisis many 
advanced countries employed expansionary monetary and fiscal policies for an 
extended period of time to dampen the negative effects of the crisis, which has a 
positive effect on the gap.  It could also be a case of reverse causality.  Also, as noted 
above, the significance and the strength of the effect of a crisis would depend on how 
long the crisis lasts and the response of the fiscal and monetary authorities to the crisis 
(see Chapter 2: Section 2.3.4).  However, it remains strongly significant over the full 
sample period.   
 
The negative coefficients on unemployment and the GDP growth rate are expected 
and consistent between periods.  As noted above (see Section 3.3), since GDP is the 
denominator in the credit-to-GDP ratio, one should expect GDP growth rate to be 
inversely related to the gap.  Also, a rise in the unemployment rate should have a 
negative effect on credit expansion and the credit-to-GDP gap.  Finally, the rate of 
inflation has a negative and significant effect on the credit-to-GDP gap.  This suggests 
that inflation is having a greater impact on GDP (denominator) than credit (numerator) 
in the credit-to-GDP ratio.  As indicated above, both the nominator and denominator 
values are in nominal terms but we expect credit to be fixed in nominal terms while 
nominal GDP typically rises in line with inflation. 
 
II. Estimated results of the effectiveness of the macroprudential instruments 
(all countries) 
 
The macroprudential instruments were tested one by one using the baseline models 
equation 3.4  (all countries).  The baseline models were transformed to include a vector 
of macroprudential instruments as shown below.   
 




The variable denoted by MAPP is the vector of  macroprudential policy instruments, 
which is a zero-one variable with zero for policy off and one for policy on.  It thus 
captures the macroprudential effect on the credit-to-GDP gap from the beginning of 
the year they are actually in place and subsequently all quarters after that starting year 
until the period it is discontinued.     
 
Table 3.12 below outline the results for each tool.  The instruments are tested over 
three periods as indicated above, 2000q1-2013q4, 2000q1-2006q4 (pre-crisis) and 
2007q1-2013q4 (crisis period).  Blanks show estimates that generated a near-singular 
matrix. 
 
a) Results for the period 2000q1-2013q4 
 
Overall in the period 2000-2013, the model results suggest that debt-to-income (DTI), 
concentration limits (CONC) and the loan-to-value ratios (LTV and LTVCAP) are the 
most effective macroprudential instruments, being statistically significant at all 
significance levels and negatively related to the credit-to-GDP gap.  DTI, LTV and 
LTVCAP has a direct effect on people’s ability to borrow, as they are determined by 
one’s income level, debt outstanding and the value of the property, thus having a 
strong effect on credit growth and the gap.  Concentration limits (CONC) affects 
financial firms’ ability to lend to specific sectors, reducing their exposure to these 
sectors.   
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(1.11) 
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Note: For macroprudential instruments definitions please see Table 3.2. for specification see Table 3.8. 
The instruments coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below 
each estimated coefficient. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Dynamic provisioning (DP) is also statistically significant.  This result is expected as 
DP is a countercyclical capital buffers tool, which help smooth credit supply cycles and 
in bad times, preserve financial firms’ ability to extent credit and their performance.  
DP contracts credit availability (volume and cost) in good times but expand it in bad 
times.  The result is consistent with Jiménez et al (2012) as they noted that dynamic 
provisioning generates countercyclical bank capital buffers, mitigates bank 





The overall MPI, the general borrowers-based MPIB and financial institutions-based 
MPIF measures are negative and statistically significant in the period 2000q1-2013q4, 
which suggest that macroprudential policies generally have a significant effect on 
credit-to-GDP gap.  This result is consistent with Cerutti et al (2017), where they 
suggested that macroprudential policies having a significant mitigating effects on credit 
growth.  
 
It is noted that the reserve requirements variables (RR and RRREV) are negative but 
statistically insignificant despite their use as a macroprudential instrument, notably in 
many emerging markets.  The difficulty in getting “right results”, that is negative and 
significant, for reserve requirements may link to their many roles such as an instrument 
of monetary policy and of macroprudential policy.  Reserve requirements set the 
minimum amount of reserves banks are required to hold and as such they are 
sometimes used as a tool in monetary policy by influencing banks’ lending, interest 
rates as well as for controlling inflation.  Also, in some emerging market economies, it 
has been used to support the foreign currency reserve and foreign exchange rate via 
reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits.  See for example Izquerido et al 
(2013) on related issues in Latin America.  In this context, the macroprudential 
instrument database does not capture and measure for what purpose reserve 
requirements were used by countries in the model, therefore interpreting the results 
for this tool could be challenging.    
 
A number of additional instruments were negative but insignificant in the period 2000-
2013, such as limits on domestics and foreign currency loans (CG and FC), the 
leverage ratio (LEV), levy/tax on financial institutions (TAX) and limits on interbank 
deposits (INTER).  This could be due to the uptick in the usage of these instruments 
because of the 2007-2008 financial crisis (see Table 3.4 above).  There is some 
promise in these instruments, but they have not been used regularly as in the case of 
LTV, CONC and DTI to form a proper conclusion to be drawn on these instruments. 
We note in this context the Bank of England (2014) view that the credit-to-GDP gap 
ratio should be complemented with other early warning indicators such as the Debt to 
Income ratio (i.e. as an indicator as well as being targeted by a tool), leverage ratio, 




b) Pre-crisis (2000q1-2006q4) and post-crisis (2007q1-2013q4) periods results 
 
In the pre-crisis period (2000q1-2006q4), the results suggest that debt-to-income ratio 
(DTI) and FX and/or countercyclical reserve requirements (RRREV) are statistically 
significant and have a negative impact on the credit-to-GDP gap.  A number of other 
macroprudential instruments are statistically significant as well such as time-varying/ 
dynamic loan-loss provisioning (DP), limits on interbank exposures (INTER) and 
foreign currency loans (FC) but their signs are positive, which in turn generates net 
positive real effects on the gap.  The positive sign in the pre-crisis period is not 
surprising as many advanced countries were experiencing an asset price boom, which 
allowed many individuals to borrow excessively against their property and financial 
institutions build-up excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the financial 
system (BCBS (2014)).  Barrell and Davis (2008) suggested that in the period leading 
up to the financial crisis, the world economy experienced an environment of low 
interest rates and with a build-up of large investment surpluses especially in China, 
which contributed to the rapid credit and asset prices expansion and consequently 
rising leverage. 
 
In term of the summary indexes, total macroprudential instruments (MPI) and MPIF, 
financial-institution-based are statistically significant but the signs are positive.  The 
MPIB, borrowers-based index is statistically insignificant but its sign is negative.  This 
suggests that in a period of rapid credit and asset prices expansion, strong economy 
growth, financial institutions are able to pass on the financial costs associated with 
macroprudential instruments to the public or absorb the costs in their profits.  In 
Chapter 5, we will look at the impact on banks’ profitability.  
 
In the post-crisis period (2007q1-2013q4), macroprudential instruments that target 
borrowers such as the loan-to-value ratios (LTV and LTVCAP) were negatively and 
statistically significant as well as the MPIB index.  Although, one of the aims of 
quantitative easing, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies was to stimulate credit 
growth and lending, yet on the other hand, we contend that there was concerns about 
high risks borrowers accessing “cheap” credit and countries used macroprudential 
instruments to target these borrowers.  Therefore, we expected that macroprudential 
instruments targeting borrowers will be significant. 
118 
 
As noted, an underlying cause of the 2007-2008 financial crisis was the build-up of 
excessive on- and off- balance sheet leverage in the financial system.  There has been 
a great deal of focus on banks’ leverage ratio by the BCBS (see Davis et al 2019a and 
b).  In the model results for the period 2007-2013, the leverage instrument (LEV) is 
negatively and statistically significant, which reduces banks’ ability to borrow to finance 
credit growth and lending.  Other instruments, concentration limits (CONC), time-
varying/ dynamic loan-loss provisioning (DP), debt-to-income ratio (DTI) and capital 
surcharges on SIFIs (SIFI) have a negative effect on the gap but they are all 
statistically insignificant.   
 
III. Advanced countries and emerging market economies results of the 
effectiveness of the macroprudential instruments 
 
a) Baseline models for advanced countries and emerging market economies 
 
The focus of the modelling results for advanced countries (ADV) and emerging market 
economies (EME) will mainly be 2007q1-2013q4 and some reference will be to the 
2000q1-2006q4 period for EME.36  Similar to the all countries models, the baseline 
models were tested for goodness of fit using the Sargan test (J-Statistics) and the test 
results indicate that the null hypothesis of over-identifying restrictions is not rejected.  
Please see Appendix 3A.2 for the baseline models results for advanced countries 
and emerging market economies. 
 
For both ADV and EME, the baseline model coefficients signs are correct and as 
expected except for the short-term monetary policy interest rate (BANKRATE) and the 
bank crisis (BCRISIS) variables.  This follows from the points made for the All countries 
model results, where the lowering of monetary policy rate to almost zero percent in 
advanced countries in the period 2007q1 to 2013q4 as well as quantitative easing, 
creating a high liquidity environment, to encourage credit growth, resulted in a positive 
relationship with the CGDPGAP variable.  In addition, for EME, the BANKRATE is not 
 
36 For the period 2000-2013, the baseline models for both group of countries, and for the period 2000-
2006 for advanced countries, the results are inconclusive as some of the independents variables are 
statistically insignificant and I was unable to use these models to test the effectiveness of the macro-
prudential instruments for these periods.   
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the only measure of monetary policy in some countries especially in emerging markets 
and other monetary policy instruments have been employed such as reserve 
requirements, which are not captured in the model. 
   
The bank crisis (BCRISIS) variable is statistically significant for EME but insignificant 
for ADV.  The same argument can be made for ADV as with the All countries model 
results, where, as a result of the financial crisis many advanced countries employ 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies for an extended period of time to dampen 
the negative effects of the crisis, which has a positive effect on the gap, could be a 
case of reverse causality.  Finally, the negative coefficients and inverse relationship 
between unemployment, inflation and GDP growth rate and the gap are expected.  
However, it should be noted that inflation is on the “border” for significant testing at 
90% for EME.  We will accept the result that inflation is insignificant for EME.  
 
For EME in the period 2000q1-2006q4, the banking crisis (BCRISIS) variable is not 
included in the baseline model since banking crises were limited to a few quarters for 
two countries (Argentina and Indonesia) in the data and the BCRISIS variable result 
was highly insignificant.  All the other coefficients results were consistent, negative 
and inversely related to the credit-to-GDP gap. 
 
IV. Macroprudential instruments results (advanced countries (ADV) and 
emerging market economies (EME)) 
 
For the period 2007q1-2013q4 for both ADV and EME, many of the macroprudential 
instruments and summary indexes are negative but they are statistically insignificant.  
Please see Appendix 3A.2 for macroprudential results.  It seems that macroprudential 
instruments were designed to work in a period of relative financial stability or assist in 
the preventing financial instability and has limited effect during an actual financial 
crisis, as other policies objectives are given priority.  This is an area where further 
research is warranted and as indicated we will look at it further in the thesis, Chapter 
5 where we look at the interaction between macroprudential and monetary policies.   
Finally, for EME in the period 2000q1-2006q4, loan-to-value ratio caps (LTVCAP) and 
MPIB, borrower-based instruments are negatively and statistically significant during 
this period.  For ADV countries, loan-to-value ratio caps (LTVCAP) is statistically 
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significant but positive.  There are other instruments that are negative but statistically 
insignificant, which could suggest that in a period of rapid credit and asset prices 
expansion, strong economy growth, financial institutions are able to pass on the 
financial costs associated with these macroprudential instruments to the public or 
absorb the costs in their profits. 
 
V. Macroprudential instruments results for a positive and negative credit-to-
GDP gap (all countries) for the period 2000q1-2013q4 
 
As a further test, Table 3.13 reports results where the credit gap is either positive or 
negative, hence testing whether macroprudential policy could be more effective in 
boom periods (when the gap is positive).  As noted by Lang and Welz (2017), and as 
shown in the Appendix 3A.1, gaps were often highly negative for prolonged periods 
in the wake of crises. Of course, countries are also more likely to apply 
macroprudential policies in boom periods, but the non-zero coefficients in the second 
column conform that policies have also been applied in times of negative gaps. 
 
Table 3.13: Macroprudential instruments results for a positive and negative 
credit-to-GDP gap using the baseline model (all countries) 
 








Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV(-1)) - 3.23*** 
(28.6) 



















Leverage Ratio (LEV(-1)) - 2.04 
(0.5) 































































Notes: For macroprudential instruments definitions please see Table 3.2, for specification see Table 
3.8. The macroprudential instruments coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis below each estimated coefficient. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 
10% 
 
In general, the results confirm that policy is more effective in reducing gaps during 
periods of positive gaps.  DTI, INTER, CONC and TAX are highly significant for 
positive gaps and not for the negative gaps, this also carries over to the summary 
variables MPIB and MPIF.  For LTV, TAX and LTV_CAP there are positive effects 
when gaps are negative. FC is positive for the both positive and negative gaps. MPI, 
MPIB and MPIF are all positive for the negative gaps. Overall, these results are 
consistent with the conclusion of Cerutti et al (2017) noted above, that policies are 
effective but especially in the upturn. 
 
VI. Summary table of results for the effectiveness of the macroprudential 
policy instruments 
 
We summarise the work in this chapter and compare results for the work with other 
research using the same IMF dataset of macroprudential instruments and time period 




Table 3.14: Summary results of the effect of macroprudential instruments 
 











Carreras et al 
(2018)a 
Memo: 
Cerutti et al 
(2017)b 
LTV  -***  -***   -***  
DTI  -*** -*   -**  -** 
FC   +*** +*** +**   -* 
TAX    +***   -***  
INTER   +**    -*** -** 
CONC  -***      -* 
LTVCAP  -***  -** -* +*  -* 
SIFI        
DP -** +**     -*** 
CTC        
LEV   -***     
CG        
RR        
RRREV  -***     -* 
MPI  -*** +*** -*   -*** -*** 
MPIB  -***  -** -***   -** 
MPIF  -*** +***  +***  -*** -*** 
Notes: For macroprudential instruments definitions please see Table 3.2 above.  Signs of significant 
variables are shown where *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%.  IMF WEO 
country classification (April 2017), ADV - advanced countries, EME - emerging market economies. a 
OECD countries, real household credit growth, b All countries, credit growth 
 
It is noteworthy that the tools that we find most consistently effective in reducing the 
credit-to-GDP gap are the housing-market focused tools, the loan-to-value ratios (LTV 
and LTVCAP) and the debt-to-income ratio (DTI).  There is a significant result for 
dynamic provisioning (DP) in the full sample, where the effect is negative.  There is 
also a post-crisis result for leverage policies. 
 
It is also of interest to compare our results with those of two other extensive studies 
using the same dataset of macroprudential instruments estimated over the same time 
period, namely Carreras et al (2018) and Cerutti et al (2017).  As noted above the 
Carreras et al paper used as a target variable the growth rate of real household credit, 
while the Cerutti et al work focused on the growth of real credit or real house prices 
credit growth in the country, although they noted that effects were greater for 
household credit.  The former paper was for advanced countries only, the latter for a 
much wider range of both advanced and emerging/developing countries. They both 
featured a banking crisis dummy to avoid crediting the crisis effect to the tools.  It can 
123 
 
be seen that the results for these papers were similar to ours regarding the 
effectiveness of macroprudential instruments, with both highlighting interbank limits 
and LTV or LTVCAP.  The Carreras et al paper also found effectiveness for taxes on 
financial institutions, while the Cerutti et al paper also found effectiveness for DTI, 
foreign currency lending limits and dynamic provisioning in limiting credit growth.  
 
Two differences between the dependent variable for our study and these studies are 
that we include (following the BIS) total non-financial credit in the dependent variable 
deflated by GDP and assessed relative to trend credit/GDP.  The tools that most 
influence the credit gap (LTV and DTI) may influence non-financial private sector credit 
growth largely via their influence on household sector credit (except to the extent 
entrepreneurs raise funds for their companies by borrowing on their home equity). 
 
3.5. Robustness checks 
 
We ran three robustness checks on the estimates above.  First, we reran the basic 
GMM equations with the difference of the credit gap as a dependent and lagged 
dependent variable.  This accordingly takes the view that stationarity over the data 
period is required, in the light of the tests in Table 3.10 showing that the variable is not 
stationary over the period 2000q1-2013q4.  Second, in line with Akinci and Olmstead-
Rumsey (2015) and Kuttner and Shim (2016), we estimated the specification by Panel 
OLS with fixed effects as an alternative to GMM.  One estimate used cross section 
fixed effects only, the other also added time series fixed effects.37  The results of the 
estimations are shown in Table 3.15.   
 
Table 3.15: All countries variant baseline models 2000q1 to 2013q4 
 
 GMM with 
difference of 
CGDPGAP 
Panel OLS with 
cross-section 
fixed effects 
Panel OLS with cross-
section and time 
series fixed effects 
Dependent DCGDGAP CGDPGAP CGDPGAP 











37  The OLS model with time-fixed effects only did not yield any useful results when testing the 



































R-squared n/a 97.51 97.66 
R-squared adj. n/a 97.45 97.55 
Sargan (J-Statistic)  
(p-value) 
0.43 n/a n/a 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(1) p-value 
0.00 n/a n/a 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) p-value 
0.60 n/a n/a 
F-statistic n/a 1,764.82 865.39 
Prob(F-statistic) n/a 0.00 0.00 
Periods included 53 55 55 
Cross sections 43 43 43 
Observations 2,124 2,210 2,210 
Notes: The coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below each 
estimated coefficient.  The Sargan tests' null hypothesis of over-identifying restrictions are not rejected. 
Arellano-Bond (AB) test for AR(1) in first differences are rejected, but not for the AR(2) test.  *** 
significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. 
 
For the GMM with difference of the gap, the growth rate of GDP is not significant so is 
omitted.  Other variables are as in the earlier levels-based estimation, including the 
positive sign for the interest rate variable.  Sargan’s J is again satisfactory and there 
is first-order autocorrelation but no second order autocorrelation in line with the 
expectation for GMM (Arellano-Bond (AB) test for autocorrelation, AR1 and AR2).  The 
two panel OLS estimates used all the variables from Table 3.8, as the growth rate of 
GDP is also significant, and again had a positive and significant interest rate effect.  
The results of the Hausman test suggested that fixed effects model is appropriate for 
the OLS models (Hausman test, X2: 80.20, p-value: 0.00). 
 
Table 3.16 shows the results for the different macroprudential instruments using these 
estimates.  It can be seen that in each case the outcome for LTV and DTI is quite 
consistently favourable, and accordingly the summary variable MPIB is also 
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significant.  In the GMM specification with the difference of the gap as dependent 
variable, LTVCAP, DTI, the instruments for interbank exposure limits (INTER) and FX 
and/or countercyclical reserve requirements (RRREV) are significant and negative 
although LTV per se is not significant and FC has the wrong sign and is significant.  
Accordingly, the summary variable MPIB, borrower-based index, is also significant.  
As regards the fixed effects specifications there is consistent significance for LTV, DTI 
and MPIB with the correct sign, while DP, LEV and MPIF have the wrong (positive) 
sign.  We may conclude that the main results for the macroprudential tools are robust 
to these alternative specifications. 
 
Table 3.16: Macroprudential instruments results for variant equations (all 
countries, 2000q1-2013q4) 
 








Panel OLS with 
cross-section 
and time series 
fixed effects 



































































































































Notes: For macroprudential instruments definitions please see Table 3.2. The macroprudential 
instruments coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below each 
estimated coefficient. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
3.6. Chapter summary 
 
Research has shown macroprudential policy and its instruments are effective in 
reducing the built up of imbalances in the financial system.  Further, using a different 
measure of imbalances, our empirical analysis has shown that the macroprudential 
instruments are effective in reducing financial system imbalances as identified by the 
credit-to-GDP gap.  The analysis suggests that the impact of macroprudential policy 
on the credit gap is most apparent for housing market related instruments, or 
instruments targeting borrowers, such as loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income 
(DTI) ratios, which is comparable with other empirical analysis using the same dataset 
of instruments for growth of credit to the non-financial sector (Cerutti et al (2017)) 
globally, and for a narrower measure, namely household credit growth (Carreras et al 
(2018)) in advanced countries. 
 
In this context, it is important to mention that the nature of macroprudential policy to 
date is that it commonly affects mainly the banks and the household sector.  The policy 
may not be effective if the imbalances are in the non-bank financial institutions’ 
lending, debt securities markets or shadow banking sector as well as in the corporate 
sector especially commercial property.  Similarly, with the recently-introduced counter 
cyclical buffer, the application of it applies to banks, although there may be situations 
where the factors driving growth in the gap, which is recommended to prompt rises in 
the countercyclical buffer (CCB), might not be bank credit or household sector related 
(e.g. non-bank financial institutions credit or bond issue).  This shows the need for 
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careful analysis of causes of a rising gap and the ratio should be complemented with 
other early warning indicators (Bank of England (2014), Drehmann and Tsatsaronis 
(2014)). 
 
Clearly, a wide measure of credit deflated by GDP and its trend such as in the “gaps” 
is in principle less likely to be less impacted by typical macroprudential policies, since 
corporate sector credit is usually not impacted by loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-
income (DTI) measures, for example, while even the countercyclical buffer (CCB) does 
not affect credit by non-bank financial institutions or market credit (unless assets are 
held on or off banks’ balance sheets).  Also, the application of macroprudential policy 
may be complicated by the presence of multiple regulators in advanced countries.   
These points may apply less to emerging market economies whose domestic financial 
system is typically bank based, and regulatory structures simpler, but their capital 
flows require alternative macroprudential measures (such as reserve requirements) 
and our current work does not suggest a strong impact of these policies on the credit 
gap per se. 
 
Finally, what useful further research could include individual country analysis (see 
Noel (2018)) and macro regional analysis of the credit-to-GDP and the effectiveness 
of macroprudential policy.  Such work might underline the importance for each country 
of tailoring the design and calibration of macroprudential policy and its instruments to 




3A. Appendix Chapter 3 
 
3A.1. Credit-to-GDP gap figures 
 
The following Appendix Figures (3A.1 to 3A.5) show the credit-to-GDP gaps for a 
number of advanced countries and emerging market economies in Europe, Asia, the 
Americas and Southern hemisphere.  The solid lines show the BCBS percentage 
threshold of 2 and 10 percent that should trigger an early warning to policymakers 
about the potential build-up of financial sector imbalances and may warrant 
policymakers making a policy decision to reduce the imbalance.  The charts are 
prepared using the BIS’ credit-to-GDP gap data (version March 2017).  
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Selected South American Countries




Appendix Figure 3A.4: Credit-to-GDP gaps for North America Free Trade 
countries 
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Selected North America Free Trade Countries








3A.2. Model estimation and macroprudential results for advanced countries 
and emerging market economies 
 












































































































































































































Observations 1,395 661 734 
Sargan (J-Statistic)  
(p-value) 
0.52 0.40 0.46 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  
p-value 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  
p-value 
0.13 0.32 0.11 
Periods included 54 26 28 
Cross sections 
included 
27 26 27 
Notes: The coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below each 
estimated coefficient.  The Sargan tests' null hypothesis of over-identifying restrictions are not rejected. 
Arellano-Bond (AB) test for AR(1) in first differences are rejected, but not for the AR(2) test.  *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Appendix Table 3A.2: Advanced countries macroprudential instruments 
results 
 
Macroprudential instruments Credit-to-GDP 













Debt-to-Income Ratio (DTI(-1)) -5.98** 
(-2.37) 
------ 
Capital Surcharges on SIFIs (SIFI(-1)) ------ -2.33 
(-1.17) 






Leverage Ratio (LEV(-1)) ------ -13.63 
(-1.29) 










Limits on Domestic Currency Loans 
(CG(-1)) 
------ ------ 




Reserve Requirement Ratios (RR(-1)) ------ ------ 












FX and/or Countercyclical Reserve 
Requirements (RRREV(-1)) 
------ ------ 






Macroprudential instruments focused 





Macroprudential instruments focused 





Notes: For macroprudential instruments definitions please see Table 3.2, for specification see Appendix 
Table 3.14. The macroprudential instruments coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 
 




















































Observations 772 325 447 
Sargan (J-Statistic)  
(p-value) 
0.44 0.33 0.37 
Arellano-Bond AR(1)  
p-value 
0.00 0.00 0.08 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  
p-value 
0.41 0.74 0.56 
Periods included 54 26 28 
Cross sections included 16 15 16 
Notes: The coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below each 
estimated coefficient.  The Sargan tests' null hypothesis of over-identifying restrictions are not rejected. 
Arellano-Bond (AB) test for AR(1) in first differences are rejected at 10%, but not for the AR(2) test.  *** 






Appendix Table 3A.4: Emerging market economies macroprudential 
instruments results 
 














Debt-to-Income Ratio (DTI(-1)) ------ 1.53 
(0.73) 
Capital Surcharges on SIFIs (SIFI(-1)) ------ ------ 









Leverage Ratio (LEV(-1)) ------ ------ 




Concentration Limits (CONC(-1)) 10.74 
(1.24) 
------ 




































Macroprudential instruments focused 





Macroprudential instruments focused 





Notes: For macroprudential instruments definitions please see Table 3.2, for specification see Appendix 
Table 3.16. The macroprudential instruments coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 
 
We now move on to Chapter 4: Financial Stability and Macroprudential Policy: 
Are there cross-border effects? where we investigate whether and to what extent is 
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there any spill over effects of macroprudential instruments between countries using 











The increase in the usage of macroprudential policy in the wake of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis has had a particular focus in that it commonly affects mainly the 
domestic banking and household sectors.  The growth in use of such policies has 
fuelled many studies on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy and the rationale 
is to focus on the area of the financial sector where there is the most potential for 
systemic risk to develop, that is the credit and housing markets and the banking sector.  
Accordingly, reflecting on the aim of the policy itself, most of these studies have 
specifically focused on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy on credit and 
housing markets, notably via domestic operating deposit-taking-institutions (DTIs), 
which are mostly commercial banks (see Chapter 3).  However, such an approach to 
the effect of macroprudential policy may be incomplete. 
 
Avdijev et al (2017) indicated that when a country enacts prudential policy, three types 
of effects may occur, firstly, domestically-owned banks’ activities in the same country 
such as credit expansion are affected (see Lim et al (2011), Cerutti et al (2017), etc.).  
Secondly, foreign banks may change their lending to the country that enacted the 
policy (see Aiyar et al (2014a and b, etc.).  Thirdly, similar to foreign banks, domestic-
owned banks may alter their foreign lending to the rest of the world (see Damar and 
Mordel (2017), Auer et al (2017), etc.).  The last two effects are international in nature 
and these are the international transmission effects between countries.   
 
Despite these insights, as far as we are aware, there is limited emphasis on the 
interconnectedness of international financial markets and how domestic 
macroprudential policies can spill over into other countries.  In this the empirical 
literature reflects the bias of the theoretical literature on banking crises (as opposed to 
currency crises) which often disregard cross-border flows, or even assume a closed 
economy.  And as noted in Chapter 2, most definitions of financial stability do not 
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include reference to international markets or international banks.  Hence, an important 
issue is the extent to which macroprudential measures generate spill over effects 
between countries and whether this can affect financial stability positively or negatively 
or whether there are no significant cross-border effects on financial stability.   
 
We suggest that we may find no effects in regions where there is a common 
macroprudential policy framework or financial stability policy such as in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) or if there is a close alignment of policies between countries, 
that is countries change their policies simultaneously.  Alternatively, the effects may 
be more significant in small open economies where policy is not coordinated in this 
manner, as in the case of the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, and indeed in respect of flows 
from Northern to Southern EMU countries in the 2000s.  This may be the case more 
generally in emerging market economies, which have a longer history of using these 
macroprudential polices.   
 
In this context, the purpose of this chapter is to present empirical research of potential 
cross-border spill over effects of macroprudential policies which will also help in the 
understanding of the interconnectedness of financial markets via international banks’ 
claims (lending activities).  It is important to understand the potential impact prudential 
measures could have on international banks’ lending as well as their ability to avoid 
any costs associated with the implementation of these instruments.  The Cross Report 
(see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the report) saw an opportunity for international 
cooperation and co-ordination between supervisory agencies in different countries as 
the interconnectedness of financial markets were growing.  As such, close cooperation 
between countries with regards to financial regulations can help in limiting financial 
instability.   
 
Additionally, the question arises whether the spill over effects of macroprudential 
policy between countries can lead to financial instability or the build-up of imbalances 
in the receiving country, that is, in the country that has not employed any prudential 
measures.  We consider this of particular relevance for understanding the concepts of 
financial stability due to the rapid spread of the 2007-2008 financial crisis to 
international markets  (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of financial stability concepts).  
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) suggested that in analysing the many crises in the 
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1990s, most researchers focused on the subject of contagion and not on the 
transmission channels in which these disturbances are transmitted.  As such, for 
example, if the transmission channel of credit between countries are disrupted, the 
question arises whether there is the potential for financial crisis or instability to develop 
in the receiving country, for instance a sudden stops crisis or a currency crisis, etc.  
This can be seen in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) where cross-
border flows into southern Europe, especially Greece in 2000s, later resulted in a debt 
crisis (see Ari (2014)). 
 
Further, a main area of focus for macroprudential policy framework is that it should 
contribute to assessment of financial system stability and as some researchers 
suggested, such as Borio and Lowe (2002 a and b, 2007), Davis and Karim (2008a), 
Giese et al (2014) etc., provide indicators to identify and prevent periods of financial 
instability (systemic risks).  We believe that understanding the interconnectedness of 
financial institutions should not only apply to the domestic financial markets but should 
include international financial markets (institutions) 38  as a result of the growth of 
international banking over the last four decades and globalization, the opening up of 
trade and financial links between countries.  Yet, most macroprudential policy analysis 
and theory focus on the domestic financial sector.  Crockett (2000) suggested that 
macroprudential approach to effective banks supervision and financial system stability 
should recognise the interconnectedness of financial institutions and the risk of 
correlated failures, such as systemically important financial institutions.   
 
In this context, by estimating a panel-vector autoregressive (PVAR) model and using 
the BIS International Banking Statistics and the International Banking Research 
Network (IBRN)39 Macroprudential Prudential Instruments database, we will analyse 
the potential spill over effects of macroprudential policies.  The remainder of the 
chapter is structured as follow.  Firstly, Section 4.2. Financial markets 
 
38 Davis (1995) suggested that the issue of international financial markets and crises is an old one as 
the seen from financial crises back to the 1970s as well as the Asian financial crisis (1997-1999), the 
Argentinian debt crisis (2001-2003), etc.   
39 It was established in 2012 by Austrian, German, U.S., and U.K. researchers who saw a need for joint 
analysis of key questions, such as the role of cross-border banking in the transmission of financial 
shocks. The group has expanded to include economists and analysts from a broad group of central 
banks, as well as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). See International Banking Research Network webpage, https://www.newyorkfed.org/ibrn/about.  
139 
 
interconnectedness and the transmission channel of credit looks at the growth of 
international banking and the role it plays in the transmission of credit, the 
interconnectedness of global financial markets and financial stability.  Secondly, 
Section 4.3. Financial stability and the role of international banks, we review the 
role of international banking in financial stability issues.  Thirdly, Section 4.4. 
Empirical analysis of the spill over effects of macroprudential policies via 
international banks claims, we present empirical results which will focus on the 
following issues; firstly, how the international banks’ claims impact total domestic 
lending (measurement credit-to-GDP ratio), banks’ regulatory capital ratio (a measure 
of banks’ strength and stability) and economic activity.  Intuitively, in order to assess 
the spill over effects of macroprudential policy, it is important to establish whether there 
is a relationship between international banks’ claims and the domestic economy.    
Secondly, we then look at the spill over effects of macroprudential policies between 
countries and what potential effects these policies can have across borders.  Panel-
vector autoregressive (PVAR) analysis will be conducted on 43 countries, using 
quarterly data from the IMF, OECD, and the BIS.  Fourthly, Section 4.5. Robustness 
checks provide a check on the model results.  Finally, Section 4.6. Chapter 
Summary, we conclude. 
 
4.2. Financial markets interconnectedness and the transmission channel of 
credit 
 
The purpose of this section is to look at the interconnectedness of global financial 
markets and financial stability, the growth of international banks and the role they play 
in the transmission of credit and other financial services between countries.   
 
4.2.1. Financial markets interconnectedness 
 
As mentioned above, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) noted that with many crises in 
the 1990s (see Chapter 2: Appendix 2A.1 for a list of crises from 1970), there tended 
to be a focus on the contagion effects and not on understanding the transmission 
channels in which these disturbances are transmitted.  Furthermore, they noted that 
there is the challenge for researchers to explain why some financial crises have a 
significant international impact and others don’t.  They suggested that understanding 
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both the trade and financial sector links between countries are both important for 
analysis of the transmission channel of crises as they found that in all studies the trade 
linkages play an important role in the propagation of shocks and this could explain why 
some contagion tend to be regional rather than global.  Contagion can be defined as 
the spread of market changes or disturbances from one regional market to others.  
Contagion occurs both globally and domestically and have become more prominent in 
the global economy and within certain geographic regions, e.g. European Union, Asia 
and Latin America, since financial markets and economies have become more 
correlated and integrated with each other. 
 
In the literature since the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, there is a growing focus on 
understanding the macro-financial linkages  between the financial sector and the real 
(domestic) economy (see Caprio Jr. (2011), Claessens and Kose (2013), etc.).  Caprio 
Jr. (2011) noted that research on macro-financial linkages was very limited prior to the 
2007-2008 financial crisis and from 2007 it has been increased significantly.  Chinazzi 
et al (2013) noted that it is critical to understand financial-market interconnectedness 
to explain systemic risk, stability and economic dynamics.  However, with the rapid 
spread of the 2007-2008 financial crisis to international markets, we contend that 
macro-financial linkages should include the need to understand the 
interconnectedness of global financial markets, the linkages between international 
financial flows to/ from an economy’s financial system to the rest of the world.  Thus, 
in order to understand the interconnectedness of global financial markets, we contend 
a discussion of the following is warranted, 1) Financial liberalisation, and 2) The role 
and growth of international banking. 
 
I. Financial liberalisation and interconnectedness 
 
Financial liberalisation became one of the most important financial reform policies in 
both advanced countries, emerging market economies and lower income countries in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  Pill and Pradhan (1997) suggested that financial liberalisation 
involves the abolition of explicit controls on the pricing and allocation of credit as well 
as an end to direct government involvement in the credit allocation process of 
commercial banks.  Financial liberalisation may also involve the abolition of controls 
on international capital (account) movements and in some cases, foreign exchange 
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rate control and foreign bank entry.  Yet, government policies continue to play a central 
role in determining how the financial sector performs in a liberalised financial system 
via structural and prudential regulations.   
 
In this respect, financial liberalisation can be interpreted as a policy where market 
forces are allowed to have a greater role in determining financial-market activities.  
This implies that interest rates are liberalised and there is the removal of other price 
controls, amounting to the reduction in the implicit taxation of financial intermediation.  
In some cases, interest rates liberalisation is accompanied with exchange rate and 
capital account liberalisation.  There may be the privatisation of state-owned 
intermediaries and reduction of administrative credit directives by government 
agencies, removal of restrictions on the admission of new entrants into the financial 
sector and legal protection for cartelized financial markets.  Finally, there may be the 
reductions in line-of-business restrictions on financial intermediaries, which 
necessitates prudential supervision (Caprio and Honohan (1999)).    
 
Capital account liberalisation implies the removal of control on the outflows and inflows 
of capital, that is, the freedom from prohibitions on transactions in the capital and 
financial accounts of the balance of payments (see Eichengreen and Mussa (1998)).  
In many countries, capital account controls were introduced in order to protect the 
exchange rate, to stabilise the financial sector or alleviate severe balance of payment 
problems.  Foreign exchange rates liberalisation is tightly coupled with capital account 
liberalisation.  As such, demand and supply in the capital markets directly affect the 
foreign exchange rates.  However, in many cases the monetary authority still indirectly 
controls the exchange rate, muting the degree of coupling between these two 
economic variables by use of interest rates, reserve requirements, etc.  For example, 
Prasad and Rajan (2008) suggested that in emerging market economies (EME), as a 
result of capital inflows, emerging markets build-up foreign exchange reserves in 
attempt to prevent large exchange rate appreciation by intervening in the foreign 
exchange market. 
 
The reasons for financial liberalisation varied from country to country.  Accordingly, 
Caprio and Honohan (1999) suggested that in many emerging market economies the 
major reasons for the movement to a market-oriented financial system can be looked 
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at from the following viewpoints.  Firstly, the commitment made by many developing 
countries to the principles of the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS), 
which form part of the Uruguay Round40 of trade negotiations, led many of these 
countries to be proactive in liberalising their respective financial sectors.  The Uruguay 
Round of trade negotiations resulted in the creation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)41 and an agreement updating the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) 42 in 1995.  Prior to Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, GATT focused 
mainly on trade in goods, and not trade in services, only with the new GATT agreement 
in 1995 was there a greater push toward globalisation and financial liberalisation of 
markets.  There is no universally acceptable definition of globalisation but it can be 
seen as the integration of economies, industries, markets, cultures and policymaking, 
etc., between countries. 
 
A second influence is the economic policies of the lending agencies (International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank).  Typically, liberalisation was one of the 
requirements of any structural adjustment package formulated by these bodies to 
assist in economic development and/or financial system stability following a financial 
or economic crisis.  As such, financial liberalisation often takes place after the country 
experiences an economic crisis or the financial system is on the verge of collapse.  
Thirdly, the perceived benefits of financial liberalisation were extrapolated from the 
experiences of other countries experiencing rapid economic growth following such 
liberalisation.   
 
Edey and Hviding (1994) suggested that in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)43 advanced countries, the reasons for the shift to 
a market oriented financial system are mainly due to the shrinkage of the regulatory 
base, due to the various forms of regulatory avoidance by financial institutions (for 
 
40 This round of trade negotiations was launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay in September 1986 and 
lasted until 1994.  See WTO website, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm.  
41 The WTO is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade and services 
between nations.  See WTO website, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm.  
42 The original GATT agreement was signed on 30th October 1947 by 23 countries and provided the 
rules for much of the world trade between the period 1948 to 1994.  See WTO website, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm.  
43 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was officially established on 




example, the development of off-shore financial sectors, securities market growth and 
off-balance sheet methods of financing), as well as a more general tendency for banks 
and other regulated institutions to lose business to the less regulated parts of the 
financial sector.  Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, the Cross Report (1986) highlighted 
the loss of comparative advantage of large international banks to international 
securities markets as a channel for credit intermediation.  This new development had 
important consequences for the functioning of the banking and financial systems, 
which led to greater risks taking by financial institutions.  There was also financial 
innovation and rapid technological development, which progressively increased the 
ease with which regulations could be avoided.  Inflationary problems and 
macroeconomic development in the 1970s resulted in the need for interest rate 
flexibility. 
   
However, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) showed empirically that banking 
crises are more likely to occur in liberalised financial systems, not necessary 
immediately after liberalisation, but rather a few years after the liberalisation process 
begins.  They noted that banking sector fragility is reduced when the institutional 
environment is strong, that is, regulations are properly adhered to by financial 
institutions, there is a low level of corruption and good prudential regulation.  
Nonetheless, they found financial liberalisation has positive effects on economic 
growth through financial development, even if it increases banking sector fragility.  
Similarly, to Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Bird and Rajan (2001) noted the 
role of financial liberalisation as a contributing factor to the East Asia financial crisis in 
1997-1998, as well as Noel (2018) looking at the Jamaican’s financial crisis 1996-
1998, and Sandel (2004) on the Nordic Banking Crises in the early 1990s. 
 
Gopalan (2015) suggested that there are different dimensions to financial liberalisation 
where, firstly, there is domestic financial liberalisation, which involves the relaxation of 
domestic credit and interest rates controls, limits on banking competition, etc.  
Secondly, there is international financial liberalisation, which encompasses both 
capital account liberalisation (as discussed above) and internationalisation of financial 
services and the banking sector.  He defined internationalisation of financial services 
and the banking sector as the elimination of barriers to entry and discriminatory 
treatment of foreign competition as well as cross-border provision of banking services.  
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Gopalan (2015) further noted that a country opens its banking sector to foreign 
competition in two ways, firstly, allowing direct investments in the banking sector or 
foreign bank entry in the sector and secondly, permitting cross-border banking 
activities, includes lending and borrowing activities involving foreign banks.  The role 
and growth of international banks are discussed further below. 
 
II. The role and growth of international banking 
 
International banking has expanded noticeably since the end of the Bretton Woods 
system of managed exchange rates in the 1970s and it plays an important role in the 
global economy.  In a 2010 report by the Committee on the Global Financial System 
(CGFS (2010c)), international banking is defined as intermediation activity which 
involve the extension of credit (or financial services) by a bank headquartered in a 
particular country to residents44 of another country.  The CGFS report also noted, 
firstly, international banking has taken a significant role in the process of financial 
globalisation and integration of financial markets.  Traditionally, international banking 
activity expanded largely in line with international trade and performed key functions 
for international non-financial firms.  However, financial liberalisation, especially in 
emerging market economies as noted above, and the increased demand for financial 
services have accelerated financial integration and the growth of international banking 
activity beyond that of international trade.   
 
Secondly, international banks play a vital role in the global economy and it is closely 
related to activities in international financial markets.  International banks perform 
important functions in term of intermediation, the allocation of credit, and maintaining 
the resilience of the market infrastructure for the healthy functioning of the global 
financial system.  And thirdly, technology development has spurred financial 
integration of international banks and paced the way for broader access to markets. 
 
CGFS (2010c) indicated that the growth of international banking has gone through 
three phases.  The first phase started in the second half of the 19th century with US 
 
44 This is a broad term which include individuals, companies and other financial institutions and it is 
based on the ultimate address of the resident. 
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banks underwriting securities being sold to European investors, for financing US 
railroads.  In addition, with the expansion of trade and the signing of the GATT 
agreement in 1947, international banking activities grew largely in line with 
international trade and mainly between developed countries.  
 
The second phase of international banking expansion began in the 1960s.  Houpt 
(1999) noted for US banks, the 1960s and 1970s were years of rapid growth in 
international banking.  Existing larger US global banks and money centre banks further 
expanded their networks and operations in foreign markets.  Also, many smaller U.S 
regional institutions expanded their operation mainly in European cities but most of 
them sought only “shell branches”45 in Caribbean offshore centres as a means to gain 
access to the Eurodollar markets.  As such, international banking growth was reflected 
in the growth of the euro-markets and international capital markets in the 1960s and 
1970s.46 
 
In the UK, British banks already had a footprint in many countries especially 
Commonwealth countries, due to historical and political connections to the British 
Empire.  In addition, many Commonwealth countries’ legal systems are founded on 
English common law – a legacy of British colonialism.  We contend that British banks 
were in a strong position to increase their foothold and banking activities when many 
Commonwealth countries adopted financial liberalisation policies in the 1980s and 
1990s, which is the third phase in the growth of international banking.   
 
The third phase started in the late 1980s with the liberalisation of many countries’ 
financial systems, especially in emerging market economies related not least to the 
push toward globalisation with the new GATT agreement in 1995 as discussed above.  
Goldberg (2009) suggested as well that this period of expansion includes the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, which led to bank entry by EU banks into central and 
Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. 
 
 
45 Shell branches are merely booking centres.  Banks personnel do not conduct operations on site at 
these branches but rather book balances at these offices from other locations. 
46  Some factors that contributed to the growth of this market are the following, the imposition of 
maximum rates of interest in the US (Regulation Q), US withholding taxes regime, listing and disclosure 
regulation requirements, etc. as well as the growth of multi-national financial institutions. 
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Figure 4.1: Quarterly percentage change in international banks’ cross-border 
claims (lending) by sector over the period 1978q4 to 2018q4 
 
 
Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics (2019) 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the percentage change in cross-border claims (lending) by sector 
(banks/ non-banks) over the period 1978q4 to 2018q4.  In the late 1970s, the average 
growth rate in international bank cross-border lending was between 20-30 per cent, it 
fell in the early 1980s due to the Latin America debt crisis.  On account of deregulation 
and financial liberalisation there was a period of high growth from the mid-1980s until 
the slowdown in the world economy in the early 1990s.  Also, during this period there 
was a diversion between banks and non-banks’ lending.  In the 1990s, the movement 
in the growth rates may be due to the increase in international trade and at the end of 
decade the Asian financial crisis.  The early 2000s represented a period of high 
economy growth especially in China and other Asian countries before there was a 
large fall in cross-border as result of the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  
 
Goldberg (2009) noted that the impetus and growth of international banking varies by 




















































































































































































banking can be seen as an opportunity for parent banks to search out higher yield and 
diversification opportunities (for instance US banks in the 1960s and 1970s).  And 
secondly, other episodes followed regulatory and political changes, which increased 
the opportunity for expanding banking services to new markets, either as cross-border 
transactions or through establishing branches and subsidiaries in these new markets.  
The expansion of international banking did not only involve the extension of financial 
services, cross-border lending, to new financial markets but it also included the 
acquisitions and ownership of foreign subsidiaries and branches.  For example, in the 
UK in the 1980s, as the financial system became “market oriented” and the removal 
of restrictive trading practices 47  in the securities market, brought the traditional 
banking system and securities trading closer together.  This led to an increasingly 
merging of functions between institutions which encourage a number of large UK 
banks and overseas retail banks to build-up a presence in London (see Bowen et al 
(1999)).   
 
We agree that deregulation and financial liberalisation in many countries played an 
active role in the growth and development of international banking as new markets 
and opportunities were created for international banks to operate and grow.  Further, 
the harmonisation of banking regulations such as Basel Capital Accord and accounting 
standards, in response to deteriorating international banks capital and growing 
international risks, provided an impetus for banks to expansion internationally.  This 
led to the growth of large international banking groups such as UBS, JP Morgan, 
HSBC, etc., which are now considered to be global systemically important financial 
institution (G-SIFIs).48  Finally, globalisation and the rapid growth in the demand for 
financial services from multinational corporations especially in quickly-growing 
emerging markets helped shape and influence the role of international banking and its 
contribution to economic growth and progress in many countries, resulting in the 
integration of global financial markets. 
 
 
47 Big Bang, on 27 October 1986, a series of reforms swept through the London Stock Exchange as 
there was the removal of restriction on membership, securities trading, etc., which allowed UK and 
overseas banks to grow in the financial system in the UK. 





Figure 4.2 shows the growth rate in cross-border by lending countries over the period 
1978q4 to 2018q4.  The changes in the growth rates are in line with the period of 
economic growth, deregulation and financial liberalisation and financial crises over the 
period as discussed above.  Particular periods of interest are the fall in lending to 
emerging market and developing countries during the 1980s on account of the Latin 
America debt crisis, at the end of 1990s due to the Asian financial crisis and the early 
2000s because of the Argentina debt crisis.  All countries reported large fall in lending 
during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
  
Figure 4.2: Quarterly percentage change in international banks’ cross-border 
claims (credit) by country over the period 1978q4 to 2018q4 
 
   
Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics (2019) 
 
We now move on to Section 4.3. Financial stability and the role of international 




4.3. Financial stability and the role of international banks 
 
There has been a resurgence of concerns over the role international banking and 
international financial integration played in the most recent financial crisis in 2007-
2008.  We suggest that prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis, potential cross-border 
financial disturbances emanating and/ or spreading through the international banking 
channel were poorly understood.  Most researchers focused on the subject of 
contagion and not on the transmission channels in which these disturbances are 
transmitted and the interconnectedness of financial markets (see Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000), Caprio Jr. (2011), Chinazzi et al (2013), etc.).  Yet, episodes of 
financial crises with an international effect (e.g. debt and currency crises which we will 
develop further below) have been happening since the 1980s such as the Latin 
American Debt crisis in the early 1980’s, Asia and Russia in 1997-1998 and Argentina 
in 2001-2002.  The continue integration of financial markets clearly raises questions 
about financial instability arising from cross-border financial disturbances or domestic 
financial stability being disrupted by international disturbances transmitted through 
international bank lending.  
 
As mentioned elsewhere in the thesis, the focus of macroprudential policy is mainly 
domestic markets (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 as well), with many of these studies 
focusing on analysing the effect of macroprudential instruments on credit growth and 
house prices and the mitigation of the build-up of imbalances in the housing market.  
However, Andrieş (2009) suggested the global financial environment enables the 
transmission of cross border crises and also that financial crises are mainly manifested 
at the level of financial institutions although it can happen in the non-financial 
institutions.  In addition, financial crises have happened in all types of financial system, 
whether market-based or bank-based as well as in different degree of development of 
the financial system that is developed, market functional or emerging. 
 
We believe that examining the role of international banks in the global financial 
landscape is important for the understanding of financial stability, as they can indeed 
amplify the international transmission of a financial shock, or weaken the stance of 
macroprudential policy in a boom by facilitating disintermediation, etc.  Cerutti et al 
(2015a, 2017) suggested that there is a weaker effect of macroprudential policy in 
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more developed and more financially open economies, suggesting some avoidance 
and/or disintermediation of the policy although they did not explicitly test for this. 
 
IMF (2010) noted that with the rapid growth in globalization in the last few decades, 
the global financial system is highly concentrated and that global financial 
intermediation is carried out in predominantly by about 20 large financial centres such 
as London, New York, Hong Kong, etc., where many large international banks and 
other financial institutions such as insurance companies and securities houses 
operate.  Financial markets have benefited from the financial globalization brought 
about by greater efficiency in intermediation, the pooling of risk and technology 
development, yet the IMF noted it has brought vulnerabilities to financial markets.  In 
retrospect, the Cross Report (1986) highlighted the vulnerabilities to financial markets 
as a result of greater risk taking by financial institutions, due in turn to the loss of the 
comparative advantage of large international banks to international securities markets 
as well as to off-shore centres (e.g. Cayman Islands) due to financial market 
innovations and tax avoidance schemes.  Also, the Report raised several issues for 
macroprudential policy (supervision) in order to deal with the concerns of financial 
innovation and the macroeconomic consequences of financial system fragility (see 
Chapter 2 for a discussion of the report).  
 
CGFS (2010c) noted that the growth of international banking has allowed economic 
agents to gain access to a broader range of financial services but it has affected the 
riskiness of individual banks and the financial system.  Hence, international banks can 
have a major effect on the financial stability of a country’s financial system.  Firstly, 
CGFS (2010c) suggested that international expansion of banks can affect the risk 
profile and resilience of individual banks through risk diversification, competition and 
efficiency gains.  But this need not necessarily enhance safety and soundness. Yet, 
diversification benefits may encourage banks to build riskier portfolios in order to 
realise higher yields and a more diversified bank does not necessarily means less risk.   
Competition can induce banks to exploit the risk-return paradigm and enter new 
markets, sometimes less regulated markets, as to maintain market share and 
profitability (The Cross Report (1986), Houpt (1999), Barrell and Davis (2008), etc.).  
Secondly, international banks have an influence on cross-border risk-sharing which 
could be beneficial for financial stability.  Yet, the ability to manage the cross-border 
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risks during a financial crisis depends on whether foreign banks operating in a country 
alleviate or add to the country’s financial sector disruption.  Goldberg (2009) 
highlighted how international banks can enhance the international transmission of 
financial disturbances through their activities.  
 
Goldberg (2009) suggested that the growth of global banks has the potential to alter 
the business cycle in a country and enhance the international transmission of financial 
disturbances through their activities.  This may vary depending on whether the country 
is being served through cross-border flows or the funding source of the locally 
operating subsidiary or branch of the global banks in the host country.  Notably, a 
banking business model based on cross-border flows or if the foreign bank subsidiary 
is more reliant on head office funding (foreign sources) than locally source funding, 
has the potential to amplify any potential international financial disturbance for the host 
country, such as a disruption to international liquidity market (the availability of cross-
border liquidity).  See Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) and Polov and Udell (2012) for 
two empirical studies which explore the effect that the 2007-2008 financial crisis had 
on lending in emerging market economies in Europe, Asia and Latin America.  This is 
will be discussed further below in Section 4.4.1. 
 
Further Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) indicated that financial linkages between 
countries can be caused of financial contagion even if bilateral and third-party trade 
links with the infected country are be weak.  They noted the cases of Argentina 
following the Mexico Tequila crisis (1994-1995) and Indonesia after Thailand (Asian 
financial crisis 1997-1998).  They suggested that one potential channel of transmission 
of financial crisis that has been ignored in the contagion literature is the role of common 
lenders, particularly commercial banks (cross-border international banks) such as in 
the case of U.S. banks extensive exposure to Latin America in the early 1980s (Latin 
America debt crisis) and the Japanese banks during the Asian financial crisis (1997-
1998).  
 
In addition, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) discussed the link between the causes of 
banking crises and balance of payments problems.  They examined currency and 
banking problems for a number of industrial and developing countries such as the 
Scandinavian countries, Spain, Thailand, Philippines, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, 
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etc. over the period 1970 to 1995.  They that found, firstly, following financial 
liberalisation, which started in the 1980s, banking and currency crises become closely 
entwined.  They suggested knowing that a banking crisis is underway helps predict a 
future currency crisis, as well, the collapse of the currency can deepen the banking 
crisis.  Secondly, banking crisis is generally the immediate cause of a currency crisis.  
Thirdly, crises are preceded by a multitude of weak and deteriorating economic 
fundamentals.  And fourthly, twin banking and currency crises tend to have severe 
effects on the economy. 
 
Glick and Hutchison (2011)  and Claessens and Kose (2013) saw that a currency crisis 
typically involves a speculative attack on the currency resulting in a devaluation (or 
sharp depreciation) or forcing the government to defend the currency, either by using 
their international reserves or sharply rising interest rates or imposing capital controls.   
They indicated that there are three generation of models to explain a currency crisis.   
 
Firstly, there is the first-generation models (Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber 
(1984)) which are specific to the 1980s, look at the sudden speculative attack on a 
fixed or pegged currency, when there is a balance of payment crisis and government 
budgetary deficit financed by central bank credit.  The second-generation models look 
at the doubts about whether a government is willing to maintain its exchange rate peg 
and which could lead currency crisis (Obstfeld and Rogoff (1986)).  The second-
generation models are in part motivated by the European Monetary system in the 
period 1992-1993, where the UK pound came under attack.  The third-generation 
models explore how rapid deterioration of balance sheets associated with fluctuations 
in assets prices, including exchange rates, can lead to a currency crisis.  These models 
were largely motivated by the Asian crises in 1997-1998.  The third-generation model 
papers show how balance sheet mismatch and over-borrowing by banks can lead to 
a currency crisis, such as Chang and Velasco (2000), McKinnon and Pill (1996), 
Krugman (1998), and Corsetti et al (1998).  However, there is not always a clear 
linkage of these currency crisis papers to the literatures on financial crises and 
macroprudential policy summarised in Chapters 2 and 3, which as noted tends to 




Claessens and Kose (2013) noted a debt crisis can take two forms, either a foreign 
debt crisis or a domestic public debt49 crisis.  A foreign debt crisis is when a country 
cannot service its foreign debt obligations (e.g. Latin American debt crisis 1980s and 
Argentina 2001).  It can take the form of a sovereign or private (or both) debt crisis.   A 
domestic public debt crisis is when a country does not honour its domestic fiscal 
obligations in real terms, either by defaulting explicitly, or inflating or debasing its 
currency or employing some form of financial repression.  Debt crises with a cross 
border element are also likely to involve sudden stops (see Claessens and Kose 
(2013)), currency or banking crises (or various combinations), making it hard to identify 
the initial cause.  
 
The role of international banks in the 2007-2008 financial crisis has been debated 
extensively and there is some common agreement that the interconnectedness of 
financial markets, with international banks as the transmission channel, contributed to 
the rapid spread of the crisis.  In hindsight, the role and risks posed by international 
banks were not clearly understood.  Regulators have since initiated research and 
assessment programs to study the transmission channels of financial crises and the 
issue of interconnectedness among the major financial institutions and markets 
especially systemically important financial institution (SIFIs) as well as global 
systemically important financial institution (G-SIFIs) operating in their financial system, 
which have since lead to the development of new regulations, Basel III and the 
enhanced role for the Financial Stability Board50 in global financial markets stability. 
 
Finally, as highlighted in the Cross Report (1986) there is an opportunity for 
international cooperation and co-ordination between supervisory agencies in different 
countries as the interconnectedness of financial markets and international banks were 
growing, as such close cooperation between countries can limit financial instability.  
Yet, the Report saw several issues for macroprudential policy (supervision).  There 
should be a broader macroprudential approach to address the concerns of 
international banks’ lending and activities and their overall effect on credit quality/ 
 
49 Domestic debt can be reduced by inflation unless it is in a currency not under direct control of the 
local central bank, e.g. the European Union - Euro currency and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States - Eastern Caribbean dollar.  
50 See the Financial Stability Board website, http://www.fsb.org/about/.   
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volumes and the domestic financial sector, which we suggest has not always been the 
case.  
 
We now move on to Section 4.4. Empirical analysis of the spill over effects of 
macroprudential policies via international banks claims, where we present 
empirical results, how the international banks’ claims impact total domestic lending 
(measurement credit-to-GDP ratio), banks’ regulatory capital ratio (a measure of 
banks’ strength and stability) and economic activity.  It then goes on to look at the spill 
over effects of macroprudential policies between countries and what potential effects 
these policies can have across borders.   
 
4.4. Empirical analysis of the spill over effects of macroprudential policies 
using international banks claims 
 
This section discusses our empirical analysis of the spill over effects of 
macroprudential policy via international bank claims, which add to the growing 
literature on financial stability and macroprudential policy.  Limited research has been 
completed in this area so far in respect of macroprudential policy and we believe there 
is a gap in the literature, where the focus tends to be on the domestic financial market, 
and with limited emphasis on the interconnectedness of financial markets and how 
domestic macroprudential policies can spill over into other countries.  As mentioned, 
due to data limitations as a result of confidentiality of micro-level banking data, the 
analysis will be done using country aggregate macro-level data.  However, we believe 
this does not detract from the empirical analysis and results as we are capturing the 
effects on the entire financial sector rather than just a few large international banks, 
allowing for macroeconomic analysis not feasible with individual banks.  Also, to our 
knowledge, the panel-vector autoregressive (PVAR) approach has not been used so 
far to investigate spill over effects of prudential instruments between countries.   
 
In the ensuing sub-sections, we will first provide a brief overview of the limited existing 
empirical research on the cross-border spill over effects of macroprudential policy.  
Also, we will outline some papers where international banks claims (lending) were 




Secondly, we discuss the datasets and set out the PVAR model for examining the spill 
over effects of macroprudential instruments via international banks claims.  The BIS 
International Banking Statistics51 (cross border claims) is one of the main datasets that 
has been used in recent research to assess the interconnectedness of financial 
markets, to develop financial global risk network maps52 (see Cecchetti et al (2010)) 
and to analyse the transmission of financial crises between countries. 
 
Thirdly, we present our empirical results which will focus on the following, firstly, how 
do international banks’ claims impact total domestic lending (measured by the 
domestic credit-to-GDP ratio), banks’ regulatory capital ratio (a measure of banks’ 
strength and stability) and economic activity.  As discussed above, intuitively, in order 
to assess the spill over effects of macroprudential policy, it is important to establish 
whether there is a relationship between international banks’ claims and the domestic 
economy.  Secondly, we then look at any potential spill over effects of macroprudential 
policy between countries via international banks’ claims and what effects these 
policies can have across borders.  Panel-vector autoregressive (PVAR) analysis is 
conducted on 43 countries, using quarterly data from the IMF, OECD, and the BIS.   
 
4.4.1. Empirical studies on the spill over effects of macroprudential policy 
 
The increase in the usage of macroprudential policy and its instruments in the wake 
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis has fuelled many studies on the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policy.  Many of these studies have specifically focused on the 
effectiveness of macroprudential policy53 in the area of the financial sector where there 
is the most potential for systemic risk to develop, that is the credit and housing markets 
and the banking sector, such as Lim et al (2011), Claessens et al (2014), Akinci and 
Olmstead-Rumsey (2015), Cerruti et al (2017), Carreras et al (2018), etc. (see 
Chapter 3).   
 
 
51 Prior to the 2007-2008 global financial crisis this dataset was used very little in research.  See Cetorelli 
and Goldberg (2010), Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2013), etc. for more recent work using this dataset. 
52  These are matrices that track the bilateral (form-level) exposures of banks, non-bank financial 
institutions and other relevant market participants.  
53 It is important to note that fiscal policy and financial crisis effects should be taken into consideration 
when analysing the effectiveness of macro-prudential policy. 
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The bias in such studies reflects the nature of macroprudential policy to date which 
has focused mainly on the domestic banking and household sectors.  Accordingly, 
limited research has been completed so far on the cross-border effects of 
macroprudential policy between countries, that is how the implementation of the policy 
in one country could have a cross-border effect in another country and vice versa.  Not 
least, we contend that implementation of macroprudential policy in a country can 
create opportunities for regulatory arbitrage for banks.  Indeed, Cerutti et al (2017) 
suggested there is a weaker effect in more developed and more financially open 
economies, suggesting some avoidance and/or disintermediation of the policy.  
Moreover, Ostry et al (2012) suggested that there may be a need to consider 
macroprudential policy and capital inflows (controls) to enhance financial stability in 
face of the risks from large capital flows.  
 
In one paper that does address the international aspect of macroprudential policy, 
Bruno et al (2015) provide a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of macro-
prudential policies in 12 Asia-Pacific economies, using databases of both domestic 
macroprudential policies and capital flow management (CFM) policies over 2004-13, 
with 152 CFM measures on banking and bond inflows and 177 domestic 
macroprudential measures.54  They employed panel regressions without country fixed 
effects because CFM indicators have little variation or are unchanged for some 
countries in the estimation.  They found that banking sector CFM polices and bond 
market CFM policies are effective in slowing down banking and bond inflows, 
respectively and also there are spill over effects of these policies on the “other” type 
of inflows. Macroprudential policies tend to be introduced along with monetary 
tightening and are most successful when they complement monetary policy by 
reinforcing monetary tightening.  The interaction between macroprudential and 




54 They classified macroprudential tools into asset-side tools (LTV Cap, Reserve Requirements, etc.), 
liability-side tools (Levy on non-core bank liabilities and foreign currency bank liabilities, etc.) and 
bank capital-oriented tools (Higher risk weights on foreign currency loans, Countercyclical buffer, 
etc.).  The instruments were further classified into residency-based tools (so called capital controls), 
currency-based capital ow measures (also called FX-related prudential measures), and general 
prudential tools with domestic focus (possibly affecting capital flows indirectly). 
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I. International Banking Research Network 
 
One of the most recent projects in the area of analysing the spill over effects of 
macroprudential policy was carried out by the International Banking Research Network 
(IBRN), which is a group of researchers from fifteen (15) central banks and two (2) 
international organisations.  The IBRN looked at how banks’ (international) lending 
responds to macroprudential policies implemented in home and foreign markets, the 
inward transmission of the policy changes to the domestic economy as well as the 
outward spillovers to foreign economies.55 
 
Buch and Goldberg (2017), IBRN co-directors, outlined the group research 
methodology, database and the meta-analysis that generated key cross-country 
results.  The research teams from 15 countries56 examined the domestic effects on 
banks’ lending 57  and banking activities and international spillovers of prudential 
instruments using confidential micro-banking data.  The BIS and ECB provided cross-
country perspectives.  The research looked for evidence of international policy 
spillovers through two channels, i) inward transmission examines how foreign 
regulations affect domestic activities of domestic banks or foreign bank branches or 
subsidiaries located in the host country and ii) outward transmission to foreign 
economies addresses the effects of foreign policies on the foreign activities of a 
reporting country’s global banks.  All country research teams implemented the same 
baseline regression models for analysing inward and outward transmission.  However, 
each country team addressed specific issues relating to their banking markets or 
banks’ business models, such as capital requirements, etc.58 
 
 
55 A special issue of the International Journal of Central Banking (March 2017) was published looking 
at the International Banking Research Network (IBRN) research on the spill over effects of 
macroprudential policy. 
56  The countries were Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
57  They saw bank lending as the key transmission channel for analysing the spill over effects of 
macroprudential instruments and this was the dependent variable.  Also, since they were interested in 
analysing the responses of lending to changes in prudential instruments, the baseline model uses (log) 
changes in loans (growth rate). 
58 Some specification included the credit-to-GDP gap data or domestic credit growth by country in order 
to test the prudential instruments effects over the credit cycle.   
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Buch and Goldberg (2017) noted that from a collective analysis of the results from all 
country research teams, the following are the three main findings.  Firstly, 
macroprudential instrument59  effects sometimes spill over across borders through 
bank lending.  For instance, Damar and Mordel (2017), the Canadian research team, 
saw that Canadian banks adjust their international lending in response to 
macroprudential measures abroad.  This effect is significant when capital 
requirements are tightened and weaker if banks lend mainly via affiliates.  However, 
Hills et al (2017), the UK team, suggested that macroprudential actions taken abroad 
do not have significant spill over effects on bank lending in the U.K.  The effects are 
more disaggregated sectoral effects, for example, when a foreign authority60 tightens 
loan-to-value standards, U.K. affiliates of banks owned in that country expand their 
lending to U.K. households. 
 
Secondly, the international spillovers vary across macroprudential instruments as 
discussed in IBRN (2017) (this will be discussed further below in Section 4.4.2) and 
are heterogeneous across banks, such as the effects of macroprudential measures 
differ across banks based on bank-specific factors like balance sheet conditions and 
business models as well as business and financial cycles.  In Switzerland, Auer et al 
(2017) saw foreign macroprudential measures, particularly foreign capital regulations 
do have significant effects on domestic lending growth of banks based on their balance 
sheet characteristics such as liquidity positions.  Similarly, in France, Bussiere et al 
(2017) indicated that banks’ balance sheet characteristics are important for the cross-
border transmission of domestic capital regulation.  
  
The BIS (see Avdjiev et al (2017)) saw that the strength of macroprudential effects is 
affected by balance sheet characteristics, with better-capitalized banking systems and 
those with more liquid assets and less core deposit funding reacting more to policy 
 
59  The macro-prudential policy instruments used in this research project are the following: Sector 
specific capital buffer: real estate credit, Sector specific capital buffer: consumer credit, Sector specific 
capital buffer: other sectors, Capital requirements, Concentration limit, Interbank exposure limit, Loan-
to-value ratio cap, Reserve requirements on foreign currency-denominated accounts and Reserve 
requirements on local currency-denominated accounts. 
60 In the European Union (EU), the European Central Bank (ECB) monitors developments in the banking 
sectors of the euro area and the EU as a whole to identify any vulnerabilities and check the resilience 
of the financial system and as such macroprudential policies implementation are coordinated with other 




changes.  They saw that these banks are able to increase their lending away from the 
domestic sector to international markets to avoid the effect of a domestic policy.  This 
suggests that there is a weaker effect of macroprudential policy on these banks in their 
domestic market of operations.  In addition, changes in macroprudential policy via 
loan-to-value limits and local currency reserve requirements have a significant impact 
on international bank lending.  In Germany (see Ohis et al (2017)), business and 
financial cycles matter for lending decisions. 
 
Thirdly, the international spillovers of macroprudential policy effects on loan growth 
rates have not been large on average as reported by the countries research teams.  
Buch and Goldberg (2017) suggested that it could be a case that the results 
underestimated the full effect of the policy and excluded the adjustments made 
through the entry and exit of entities in foreign markets and the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions.  Also, the analysis covered a period in which relatively few countries 
implemented country-specific macroprudential policies, that is, during the period 2000-
2014.  That said, most studies found that there was a decline in domestic lending 
following a domestic regulatory tightening, with the domestic effects differing across 
banks, countries and instruments.  This is in line with the existing literature regarding 
the effectiveness of macroprudential policy on domestic lending and the housing 
sector, see Chapter 3 and our empirical results, which draw the same conclusion that 
macroprudential policy is effective in reducing financial system imbalances as 
measured by the credit-to-GDP gap.   
 
Overall, Buch and Goldberg (2017) concluded that with the range of experiences with 
the spill over effects of macroprudential instruments between countries, there is not a 
one-size-fits-all pattern, and most prudential instruments have been associated with 
positive or negative spill over effects within or across the transmission channel.  The 
effects are influenced by the characteristics and business model of the financial 
institutions.  They noted that although most of the countries in the research project are 
advanced countries, they did not observe that the results are systematically different 






II. Research based on international banks’ lending 
 
Reinhardt and Sowerbutts (2015) constructed a database of macroprudential 
instruments61 and examined whether macroprudential regulations affect international 
banking flows.  They categorised macroprudential instruments into three broad 
categories, i) capital regulation, ii) lending standards (loan-to-value (LTV), debt-to-
income (DTI) ratios and underwriting standards) and iii) reserve requirements.62  They 
suggested that each measure may have differing implications for banking flows.  Using 
a panel regression of 37 countries, they found that domestic non-bank sectors 
increase aggregate borrowing from foreign banks after home authorities increase 
capital requirements.  They saw no increase in borrowing from foreign banks after a 
tightening of lending standards and the results for reserve requirement are 
inconclusive. 
 
There were also several studies that look at regulatory policy leakage from the 
perspective of a specific country and lending in the domestic economy.  Aiyar et al 
(2014a), using evidence from the UK, examined the impact of banks’ minimum capital 
requirements on cross-border bank loan supply (lending) in the UK from 1999 to 2006.  
They found that changes in banks’ capital requirements have a negative and 
significant effect on cross-border lending, but countries with important banking 
relationships to the UK tend to be affected less.  Also, Aiyar et al (2014b) found that 
regulated banks (UK-owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries) reduce lending 
in response to tighter capital requirement but unregulated banks (resident foreign 
branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements, suggesting 
competitive advantages. 
 
Houston et al (2012), using the Barth et al (2004, 2006, 2008)63 database which 
provides data and measures of bank regulatory and supervisory policies,  in more than 
 
61 They constructed a macroprudential database using information from Lim et al (2011), Borio and 
Shim (2007), Kuttner and Shim (2013) and International Monetary Fund (2014) being the main sources.  
Further, they supplemented their data by collecting information from country regulators' websites and 
financial stability reports, and individual communication with relevant authorities. 
62  They asserted that reserve requirements are typically classified as monetary policy tools for 
controlling the supply of credit by banks but they contented reserve requirements are similar to liquidity 
requirements in terms of their economic effects and sometimes used for financial stability purposes and 
as such have macro-prudential consequences. 
63 The database was updated in 2013 to include 180 countries for the period 1999 – 2011. 
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100 countries, found in their regression analysis that cross-country differences in 
regulations have an effect on international banks’ flows, where banks transferred funds 
to markets with less stringent regulation.  They noted that regulatory arbitrage, where 
banks transfer funds between countries to limit their regulatory obligations tend to 
restrict domestic regulators’ ability to limit banks risk-taking.  They looked at data from 
primarily 26 OECD source countries (the source of funds) to 120 recipient countries 
(recipient of funds) for the period 1996 to 2008.  Also, Bremus and Fratzscher (2015), 
using the updated Barth et al (2013) database and the BIS International Banking 
Statistics, which cover 15 reporting source countries and 46 recipient countries in a 
regression analysis, suggested that cross-border flows appear to be influenced by 
expansionary monetary policy and some flows are driven by regulatory policy where 
a higher degree of independence and power of the financial regulator in a country 
encourages cross-border bank lending.  
 
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) suggested that global banks played a significant role in 
the transmission of the 2007-2008 global crisis to emerging market economies.  They 
examined the relationships between adverse liquidity shocks in developed country 
banking systems and the effect it had on emerging markets in Europe, Asia and Latin 
America by isolating loan supply from loan demand effects using a difference-in-
difference approach (see Khwaja and Mian (2008)).  Their analysis looked at 17 
source countries (the source of funds) and 94 destination countries (recipient of funds) 
from three emerging market regions: Latin America (30 countries), Emerging Asia (21 
countries) and Emerging Europe (43 countries) over the period 2006 to 2009 using 
regression analysis.  They found that loan supply in emerging markets was 
significantly affected through three channels, i) a contraction in direct, cross-border 
lending by foreign banks, ii) a contraction in local lending by foreign banks’ affiliates in 
emerging markets and iii) a contraction in loan supply by domestic banks resulting 
from funding shock to their balance sheet induced by the decline in interbank, cross-
border lending.    
 
Similarly, Polov and Udell (2012), using survey data on over ten thousand loan 
applicants, found that firms’ access to credit (cross-border lending) in 16 emerging 
European countries was affected by the financial conditions of their banks, particularly 
foreign owned banks.  They found that over the period 2005 to 2008, different types 
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of financial shock, both positive and negative, on foreign banks as well as domestic 
banks had a significant impact on business lending to firms in emerging Europe 
countries.  
 
Finally, Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2013) studies the effect of financial integration (through 
banks) on the international transmission of country-specific shocks.  They examined 
the role of global banks in transmitting the 2007-2008 global crisis from the U.S. 
financial markets to the rest of developed world.  Using quarterly BIS’ Locational 
Banking Statistics data for 20 advanced countries between 1978 and 2009, they found 
that in periods without financial crises, increases in bilateral banking linkages are 
associated with more divergent output cycles and this relationship is weaker during 
financial turmoil periods.  They suggested as well that countries with direct and indirect 
strong cross-border banking linkages with the U.S. and its main offshore financial 
centre, for instance Cayman Islands, experienced more synchronised business cycles 
with the U.S. during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  Similar findings were seen during 
financial crisis episodes in advanced economics such as the banking crisis in 
Scandinavian countries in the early 1990s. 
 
4.4.2. Datasets for modelling the spill over effects of macroprudential policies 
via the credit channel 
 
Our empirical modelling is using three key datasets, two from the BIS – International 
Banking Statistics (IBS) (cross-border claims) and Credit-to-GDP (CREDITGDP) ratio 
data and the third dataset, the IBRN Macroprudential Instruments database (Cerutti et 
al IBRN (2017)).64 
  
I. BIS’ international banking statistics dataset 
 
In the literature, one of the key datasets for analysing issues such as financial markets 
interconnectedness, transmission channels for financial crises, and global risk network 
 
64 See special issue of the International Journal of Central Banking (IJCB) (March 2017) - Cerutti, E., 




maps, etc., is the BIS International Banking Statistics (IBS).65  The IBS, which is 
publicly available in aggregate form, track internationally active banks’ foreign 
positions and provides a comprehensive picture of total cross-border banks claims.  
The data are organised in two datasets – locational and consolidated banking 
statistics.66 
 
The Locational banking statistics (LBS) 67  provide information about the currency 
composition of banks’ balance sheets and the geographical breakdown of their 
counterparties.  The LBS were first compiled in the 1960s but the first year of data 
availability for a country is 1977.  They capture outstanding claims and liabilities of 
internationally active banks located in BIS forty-seven (47) reporting countries 68 
against counterparties residing in other countries.  The LBS are residence-based data 
and track the cross-border positions and the local positions in foreign currencies of 
banks located in a country.  Banks record their positions on an unconsolidated basis, 
including intragroup positions between offices of the same banking group.  The data 
are compiled following principles that are consistent with balance of payments 
statistics.  
  
The Consolidated banking statistics (CBS) capture the worldwide consolidated 
positions of internationally active banking groups headquartered in BIS reporting 
countries.  The CBS had their origins in the expansion of international banking activity 
in the Caribbean and other offshore centres in the 1970s but the first year of data 
availability for a country is 1983.  The CBS track banks’ worldwide consolidated gross 
claims and other exposures to individual countries and sectors, thus providing 
comparable base measures of national banking exposures to specific country risk.  
The data include the claims of reporting banks’ foreign affiliates but exclude intragroup 
positions, similarly to the consolidation approach followed by banking supervisors.  
They detail the transfer of credit risk from the immediate counterparty to the country 
of ultimate risk (where the guarantor of a claim resides). 
 
65 See BIS website, https://www.bis.org/statistics/about_banking_stats.  
66  Both datasets are collected under the auspices of the Committee on Global Financial System 
(CGFS). See CCFS webpage, https://www.bis.org/cgfs.  
67 The LBS capture around 93% of all cross-border interbank business.  See BIS Statistical Bulletin 
March 2018, https://www.bis.org/statistics/bulletin.  
68 See BIS website, https://www.bis.org/statistics/rep_countries.htm.  
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Both the LBS and CBS datasets are reported to the BIS at an aggregate (banking 
system) level rather than individual bank level, meaning these datasets do not report 
micro data, that is individual banks data.  For our empirical analysis, we are using the 
quarterly Consolidated banking statistics from 2000q1 to 2014q4 (reflecting the 
coverage of the IBRN macroprudential instruments dataset outlined below), and the 
variable which captures total international banks’ claims (CCBTC), that is cross border 
claims plus local claims in foreign currency plus local claims in local currency.  CCBTC 
includes all instrument types. 
 
II. BIS’ domestic credit-to-GDP ratio 
 
A key variable in our PVAR model is domestic credit and this is represented by the 
BIS’ domestic credit-to-GDP ratio.  The BIS has constructed credit series for forty three 
(43) countries, both advanced and emerging countries and one economic area, the 
Euro zone.69  The domestic credit-to-GDP ratio represents lending by domestic bank 
and non-banking institutions credit to residents but excludes cross-border claims 
(funds raised abroad).  The domestic credit ratio is thus different from the credit-to-
GDP ratio used in the calculation of the credit-to-GDP gap (see Chapter 3) as the 
domestic credit ratio does not include cross-border claims (funds raised abroad). 
 
Domestic credit represents credit as reported on the balance sheet of depository 
corporations that form the basis for the compilation of the monetary aggregates and 
their counterparts.  The counterparts cover banks’ claims on the private non-financial 
sector.  The private non-financial sector includes non-financial corporations (both 
private-owned and public owned), households and non-profit institutions serving 
households as defined in the System of National Accounts 2008. 70   In terms of 
financial instruments, credit covers loans and debt securities.  The series has quarterly 
frequency and capture the outstanding amount of credit at the end of the reference 
quarter.  The credit series is divided by GDP, which is the four-quarter moving sum of 
 
69 See BIS website, https://www.bis.org/statistics/totcredit/credpriv_doc.pdf.  
70 This is the international statistical standard for the national accounts, adopted by the United Nations 
Statistical Commission (UNSC). See https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna2008.asp.  
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nominal GDP.71  For our empirical analysis, we are using the quarterly data for the 
period 2000q1 to 2014q4. 
 
We note one data issue, namely that there is no data or it would be difficult to remove 
local claims that may be included in international banks’ claims, these are foreign bank 
subsidiaries or branches, operating domestically, credit that may be included in 
domestic credit as well as international banks’ claims.72  Hence there is a degree of 
overlap with the Consolidated Banking Statistics. 
  
III. IBRN macroprudential instruments dataset 
 
The IBRN dataset on macroprudential instruments covers sixty-four (64) countries for 
the period 2000 to 2014.  This dataset was used by the International Banking Research 
Network (IBRN) research project teams on analysing the spill over effects of 
macroprudential policy as well as Carreras et al (2018), who analysed the transmission 
of macroprudential policies and its effectiveness in reducing asset prices and credit 
growth.   
 
The macroprudential instruments data are aggregate information from primary 
sources such as central banks reports, and the IMF’s Global Macroprudential Policy 
Instruments (GMPI) survey conducted by the IMF during 2013.  There are five 
categories of macroprudential instruments in the database which are used to construct 
nine prudential tools indexes.  The five categories are capital buffers, interbank 
exposure limits, concentration limits, loan-to-value (LTV) ratio limits and reserve 
requirements.  Capital buffers and reserve requirements are divided in four and two 
sub-indexes respectively.  The IBRN dataset omits some categories of 
macroprudential instruments included in the IMF macroprudential instruments dataset 
used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 such as the debt-to-income ratio (DTI), taxes, 
dynamic loan-Loss provisioning (DP), etc. as discussed in Cerutti et al (2015a, 2017).  
 
 
71 When historical data are insufficient to calculate the four-quarter moving sum nominal GDP, the 
annual data is converted to quarterly data using linear interpolation. 




The IBRN database captures quarterly changes for the nine prudential tools indexes 
that have been used by policymakers between 2000-2014.  Also, it focuses on 
changes in the intensity in the usage of several widely used prudential instruments by 
cumulation of policy actions, considering both macroprudential and microprudential 
objectives.  The indexes are coded with the change in a policy tool with a 1 or -1 entry, 
depending on whether the tool was tightened or loosened in a given quarter.  The 
index equals 0 in those quarters when no changes occur.  There is no recorded entry 
in the database for a given tool if policymakers cannot use that tool.  Cerutti et al IBRN 
(2017) noted the advantage of this type of coding is that it can capture the intensity of 
a policy change while incorporating qualitative traits form the policy that cannot be 
measured by a unique numerical statistic.    
 
We use the IBRN database in this chapter over the IMF macroprudential instruments 
dataset as it captures the changes in the intensity (positive/negative) of the 
macroprudential instruments, which allow us to analyse the shock of each instrument 
in the panel-VAR model.  The five categories of macroprudential instruments and sub-
indexes as well as the cumulative indexes are in the following table. 
 
Table 4.1: IBRN macroprudential instruments dataset 
 
Changes in prudential instruments 
Sector specific capital 
buffer – real estate 
credit (sscbres) 
Change in sector specific capital buffer: real estate credit. 
Requires banks to finance a larger fraction of these 
exposures with capital.  
Sector specific capital 
buffer: consumer 
credit (sscbcons) 
Change in sector specific capital buffer: consumer credit 
Requires banks to finance a larger fraction of these 
exposures with capital.  
Sector specific capital 
buffer: other sectors 
(sscboth) 
Change in sector specific capital buffer: other sectors. 
Requires banks to finance a larger fraction of these 
exposures with capital.  
Capital requirements 
(capreq) 
Change in capital requirements. Implementation of Basel 
capital agreements.  
Concentration limit 
(concrat) 
Change in concentration limit.  Limits banks' exposures to 
specific borrowers or sectors.  
Interbank exposure 
limit (ibex) 
Change in interbank exposure limit.  Limits banks 
exposures to other banks.  
Loan-to-value ratio 
cap (ltvcap) 
Change in the loan-to-value ratio cap.  Limits on loans to 
residential borrowers.  
Reserve requirements 
on foreign currency 
(rrforeign) 
Change in reserve requirements on foreign currency - 




on local currency 
(rrlocal)  
Change in reserve requirements on local currency - 
denominated accounts.  
Aggregate indexes  
Sector-specific capital 
buffers (sscb) 
Sum of changes in sector-specific capital buffers across 
the residential, consumer, and other sectors. 
Sum of all country 
prudential instruments 
(pruC) 
Country index by time t and country c, equal to 1 if the 
sum of the 9 instruments is >=1 and -1 if the sum of the 
instruments is <=-1, 0 otherwise. 
Sum of all country 
prudential instruments 
(pruC2) 
Country index by time t and country c, equal to 1 if the 
sum of the 9 instruments is >=1 and -1 if the sum of the 
instruments is <=-1, 0 otherwise.  In this case, all 
individual instruments are adjusted to have maximum and 
minimum changes of 1 and -1.  
Cumulative indexes (relative from 2000q1)73 
Cumulative change in sector specific capital buffer: real estate credit (cumsscbres) 
Cumulative change in sector specific capital buffer: consumer credit 
(cumsscbcons) 
Cumulative change in sector specific capital buffer: other sectors (cumsscboth) 
Cumulative change in capital requirements (cumcapreq) 
Cumulative change in concentration limit (cumconcrat) 
Cumulative change in interbank exposure limit (cumibex) 
Cumulative change in the loan-to-value cap (cumltvcap) 
Cumulative change in reserve requirements on foreign currency-denominated 
accounts (cumrrforeign) 
Cumulative change in reserve requirements on local currency-denominated 
accounts (cumrrlocal) 
Cumulative change in the aggregate sector-specific capital buffer instrument 
(cumsscb) 
Sum of the cumulative version of the 9 instruments by country c and time t 
(cumPruC) 
Sum of the cumulative version of the 9 instruments by country c and time t. In this 
case, all individual instruments are adjusted to have maximum and minimum 
changes of 1 and -1 (cumPruC2) 
Source: Cerutti et al (2017).  The database covers a sample from 2000 to 2014 with quarterly data.   
 
Our main focus is on prudential instruments that have a significant effect, either 
positive or negative, on international banks’ cross-border activities as measured by 
international banks’ claims.  We expect that prudential measures which target banks’ 
capital and liquidity positions will have the greater effect on international banks’ claims 
as this will restrict banks’ ability to move assets between countries.  Additionally, in 
emerging markets, prudential measures that has a dual role of protecting the country 
 
73 The cumulative macroprudential instruments indexes form part of the testing in the panel VAR model 
but these indexes results were not much different from the individuals macroprudential instruments as 
such no results for these instruments will be discussed. 
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foreign reserves and currency exchange rate should have a spill over effect.  We 
expect that capital requirements (CAPREQ), interbank exposure limit (IBEX) and 
reserve requirements – foreign currency (RRFOREIGN) and local currency 
(RRLOCAL), etc., should have a greater effect on international banks’ claims.  This 
supported by the research of IBRN (2017), Cerutti et al (2015a, 2017), Aiyar et al (2014 
a and b), etc., (see Section 4.4 above).  As well, see Chapter 2 for a presentation of 
a taxonomy of the macroprudential instruments. 
 
IV. Banks’ regulatory capital ratio 
 
As a measure of banking strength and financial stability, the aggregate banking sector 
regulatory capital ratio is included in the model.  Banks’ capital ratios are a key part of 
banking regulation as helping to ensure robustness.   The introduction of the Basel 
Accord, which established rules for banks’ regulatory capital ratio, provides a means 
for varying capital requirements for limiting banks’ fragility and financial sector 
vulnerabilities.  There are other tools to measure banking sector fragility and financial 
sector vulnerabilities.  In our model, banks regulatory capital ratio is used as a proxy 
for banking sector fragility and financial sector vulnerabilities.  The measure of banks’ 
regulatory capital ratio we used is the ratio of total regulatory capital to its assets held, 
weighted according to risk of those assets.  The World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database (GFDD) (version July 2018) provides aggregate banking 
sector regulatory capital ratio (Čihák et al (2012), World Bank (2017)).  This is GFDD 
series SI.05.  The GFDD dataset frequency is annual but it was changed to quarterly 
data using linear interpolation. 
 
V. Countries included in the panel analysis 
 
Table 4.2. shows the countries that are included in the panel VAR with their respective 
prudential measures and international banks’ claims.  The dataset contains quarterly 
observations for 43 countries which includes 16 emerging market countries and 27 
advanced countries which account for more than 90% of the global economy in terms 
of nominal GDP in 2014.  These countries are the same used in Chapter 3 since we 
are using BIS’ domestic credit-to-GDP ratio, which is produced only for the countries 
listed in the table below.  
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Table 4.2: List of countries in the panel analysis 
 
Country ISO Code IMF category 
Argentina ARG EME 
Australia AUS ADV 
Austria AUT ADV 
Belgium BEL ADV 
Brazil BRA EME 
Canada CAN ADV 
Switzerland CHE ADV 
Chile CHL EME 
China (People's Republic of) CHN EME 
Colombia COL EME 
Czech Republic CZE ADV 
Denmark DEN ADV 
Germany DEU ADV 
Spain ESP ADV 
Finland FIN ADV 
France FRA ADV 
United Kingdom GBR ADV 
Greece GRC ADV 
Hong Kong SAR HKG ADV 
Hungary HUN EME 
Indonesia IDN EME 
India IND EME 
Ireland IRL ADV 
Israel ISR ADV 
Italy ITA ADV 
Japan JPN ADV 
Korea KOR ADV 
Luxembourg LUX ADV 
Mexico MEX EME 
Malaysia MYS EME 
Netherlands NLD ADV 
Norway NOR ADV 
New Zealand NZL ADV 
Poland POL EME 
Portugal PRT ADV 
Russia RUS EME 
Saudi Arabia SAU EME 
Singapore SGP ADV 
Sweden SWE ADV 
Thailand THA EME 
Turkey TUR EME 
United States USA ADV 
South Africa ZAF EME 





4.4.3. Empirical analysis for testing the spill over effects of macroprudential 
policies via international banks’ claims 
 
I. Model specifications and estimation methodology 
 
The starting point for the empirical analysis is the work of International Banking 
Research Network (IBRN) as mentioned above, who looked at how banks’ 
(international) lending responds to macroprudential policies implemented in home and 
foreign markets by using OLS regression models for analysing inward and outward 
transmission of the impact.  However, we differ in the modelling approach as we use 
panel-vector autoregressive (PVAR) analysis and country aggregate macro-level data 
to analyse the macroprudential measures’ impact.   
 
The main advantage of using a panel approach is that it increases the efficiency of the 
statistical inference, which would otherwise suffer from a small number of degrees of 
freedom when the VAR is estimated at the country level.  Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) 
noted that panel VAR is built with the same logic as standard VAR yet by adding a 
cross-sectional dimension, they can be a useful tool to address policy related 
questions such as the transmission of shocks across borders.  Panel VAR can better 
model the spill over effects from country to another since it can capture country level 
heterogeneity.  Also, Carreras et al (2018) noted that a PVAR can overcome the 
difficulty of reduced form estimation such as OLS by capturing interaction of policy, 
real and financial sectors.   
 
Before analysing the extent of spill over effects of macroprudential instruments 
between countries using international banks’ claims (lending activities), we will assess 
the relationship between domestic credit  and international banks’ claims, that is, how 
one variable responds when there is a shock to the other variable and vice versa.  
Then, we will look at the spill over effects of macroprudential policies between 
countries and what potential effects these policies can have across borders.  The 
macroprudential instruments will be tested one by one using the baseline PVAR model 
and the macroprudential instrument is adjudged to have a cross-border spill over effect 
if it has a significant effect on international banks’ claims.  Moreover, the 
macroprudential instruments are considered to have a domestic impact if domestic 
171 
 
credit is mainly affected.  The cross-border spillovers and domestic effects can be 
categorised as being positive or negative. 
 
The PVAR model is given by: 
 
Xi,t = B(L)Xit-1 + ɛit   (4.1) 
 
where Xi,t is a vector of endogenous variable country i, B(L) is a matrix polynomial in 
lag operator, L, with country i = 1,….N (N = 43), t = T (T = 60), and ɛit is a vector of 
idiosyncratic errors. 
 
In the baseline specification, the vector X includes the following variables: 
• domestic credit to GDP ratio 
• international banks’ claims to GDP ratio74 
• monetary policy interest rate 
• the rate of real GDP growth 
• the rate of inflation  
• banks’ regulatory capital ratio 
 
The endogenous variables in the model are domestic credit and international banks’ 
claims, while in addition, following Ciccarelli et al (2010) 75, we include real GDP 
growth, monetary policy interest rate, and the inflation rate.  Banks’ regulatory capital 
ratio is added as a measure of banking strength and financial stability.  An exogenous 
bank crisis variable (BCRISIS) is included in the PVAR, capturing the presence of a 
banking crisis during the period a country experienced a banking crisis as defined by 
Laeven and Valencia (2018).  It is a dummy variable and it is coded in the quarter the 
crisis starts until the period it was over.   
 
The macroeconomic data included in the model capture the focus of macroprudential 
policy (see Chapter 3), that is, the area where financial imbalances are mostly to 
 
74 International banks’ claims are divided by GDP to deflate the series. 
75 Using a standard VAR, they looked at the impact of the credit channels on GDP growth and inflation 
and how changes in monetary policy are transmitted through these channels in the Euro area and the 
US.   
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occur, the credit markets and the reason for using such policies as well as the variables 
that capture economic activities.  We look at the impact of the credit (domestic and 
international lending) on GDP growth, inflation and changes in monetary policy interest 
rate, see Ciccarelli et al (2010).  Table 4.3. shows the list of variables and the data 
source. 
 
Table 4.3: List of variables and source 
 
Variable Source 
Domestic Credit-to-GDP  Bank for International Settlements 
International banks’ claims to GDP  Bank for International Settlements 
Monetary policy interest rate  IMF International Financial Statistics 
and Bank for International Settlements 
Real GDP growth rate  IMF International Financial Statistics 
Banks’ regulatory capital ratio (capital to 
risk-weighted assets) 
World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database (GFDD) 
Inflation rate  IMF International Financial Statistics 
Banking crisis dummy  Laeven and Valencia (2013) 
Notes: For some countries, data for certain variables were collected from their central bank and/or 
national statistical agency. In addition, some data were derived by the author.  
 
II. Descriptive statistics of the model variables 
 
Table 4.4. shows some descriptive statistics of the variables in the model for the period 
2000q1-2014q4 (all countries).  Note that the data differ from the comparable data in 
Chapter 3 as the period there ends in 2013q4.  The mean for domestic credit is 
81.288% of GDP but there is a large variation in the data as the standard deviation 
(StdDev) is 42.33%.  Also, international banks claims are on average almost as large 
as domestic credit, but that this is affected by extreme observations from international 
financial centres (especially Luxembourg), the median for international claims is only 
half as high as for domestic credit.  Argentina experienced deflation in 2014, where 
the inflation rate fell to -23.9 per cent which is an IMF estimate as there is no official 
rate but the 2014 values are seen as outliers in the data.  In our sample, the average 
regulatory capital ratio for banking sectors is 14.14%, well above the 8% Basel 




Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of the variables in the model for the period 























 Mean  4.63  81.28 79.87  2.97  14.14  3.48 
 Median  3.25  80.65 41.15  2.99  13.57  2.58 
 Maximum  82.46  229.30 1,371.69  18.85  30.90  70.33 
 Minimum -0.25  8.40 3.35 -16.34  2.50 -23.90 
 StdDev  5.83  42.33 166.65  3.62  2.88  4.94 
Observations  2,58  2,57 2,58  2,58  2,52  2,58 
Number of 
countries 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Note: The values are in percent except for the observations and the number of countries, which is a 
number.  The data are quarterly values.  The variables are in level (not log).  StdDev is standard 
deviation.  The variables are in level (not lagged).  
 
Table 4.5 below shows that domestic credit market and international banks’ claims are 
higher in advanced countries than in emerging market economies.  Real GDP growth 
is higher in emerging market economies as indicated above as is inflation.  Intuitively, 
it follows that with higher economic growth and inflation in emerging markets, the 
monetary policy interest rate may also need to be higher as there is a need to control 
higher inflation and cool the overheating economy in emerging markets (see Chapter 
3 as well).  The average regulatory capital ratio for banking sectors is higher in 
emerging markets.  Yet, it is important to note that some of the large maximum and 
minimum values for the model variables are the result of political and financial crises 
in a number of countries (e.g. Argentina, Turkey, Greece, Ireland, Russia, Spain, etc.) 




Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics of the variables in the model for the period 


















 ADV EME ADV EME ADV EME ADV EME ADV EME ADV EME 
Mean 2.48 8.28 99.39 50.95 110.97 27.39 2.14 4.35 13.42 15.38 2.00 5.98 
Median 2.00 6.45 93.40 40.45 56.36 19.87 2.32 4.63 12.85 14.97 2.00 4.66 
Max 9.90 82.46 229.30 141.60 1,371.69 120.72 18.86 18.57 22.68 30.90 7.47 70.33 
Min -0.25 0.00 23.50 8.40 5.61 3.35 -10.73 -16.34 7.00 2.50 -6.11 -23.90 
StdDev 1.87 8.02 35.41 35.00 203.44 20.62 3.19 3.88 2.46 3.12 1.55 7.19 
Obs 
          
1,620  960 
          
1,608  960 
          
1,620  960 
          
1,620  960 
          
1,589  934 
          
1,620  960 
NosCo 27 16 27 16 27 16 27 16 27 16 27 16 
Note: The values are in percent except for the observations and the number of countries, which is a 
number.  The data are quarterly values.  The variables are in level (not log).  StdDev – standard 
deviation, Obs – number of observations, NosCo – number of countries, ADV – advanced countries, 
EME – emerging market economies. 
 
III. Correlation matrix for the variables in the model 
 
Table 4.6 shows that for all countries, none of the variables are highly correlated 
except for the monetary policy interest rate, which is high positively correlated 
(Pearson’s correlation coefficient) (see Hinkle et al (2003)).76   See above and in 
Chapter 3 for further discussion of the relationship between the macroeconomic 
variables.  Domestic credit has a positive relationship with international banks’ claims 
but a negative relationship with the rate of interest, inflation and real GDP growth.  




76 The rule of thumb for interpreting the size of a correlation coefficient is the following: 0.90 to 1.00 (-
0.90 to –1.00) Very high positive (negative) correlation; 0.70 to 0.90 (-0.70 to -0.90) High positive 
(negative) correlation; 0.50 to 0.70 (-0.50 to -0.70) Moderate positive (negative) correlation; 0.30 to 0.50 
(-0.30 to -0.50) Low positive (negative) correlation; 0.00 to 0.30 (0.00 to -0.30) Little if any correlation. 
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Table 4.6: Correlation matrix for the variables in the model for the period 
























rate 1.00      
Domestic 




GDP -0.14 0.18 1.00    
Real GDP 
growth rate 0.11 -0.17 -0.07 1.00   
Banks’ 
regulatory 
capital ratio 0.20 -0.30 0.09 0.12 1.00  
Inflation rate 0.72 -0.38 -0.10 0.13 0.21 1.00 
Note: The variables are in level. 
 
Table 4.7: Correlation matrix for the variables in the model for the period 
2000q1-2014q4 (advanced countries and emerging market economies) 
 
 MPIR DC IBC GDP BCR IR 
 ADV EME ADV EME ADV EME ADV EME ADV EME ADV EME 
MIR 1.00 1.00           
DC -0.12 -0.36 1.00 1.00         
IBC -0.06 -0.19 0.05 0.28 1.00 1.00       
GDP 0.29 -0.15 -0.13 0.16 0.02 -0.24 1.00 1.00     
BCR -0.47 0.21 0.03 -0.39 0.28 -0.30 0.07 -0.03 1.00 1.00   
IR 0.32 0.69 -0.11 -0.31 0.03 -0.16 0.14 -0.02 -0.20 0.19 1.00 1.00 
Note: The variables are in level. MPIR – monetary policy interest rate, DC - domestic credit-to-GDP, 
IBC – international banks’ claims-to-GDP, GDP - real GDP growth rate,  BCR - Banks’ regulatory capital 
ratio, IR – inflation rate, ADV – advanced countries, EME – emerging market economies 
 
Once again, in Table 4.7 above, none of the variables are highly correlated except for 
the monetary policy interest rate and inflation, which is high positively correlated in 
emerging markets.  As suggested above, this could be due to the higher reported 
monetary policy interest rate and inflation rate in a number of countries such  
Argentina, Russia and Turkey, etc., which at some point experienced a political and 
financial crisis during the period.  Also as noted above, emerging market economies 
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were experiencing higher economic growth than advanced countries, and as such 
interest rates were used to dampen economic growth and higher inflation growth rate. 
 
IV. Estimation methodology 
 
Following the literature (see Hristov et al (2012)), we estimated the PVAR with the 
real-GDP growth rate, international banks’ claims-to-GDP, the inflation rate, domestic 
credit-to-GDP and regulatory capital are in logs, while the monetary policy interest rate 
is expressed in per cent.  Woolridge (2006) noted that economic variables measured 
in monetary values are normally in log form while variables measured in units of time 
or interest rates are often left in levels.  See for example the work of Carreras et al 
(2018).  Similarly, variables that are ratios are often left in that form in empirical work 
e.g. the unemployment rate.   Therefore, we adopted the modelling methodology of 
Hristov et al (2012), where they look at loan supply shocks during the financial crisis 
in the Euro area.  Further, the variables are estimated in the model as endogenous 
variables except for the banking crisis, which is an exogenous variable.  We control 
for country fixed and time effects by using dummy variables.  The panel VAR is 
estimated quarterly for the period 2000q1 to 2014q4 using 43 countries (All Countries).   
 
a) Unit Root Tests 
 
An important issue is how to enter variables into the model.  We would prefer to have 
stationary variables for the PVAR.  A set of results for panel unit root tests is given in 
Table 4.8 below, where we see that over 2000q1-2014q4, all the variables are 
stationary except the log domestic credit variable according the Im-Pesaran-Shin 
(2003) test (which allows for individual unit root processes between countries).  
  
Table 4.8: Summary statistics of the unit root tests 2000q1-2014q4 
 
Log variable Im-Pesaran-Shin 
International banks’ claims to GDP 
(LNCCBTCTOGDP) 
-3.95 (0.00) 
Monetary policy interest rate (BANKRATE)  -4.65 (0.00) 
Log Banks’ regulatory capital ratio 
(LNREGCAPRATIO) 
-2.38 (0.00) 
Log Inflation rate (LNINFLATRATE) -3.90 (0.00) 
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Log Real GDP growth rate (LNREALGDPRATE) -10.57 (0.00) 
Log Domestic Credit-to-GDP (LNDOMCREDIT) 2.60 (0.99) 
Difference of LNDOMCREDIT -16.23 (0.00) 
Note: P-value in parentheses 
 
Ashley and Verbrugge (2009) suggested that modelling even in the presence of a non-
stationary series is appropriate in the context of impulse response function that are 
robust and the misspecification danger from possible over differencing clearly 
outweighs the danger of spurious regression.  Similarly, Fanchon and Wendel (1992) 
indicated that VAR models estimated with non-stationary series yield consistent 
parameter estimates especially when the non-stationary data is also cointegrated.  
Ludvigson (1998) notes that even in the case where some variables may be non-
stationary, a VAR in levels will have standard asymptotic distributions.  Therefore, we 
included the non-stationary LNDOMCREDIT in the PVAR model and a separate 
robustness test was completed using the variable in first differenced.  Note that given 
we have stationary variables, a simple VAR is appropriate as opposed to a 
cointegrating vector-error-correction model as employed in Carreras et al (2018). 
 
b) PVAR lagged order selection 
 
We applied the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (1974) and the Schwarz information 
criterion (SIC) (1978) to determine the lag order of the PVAR models.  The two criteria 
are very similar but arise from very different assumptions.  The AIC is derived from 
information theory and it is designed to pick the model that produces a probability 
distribution with the smallest discrepancy from the true distribution, that is, it minimizes 
the loss of information.  Similar to the AIC, the SIC is also based on information theory 
but it is set within a Bayesian model selection criterion (see Fabozzi et al (2014)).  
 
Table 4.9 below shows the lag order results using the AIC and SIC.  The results show 
that AIC recommends a lag order selection of 6 lags, while SIC reported a 2-lag order 
selection.  In addition, the autoregressive (AR) roots polynomial results for both the 
AIC and SIC show that both order lag sections criteria satisfy the PVAR stability 





Table 4.9: Lag-order selection statistics for Panel VAR (all Countries) 
 
Endogenous variables (all in logs except monetary policy interest rate): Inflation rate, 
Monetary policy interest rate, Domestic credit, International banks’ claims, Banks’ 
regulatory capital ratio and Real GDP growth rate. 
Exogenous variables: Banking crisis dummy, Country dummy for fixed and time 
effects. 
Included observation: 1140 
 Lag AIC SIC 
0 12.636 12.689 
1 -7.968 -7.755 
2 -8.886  -8.515* 
3 -8.953 -8.423 
4 -8.980 -8.291 
5 -9.118 -8.269 
6  -9.275* -8.267 
7 -9.256 -8.089 
8 -9.255 -7.929 
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion. AIC: Akaike information criterion. SC: Schwarz 
information criterion. 
 
In the research literature, Koehler and Murphree (1988), using 91 times series data 
from the Makridakis competition (1982), found that AIC procedure tends to overfit the 
data and choose higher order models for empirical analysis.  They found that SIC is a 
better criterion to use.   Similar results were found by Hannan (1982) and Geweke and 
Meese (1981).  Moreover, Yang (2005) acknowledged that BIC is consistent in 
selecting the true model, yet, AIC may be better than BIC in case of multivariate 
regression analysis. However, Burnham and Anderson (2011) provided theoretical 
arguments in favour of AIC.    
 
Intuitively, if the PVAR satisfies the stability condition at a lower lag, in this case at lag 
2, all subsequent higher lags should all satisfy the stability condition as well.  We will 
discuss the baseline PVAR model results mainly using the 2-lag order section criterion 
model.  In discussion of the macroprudential results, we will first review the results 
from the 2-lag order section criterion model and then as a robustness checks, we will 
assess the results using the 6 lags order selection model before drawing a conclusion 
on the cross-border effects of macroprudential instruments. 
 
Nevertheless, this will require further investigation and analysis of the estimation 
method and how cross countries effects are dealt with in the PVAR model for all 
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countries as when the PVAR is estimated for advanced countries and emerging 
market economies, both the AIC and SIC are indicating two lags.  This could be a topic 
for future research.   
 
c) Identification of structural shocks 
 
The premise of the empirical analysis is to provide an analysis of the spill over effects 
of macroprudential policy, which will aid in the understanding of the 
interconnectedness of financial markets via international banks’ claims (lending 
activities).  The main focus of macroprudential policy to date is to prevent the build of 
imbalances in the credit market, mainly affecting domestic banking and household 
sectors.  For the identification of the macroprudential policy shocks, we use the IBRN 
Macroprudential Instruments dataset as discussed above, which captures quarterly 
changes for the nine prudential tools indexes that have been used by policymakers 
between 2000 to 2014.  For further information of the dataset, see IBRN 
Macroprudential Instruments dataset as discussed above for the description of 
macroprudential policy. 
 
We follow common practice and identify shocks using recursive identification (through 
the Cholesky decomposition), with the variables ordered as follows, inflation, monetary 
policy rate, domestic credit, international banks’ claims, bank regulatory capital ratio 
and real GDP growth. The logic of the chosen Cholesky ordering is to start with the 
response of monetary policy authority to inflation rate as price stability is recognised 
as the primary objective of monetary policy and a number of countries have adopted 
an inflation targeting framework (see Hammond (2012)).  The assumption is that the 
best that monetary policy can do to support the long-term growth of the economy is to 
maintain price stability (see Jahan (2017)), such that when the inflation rate moves 
away from the target inflation rate, monetary policy rate is adjusted.  This in turn affects 
the cost of credit (domestic credit), international banks’ claims, bank regulatory capital 
ratio and then the GDP growth rate, where there is expected to be a lagged effect on 
GDP growth.  We note that not all monetary authorities have an inflation targeting 
monetary policy regime, where the monetary authority has an explicit publicly 
announced target inflation rate for the medium term.  However, in most countries price 
stability remains the primary objective of monetary policy which can also include other 
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goals such as economic growth and employment.  Accordingly, we ordered the 
variables as discussed above using Cholesky decomposition. 
 
4.4.4. Estimated results for analysing the relationship between domestic credit 
and international banks’ claims 
 
I. Impulse responses to domestic credit and international banks’ claims 
for the period 2000q1-2014q4 (all countries, 2 lags PVAR model) 
 
Before presenting the results analysing the spill over effects of macroprudential 
policies using international banks’ claims (lending activities), we discuss the impulse 
responses and variance decomposition of the baseline PVAR model, looking at the 
relationship between domestic credit (DOMCREDIT), international banks’ claims 
(CCBTCTOGDP), and the domestic economy.77  As mentioned previously, in order to 
assess the spill over effects of macroprudential policy, it is important to establish 
whether there is a relationship between international banks’ claims and the domestic 
economy.     
 
We assess the effects of domestic credit and international banks’ claims on  
macroeconomic and banking variables – inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, 
real GDP growth rate and banks’ regulatory capital ratio over the period 2000q1 to 
2014q4 since in the empirical literature, credit has been the focus of macroprudential 
policy and also a key early warning indicator.  Impulse response functions were 
estimated from the six-variable panel vector autoregression model (PVAR), as 
discussed above. 
 
The results for the impulse response functions to domestic credit and international 
banks’ claims are presented in the following figures.  In Figure 4.3 below, the effects 
of a one-standard-deviation shock to domestic credit has a positive and significant 
effect on the inflation rate, the monetary policy interest rate and international banks’ 
claims.  The positive impact on the inflation rate is about 0.04 point after 3 quarters, 
 
77 The results discussion is based on using the 2-lag order selection PVAR model.  The results for the 
6-lag order selection model is available from the author on request. 
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while the monetary policy interest rate rises to, up to 0.22 point after 8 quarters.  
Accordingly, credit growth is shown to accompany procyclical price pressures, and no 
doubt partly for this reason, monetary policy is shown to respond to domestic credit 
growth, also potentially complementing the effect of macroprudential policies. 
 
Figure 4.3: Response of macroeconomic and banking variables to a shock to 




Note: The shock is defined as a Cholesky one-standard deviation.  Dotted lines show the plus or minus 
two-standard error bands.  The horizon period is measured in quarters and the sample spans from 
2000q1 to 2014q4.  Cholesky order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, 
international banks’ claims, banks’ regulatory capital ratio and real GDP growth rate. 
 
There is a positive and significant effect on international banks’ claims up to the tenth 
quarter, increasing as much as 0.017 point, which shows the positive relationship 
between domestic credit and international banks’ claims.  Also, it suggests the ease 
in which domestic borrowers can access the international capital markets and 
substitute cheaper international credit for more costly domestic borrowing as domestic 
interest rates rise.  Yet, it is critical to note that there is a partial overlap as discussed 
above, which may also partly explain the effect on international credit.78  Meanwhile, 
there is a significant and negative effect of domestic credit on regulatory capital ratios, 
 
78 It would be difficult to remove domestic credit (local claims) that may be included in international 
banks’ claims, these are foreign bank subsidiaries or branches, operating domestically, credit that may 
be included in domestic credit as well as international banks’ claims. The credit can be foreign or local 
currency loans issued by these foreign bank subsidiaries or branches.  The credit can be foreign or 
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which suggests lax regulation during at least part of the period (and inversely the 
tightening of Basel III during a period of subdued credit growth).  Meanwhile, there is 
no continuous significant effect of GDP growth, although there is a negative effect on 
GDP growth from the sixth quarter. 
 
Figure 4.4: Response of macroeconomic and banking variables to a shock to 




Note: The shock is defined as a Cholesky one-standard deviation.  Dotted lines show the plus or minus 
two-standard error bands.  The horizon period is measured in quarters and the sample spans from 
2000q1 to 2014q4.  Cholesky order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, 
international banks’ claims, banks’ regulatory capital ratio and real GDP growth rate. 
 
The effects of one-standard-deviation shock on international banks’ claims on the 
variables are shown in Figure 4.4 above.  Overall, international banks’ claims do not 
have a significant effect on the macroeconomic variables and banks’ regulatory capital 
ratio, except for real GDP growth.  There no continuous significant effect on real GDP 
growth but negative effects in the mid to longer term periods.  This could reflect the 
fact that international lending is highly cyclical and may accordingly precede a 
downturn. This apart, the result suggests there is no significant spill over effect of 
international banking activities in the domestic economy.  The lack of effect on 
domestic credit suggests that on average the domestic banking sector is not reliant on 
international markets for funds and is thus less likely to be affected by any potential 
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international liquidity market (Goldberg (2009)).  Further, this may suggest in advance 
that macroprudential policy has no spill over effects via international banks’ claims.  
We will explore this further below. 
 
In the term of pre-crisis (2000q1-2006q4) and post-crisis (2007q1-2014q4), the impact 
of a shock on domestic credit (see Appendix Figures 4A.1 and 4A.2) on the 
economic and banking variables is weaker in the post-crisis period which we suggest 
may be due to the financial crisis and subsequent recession especially in advanced 
countries.  In the pre-crisis period, there is a positive and significant effect on inflation, 
the monetary policy interest rate, international banks’ claims and economic growth.  
The domestic credit shock impacts on banks’ regulatory capital ratio is negative and 
significant in the pre-crisis period, which could be due to Basel II new capital 
requirements and increasing competition.  In the post-crisis period, there is positive 
and significant effect on monetary policy interest rate and international banks’ claims.  
The effect on economic growth is significant and negative in the post-crisis period, 
while the effect on banking sectors’ regulatory capital ratios is insignificant.   
 
In term of international banks’ claims (see Appendix Figures 4A.3 and 4A4), the 
effects of a shock to international banks’ claims are only significant on banks’ 
regulatory capital ratio in the pre-crisis period (2000q1-2006q4) and inflation rate in 
the post-crisis period (2007q1-2014q4).  There is a negative and significant impact on 
banks’ regulatory capital ratio in the pre-crisis (2000q1-2006q4) period, which could 
be the effect of the new regulatory capital requirement (Basel II Accord).  In the post-
crisis period (2007-2014), the impact of a shock on international banks’ claims is 
stronger and significant on the rate of inflation than in the pre-crisis period (2000-
2006), where the effect is positive.  Once again, there is no significant relationship 
between international banks’ claims and the domestic economy, further highlighting 
that there may be no spill over effects of macroprudential policy via international banks’ 
claims. 
 
Table 4.10 below shows the result summary of the effects of a shock to domestic credit 
and international banks’ claims on the macroeconomic and banking variables (All 
countries).  From the table, it seems in the current sample that international banks 
claims’ do not really have a significant effect on the domestic economy except for 
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banks’ capital, which suggest capital flows are affected by changes in international 
banks’ claims.  
 
Table 4.10: Summary statistics of the effects of a shock to domestic credit and 
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2006q4 
o o o + - o 
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2014q4 
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Note: + positive and significant effect; - negative and significant effect; o insignificant effect. The 
frequency is quarterly. 
 
II. Variance decomposition of credit and international banks’ claims (all 
countries, 2 lags PVAR model) 
 
In order to assess the importance of the domestic credit and international banks’ 
claims shocks, we also present the variance decomposition analysis for up to 10 
quarters, using the same Cholesky order (inflation, monetary policy interest rate, 
domestic credit, international banks’ claims, banks’ regulatory capital ratio and real 
GDP growth rate).  The forecasted error variance decomposition shows the 
contribution of the variation of one variable that is explained by a shock (one standard 
deviation) in another variable, the effect over time.  Tables 4.8 shows the percentage 
of variation of the variables that are explained by domestic credit and international 
banks’ claims shocks over the period 2000q1-2014q4 (see Appendix Table 4A.1). 
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In Table 4.11 below, the forecasted error variance decomposition shows that the 
contribution of the unexpected domestic credit and international banks’ claims shocks 
are rather unresponsive in the early periods but increase over time.  These results are 
in line with the impulse response functions as a domestic credit shock tends to have 
stronger accumulated impact on the variables than an international banks’ claims 
shock.  As noted above with the impulse response functions, domestic credit has a 
strong impact on international banks’ claims, which suggest the ease in which 
domestic borrowers can access the international market and substitute more costly 
domestic borrowing for cheaper international credit as domestic interest rates rise, as 
suggested by the increase in interest rate.  See Appendix Tables 4A.1, 4A.2 and 
4A.3 for the forecasted error variance decomposition discussion for the periods 
(2000q1-2014q4, 2000q1-2006q4 and 2007q1-2014q4).  
 
Table 4.11: Forecasted error variance decomposition of the variable explained 
by domestic credit and international banks’ claims shocks for the period 
2000q1-2014q4 (all countries, per cent) 
 
Variable Domestic credit International banks’ claims 
Quarter Quarter 
1 5 10 1 5 10 
Inflation rate 0.00 1.10 1.41 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Monetary policy 
interest rate 
0.00 1.06 1.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Domestic credit 99.72 97.93 94.00 0.00 0.05 0.08 
International 
banks’ claims 
0.86 4.59 5.36 99.65 94.01 91.11 
Banks’ regulatory 
capital 
0.35 0.75 1.08 0.01 0.14 0.20 
Real GDP growth 
rate 
0.22 0.15 0.38 0.08 0.27 0.32 
Note: Cholesky order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, international banks’ 
claims, banks’ regulatory capital ratio and real GDP growth rate.  The table shows the contribution effect 
domestic credit and international banks’ claims have on the other variables.  The total will not add up 
to 100%. 
 
The forecasted error variance decomposition results provide further evidence that 





4.4.5. Estimated results for analysing the spill over effects of macroprudential 
policies using international banks’ claims for the period (all countries, 2 
lags PVAR model) 
 
In analysing the spill over effects of macroprudential policies using international banks’ 
claims channel, the macroprudential instruments were tested one by one using the 
baseline PVAR models (all countries).  The cumulative macroprudential instruments 
indexes form part of the testing in the VAR model but these indexes results were not 
much different from the individual’s macroprudential instruments that made up the 
cumulative indexes.  Also, in some cases the PVAR model did not satisfy the stability 
condition that no AR root lies outside the unit circle, so the results for these instruments 
are not presented.79   
 
Each macroprudential instrument was added as an endogenous variable, which allow 
for the measuring of the impact of a change in the instrument on the other variables in 
the model.  This endogeneity suggests that macroprudential instruments are explained 
by the relationship to the other variables in the model.  As discussed above, the nature 
of macroprudential policy to date is to prevent the build of imbalances in the credit 
market, mainly affecting domestic banking and household sectors.  As such, the 
operation of macroprudential policy is based on responding to increasing credit 
demands (a positive credit shock).  Therefore, the inclusion of domestic credit and 
international banks’ claims (lending activities) in the model should suggest that the 
macroprudential instruments can be treated as endogenous variable in a model as the 
usage of these instruments are influenced by credit conditions.   
 
As before, the impulse response functions were estimated using the baseline PVAR 
models (all countries) with the macroprudential instrument included and controlling for 
country fixed and time effects and financial crises during the period using the Cholesky 
decomposition. The variables are ordered as follows, the inflation rate, monetary policy 
interest rate, domestic credit, international banks’ claims, banks’ regulatory capital 
ratio and real GDP growth rate and the macroprudential instrument. The logic of the 
ordering is as before, but we see macroprudential policy as responding to 
 
79 Results are available from the author on request. 
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procyclicality, and hence it comes after both types of credit and GDP growth.  The 
assumption is also that the effect of such policies is likely to be lagged (as typically 
found in the literature).  The ordering also assumes that monetary policy is a key part 
of the background to macroprudential policy decisions.  
 
Similar to the research literature such as IBRN (2017), Cerutti et al (2017), Aiyar et al 
(2014 a and b), etc., the analysis focuses mainly on the macroprudential instruments 
that have a noteworthy effect on the international banks’ claims (spill over effect) and 
domestic credit (domestic effect).  A macroprudential instrument is adjudged to have 
a spill over effect if it has an effect on international banks’ claims after analysing both 
the impulse response function and variance decomposition results.  Moreover, the 
macroprudential instruments are considered to have a domestic impact if domestic 
credit is mainly affected.  The cross-border spillovers and domestic effects can be 
categorised as being positive or negative.  
 
As mentioned above, we expect that prudential measures which target banks’ capital 
and liquidity positions will have the greater effect on international banks’ claims as this 
will restrict banks’ ability to move assets between countries.  Additionally, in emerging 
markets, prudential measures that has a dual role of protecting the country foreign 
reserves and currency exchange rate should have a spill over effect.  We expect that 
capital requirements (CAPREQ), interbank exposure limit (IBEX) and reserve 
requirements – foreign currency (RRFOREIGN) and local currency (RRLOCAL), etc., 
should have a greater effect on international banks’ claims.    
 
Yet, it is important to bear in mind some potential effects are not fully captured in the 
VAR models such as the underlying impact of quantitative easing, fiscal policies, asset 
prices etc. Also, it seems that macroprudential instruments were designed to work in 
a period of relative financial stability or assist in the prevention of financial instability 
and may have a more limited effect during an actual financial crisis, as other policy 
objectives were given priority.  This is an area where further research is warranted and 
as indicated we will look at it in Chapter 5 where we analyse the potential effects of 
macroprudential policies on banks’ profitability and activities  as well as we look at the 




I. Summary results of the impulse responses functions and variance 
decomposition of the macroprudential instruments for the period 2000q1-
2014q4 (all countries, 2 lags PVAR model) 
 
Overall in the period 2000q1-2014q480 , none of the macroprudential instruments 
including the aggregate indexes had any significant effects on international banks’ 
claims.  As mentioned above, we expected that prudential measures which target 
banks’ capital and liquidity positions will have the greater effect on international banks’ 
claims as this will restrict banks’ ability to move assets between countries.  Yet, the 
results do not show this and discussed in Section 4.4.4, the inability to establish a 
significant relationship between international banks’ claims and the domestic 
economy, suggest in advance that there is no spill over effects of macroprudential 
policy via international banks’ claims.   
 
On balance, our empirical results show that individual macroprudential measures in 
one country will not generate significant spill over effects into another country.  This 
result is in line with the general observation of the IBRN (2017), which suggested that 
macroprudential measures effects sometimes spill over across borders through bank 
lending but that it varies by country depending on factors such as the financial 
openness of the country’s financial system, the business and financial cycle and the 
characteristics of banks’ balance sheets.  Yet, IBRN (2017) suggested that 
macroprudential policy effects on international banks loan growth are not very large.  
See Table 4.12 below for the summary results.   
  
 
80 The results for the pre-crisis (2000-2006) and post-crisis (2007-2014) periods are not presented as 
they don’t change the analysis for full sample period 2000-2014.  The results are available from the 
authors on request. 
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Table 4.12: Summary statistics of PVAR model (with 2 lagged order selection) 
variables to a shock to the macroprudential instruments for the period 2000q1-





















SSCBRES o o o o o o 
SSCBCONS o o o o o o 
SSCBOTH o + o o o o 
CAPREQ na na na na na na 
CONCRAT o + o o o o 
IBEX na na na na na na 
LTVCAP na na na na na na 
RRFOREIGN o o + o o o 
RRLOCAL  o + o o o o 
Aggregate 
indexes 
      
SSCB o o o o o o 
PRUC o + o o o o 
PRUC2 o + o o o o 
Note: The results represent the initial impact of the macroprudential instrument shock on the variables 
over 10 quarters based on the impulse response functions.  The shock is defined as a Cholesky one-
standard deviation.  Cholesky order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, 
international banks’ claims, banks’ regulatory capital ratio, real GDP growth rate and the 
macroprudential instrument.  + positive and significant effect; - negative and significant effect; o 
insignificant effect, na – not applicable as the PVAR does satisfy the stability condition. See Appendix 
4A.4 for the impulse response functions figures. 
 
Other significant results to highlight are from Table 4.12 above, where we find foreign 
currency reserve requirements ((RRFOREIGN) have a significant and positive effect 
in domestic credit growth.  This may be attributed to a potential switch to domestic 
loans by banks when such requirements are imposed.  It remains important to note 
these results for credit growth should not be taken in isolation, as there remains an 
impact of macroprudential policies on the other macroeconomic variables in the PVAR 
which is not captured in single equation studies.  As suggested in the macroprudential 
policy literature, some macroprudential instruments may be more effective than others 
as well as affecting the macroeconomy differently (see Chapter 3).   
 
Local currency reserve requirements (RRLOCAL) had a positive and significant effect 
on monetary policy, which suggest the dual role, as an instrument for macroprudential 
regulation and monetary policy especially in emerging market economies.  The loan-
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to-value ratio cap (LTVCAP) and interbank exposure limit (IBEX) when included in the 
model resulted in an unstable PVAR, where the PVAR does not satisfies the stability 
condition and at least one root lies outside of the unit circle of the AR polynomial.  One 
possible reason for the unstable VAR is that some of these macroprudential 
instruments have not been used by a number of countries or only infrequently. 
   
Local currency reserve requirements variables (RRLOCAL), concentration limits 
(CONCRAT) and sector specific capital buffer: other sectors (SSCBTH) have a 
positive effect on the monetary policy interest rate but the long-term effect for 
economic growth is insignificant, which suggest that the strong positive effect on the 
monetary policy interest rate, outweigh the benefit of the increase in domestic credit.  
Yet, we can ignore the dual role of reserve requirements as an instrument of monetary 
policy and of macroprudential policy notably in many emerging markets as such it may 
difficult to interpret the results for these instruments. 
 
The aggregate indexes, PRUC and PRUC2 have a positive effect in the monetary 
policy interest rate.  PRUC and PRUC2 are composite aggregate prudential indexes, 
derived information from the set of individual prudential instruments and the results 
accordingly do not indicate which combination of prudential instruments are causing 
the impact.   
 
We conclude from the results that macroprudential policies applied to date tended to 
have a more domestic effect rather that an international, cross border effect. 
 
II. Advanced countries versus emerging market economies summary 
results 
 
We then investigated the differences in spill over effects of macroprudential policies81  
using international banks’ claims between advanced countries and emerging market 
economies.  We are interested to see if the results would be different based on the 
 
81 As noted above, the cumulative macroprudential instruments indexes form part of the testing in the 
panel VAR model for both advanced countries and emerging market economies but in some cases the 
index results were not much different from the individual macroprudential instruments or the VAR was 
unstable as such no results for these instruments will be discussed. 
191 
 
countries characteristics, advanced countries versus emerging market economies.  In 
addition, Cerutti et al (2017) indicated that emerging markets use macroprudential 
policies more frequently than advanced countries and there tends to be a weaker 
effectiveness of macroprudential instruments in more developed and more financially 
open economies, suggesting some avoidance and/or disintermediation.  Further, they 
suggested advanced countries use more borrower-based policies which specifically 
target the consumer spending and the real estate market while emerging markets 
focus on foreign exchange policies, suggesting the dual objective of stabilising the 
country foreign exchange market. 
 
As such, the focus of the analysis for advanced countries will be borrower-based 
policies82, such as sector specific capital buffers and capital requirements and the 
effect these macroprudential instruments has on the macroeconomic and banking 
variables.  The period of analysis will be the 2007q1-2014q4 period since not many 
advanced countries used macroprudential instrument prior to the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis.  For emerging market economies, the focus will be on the foreign exchange 
policies such as reserve requirements on currency (foreign and local), loan-to-value 
cap as these instruments have been used the most by countries in the sample.   
 
The baseline PVAR model (2 lags) was used to analyse the spill over effects of 
macroprudential policies for twenty-seven advanced countries and sixteen emerging 
market economies.   
   
a) Advanced countries analysis for the period 2007q1-2014q4 
 
The impulse response functions for the macroprudential instruments83  (see Appendix 
Figure 4A.5) show that none of the borrower-based policies measures or other 
macroprudential instruments, including the aggregate indexes had any significant 
 
82 The addition of some macroprudential instruments to the advanced countries baseline model resulted 
in an unstable VAR, where PVAR does not satisfies the stability condition and at least one root lies 
outside of the unit circle of the AR polynomial such as loan-to-value cap (ltvcap). One possible reason 
for the unable VAR is that some of these macroprudential instruments have not been used by a number 
of countries or infrequent.      
83 The impulse response functions and variance decomposition for the macroprudential instruments for 
the periods 2000q1-2014q4 and 2000q1-2006q4 are available from the author on request.  The impulse 
responses suggest that most of the significant effects arise from the later period as there are very few 
significant impulse responses for the 2000q1-2006q4 period. 
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effects on international banks’ claims, which suggest that there is no spill over effects 
between advanced countries over the period 2007q1-2014q4.  This is in line with the 
all countries modelling results in Table 4.12. 
 
Of interest for advanced countries, capital requirements (CAPREQ) have a negative 
effect on inflation and domestic credit, which for advanced countries has a negative 
and significant effect on economic growth.  The reserve requirements variables, 
foreign currency (RRFOREIGN)  had a positive effect on the monetary policy interest 
rate, yet local currency requirements (RRLOCAL) has a positive and significant on 
economic growth, which suggest that strong positive effect of domestic demands 
outweigh the effect of high interest rates.  Please see Table 4.13 below for summary 
results. 
      
Table 4.13: Summary results of the PVAR model (with 2 lagged order selection) 
variables to a shock to the macroprudential instruments for the period 2007q1-





















SSCBRES o o o o o o 
SSCBCONS o o o o o o 
SSCBOTH o o o o o o 
CAPREQ - o - o o - 
CONCRAT na na na na na na 
IBEX na na na na na na 
LTVCAP na na na na na na 
RRFOREIGN o + o o o o 
RRLOCAL  o o o o o + 
Aggregate 
indexes 
      
SSCB o o o o o o 
PRUC o o o o o o 
PRUC2 o o o o o o 
Note: The results represent the initial impact of the macroprudential instrument shock on the variables 
over 10 quarters based on the impulse response functions.  The shock is defined as a Cholesky one-
standard deviation.  Cholesky order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, 
international banks’ claims, banks’ regulatory capital ratio, real GDP growth rate and the 
macroprudential instrument.  + positive and significant effect; - negative and significant effect; o 
insignificant effect, na – not applicable as the PVAR does satisfy the stability condition.  See Appendix 




b) Emerging market economies analysis 
 
Table 4.14 below shows the macroprudential policy summary results for merging 
market economies over the period 2007q1 to 2014q4. 
 
Table 4.14: Summary statistics of PVAR model (with 2 lagged order selection) 
variables to a shock to the macroprudential instruments for the period 2007q1-





















SSCBRES o o o o o o 
SSCBCONS o o o o o o 
SSCBOTH o o o o o o 
CAPREQ o o o o o o 
CONCRAT o o o o o o 
IBEX o o o o o o 
LTVCAP o o o o o o 
RRFOREIGN o o + o o + 
RRLOCAL  o + o + o o 
Aggregate 
indexes 
      
SSCB o o o o o o 
PRUC o + o o - o 
PRUC2 o + o o - o 
Note: The results represent the initial impact of the macroprudential instrument shock on the variables 
over 10 quarters based on the impulse response functions.  The shock is defined as a Cholesky one-
standard deviation.  Cholesky order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, 
international banks’ claims, banks’ regulatory capital ratio, real GDP growth rate and the 
macroprudential instrument.  + positive and significant effect; - negative and significant effect; o 
insignificant effect.  See Appendix 4A.6 for the impulse response functions figures. 
 
In emerging market economies for the period 2007q1-2014q484, the impulse response 
functions for the macroprudential instruments (see Appendix 4A.6) show that 
changes in local currency reserve requirements (RRLOCAL) had a significant and 
positive effect on international banks’ claims.  This suggests that there is some positive 
spill over effects in emerging markets.  The purpose of reserve requirement is to have 
 
84 The impulse response functions and variance decomposition for the macroprudential instruments for 
the periods 2000q1-2014q4 and 2000q1-06q4 are available from the authors on request. The impulse 
responses suggest that most of the significant effects arise from the later period as there are very few 
significant impulse responses for the 2000q1-2006q4 period. 
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financial firms holding more cash, thus affecting their abilities to lend, etc.  Hence in 
most cases the effect on domestic credit should be negative.  Yet, there is no 
significant effects were detected on domestic credit, which suggest capital portfolio 
flows are attracted to higher returns in the domestic market on account of high interest 
rates (see Ahmed and Zlate (2014)).  However, one needs to keep in mind the dual 
role of reserve requirements as an instrument of monetary policy and of 
macroprudential policy notably in many emerging markets.  As such, there is some 
difficulty in interpreting this result for reserve requirements.  Nevertheless, we did 
expect reserve requirements to have a significant effect on international banks’ claims.  
 
In addition, RRLOCAL effects on banks’ regulatory capital is negative and significant, 
suggesting that banks offset the cost of reserve requirements with less capital, 
potentially offsetting the benefit to financial stability.  As well, it can suggest 
competition by the banking sector to attract the capital portfolio flows.  A similar 
negative effect on capital is found in the aggregate macroprudential measures PRUC 
and PRUC2.  Foreign currency reserve requirements (RRFOREIGN) had a positive 
and significant effect on domestic credit and economic growth.  Yet, there may be 
more a focus on managing the foreign exchange rate and not the domestic economy 
when there is a restriction on the inflow and outflow of capital (see Cerutti et al (2017)).   
 
In the full sample period, 2000q1-2014q4, of interest is that in the longer-term loan-to-
value cap (LTVCAP) has a negative and significant effect on domestic credit.  See 
Table 4.15 below for the summary results.  This instrument has a direct effect on 
people’s ability to borrow, as they are determined by one’s income level, debt 
outstanding and the value of the asset, thus having a strong effect on credit growth. 
As such, it has become one of the most common macroprudential instruments for 
reducing credit growth since the 2007-2008 financial crisis, as cited by studies such 
as Crowe et al (2011), Claessens et al (2014), Carreras et al (2018), Cerutti et al 
(2017).  However, Jácome and Mitra (2015) suggested that although LTVCAP is 
effective in reducing loan-growth, it is not always the case in curbing house prices 




Table 4.15: Summary statistics of PVAR model (with 2 lagged order selection) 
variables to a shock to the macroprudential instruments for the period 2000q1-





















SSCBRES o o o o o o 
SSCBCONS o o o o o - 
SSCBOTH o o o o o o 
CAPREQ o o o o o o 
CONCRAT o + o o o o 
IBEX o o o o o o 
LTVCAP o o - o o o 
RRFOREIGN o o + o o o 
RRLOCAL  o o o o o o 
Aggregate 
indexes 
      
SSCB o o o o o o 
PRUC o + + o o o 
PRUC2 o o o o o o 
Note: The results represent the initial impact of the macroprudential instrument shock on the variables 
over 10 quarters based on the impulse response functions.  The shock is defined as a Cholesky one-
standard deviation.  Cholesky order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, 
international banks’ claims, banks’ regulatory capital ratio, real GDP growth rate and the 
macroprudential instrument.  + positive and significant effect; - negative and significant effect; o 
insignificant effect.  See Appendix 4A.6 for the impulse response functions figures. 
 
4.5. Robustness checks 
 
4.5.1. Lag order selection (all countries, 6 lags PVAR model) 
 
As discussed above, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz 
information criterion (SIC) determined two difference lag order selection of the PVAR 
models.  AIC suggested 6-lags while SIC indicated 2 lags.  Koehler and Murphree 
(1988) noted that AIC procedure tends to overfit the data and choose higher order 
models for empirical analysis and they suggested that SIC is a better criterion to use.  
Similarly, Yang (2005) acknowledged that BIC is consistent in selecting the true model.  
As such we robust check the 2 lagged order selection PVAR model estimates with the 
PVAR models with 6 lagged order selection and the macroprudential instruments test 




The results in Table 4.16 suggests that over the period 2000q1-2014q4, local currency 
reserve requirements (RRLOCAL) had a significant and negative effect on 
international banks’ claims but it is insignificant on domestic credit.  Also, RRLOCAL 
had a positive and significant effect on banks’ regulatory capital.  Similarly, in terms of 
the aggregate indexes, the sum of all of a country’s prudential instruments (PRUC and 
PRUC2) have a negative and significant effect on international banks claims as well 
as a positive and significant effect on banks’ regulatory capital.  In comparison to the 
PVAR models with 2 lagged order section results, RRLOCAL and the aggregate 
indexes only had a significant and positive effect on the monetary policy interest rate 
and insignificant effects on international banks claims.  Thus, the 6 lagged order 
selection model result is not in line with the 2 lags order selection model for all 
countries (see Table 4.12 above). 
 
Table 4.16: Summary statistics of PVAR model (with 6 lagged order selection) 
variables to a shock to the macroprudential instruments for the period 2000q1-





















SSCBRES - o o o o o 
SSCBCONS o o o o o o 
SSCBOTH o + o o o o 
CAPREQ na na na na na na 
CONCRAT o o o o o o 
IBEX o o o o o o 
LTVCAP na na na na na na 
RRFOREIGN o o + o o o 
RRLOCAL  o + o - + o 
Aggregate 
indexes 
      
SSCB o o o o o o 
PRUC o + o - + o 
PRUC2 o + o - + o 
Note: The results represent the initial impact of the macroprudential instrument shock on the variables 
over 10 quarters based on the impulse response functions.  The shock is defined as a Cholesky one-
standard deviation.  Cholesky order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, 
international banks’ claims, banks’ regulatory capital ratio, real GDP growth rate and the 
macroprudential instrument.  + positive and significant effect; - negative and significant effect; o 
insignificant effect, na – not applicable as the PVAR does satisfy the stability condition.  See Appendix 




However, as we discussed above, we cannot ignore the dual role of reserve 
requirements as an instrument of monetary policy and of macroprudential policy 
notably in many emerging markets, and as such it may difficult to interpret the results 
for these instruments.  On the balance of the empirical results in Tables 4.12 and 4.16, 
we show that most individual prudential measures in one country will not generate 
significant spill over effects into another country and the macroprudential instruments 
mostly affect the domestic financial sector and economy.  This result is in line with the 
general observation of the IBRN (2017). 
 
4.5.2. First differenced domestic credit (all countries, 2 lags PVAR model) 
 
A second robustness check is the stationarity of the domestic credit variable.  Table 
4.17 shows the summary results when the domestic credit is first differenced and 
included in the model.  In order to achieve a stable PVAR model, we made an 
adjustment to the baseline model as we included the log variant of the monetary policy 
interest rate.  Once again, the results suggest that prudential measures in one country 
will not generate significant spill over effects into another country as none of the 
individual macroprudential instruments have any effect on international banks’ claim, 
which is consistent with Table 4.12 all countries modelling results. 
 
Of interest, capital requirements (CAPREQ) had a negative and significant effect on 
the rate of inflation, the interest rate, domestic credit and also GDP growth, which 
suggests domestic banks’ lending was restricted with the new capital requirements, 
with wider macroeconomic effects.  
 
Table 4.17: Summary statistics of PVAR model (with first differenced domestic 
credit and 2 lagged order section criterion) variables to a shock to the 





















SSCBRES o o o o o o 
SSCBCONS o o o o o o 
SSCBOTH o o o o o o 
CAPREQ - - - o o - 
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CONCRAT na na na na na na 
IBEX na na na na na na 
LTVCAP na na na na na na 
RRFOREIGN o o + o o o 
RRLOCAL  + + o o o o 
Aggregate 
indexes 
      
SSCB o o o o o o 
PRUC + o o o o o 
PRUC2 + o o o o o 
Note: The results represent the initial impact of the macroprudential instrument shock on the variables 
over 10 quarters based on the impulse response functions.  The shock is defined as a Cholesky one-
standard deviation.  Cholesky order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, 
international banks’ claims, banks’ regulatory capital ratio, real GDP growth rate and the 
macroprudential instrument.  + positive and significant effect; - negative and significant effect; o 
insignificant effect, na – not applicable as the PVAR does satisfy the stability condition.  See Appendix 
4A.8 for the impulse response functions graphs. 
 
4.5.3. Omitting outlying countries as measured by the international banks’ 
claims to GDP ratio (all countries, 2 lags PVAR model) 
 
A third robustness check is omitting countries (outliers) with high international banks’ 
claims to GDP ratio mean.  Using the calculated standard deviation of 166.65 for the 
full sample, we assessed that Ireland (214.68), Hong Kong (200.64), Luxembourg 
(1,092.26) and Sweden (180.44) are outliers in the dataset as these countries means 
(in brackets) are more than one standard deviation from the full sample mean of  
79.870 (see Table 4.4 for summary of the descriptive statistics of the variables in the 
model).  Apart from Sweden they are international financial centres and hence the 
inwards international claims that we study might be largely “entrepot” rather than 
directly affecting the domestic economy. 
 
Table 4.18 below shows the results of the panel-VAR model with the omitted countries.  
In the table, the local currency reserve requirements (RRLOCAL) result had a positive 
and significant effect on international banks’ claims, which is different from the results 
for all countries in Table 4.12 above but consistent with emerging markets results (see 
Table 4.14).  This is could be due to the positive and significant effect RRLOCAL had 
on monetary policy interest rate.  However, as we discussed above, once again we 
cannot ignore the dual role of reserve requirements as an instrument of monetary 
policy and of macroprudential policy as such it may difficult to interpret the results for 
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these instruments.  In general, however, these results suggest that the main results of 
the Chapter are not affected by the inclusion of these outliers. 
 
Table 4.18: Summary statistics of PVAR model (with omitted countries and 2 
lagged order section criterion) variables to a shock to the macroprudential 





















SSCBRES + o o o o - 
SSCBCONS o o o o o - 
SSCBOTH o + o o o o 
CAPREQ na na Na na na na 
CONCRAT na na Na na na na 
IBEX na na Na na na na 
LTVCAP na na Na na na na 
RRFOREIGN o o + o o o 
RRLOCAL  o + o + o o 
Aggregate 
indexes 
      
SSCB o o o o o - 
PRUC o o o o o o 
PRUC2 o o o o o o 
Note: Omitted countries are Ireland, Hong Kong, Luxembourg and Sweden.  The results represent the 
initial impact of the macroprudential instrument shock on the variables over 10 quarters based on the 
impulse response functions.  The shock is defined as a Cholesky one-standard deviation.  Cholesky 
order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, international banks’ claims, banks’ 
regulatory capital ratio, real GDP growth rate and the macroprudential instrument.  + positive and 
significant effect; - negative and significant effect; o insignificant effect, na – not applicable as the PVAR 
does satisfy the stability condition.  See Appendix 4A.9 for the impulse response functions graphs. 
 
In term of the macroeconomic variables, of interest is that sector specific capital buffer 
real estate (SSCBRES), consumer credit (SSCBCONS) and the aggregate index 
sector-specific capital buffers (SSCB) had a negative and significant effect on real 
GDP growth.    Also, sector specific capital buffer real estate (SSCBRES) had a 
positive and significant effect on the rate of inflation. 
 
4.6. Chapter summary 
 
The purpose of the chapter is to present empirical research on potential cross-border 
spill over effects of macroprudential policies using a PVAR approach that has been 
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rarely employed in the literature on macroprudential policy.  The empirical results 
suggest, in the sample period, 2000-2014, that macroprudential policy inwards cross-
border spillovers are generally insignificant although there was a positive result in 
emerging market economies for local currency reserve requirements.  Similar to the 
results of the IBRN, we consider the impact to be negligible in term of affecting financial 
stability. In addition, macroprudential instruments have a stronger effect on domestic 
credit and the macroeconomic variables.  However, these results cannot be 
interpreted in isolation of the fact there is not a very long history of the usage of 
macroprudential policy, particularly in advanced countries and “time series” 
macroprudential policy was largely designed to operate in a period of upturn or 
absence of any financial disturbance. 
  
One explanation for these results may be that inwards cross border lending is not 
always subject to domestic macroprudential policies, implying there is scope for 
disintermediation by cross border borrowing.  However, a further notable point is that 
there are less significant effects for macroprudential instruments even for domestic 
credit than in most single equation panel tests (such as Cerutti et al (2017) and 
Carreras et al (2018)).  As noted by Carreras et al (2018) a PVAR can overcome the 
difficulty of reduced form estimation such as OLS by capturing interaction of policy, 
real and financial sectors.  Their PVECM had fewer significant policy effects on credit 
(although not on house prices) than single equation reduced form panels. 
 
Further research can be undertaken to analyse the impact of a financial disturbance 
on the effectiveness of the macroprudential instruments. A good starting point could 
be how the 2007-2008 financial crisis affected the effectiveness of macroprudential 
instruments, particularly in emerging market economies since they have a longer 
history of using macroprudential instruments.  Effects of macroprudential policy on 





4A. Appendix Chapter 4 
 
4A.1. Impulse responses to domestic credit and international banks’ claims for 
the pre-crisis (2000-2006) and post-crisis (2007-2014) periods (all 
countries, 2 lags PVAR model) 
 
Appendix Figure 4A.1 shows the response of macroeconomic and banking variables 
to a one-standard-deviation shock to domestic credit for the period 2000q1-2006q4.  
From the graph we see that there is a positive and significant effect to the rate of 
inflation, monetary policy interest rate and international banks’ claims.  GDP growth is 
positive in the short-term and the effect on banks’ regulatory capital is negative and 
significant. 
 
Appendix Figure 4A.1: Response of macroeconomic and banking variables to 




Note: The shock is defined as a Cholesky one-standard deviation.  Dotted lines show the plus or minus 
two-standard error bands.  The horizon period is measured in quarters and the sample spans from 
2000q1 to 2006q4.  Cholesky order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, 
international banks’ claims, banks’ regulatory capital ratio and real GDP growth rate. 
 
Appendix Figure 4A.2 below shows the response of macroeconomic and banking 
variables to a one-standard-deviation shock to domestic credit for the period 2007q1-
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monetary policy and international banks’ claims.  The effect on economic growth is 
significant and negative in the post-crisis period, while the effect on the rate of inflation 
and banks’ regulatory capital ratio are insignificant which may reflect tighten regulatory 
control over capital after the crisis.  
 
Appendix Figure 4A.2: Response of macroeconomic and banking variables to 




Note: The shock is defined as a Cholesky one-standard deviation.  Dotted lines show the plus or minus 
two-standard error bands.  The horizon period is measured in quarters and the sample spans from 
2007q1 to 2014q4.  Cholesky order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, 
international banks’ claims, banks’ regulatory capital ratio and real GDP growth rate. 
 
4A.2. Impulse responses to international banks’ claims of the macroeconomic 
and banking variables for the pre-crisis (2000q1-2006q4) and post-crisis 
(2007q1-2014q4) periods (all countries, 2 lags PVAR model) 
 
Appendix Figure 4A.3 below shows the response of macroeconomic and banking 
variables to a one-standard-deviation shock to international banks’ claims credit for 
the period 2000q1-2006q4.  From the graph we see that negative and significant effect 
to the banks’ regulatory capital ratio.  The effect on the rate of inflation, monetary policy 
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Appendix Figure 4A.3: Response of macroeconomic and banking variables to 
a shock to international banks’ claims for the period 2000q1-2006q4 (all 
countries, 2 lags PVAR model) 
 
 
Note: The shock is defined as a Cholesky one-standard deviation.  Dotted lines show the plus or minus 
two-standard error bands.  The horizon period is measured in quarters and the sample spans from 
2000q1 to 2006q4.  Cholesky order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, 
international banks’ claims, banks’ regulatory capital ratio and real GDP growth rate. 
 
Appendix Figure 4A.4: Response of macroeconomic and banking variables to 
a shock to international banks’ claims for the period 2007q1-2014q4 (all 
countries, 2 lags PVAR model) 
 
 
Note: The shock is defined as a Cholesky one-standard deviation.  Dotted lines show the plus or minus 
two-standard error bands. The horizon period is measured in quarters and the sample spans from 
2007q1 to 2014q4.  Cholesky order is inflation rate, monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, 
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Appendix Figure 4A.4 above shows the response of macroeconomic and banking 
variables to a one-standard-deviation shock to international banks’ claims credit for 
the period 2007q1-2014q4.  From the graph we see that positive and significant effect 
to inflation rate.  The effect on monetary policy interest rate, domestic credit, GDP 
growth and banks’ regulatory capital ratio is insignificant. 
 
4A.3. Forecasted error variance decomposition table for the period 2000q1-
2014q4, 2000q1-2006q4 and 2007q1-2014q4 (all countries, 2 lags PVAR 
model) 
 
I. Forecasted error variance decomposition table for the period 2000q1-
2014q4 
 
The forecasted error variance decomposition shows the contribution of the variation 
of one variable that is explained by a shock (one standard deviation) in another 
variable over a time period.  In the Appendix Table 4A.1 below, the forecast horizon 
time period is 10 quarters.  In the table, we can see shocks to banks’ regulatory capital 
and GDP growth have about a 2 per cent impact on domestic credit, while inflation 
rate has 1 per cent impact.  A shock to international banks’ claims has a low impact 
on domestic credit.  In term of international banks’ claims, a shock to domestic credit 
has about a 5 per cent impact on international banks’ claims, while banks’ regulatory 
capital has a 2 per cent impact.  A shock to monetary policy interest rate has between 
8 to 10 per cent impact on the inflation rate and banks’ regulatory capital respectively.  
GDP growth is mainly affected by a shock to the rate of inflation. 
 
Appendix Table 4A.1: Forecasted error variance decomposition for the period 
2000q1-2014q4 (all countries, 2 lags PVAR model, per cent) 
 
        
        Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Inflation Rate: 













        
         1  0.377  100.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 2  0.515  98.835  0.392  0.319  0.002  0.072  0.379 
 3  0.597  96.788  1.138  0.663  0.003  0.206  1.200 
 4  0.652  94.307  2.126  0.925  0.004  0.357  2.279 
 5  0.691  91.647  3.295  1.108  0.005  0.495  3.450 
 6  0.721  88.965  4.601  1.232  0.006  0.602  4.593 
 7  0.744  86.362  6.006  1.315  0.006  0.676  5.634 
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 8  0.762  83.896  7.477  1.367  0.007  0.719  6.533 
 9  0.778  81.594  8.985  1.398  0.008  0.738  7.276 
 10  0.791  79.462  10.505  1.415  0.009  0.741  7.867 
        
        Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Monetary Policy Interest Rate: 













        
         1  0.785  0.230  99.770  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 2  1.467  0.129  99.411  0.267  0.003  0.053  0.135 
 3  2.087  0.085  98.896  0.601  0.004  0.160  0.253 
 4  2.637  0.062  98.411  0.869  0.004  0.286  0.366 
 5  3.122  0.050  97.994  1.064  0.004  0.409  0.477 
 6  3.553  0.043  97.648  1.200  0.004  0.516  0.588 
 7  3.940  0.039  97.363  1.295  0.004  0.601  0.697 
 8  4.291  0.036  97.133  1.362  0.003  0.662  0.803 
 9  4.614  0.033  96.948  1.410  0.003  0.701  0.904 
 10  4.913  0.031  96.801  1.445  0.003  0.720  0.999 
        
         Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Domestic Credit: 













        
         1  0.022  0.043  0.237  99.719  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 2  0.036  0.022  0.092  99.752  0.0193  0.082  0.031 
 3  0.047  0.034  0.133  99.360  0.031  0.278  0.162 
 4  0.057  0.120  0.184  98.712  0.040  0.553  0.389 
 5  0.065  0.259  0.197  97.938  0.048  0.866  0.692 
 6  0.073  0.423  0.179  97.116  0.056  1.181  1.044 
 7  0.080  0.589  0.151  96.293  0.063  1.475  1.427 
 8  0.087  0.745  0.131  95.493  0.072  1.736  1.822 
 9  0.093  0.885  0.129  94.728  0.080  1.958  2.218 
 10  0.099  1.007  0.154  94.003  0.089  2.139  2.607 
        
        Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of International Banks’ Claims: 













        
         1  0.069  0.244  0.233  0.864  98.657  0.000  0.000 
 2  0.094  0.136  0.312  2.596  96.863  0.092  4.440 
 3  0.114  0.093  0.327  3.578  95.688  0.288  0.025 
 4  0.131  0.072  0.321  4.193  94.776  0.564  0.073 
 5  0.146  0.063  0.308  4.591  94.009  0.893  0.134 
 6  0.160  0.061  0.294  4.860  93.327  1.255  0.201 
 7  0.173  0.065  0.280  5.050  92.704  1.633  0.266 
 8  0.186  0.074  0.265  5.188  92.131  2.016  0.325 
 9  0.197  0.087  0.250  5.289  91.600  2.396  0.377 
 10  0.208  0.103  0.235  5.364  91.109  2.767  0.421 
        
        Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Banks’ Regulatory Capital Ratio: 













        
         1  0.014  0.055  0.186  0.347  0.012  99.399  0.000 
 2  0.029  0.154  1.203  0.429  0.068  98.110  0.035 
 3  0.043  0.284  2.418  0.540  0.099  96.621  0.038 
 4  0.058  0.429  3.621  0.650  0.121  95.146  0.031 
 5  0.071  0.582  4.728  0.750  0.140  93.776  0.022 
 6  0.083  0.737  5.711  0.838  0.155  92.541  0.016 
 7  0.094  0.888  6.569  0.914  0.169  91.443  0.015 
 8  0.104  1.034  7.311  0.979  0.181  90.474  0.020 
 9  0.112  1.170  7.950  1.035  0.193  89.621  0.030 
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 10  0.119  1.297  8.501  1.083  0.203  88.870  0.045 
        
        Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Real GDP Growth Rate: 













        
         1  0.543  0.010  0.378  0.227  0.084  0.186  99.112 
 2  0.675  0.123  0.245  0.148  0.197  0.121  99.165 
 3  0.749  0.403  0.248  0.124  0.228  0.129  98.866 
 4  0.793  0.774  0.334  0.126  0.252  0.198  98.315 
 5  0.821  1.176  0.463  0.148  0.269  0.313  97.629 
 6  0.839  1.569  0.613  0.184  0.284  0.463  96.885 
 7  0.851  1.927  0.774  0.229  0.296  0.638  96.135 
 8  0.859  2.235  0.939  0.278  0.306  0.826  95.415 
 9  0.865  2.488  1.107  0.329  0.314  1.018  94.743 
 10  0.870  2.688  1.275  0.379  0.322  1.205  94.130 
        
        Cholesky Ordering: Inflation Rate, Monetary Policy Interest Rate, Domestic Credit, International Banks’ Claims, 
Banks’ Regulatory Capital Ratio, Real GDP Growth Rate. 
        
 
II. Forecasted error variance decomposition table for the period 2000q1-
2006q4 
 
In the pre-crisis period, Appendix Table 4A.2, a shock to monetary policy interest rate 
has an impact on inflation (up to 16%), banks’ regulatory capital (up to 5%) and GDP 
growth (up to 7%), which shows the strong performance of the economy to the 2007-
2008 financial crisis.  A shock to GDP growth has an impact on inflation rate (up to 4 
per cent) and domestic credit (up to 2 per cent).  The forecast horizon is 10 quarters. 
 
Appendix Table 4A.2: Forecasted error variance decomposition for the period 
2000q1-2006q4 (all countries, 2 lags PVAR model, per cent) 
 
        
        Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Inflation Rate: 













        
         1  0.396  100.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 2  0.505  98.328  0.837  0.320  0.078  0.102  0.334 
 3  0.566  95.711  2.318  0.748  0.082  0.221  0.920 
 4  0.605  92.693  4.164  1.149  0.080  0.311  1.602 
 5  0.631  89.592  6.200  1.481  0.077  0.361  2.288 
 6  0.652  86.588  8.312  1.736  0.073  0.379  2.910 
 7  0.667  83.768  10.423  1.925  0.070  0.377  3.436 
 8  0.681  81.168  12.486  2.058  0.067  0.365  3.854 
 9  0.692  78.790  14.473  2.147  0.065  0.353  4.170 
 10  0.703  76.620  16.370  2.205  0.063  0.345  4.397 
        
         Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Monetary Policy Interest Rate: 













        
         1  0.927  0.144  99.855  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
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 2  1.736  0.066  99.255  0.494  0.019  0.072  0.092 
 3  2.471  0.032  98.417  1.132  0.029  0.217  0.172 
 4  3.120  0.028  97.641  1.662  0.034  0.388  0.246 
 5  3.688  0.038  96.996  2.058  0.038  0.553  0.316 
 6  4.190  0.055  96.482  2.347  0.042  0.691  0.381 
 7  4.639  0.075  96.083  2.560  0.045  0.794  0.441 
 8  5.045  0.095  95.778  2.722  0.049  0.860  0.495 
 9  5.417  0.116  95.546  2.849  0.054  0.892  0.543 
 10  5.762  0.135  95.371  2.953  0.059  0.896  0.585 
        
         Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Domestic Credit: 













        
         1  0.023  0.037  0.720  99.24283  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 2  0.038  0.041  0.265  99.62847  0.010  0.001  0.054 
 3  0.050  0.024  0.245  99.51723  0.017  0.004  0.191 
 4  0.060  0.042  0.357  99.16757  0.024  0.012  0.396 
 5  0.069  0.093  0.465  98.73757  0.032  0.023  0.648 
 6  0.077  0.163  0.531  98.30235  0.041  0.034  0.926 
 7  0.084  0.240  0.555  97.89134  0.052  0.044  1.216 
 8  0.091  0.315  0.550  97.51310  0.065  0.050  1.506 
 9  0.097  0.384  0.525  97.16773  0.080  0.052  1.790 
 10  0.103  0.446  0.492  96.85226  0.096  0.052  2.061 
        
        Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of International Banks’ Claims: 













        
         1  0.077  1.009  0.312  1.008  97.671  0.000  0.000 
 2  0.104  0.811  0.498  1.773  96.734  0.136  0.047 
 3  0.126  0.885  0.590  2.252  95.879  0.360  0.032 
 4  0.145  1.014  0.618  2.639  95.070  0.628  0.030 
 5  0.163  1.153  0.604  2.952  94.336  0.910  0.044 
 6  0.178  1.285  0.564  3.210  93.679  1.189  0.070 
 7  0.193  1.405  0.513  3.423  93.096  1.457  0.104 
 8  0.206  1.511  0.458  3.599  92.580  1.708  0.143 
 9  0.219  1.604  0.407  3.744  92.121  1.940  0.183 
 10  0.231  1.685  0.366  3.862  91.711  2.151  0.223 
        
        Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Banks’ Regulatory Capital Ratio: 













        
         1  0.016  0.043  0.274  0.963  0.070  98.649  0.000 
 2  0.031  0.029  1.219  1.121  0.320  97.309  0.001 
 3  0.047  0.036  2.260  1.328  0.463  95.910  0.002 
 4  0.061  0.051  3.196  1.543  0.569  94.635  0.003 
 5  0.075  0.071  3.959  1.747  0.657  93.559  0.006 
 6  0.087  0.094  4.536  1.930  0.735  92.696  0.008 
 7  0.097  0.118  4.946  2.090  0.806  92.028  0.010 
 8  0.107  0.142  5.214  2.227  0.875  91.529  0.012 
 9  0.114  0.165  5.366  2.344  0.941  91.168  0.014 
 10  0.121  0.187  5.428  2.443  1.006  90.919  0.015 
        
        Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Real GDP Growth Rate: 













        
         1  0.517  0.030  0.583  0.075  0.004  0.164  99.143 
 2  0.642  0.032  0.393  1.002  0.126  0.117  98.329 
 3  0.711  0.185  0.670  1.405  0.170  0.193  97.376 
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 4  0.7529  0.403  1.347  1.478  0.208  0.350  96.212 
 5  0.780  0.623  2.270  1.429  0.243  0.555  94.879 
 6  0.798  0.814  3.314  1.365  0.276  0.782  93.447 
 7  0.811  0.966  4.398  1.329  0.307  1.015  91.985 
 8  0.821  1.078  5.474  1.326  0.337  1.241  90.542 
 9  0.830  1.155  6.518  1.357  0.367  1.454  89.148 
 10  0.837  1.204  7.517  1.412  0.396  1.649  87.822 
        
        Cholesky Ordering: Inflation Rate, Monetary Policy Interest Rate, Domestic Credit, International Banks’ Claims, 
Banks’ Regulatory Capital Ratio, Real GDP Growth Rate. 
        
        
 
III. Forecasted error variance decomposition table for the period 2007q1-
2014q4 
 
In the post-crisis period, Appendix Table 4A.3 below, a shock to monetary policy 
interest rate and GDP growth have about a 6 per cent variance effect on inflation.  A 
shock to GDP growth has an impact on inflation rate (up to 4 per cent) and domestic 
credit (up to 2 per cent).  A rate of inflation shock has on average a 3 to 4 per cent 
impact on monetary policy interest rate, international banks’ claims and banks’ 
regulatory capital ratio and GDP growth rate.  The forecast horizon time period is 10 
quarters. 
 
Appendix Table 4A.3: Forecasted error variance decomposition for the period 
2007q1-2014q4 (all countries, 2 lags PVAR model, per cent) 
 
        
         Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Inflation Rate: 













        
         1  0.346  100.00  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 2  0.529  99.263  0.143  0.104  0.262  0.019  0.208 
 3  0.649  98.131  0.446  0.249  0.352  0.083  0.738 
 4  0.730  96.664  0.907  0.333  0.392  0.198  1.505 
 5  0.788  94.936  1.521  0.370  0.405  0.355  2.411 
 6  0.832  93.034  2.279  0.380  0.405  0.542  3.357 
 7  0.865  91.044  3.165  0.378  0.400  0.744  4.267 
 8  0.891  89.035  4.157  0.371  0.393  0.949  5.095 
 9  0.913  87.059  5.231  0.362  0.385  1.148  5.814 
 10  0.931  85.152  6.364  0.353  0.377  1.336  6.416 
        
          Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Monetary Policy Interest Rate: 













        
         1  0.551  1.104  98.895  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 2  0.905  1.328  98.259  0.194  0.007  0.010  0.202 
 3  1.184  1.574  97.575  0.381  0.012  0.043  0.413 
 4  1.413  1.855  96.881  0.496  0.016  0.104  0.648 
 5  1.607  2.147  96.190  0.557  0.018  0.189  0.897 
209 
 
 6  1.777  2.430  95.520  0.585  0.020  0.293  1.152 
 7  1.928  2.688  94.885  0.594  0.019  0.410  1.403 
 8  2.066  2.915  94.295  0.592  0.019  0.535  1.643 
 9  2.192  3.108  93.757  0.583  0.019  0.664  1.867 
 10  2.309  3.268  93.274  0.570  0.019  0.794  2.074 
        
         Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Domestic Credit: 













        
         1  0.020  0.075  0.243  99.682  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 2  0.033  0.062  0.406  99.066  0.145  0.320  0.000 
 3  0.043  0.044  0.629  98.059  0.172  1.011  0.083 
 4  0.051  0.126  0.925  96.577  0.183  1.925  0.264 
 5  0.059  0.307  1.290  94.770  0.185  2.934  0.512 
 6  0.066  0.555  1.719  92.792  0.185  3.950  0.799 
 7  0.073  0.833  2.204  90.758  0.184  4.920  1.100 
 8  0.079  1.118  2.737  88.745  0.183  5.814  1.402 
 9  0.085  1.396  3.312  86.793  0.182  6.620  1.696 
 10  0.091  1.658  3.923  84.926  0.181  7.335  1.976 
        
        Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of International Banks’ Claims: 













        
         1  0.061  0.018  0.080  0.824  99.078  0.000  0.000 
 2  0.082  0.162  0.044  5.431  94.185  0.009  0.168 
 3  0.100  0.508  0.030  7.390  91.664  0.073  0.334 
 4  0.115  0.953  0.023  8.427  89.836  0.188  0.572 
 5  0.129  1.463  0.018  8.960  88.408  0.334  0.816 
 6  0.141  2.017  0.015  9.242  87.190  0.495  1.040 
 7  0.152  2.600  0.013  9.388  86.112  0.656  1.228 
 8  0.163  3.197  0.012  9.460  85.141  0.811  1.379 
 9  0.173  3.797  0.011  9.488  84.258  0.953  1.492 
 10  0.182  4.390  0.010  9.491  83.454  1.081  1.572 
        
        Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Banks’ Regulatory Capital Ratio: 













        
         1  0.013  0.023  0.019  0.038  0.159  99.760  0.000 
 2  0.026  0.158  0.838  0.077  0.269  98.507  0.150 
 3  0.039  0.533  1.786  0.118  0.327  97.100  0.135 
 4  0.052  0.971  2.636  0.161  0.365  95.780  0.087 
 5  0.064  1.404  3.357  0.206  0.392  94.581  0.059 
 6  0.075  1.804  3.963  0.251  0.411  93.496  0.074 
 7  0.086  2.158  4.474  0.297  0.426  92.508  0.135 
 8  0.095  2.463  4.907  0.343  0.438  91.607  0.241 
 9  0.103  2.719  5.275  0.389  0.447  90.785  0.384 
 10  0.110  2.928  5.591  0.435  0.455  90.035  0.554 
        
         Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition of Real GDP Growth Rate: 













        
         1  0.564  0.022  0.166  1.636  0.230  0.062  97.882 
 2  0.702  0.350  0.146  2.319  0.316  0.059  96.810 
 3  0.783  0.911  0.160  2.758  0.362  0.179  95.629 
 4  0.832  1.590  0.191  3.035  0.3911  0.426  94.367 
 5  0.865  2.290  0.229  3.208  0.409  0.783  93.081 
 6  0.887  2.945  0.267  3.315  0.419  1.221  91.831 
 7  0.902  3.515  0.302  3.380  0.425  1.709  90.667 
210 
 
 8  0.913  3.982  0.333  3.418  0.428  2.219  89.620 
 9  0.922  4.346  0.358  3.439  0.428  2.722  88.705 
 10  0.928  4.617  0.378  3.449  0.428  3.205  87.923 
        
        Cholesky Ordering: Inflation Rate, Monetary Policy Interest Rate, Domestic Credit, International Banks’ Claims, 
Banks’ Regulatory Capital Ratio, Real GDP Growth Rate. 
        
        
 
4A.4. All countries impulse responses to a macroprudential instrument shock 
of the macroeconomic and banking variables for the 2000q1-2014q4 
period (2 lags PVAR model) 
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4A.5. Advanced countries impulse responses to a macroprudential instrument 
shock of the macroeconomic and banking variables for the 2007q1-
2014q4 period (2 lags PVAR model) 
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4A.6. Emerging market economies impulse responses to a macroprudential 
instrument shock of the macroeconomic and banking variables for the 
2000q1-2014q4 and 2007q1-2014q4 periods (2 lags PVAR model) 
 
I. Emerging market economies impulse responses for the period 2007q1-
2014q4 
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II. Emerging market economies impulse responses for the period 2000q1-
2014q4 
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4A.7. Lag order variant (6 lags) impulse response functions for the period 
2000q1-2014q4 
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4A.8. First differenced domestic credit impulse response functions (all 
countries, 2 lags PVAR model) 
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4A.9. Omitted outlying countries impulse response functions as measured by 
the international banks’ claims to GDP ratio (all countries, 2 lags PVAR 
model) 
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It has been more than ten years since the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, which 
contributed to the widespread introduction of macroprudential policy as an essential 
financial regulatory policy tool to forestall crises or at least offer a buffer to soften the 
impact of them.  Supporting this, there have been numerous empirical studies which 
provide robust evidence for the effectiveness of macroprudential policy in advanced 
countries and emerging market economies such as Carreras et al (2018), Cerutti et al 
(2017), Davis et al (2017), Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015), Claessens et al 
(2014), Dell’Ariccia et al (2012), Lim et al (2011), etc.).  Many of these studies have 
specifically focused on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy in the area of the 
financial sector where there is the most potential for systemic risk to develop, that is 
the credit and housing markets and the banking sector (see Chapter 2 and 3).  In 
hindsight, these studies of the effectiveness of macroprudential policy and many 
countries’ policy framework are rather narrow, as they mostly focus on the effects 
operating via the banking sector on the household sector.  
 
In this context, despite the increased trend toward disintermediation of banks (see BIS 
(1986) - “Cross Report” as well) with the growth of capital and securities markets, 
improvement in financial system technology and the transformations of banks’ 
operating environment, banks remain central in the financing of economic activity.  
Both internal and external factors have affected their growth, structure, performance 
and competition, etc. and their role and dominance vary significantly between 
countries.    Nevertheless, it remains clear that a sound and profitable banking sector 
is important for the effective functioning of the economy.  Furthermore, such as sector 
is better able to withstand negative shocks from financial disruptions and contribute to 
financial stability.   Given the importance of profitability to banks’ growth, survival, 
stability and the significance of the banking sector for the real economy, and the recent 
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growth in the standing of macroprudential policy, understanding the effect of 
macroprudential regulation on banks’ profitability is of vital importance.   
 
As such we believe there is a gap in the literature on macroprudential policy, where 
the focus tends to be on the overall system-wide benefits of such regulation.  So, for 
example, analysis of prudential instruments typically focuses on their effectiveness in 
dampening aggregate credit growth and house prices and the overall benefits of 
limiting financial sector disruptions.  There tends to be limited emphasis on the effects 
on banks as measured by the impact on their profitability, structure and activities, etc.  
Also, there is limited research using micro banking data in analysing the use of 
macroprudential policy (for an exception, see Claessens et al (2014) which focused 
on asset growth as a dependent variable).  
 
In the support of the relevance of the question, Van den Heuvel (2008) and Tchana 
(2012) suggested that although capital requirements limit moral hazard on the part of 
banks and hence are beneficial for financial stability, they are costly since they reduce 
the ability of banks to lend, and thus can hamper long term economic growth, which is 
an unintended side effect of regulations that limit banking activities.  We contend 
further that although the premise of macroprudential policy is to prevent or limit 
financial instability across the broad financial system, the currently suggested 
macroprudential tools and new regulations target the banking sector narrowly.  As 
such, macroprudential action can be seen as an added cost to banks which in turn can 
affect banks’ profitability, hence their net income, the cost of credit and their ability to 
lend.  Ultimately, this could affect banks retained earnings and thus accumulated 
capital and hence could be counterproductive to financial stability as well as economic 
performance. 
 
In this context, the purpose of this chapter is, firstly, to present empirical research of 
potential effects of macroprudential policies on banks’ profitability which will also help 
in the understanding of how banks react to macroprudential regulations.  We consider 
this of particular relevance because to our knowledge no extant research on which 
instrument has the most effect on banks’ profitability as well as examining the different 
between advanced countries and emerging market economies.  Furthermore, by 
tracing such effects we can understand better the transmission process from policy to 
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credit issuance.  Cerutti et al (2017) suggested there is a weaker effect on asset prices 
and credit in more developed and more financially open economies, suggesting some 
avoidance and/or disintermediation of the policy, which should find parallels in 
profitability. 
 
In addition, the question arises how macroprudential policy interrelates with monetary 
policy, whether positively or negatively or whether there is no significant effect.  The 
second purpose of the chapter is to look at macroprudential policy’s relationship with 
monetary policy in the context of the specific profitability measure the net interest 
margin.  Constâncio (2016) suggested that macroprudential policy provides monetary 
policy with additional room to manoeuvre so as to focus on ensuring price stability.  In 
essence, macroprudential policy provides a stable platform (financial stability) for 
monetary policy to function effectively.  Borio el at (2017) and Alessandri and Nelson 
(2015), who looked at the influence of monetary policy on banks’ profitability, 
suggested that there is positive relationship between the level of short-term interest 
rates and bank profitability, which suggest that monetary policy tightening benefits 
banks’ profitability.  Yet, Borio el at (2017) also found that over time, unusually low 
interest rates and flat yield curve erode banks’ profitability.    
 
Beau et al (2012), who analysed the interactions between monetary and 
macroprudential policies, suggested that there are circumstances under which such 
interactions call for their coordinated implementation, given macroprudential policy 
has an effect on the goals of monetary policy and vice versa for monetary policy.  
Meanwhile, Agur and Demertzis (2015), suggested that there could be situations 
where monetary and macroprudential policies could work in contradiction to each other 
and policy makers would have to favour one policy over the other depending on the 
situation and the goal of policy makers.  In addition, Claessens et al (2015) suggested 
that the phase of the cycle could give a differing result for policies’ impact.  We further 
contend, policy makers would need to weigh the benefits and cost between 
macroprudential policy (financial stability goal) vs monetary policy (price stability and 
economic growth goals) in determining which policy needs to act in a secondary role.  
Hence, there needs to coordination and cooperation between policy makers in the 




In this chapter of the thesis, we estimate Ordinary Least Square (OLS) models using 
Fitch-Connect database of bank financial statements for 92 countries, which include 
6,010 banks (3,095 banks from advanced countries and 2,915 banks from emerging 
market economies).  We will investigate whether and to what extent macroprudential 
policy could have an impact on banks’ profitability as well as the interaction with 
monetary policy.  The period of coverage for the empirical analysis is 2000 to 2013, 
using the same IMF database of macroprudential policies as in Chapter 3.   
 
The chapter is structured in the following manner.  Firstly, Section 5.2. The role of 
banks and banks’ profitability motivates the study by looking at the role of banks in 
the financial system, their transformation and profitability.  Secondly, Section 5.3. 
Banking regulation and the impact on banks’ cost and lending looks at the how 
banks are regulated and the impact of regulation on banks’ activity.  Section 5.4. 
Empirical analysis of the effects of macroprudential policy on banks’ 
profitability and interaction with monetary policy provides a quantitative analysis 
of the effects of macroprudential policy on banks’ profitability as well as looking at its 
interaction with monetary policy using the Net Interest Margin profitability model.  
Fourthly, Section 5.5. Robustness checks provide a check on the model results. 
Finally, in Section 5.6. Chapter Summary, we conclude. 
 
5.2. Banks and the factors affecting banks’ profitability 
 
Despite the increased trend toward disintermediation of traditional bank loans and 
deposits, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 underlined just how important the banking 
sector is to the financial system and the economy even in highly securitised financial 
systems.  Banks perform many roles in the financial system and understanding these 
many roles have become one of the fundamental issues in fields of study of financial 
stability and the transmission of monetary policy as well as the efficient channelling of 
savings into productive economic activities, etc.  As such, the purpose of this section 
is to look briefly at role of banks in the financial system, the ongoing transformation of 





5.2.1. Banks in the financial system 
 
I. The development of the banking sector 
 
The evolution of banks’ functions has not changed the link of banking to financial and 
economic development as is evident from a considerable literature on the topic of 
financial development and growth (see Popov (2017, Beck (2008), Levine (2005), 
etc.).  Banks continue to be a key player in the financial system yet their functions, role 
and operation varies significantly between countries.  Accordingly, it is important to 
begin by emphasising the diversity of financial structure and experience.   
 
Figure 5.1: Banks domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators and author’s calculations 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the growth of banks domestic credit to private sector as a per cent 
of GDP for the UK, Japan, the US and the World (Total) for the period 1960 to 2016.  
Over the period there has been a rapid rise in banks credit to the private sector 
especially in the UK and Japan.  In the UK, we see the impact of deregulation in the 
1980s, where there was a large jump in banks’ credit as banking restrictions were 
removed.  In Japan, the Japanese financial system has historically been banking-
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oriented but credit fell after the onset of the banking crisis.  See below for further 
discussion.     
 
In the US, figure 5.1 shows relative stability in domestic bank credit/GDP.  There have 
traditionally been many banks due inter alia to restrictions on interstate banking, while 
securities have long been an important source of financing for the private sector, this 
underlying the stability of bank credit.  DeYoung (2014) noted that merger and 
acquisition reduced the number of banks in the 1980s.  Although many banks still exist, 
the US has seen the emergence of a number of very large banks.  Furthermore, new 
technologies for production and distribution of financial services, increases in 
competition and abolition of the separation of banks’ business functions between 
commercial and investment banking that pressured banks to operate more efficiently 
have also played a major role.  DeYoung (2014) suggested that this led to the 
appearance of strategic dichotomy, with small “community” and regional banks 
providing person-to-person retail and small business banking services, and with large 
commercial banks providing high-volume retail banking services in larger domestic 
markets and cities and corporate and investment banking services, initially largely in 
other countries (notably via the international capital markets highlighted in Chapter 4).  
These changes in the structure and operation of the banking sector in the US brought 
improved efficiency to the banking industry and its customers but introduced new 
financial system instabilities as revealed during the global financial crisis (DeYoung 
(2014)). 
 
In the United Kingdom (UK), the system had long been quite concentrated and 
dominated by major clearing banks. With the Competition and Credit Control (CCC) 
reform (1971-1973), there was the removal of credit controls on all banks, which 
sharply increased competition in the banking sector.  This led to a rapid increase in 
lending, a stock market and property boom (Figure 5.1).  But by the middle of the 
1970s, many developed countries were fighting rapid inflation by rising interest rates 
to reduce demand and tightening fiscal policy.  In the UK, the push to control inflation 
led to a sharp fall in share and property values and the reimposition of credit controls 
on all banks.  This in turn weakened the balance sheet of secondary banks and led to 
the UK secondary banking crisis in 1973.  The 1980’s was another period of 
deregulation and abolition of credit controls, led by the removal of exchange controls 
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(see Davis (1995)), leading to a vast expansion of banking activity (see Figure 5.1 
above).  The 1986 “Big Bang” stock market reform led UK banks to increase 
investment banking activity also. Also, as noted in Chapter 4, British banks already 
had a footprint in many countries especially Commonwealth countries, due to historical 
and political connections to the British Empire as well as many Commonwealth 
countries’ legal systems being founded on English common law – a legacy of British 
colonialism, which further underpinned their growth. 
 
Uchida and Udell (2014) suggested, unlike most other developed countries, the 
Japanese financial system has historically been banking-oriented (as in Europe) but 
also segmented, that is the banking sector is segmented by the nature of the services 
that each type of financial institution provides (as historically in the US).  The regulatory 
segmentation dates back to the World War II, the wartime system, where the purpose 
was to limit competition in order to promote banking profitability, thereby enhancing 
the safety and soundness of the financial system.  As for the US, Glass–Steagall Act 
of 1933, Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law effectively prohibited commercial 
banks from engaging in insurance, underwriting and brokerage activities, thus 
preventing competition between commercial banks and non-depository institutions 
(insurance companies, investment banks, brokerage firms) (see DeYoung (2014)).  
Uchida and Udell (2014) further noted that although financial liberalisation in the 1980s 
and 1990s blurred the divide between different types of financial institutions, there still 
remain some boundaries.  Banks are defined under the 1981 Banking Law (Japan) 
and they are defined according their activities, either lending, deposit-taking or just 
provision of payments and settlement services.  Also, still remaining are major 
investment banking institutions.  Following the 1980s credit and asset price boom, 
Japan suffered a banking crisis of 1990s which led to major decline in bank lending 
and stagnation of economic activity (see Figure 5.1 above). 
 
The tradition in most EU countries is of universal banking, combining commercial and 
investment banking activities, but also with many local as well as national banks. 
Banking is much more important than securities for private sector financing.  Since the 
passing of the First Banking Directive in 1977, there has been a rapid change in the 
European banking sector, as European Union (EU) legislation has been directed 
consistently towards reducing barriers to cross-border bank ownership and activity 
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(Goddard et al (2014)).  The directive established the principle of home country control 
and responsibility for the supervision of credit institutions operating in two or more 
members countries would gradually be shifted from the host country to the home 
country of the parent bank.  This was the first step toward the harmonization of 
regulations (Dermine (2002)).  In addition, Goddard et al (2014)) noted that with the 
introduction of the euro in 1999 and the creation of the Single Market in financial 
services after 1992, the financial sector in Europe has been subject to rapid expansion, 
which extended to non-euro area countries such as Switzerland and the UK.  They 
noted that banks have increased their range of financial products and services to 
customers, blurring the distinction between banks, insurance companies and other 
financial firms and entry by foreign-owned banks has led to increased competition.  
 
Likewise, in Latin America, the banking sectors have been subject to extensive 
deregulation and financial liberalisation, which involved interest rate deregulation, 
bank privatization and the removal of restrictions on foreign bank entry.  In addition to 
other liberalising reforms pertaining to the macro economy and balance of payments 
often following IMF programmes in the wake of financial and economic crises such as 
the Latin American debt crisis of 1982 (see Chapter 4).  As a result, the banking 
sectors have become more consolidated and there has been a change in the 
governance structure of the banking sectors as foreign bank penetration has 
deepened and there has been a growth in regional capital markets (see De Carvalho 
et al (2014)).  Meanwhile, in Africa, although the banking sectors have experienced 
some form of financial liberalisation, African banks lend less to the private sector in 
comparison to banks in non-African developing countries.  African enterprises and 
households are less likely to use financial services but access services in the informal 
sector, the shadow banking sector (see Beck and Cull (2014)). 
 
Banking systems in developing countries in South and East Asia such as China, 
Thailand, Pakistan and India, have witnessed important restructuring especially since 
the 1997 Asia financial crisis.  Similar to Latin America and other developing countries, 
there is a trend toward increasing financial integration, which has resulted from 
financial sector reforms and structural changes.  Countries in South and East Asia 
have undertaken efforts to clean up the banking system, reduce political interference 
and state ownership and allow for greater foreign participation (Klapper et al (2014)).  
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II. International banking 
 
As outlined in Chapter 4, international banking expanded rapidly from the early 60s 
as Euromarkets grew following US regulatory restrictions. This expansion accelerated 
after the end of the Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates in the 1970s 
and international banking plays an important role in the global economy.  It also 
experienced financial crises such as Herstatt (1974), the Latin American debt crisis 
(1980s) and the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. 
 
The Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS (2010c)) noted firstly, 
international banking has taken a significant role in the process of financial 
globalisation and integration of financial markets.  Traditionally, international banking 
activity expanded largely in line with international trade and performed key functions 
for international firms.  However, with financial liberalisation, especially in emerging 
market economies, the rise in international securities activity and the increase demand 
for financial services have accelerated the growth of international banking activity and 
financial integration much faster than international trade.  Secondly, international 
banks play a vital role in the global economy and it is closely related to activities in 
international financial markets.  International banks perform important functions in term 
of intermediation, the allocation of credit, and maintaining the resilience of the market 
infrastructure for the healthy functioning of the global financial system.  And thirdly, 
technological development has advanced financial integration of international banks 
and paced the way for broader access to markets (see Chapter 4 for further 
information on the role and growth of international banking). 
 
III. The role of banks in the financial sector 
 
Against the background of the diverse structure and experience of banks as noted 
above, some common roles remain.  Bollard (2011) noted that banks and other 
financial intermediaries exist because they are an efficient response to the fact that 
information is costly.  Banks specialise in assessing the credit worthiness of borrowers 
and providing an ongoing monitoring function to ensure borrowers meet their 
obligations.  Further, he suggested that bank’s role as financial intermediaries has a 
major bearing on how efficiently the economy allocates its resources between 
236 
 
competing uses.  Allen et al (2014) suggested that banks allow various informational 
problems to be solved, so banks act as delegated monitors between investors and 
borrowers by monitoring the latter and ensuring a proper use of depositors’ funds.  
 
Another role of banks is to make the financial system safer by reducing and managing 
risk, although many financial crises (see Chapter 2 Appendix 2.A1 for a list of crises 
since the 1970s) have occurred in the banking sector.  Bollard (2011) suggested that 
banks’ own practices as well as financial regulation have an important bearing in 
reducing or amplifying risk in the financial system and given the interconnection 
between banks and the rest of the economy, financial fragility can have potentially 
negative effects on the real economy.   
 
Allen et al (2014) indicated that one of the most important roles of the financial system 
is the sharing of risk as they saw that households face certain amounts of risk 
depending on the characteristics of the financial system, such as in the UK and US, 
where a large amount of households assets are held in equity (mainly via institutional 
investors such as pension funds) and only a small amount in banks.  In Japan (and 
much of continental Europe), which historically been a banking-oriented financial 
system, households are shielded from market risk, yet more vulnerable to banking 
crises, because they hold a majority of their assets in banks and very little in equities 
unlike in the US and UK, etc. (see Uchida and Udell (2014), Allen et al (2014)).   
 
Banks play an important role in the transmission of monetary policy, which is the 
process where changes in the monetary policy instrument (e.g. short-term interest 
rate) work their way through the economy, where for many countries the goal is to 
ultimately affect the rate of inflation while for others it is to do so indirectly via an 
exchange rate peg.  Changes in monetary policy instrument affects banks’ ability to 
lend either by affecting banks’ lending interest rates or restricting the amount of funds 
available for extending loans (reserve requirements), which has an effect on the level 
of demand for goods and services. It also impacts on loan demand as the private 
sector is less likely to borrow at high interest rates.  Peek and Rosengren (2014) noted, 
although the traditional interest rate channel is still important for the transmission of 
monetary policy, the broad credit channel (See Bernanke and Gertler (1995)) in 
augmenting the impact of monetary policy on the economy has gained in importance.  
237 
 
Yet, the narrower bank lending (credit) channel, the supply of loans from banks, needs 
further investigation.  In addition, they noted that a key issue is whether a shift in 
monetary policy affects bank loan supply as opposed to loan demand, and if it does, 
the extent to which a change in bank loan supply can affect economic activity.  
 
5.2.2. Factors affecting banks’ profitability 
 
Research on the factors affecting banks’ profitability has attracted a lot of attention 
due to the importance of the banking sector to the stability of the financial system and 
the economy, as well as to economic growth.  Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) 
suggested that bank profitability is important for understanding financial stability and 
fragility.  However, they noted that monitoring banks’ profits is made difficult by the 
fact that the components of bank profits are observed at low frequencies, at best 
quarterly reporting, and mainly large and listed banks’ information are available 
publicly.   
 
Kok et al (2015) suggested that weak bank profitability is relevant for financial stability 
because the inability of banks to build up capital buffers by retained earnings hampers 
shock-absorption capacity.  Also, they noted persistently low profitability could 
encourage banks to take undue risks in order to generate higher returns, which can 
increase financial fragility.  Deutsche Bundesbank (2018) noted that weak profitability 
can reduce the ability of banks to generate capital in the form of retained earnings 
which can lead to restrictive lending policies, thus reducing the impact of 
accommodative monetary policy measures.   
 
Typically, in the literature bank profitability is measured by the returns on average 
assets (ROAA) and equity (ROAE) or the net interest margin (NIM).  ROAA reflects 
how a bank is using its assets to generate profits while ROAE measures the 
performance of a bank based on its average shareholders’ equity, the return to 
shareholders on their equity.  NIM is a measure of how successful a bank is in its 
portfolio investment decisions, that is the bank’s interest spread between interest 
revenue from investment (loans) and their interest expenses paid to lenders 
(depositors).  According to the OECD (2010), NIM is defined to include income on 
interest-bearing assets, fee income related to lending operations, and dividend income 
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on shares and participations.  In some cases, it may also include income on bonds 
calculated as the change in the difference between the book value and the redemption 
value of bonds.  Also, unlike the other measurements (ROAA and ROAE), it does not 
allow for non-interest income and non-interest costs which are the other components 
of the numerator of ROAA and ROAE such as non-interest income, staff costs and 
loan loss provisions.  Non-interest income is income derived primarily from fees and 
commission, etc.  Loan loss provisions are expected expense set aside as an 
allowance for uncollected loans and loan payments  
 
The factors that influence banks’ profitability in the literature are typically split in two 
groups, internal and external determinants.  The internal determinants include bank-
specific factors which are based on financial statements information such as bank size, 
financial structure (capital/ leverage ratios), risks and management efficiency.  The 
external determinants relate to industry and macroeconomic factors, which include 
market concentration, competition, economic growth and inflation. 
 
a) Bank-specific factors 
 
Empirical research suggested that bank size tends to have a positive and significant 
effect on bank profitability, at least up to a certain point.  This is because large banks 
are able to raise capital at lower cost and appears more profitable to small banks 
(Short (1979)).  Goddard et al (2004), using data from 665 banks in six European 
countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) over the period 1992-
1998, indicated that larger banks can benefit from economies of scale but these 
become exhausted as size increase.  However, they found that size-profitability 
relationship in their estimations are problematic since the cross-sectional estimations 
between the countries produced different results.  For example, in Germany the small 
banks appeared to perform better than the larger ones while in the UK larger banks 
seen to benefit from their size.  In France, Denmark, Italy and Spain the results the 
size-profit relationship appears to be neutral.  Similarly, Pasiouras and Kosmidou 
(2007), using banking data from 15 EU countries over the period 1995-2001 analysed 
the determinants of ROAA, found that larger banks are likely to have a higher degree 
of product and loan diversification than smaller banks and they should benefit from 
economic of scale.  Yet, they found that bank size has a negative effect on profitability.  
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Korytowski (2018), using data from 4,179 European commercial banks in the post 
crisis period for the period 2011 and 2015 found that bank-size had a negative and 
significant effect on ROAA while it is insignificant for ROAE.   
 
Berger et al (1987) looked that competitive viability in banking using 1983 Functional 
Cost Analysis (FCA) in state banks in the US, while Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
applied frontier efficiency analysis to financial institutions in 21 countries. These 
studies indicated that little cost saving can be achieved by increasing bank size and 
eventually large banks could face scale inefficiencies, which could suggest that in 
some cases there could be a negative relationship between bank size and bank 
profitability.  The issue of “Too Big to Fail” can supervene and distort the relationship 
of size to profitability 
 
Empirical estimates of the effect of financial structure (capital adequacy/ leverage 
ratios) on bank profitability, which show the way bank’s assets are financed and the 
ability of the bank to cover losses, vary from positive to negative.  This variable is 
partially determined by regulatory capital limits such as set out in the Basel Accord, 
yet it is mostly computed as a reciprocal measure of leverage (see Saona (2016)), 
which is a measure of solvency unadjusted for risk that has only recently become a 
regulatory measure under Basel III for most countries.  Goddard et al (2004) 
suggested that higher capital ratios allow banks greater flexibility in taking advantage 
of new business opportunities which allow for improve profitability.  Petria et al (2013) 
did not find a significant impact of capital adequacy ratio on ROAE but a positive, 
significant and very weak coefficient effect on ROAA, using banking data from 27 
European Union countries over the period 2004-2011.  Berger (1995), using 10 years 
(1980-1989) of banking data from the US with ROA and ROE as dependent variables, 
argued that a positive relationship between the book values of capital and bank 
profitability is based on the signalling hypothesis that expected bankruptcy cost may 
cause banks to increase capital. 
 
Athanasoglou et al (2006) noted that a higher solvency ratio may have positive effect 
on performance as it reduces the solvency risks taken by the bank for a given balance 
sheet.  This may also reduce funding costs.  They examined the profitability (ROA and 
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ROE) of banks using an unbalanced panel dataset in South Eastern European (SEE)85 
credit institutions over the period 1998-2002.  On the other hand, some of the literature 
supports a negative relationship between capital adequacy and bank profitability as 
excessive higher capital can imply higher opportunity cost of capital (Hoffmann 
(2011)).  Topak and Talu (2017), who look at the determinants of bank profitability 
(ROAA and ROAE) in Turkey between 2005 and 2015, found that capital adequacy 
(equity/ total assets) has a negative and significant effect on bank probability.   
 
The measurement and management of risks are an integral part of banking, as well 
as being important for the stability of the financial system.  Poor asset quality and low 
levels of liquidity are the two major causes of bank failures.  In respect to the 
determinants of traditional bank profitability, risks can be divided into credit and 
liquidity risks (market risk can be included as well) and these risks have been covered 
extensively in the research literature and in banking regulations such as the Basel 
Accords.  Athanasoglou et al (2006) found that higher exposure to credit risk, 
measured as average loan loss provisions to total loans ratio, is associated with lower 
bank profitability.  Miller and Noulas (1997), using US banking data for the period 1984-
1990, found a negative and significant relationship between credit risk (loan loss 
provisions to total loans ratio) and profitability (ROA) as banks with high risk loans tend 
to have a higher accumulation of unpaid loans.  Yet, Korytowski (2018) found in 
European commercial banks risk appetite to be insignificant in the determinants of 
banks’ profitability (ROAA and ROAE).  He measured risk as the ratio of loan loss 
reserve to gross loans. 
 
Petria et al (2013), measured liquidity risk as the ratio of loans to customer deposits.  
When this ratio increases, implying that banks use less deposits to grant loans or grant 
more loans without increasing deposits, then bank performance deteriorates.  They 
saw a negative and significant relationship between liquidity and profitability (ROAA 
and ROAE).  Furthermore, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) found that there is a 
negative and significant relationship between level of liquidity, measured as cash and 
bank deposits and investment securities to total assets, and profitability which is to be 
 
85 The countries are Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia Romania (FYROM), and Serbia-Montenegro. 
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expected as liquidity holdings (particularly those imposed by the authorities such as 
reserve requirement, etc.) represent a cost to the bank.  They examined the 
determinants of bank performance across 18 European countries between 1986 and 
1989 by replicating Bourke’s methodology.86  On the other hand, Bourke (1989) found 
that liquidity risk has a positive and significant effect on bank profitability.  He studied 
the performance of banks in 12 countries or territories in Europe, North America and 
Australia over the years 1972 and 1981.  Similarly, Korytowski (2018) found that 
liquidity has positive and significant effect on bank profitability (ROAA) but the result 
is insignificant for ROAE.  He measured liquidity as the ratio of net loans to total 
deposits.  
  
Athanasoglou et al (2008) noted that is management cost decisions benefit bank 
profitability, suggesting that higher management efficiency generates higher income 
and profit.  They defined management cost as operating expenses divided by assets.  
Athanasoglou et al (2008) studied the effect of bank-specific, industry-specific and 
macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability (ROA and ROE) using a framework 
that incorporates the traditional structure conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis in 
Greek commercial banks spanning the period 1985-2001.  Similarly, Goddard et al 
(2013), noted the cost-to-income ratio, defined as the ratio of total operating cost to 
total income, is an important determinant of profitability.  They found that cost-to-
income ratio has a negative and significant effect on bank profitability.  Goddard et al 
(2013) examined the determination and convergence of bank profitability (ROE) in 
eight EU countries between 1992 and 2007, using a dynamic panel model.  Similarly, 
Korytowski (2018) and Petria et al (2013) found that the cost to income has a negative 
and significant effect on both ROAA and ROAE. 
 
In addition, diversification (business mix) has been noted as having a significant effect 
on bank profitability.  Goddard et al (2013), who defined diversification as non-interest 
income to total operating income suggested that banks that focused more on non-
traditional lines of business were more profitable on average.   They saw that synergies 
 
86  Bourke (1989) used a pooled time series approach to estimate a linear equation, regressing 
performance measures against a variety of internal (staff expenses, capital ratios, liquidity ratios) and 
external (concentration ratios, government ownership, interest rates, market growth and inflation) in the 
determinants of bank profitability. 
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between core and related activities allow diversified banks to gain and maintain a 
competitive advantage over less diversified banks.  Similarly, Petria et al (2013) found 
a positive and significant effect of diversification on banks profitability.   However, 
Saona (2016), using commercial banks data from 7 Latin American countries from 
1995 to 2012, suggested that there is a negative relationship between revenue 
diversification and profitability (NIM).  As noted, NIM is a subset of profits from interest 
only, thus revenue diversification results may not be surprising.  
 
b) Bank industry and macroeconomic factors 
 
Many empirical studies of bank profitability include external determinants i.e., industry 
and macroeconomic factors such as interest rates, inflation, GDP growth, taxation, 
market characteristics (e.g. market concentration and competition) and banking/ 
financial crisis.  Studies that do include them tend to show a positive relationship 
between inflation, interest rates, GDP growth on the one hand and bank profitability 
on the other such as Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Athanasoglou et 
al (2008), and Chronopoulos et al (2015).  Saona (2016) suggested that if inflation is 
fully anticipated by bank managers, this will have a positive effect on profitability as it 
leads earnings to increase faster than costs.  Yet, she argued GDP growth impacts 
negatively on bank profitability, it appears that in periods of substantial economic 
growth, banks adjust by reducing their profit margins.  However, Korytowski (2018) 
found that the rate of inflation had negative and significant effect on both ROAA and 
ROAE in the period after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
 
In the research literature, only a few studies have included a monetary policy or an 
interest rate variable in the study of the determinants of bank profitability.  Yet, the link 
between monetary policy and bank profitability has been established in the research 
literature.  Alessandri and Nelson (2015), using UK banking data for the period 1992-
2009, studied the systematic effect of interest rates on bank profitability (net interest 
margin).  They found that high interest rates are associated with large interest income 
margins and the slope of the yield curve has an important influence on interest income.  
Yet, interest rate level and yield curve slope have a significant but difference effect on 
net interest income (both positive) and trading income (negative), which they 
suggested is consistent with banks hedging interest risk through derivatives.  Also, 
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they provided evidence that maturity mismatches and repricing frictions and a rise in 
interest rates can, in the short-term, lower banks’ income margins.  Finally, they 
concluded that monetary policy has a systematic effect on bank profitability and hence 
on the capital, which should support the use of an independent macroprudential tool. 
 
Borio et al (2017), using data from 109 large international banks located in 14 
advanced countries for the period 1995-2012, studied the influence of monetary policy 
on banks’ profitability and found results similar to Alessandri and Nelson (2015).  They 
measured banks profitability in four ways, net interest income, non-interest income, 
provisions and return on assets (profit before taxes), which are all divided by total 
assets.  They found that there is a positive and significant relationship between the 
level of short-term interest rates and the slope of the yield curve (interest rate structure) 
and bank profitability (return on assets), which suggest that a tight monetary policy 
stance affects bank profitability favourably.  They suggested that the positive effect on 
net interest income more than offsets the negative effects on non-interest income and 
loan loss provisions.  Yet, they found that over time, the effect on profitability is 
stronger when the interest rate is lower and the yield curve slope is less steep, which 
suggest unusually low interest rates and flat yield curve erode banks’ profitability.  This 
suggests that monetary policy affects loans rates more than deposits rates at very low 
interest rates since these compress market (loans) rates toward deposit rates, which 
cannot fall significantly below zero. 
 
Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), using banking data for 80 countries in the years 
1988-1995, found that high real interest rates are associated with higher interest 
margins and profitability (net interest margins and before tax profits), especially in 
developing countries.  They suggested that increases in real interest rate do not raise 
spreads as much in advanced countries since deposit rates may not be tied down by 
deposit rate ceilings.  Also, in developing countries, they indicated that demand 
deposits frequently pay zero and below market interest rates.  Real interest rate is 
constructed using short-term government debt yield and other short-term market rates 
less inflation. 
 
Market concentration and competition, measures of the effect of bank-specific factors 
in profitability studies are normally proxied by the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
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a measure of market concentration87 or the Lerner Index, which is a measure of the 
price-cost margin (competition).   Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) reported a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between bank concentration and bank 
profits and larger banks tend to have higher profit margins.  Also, Bourke (1989), 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Goddard et al (2013), Petria et al (2013) found that 
concentration had a positive and significant effect on bank profitability.  Maudos and 
Solis (2009), Kasman et al (2010) found that the Lerner Index had a positive and 
significant effect on bank profitability.  This is consistent with the traditional structure-
conduct-performance paradigm (Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011)).  It is indicated that 
banks are able to increase profitability by exploiting market domination, whereas 
increased competition and less market concentration tend to have a negative effect 
on profitability.  Yet, Korytowski (2018) found that concentration (HHI) had a negative 
and significant effect on both ROAA and ROAE, using European commercial banks 
data for the post crisis period 2011 and 2015. 
 
Finally, there are relatively few studies of the effect of financial/ banking crisis on bank 
profitability, yet there are studies of the impact of crisis on bank failures (e.g. see 
Cariboni et al (2016), Yang (2016), etc.).  One exception is Bouzgarrou et al (2018) 
who examined the profitability of domestic and foreign banks before, during and after 
the financial crisis using 170 banks operating in France over the period 2000-2012. 
They found that the financial crisis had a major impact on the French financial system 
and financial stability, with a negative effect on profitability for domestic banks and 
positive effect on foreign banks operating in France.  They show that foreign banks 
were more profitable than domestic banks especially during the financial crisis.   Xioa 
(2009) looked at the performance of French banks during 2006-2008 and the impact 
of the financial support measures taken by the French government.  She concluded 
that French banks were not immune to the turbulence but proved relatively resilient to 
the financial crisis reflecting their business and supervision features and government 
policies.  Adelopo et al (2017) examined the determinants of bank profitability (ROA 
and NIM) before (1999-2006), during (2007-2009) and after (2009-2009) the 2007-
 
87 Concentration can be a poor measure of competition due to the possibility of contestability, barriers 
to entry and exit in the market. 
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2008 financial crisis in West African State’s bank.  They saw that financial crisis seems 
to have no effect on banks profitability. 
 
We now move on to Section 5.3. Banking regulation and the impact on banks’ 
cost and lending, where we look at the regulatory framework in which banks operate 
and the impact of regulation on banks.  
 
5.3. Banking regulation and the impact on banks’ cost and lending 
 
In the 1980s, in response to many international financial disruptions, banking 
regulation was strengthened with the introduction of the Basel I (Capital) Accord 
(1988) by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).  The 1988 Basel 
Accord, at the time focused mainly on applying common minimum capital standards 
for the banking sector and addressed credit risk, which was the main risk faced by 
banks (see Chapter 2).  Many subsequent financial sector and regulatory reforms 
tended to focus mostly on the banking sector, which is not surprising, as a stable and 
efficient banking sector is important to the economy (see section above).  As such, the 
purpose of this section is to look at how banks are regulated (financial system 
regulatory and supervisory framework) with the role therein of macroprudential policy 
and the impact regulations have on banks’ cost and lending. 
 
I. Financial system regulatory and supervisory framework 
 
The regulation of the banking sector has always been a major fundamental issue for 
researchers and regulators especially as the sector continues to experience banking 
crises (see Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Laeven and Valencia (2018)) as well as the 
special economic role of money and uncertainty associated with it (Dow (1996)).  Even 
though the role of banks is changing as a result of the increase trend towards 
disintermediation, banking sector regulations are still imperative as banks remain 
central in the financing of economic activity and for financial system stability as argued 
above.  In this section, banks’ regulatory and supervisory frameworks will be discussed 
in the broader context of financial system regulatory and supervisory framework 
(structure).  Further, specific banking and financial system regulatory polices such as 
the Basel Accord (Microprudential Policy) and Macroprudential Policy have been 
246 
 
discussed in Chapter 2 as such the focus in this section is more on the supervisory 
framework, with brief references to financial system regulations.  
 
Čihák and Tieman (2008) indicated that there are substantial differences in the quality 
of regulatory and supervisory frameworks across countries, with the country’s income 
level (per capita income) being a major factor for these cross-country differences.  
Further, they noted that not all differences are due to economic development and high-
income countries characterized by better supervisory structures needs to be put in the 
perspective that these countries usually have more developed and complex financial 
system yet gaps still exist in their framework.  They studied the quality of financial 
sector regulation and supervision around the world using the data from IMF-World 
Bank assessments of compliance with international standards and codes.88 
  
Labonte (2017) suggested that major changes in the regulatory and supervisory 
framework are sometimes driven by the response to various financial crises.  In the 
US, he indicated that the framework evolved piecemeal and punctuated by major 
changes in the framework in response to various financial crises.  He added that the 
US financial regulator system has been described as being fragmented, with multiple 
overlapping regulators and a dual state-federal regulatory system.  For example, the 
2007-2008 financial crisis resulted in changes in the regulatory system through the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) 
and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act 2008 (HERA).  Labonte (2017) noted to 
address the fragmented nature of system, the Dodd-Frank Act created the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), a council of regulators and experts chaired by the 
US Treasury Secretary.  
 
Yet, Labonte (2017) indicated that financial regulation aims to achieve diverse goals, 
which vary from regulator to regulator such as the following. 
 
• market efficiency and integrity, 
• consumer and investor protections, 
 
88  See IMF website for the List of Standards, Codes and Principles Useful for Bank and Fund 




• capital formation or access to credit, 
• taxpayer protection, 
• illicit activity prevention, and 
• financial stability. 
 
Calvo et al (2018) advised that institutional design for financial sector oversight must 
fit the purpose for which it is designed and effective oversight depends on the 
appropriate allocation of functions either to one or more agencies.  And in turn, these 
agencies should be able to act with clear objectives, operational autonomy, 
comprehensive and effective powers, adequate resources and incentives.  Further, 
they saw that different jurisdictions (authorities) have assigned financial sector 
responsibilities to various financial sector governing agencies based on a variety of 
supervisory models.  The choice of financial supervisory model entails the trade-offs 
between synergies across function and possible conflicts of interest between these 
agencies.  Post 2007-2008 global financial crisis, these financial supervisory models 
have added two new relevant functions for financial sector governing agencies, 
macroprudential policy and resolution (financial crisis).  
 
Calvo et al (2018) noted in the study of financial supervisory framework in 82 countries 
and jurisdictions suggests that the framework corresponds to one of the following 
supervisory models.  
 
• Sectoral Model – consists of three separate authorities that supervise three 
different financial sectors: banking, insurance and securities.  Each authority 
typically has a prudential role and a conduct of business role in the sector they 
supervise.  Countries and jurisdictions with this model include Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Hong Kong. Luxembourg, Mexico, Portugal and South Africa, etc. 
 
• Integrated Model – this model, which also referred as the single or unified 
model, involves the integration of supervisory functions for most of all financial 
sectors into a single authority either through a central bank (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Ireland, Singapore) or a separated supervisory agency (Austria, 
Colombia, Denmark Germany, Japan, Norway, Switzerland) is responsible for 
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all oversight functions of all three sectors - banking, insurance and securities.  
This model includes the oversight of the prudential regulation as well as the 
conduct of business requirements affecting different types of financial institution 
and their activities.  This model was closely linked to the development of 
financial conglomerates. 
 
• Twin Peaks Model – is based on supervisory specialisation by objectives.  One 
specialised in prudential monitoring of regulated institutions and another 
agency on the oversight of business conduct.  This model permits mitigation of 
conflicts of interest between promoting the solvency of financial institutions and 
ensuring protection for their clients and investors.  Countries with this model 
are Australia, Belgium, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Netherlands, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom. 
 
• Two Agency Model – currently adopted in France, Greece, Italy, Malaysia, 
Paraguay, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago, where one agency is in charge of 
prudential and conduct supervision of the banking and insurance sectors and 
the another is responsible for securities firms.  The model takes advantage of 
the synergies between banking and insurance supervision, yet compared to 
twin peaks model, it is less well adapted in dealing with possible conflict of 
interest arising from prudential and consumer/ investor protection objectives. 
 
Twin peaks and two agency models can be considered to be partially integrated 
models.  In addition, the involvement of central banks is a key feature of any financial 
supervisory framework either through prudential oversight, conduct supervisions or 
both.  As well as they have a major role in economic stability, liquidity management 
and financial system solvency (lender of last resort).  Yet, conflict of interest can arise 
from the role of central banks in setting monetary policy (interest rates) and the impact 
it can have on banks’ profitability and solvency. 
 
As we mentioned in Chapter 2, macroprudential policymaking models (IMF-FSB-BIS 
(2016)) tend to reflect the financial supervisory framework existing in many countries 
such as sectoral, integrated twin peaks and two agency supervisory models.  It is a 
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situation where most countries integrated macroprudential policy as well as financial 
stability framework in the existing financial supervisory framework, thus minimising the 
need for legislative changes.    
 
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) looked at whether monetary policy and banking 
supervision should be separated.  They began by examining the issue on whether 
which regime (combined or separated) is less prone to bank failures, yet they noted 
that regime with the minimum number of banking failures is not necessarily the most 
efficient in term of welfare costs.  Further, they raised two additional issues in the 
debate, firstly, whether the combination of functions can lead to a conflict of interest, 
in particular whether concerns for the micro-level health and stability of the banking 
system might distort a central bank’s conduct of monetary policy.  Secondly, a main 
argument for combining the functions within a central bank (single agency) is the 
concern for systemic stability of the financial system and preventing contagious 
systemic crises.  In this case, they added whether it is appropriate for the central bank 
should be the lender of last resort.  They found that there are no overwhelming 
arguments for either model, that is, combined or separated functions of banking 
supervision and monetary policy.  In their view, they noted the institutional control of 
supervision and regulation will depend, aside from national tradition, largely on the 
matter of who is ultimately going to pay for any banking sector bailout. 
 
Further, Quintyn and Taylor (2002) discussed the issue of financial sector regulatory 
and supervisory independence (RSI).  They argued that bank regulators and 
supervisors need a substantial degree of independence, both from government and 
the industry, in order to fulfil their mandate and contribute to the preservation of 
financial stability.  Also, they said that regulatory and supervisory independence 
complements central bank independence to achieve or preserve the twin goals of 
monetary and financial stability.   They noted two factors have served to give raise to 
RSI, firstly, the financial sector crises of the 1990s89, where it was cited that lack of 
independence of supervisory authorities from political influence contributed to the 
crises.  Secondly, the growing tendency to move to unified financial sector supervision, 
often removing banking supervision from the central bank, where there was degree of 
 
89 For examples, Venezuela crisis in the mid-1990s and Asian financial crisis (1997-1998). 
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independence derived from central bank’s independence with respect to monetary 
policy function.  They argued that independence of regulatory agencies is important 
for financial stability in the same reasons that the independence of central banks 
matters for monetary policy. 
 
Finally, Calvo et al (2018) noted that supervisory models in the United States and 
European Union have special characteristics.  In the US, different functions are 
assigned to several agencies at the federal and state level (see Labonte (2017) as 
well).  While in the EU, countries within the euro currency zone share a single 
prudential supervisory authority (the ECB’s Single Supervisors Mechanism 90 ) for 
significant banks 91  and member states for smaller banks and other supervisory 
functions. 
 
II. The cost of regulation to the banking sector 
 
As suggested previously, overall benefits of financial sector and regulation reforms are 
evidently sizeable due to the many financial crises over the last few decades especially 
in light of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis.  Yet, Van den Heuvel (2008) and 
Tchana (2012) suggested that although capital requirements limit moral hazard on the 
part of banks and hence are beneficial for financial stability, they are costly since they 
reduce the ability of banks to lend, thus can hamper economic growth, which is an 
unintended side effect of regulations that limit banking activities.  However, Barrell et 
al (2009) calculated that the cost of tighter regulation is small in the long run and if the 
costs of crises are potentially high, then tighter regulation would be appropriate, as the 
cost of the crisis outweighs the cost of the loss of economic output. The cost of 
regulation was estimated via impacts of higher capital ratios on loan spreads to 
households and companies in the UK, which were then integrated in the global 
macroeconomic model (NiGEM). Davis et al (2018) looking at the UK, Germany and 
Italy in a similar manner, suggested that the hypothetical introduction of 
 
90 Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) refers to the system of banking supervision in Europe. It 
comprises the ECB and the national supervisory authorities of the participating countries.  See website, 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/thessm/html/index.en.html.  
91 The ECB directly supervises 117 significant banks of the participating countries of the European 
Union.  These banks hold almost 82% of banking assets in the euro currency area.  See website, 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/who is supervised.html.  
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macroprudential measures such as capital adequacy prior to the subprime crisis might 
have the reduced the incidence of the crisis and improve macroeconomic 
performance. 
 
Van den Heuvel (2008) found, using US banking data, that the welfare cost of current 
capital adequacy (Basel Accords) of 8%, reduces consumption by between 0.1% and 
1% because it reduces the ability of banks to create liquidity.  The author uses the 
Sidrauski (1967) modelling framework to measure the welfare cost of capital 
adequacy, which involve modelling the preferences for liquidity and including it in the 
utility function.  Tchana (2012) found that higher capital adequacy requirements 
hamper economic growth by shifting banks’ portfolios from more productive, risky 
investment projects toward less productive and safer investment projects.  The author 
uses an Overlapping Generations (OLG) model where banks serve as financial 
intermediaries and banking regulation is modelled as a constraint on banks’ portfolios 
to analyse the effect capital requirement has on economic growth.  Yet, Kim and Sohn 
(2017) suggested that bank capital has a significant positive effect on lending once 
banks retain sufficient liquid assets.  They used quarterly US banks data for the period 
1993 to 2010, to determine whether the effect of bank capital on lending changes 
depending on the level of bank liquidity.  
 
Noss and Toffano (2015), using UK quarterly banking data from 1986 to 2010, looked 
at the impact of changes in aggregate bank capital requirements on lending and 
growth during an economic upswing.  Their analysis uses data on the aggregate ratio 
of UK banks’ capital-to-assets where assets are not risk weighted, that is not adjusted 
by regulatory risk weight as designed to capture their relative risk.  This definition of 
capital is closer to the regulatory leverage ratio of capital than Basel III capital ratio as 
they suggested using a non-risk weighted data provide a better representation of 
banks’ true leverage. They found that an increased capital requirement during an 
economic upswing is associated with a reduction in lending.  The impact on GDP 
growth is however statistically insignificant as firms substitute from banks’ credit 
towards the bond markets or shadow banking entities. 
 
Similarly, Aiyar et al (2014a) indicated that regulated banks (UK-owned banks and 
resident foreign subsidiaries) reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirement 
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but unregulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to 
tighter capital requirements, suggesting competitive advantages.  Also, our results in 
Chapter 3 suggested that macroprudential policy (regulation) has a stronger effect on 
domestic credit (credit-to-GDP gap) and the macroeconomic variables but it is noted 
that the results cannot be interpreted in isolation of the fact as there is not a very long 
history of the usage of macroprudential policy, particularly in advanced countries and 
“time series” macroprudential policy was largely designed to operate in a period of 
upturn or absence of any financial disturbance. 
 
Pasiouras et al (2009), in providing an international perspective, looked at the effect 
of regulatory and supervision framework, that is capital adequacy (Basel II), official 
supervisory power and market discipline mechanisms have on bank efficiency, cost, 
activities, and profit.  The dataset consists of 2,853 observations from 615 publicly 
quoted commercial banks operating in 74 countries during the period 2000-2004.  
Pasiouras et al (2009) found that banking regulations that enhance market discipline 
and empower supervisory authorities increase both cost and profit efficiency of banks.  
In addition, they suggested that stricter capital requirements improve cost efficiency 
but lower profit efficiency while restricting bank activities. 
 
Roulet (2017) and Naceur et al (2018), using banking data for 23 countries in the US 
and Europe following the financial crisis for the period 2008-2015, looked at the effects 
of capital and liquidity regulations (Basel III) on bank lending.  They found that capital 
ratios have significant and negative impacts on large European banks’ retail and other 
lending growth in the context of deleveraging and the “credit crunch” – difficulty in 
securing loans, in Europe during the post 2007-2008 financial crisis.  More stringent 
capital adequacy encourages substitution of retail and other loan assets (lending) into 
less risky (risk-free) and liquid assets such as government bonds as capital is more 
expensive to hold for assets that are assigned higher risk weights (Basel Accord risk 
ratings) or when expanding bank balance via credit activities.  Yet, capital ratios were 
not significant in the determination of European bank commercial lending growth.  In 
the US, they saw that small US banks strengthen their financial soundness and loss 
absorption capacities when expanding both commercial and retail lending activities as 
such capital and leverage ratios have significant and positive impacts on US bank-
lending growth.  They suggested that capitalization plays a major role in US bank 
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lending growth over the period 2008-2015 and the cautious approach of US banks 
when facing higher risk exposure. 
 
Additionally, Roulet (2017) and Naceur et al (2018) found that liquidity indicators have 
a positive and perverse effect on bank-lending growth.  Liquidity ratios (non-required 
amount of stable funding/ total assets) has a significant and positive impact on 
commercial lending growth on US banks, regardless of size and large European 
banks.  
 
Kupiec et al (2016) looked at the impact a poor banking supervision rating (CAMELS 
Ratings System) can have on growth rates of individual bank loan portfolios using 
381,000 bank-quarter observations from 1994 to 2011 in the US.  CAMELS is a rating 
system that bank supervisory authorities use in order to rate financial institutions 
according to six factors.  The factors are Capital Adequacy, Asset quality, Earnings, 
Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk  (see Stackhouse (2018)).  They argued that a 
core goal of bank supervision is to stop banks from making high risks loans that will 
not meet the requirement for receiving government safety net subsidy.  They found 
that poor CAMELS rating has a strong and significant negative effect on banks loan 
growth, even controlling for the impact of monetary policy and bank-specific factors 
such as bank capital and liquidity conditions, loan portfolio performance and bank 
losses.  In contrast, they found that capital adequacy measures (Tier 1 capital, 
Leverage and Total risk-based capital ratios) have a statistically significant but 
economically small impact on loan growth.  Similarly, Čihák and Tieman (2008) noted 
that higher regulatory quality in banking is correlated with better banking sector 
performance.  
 
Finally, Lee (2015) noted that capital and profitability can have a bearing on imposing 
regulatory policy as higher profit and better capitalised banks may need less regulatory 
oversight.  In analysing Korean banks over the period 2000-2008, he saw that better 
capitalised banks generate higher profit as they have a lower cost of capital, lower 
bankruptcy and financial distress costs and less regulatory interference from bank 
regulators, etc.  As such, Lee (2015) suggested in order to improve bank profitability 
for banking sector’s soundness and stability, regulators should implement 
discriminatory regulatory policy between higher and lower capitalised banks, this is 
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because ignoring the degree of bank capital strength and imposing uniform regulatory 
policy may not be effective in improving bank profitability and stability.   
 
We now move on to Section 5.4. Empirical analysis of the effects of 
macroprudential policy on banks’ profitability and interaction with monetary 
policy, where we present empirical results testing the effects of macroprudential policy 
on banks’ profitability and interaction with monetary policy.  
 
5.4. Empirical analysis of the effects of macroprudential policy on banks’ 
profitability and interaction with monetary policy 
 
In this section of the chapter, we outline our empirical analysis of the impact 
macroprudential policy has on banks’ profitability as well as the relationship with 
monetary policy.  The section is organised in the following manner, firstly, we provide 
a brief overview of the hypothesis for modelling the effect of macroprudential policy on 
bank profitability. Secondly, we review the key datasets use in our empirical analysis.  
Thirdly, we discuss, 1) the results of the determinants of banks’ profitability model (the 
baseline model), 2) the results of the effect of macroprudential policy instruments have 
on reducing banks’ profitability and 3) determine whether macroprudential policy has 
an effect on monetary policy, using the Net Interest Margin profitability model.  The 
empirical analysis uses Ordinary Least Square modelling and Fitch Connect individual 
bank data for 92 countries, which include 6,010 banks (3,095 banks from advanced 
countries and 2,915 banks from emerging market economies).  The period of coverage 
for the empirical analysis is 2000 to 2013 as a result of the data available in the Cerutti 
et al (2015a) database.   
 
5.4.1. Hypothesis for modelling the effect of macroprudential policy on bank 
profitability 
 
Whereas there has been extensive research on bank profitability, banking regulations’ 
effect on lending and the benefit of a stable and efficient financial system as discussed 
in sections 5.1 and 5.2 above, there is a need to understand the effect of new 
regulations on the banking sector since banks remain central in the financing of 
economic activity.  In the literature, studies have found there is a cost of 
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microprudential regulations to the banking sector, where they are costly since they 
reduce the ability of banks to lend and engage in productive activities, which can 
hamper economic growth, an unintended side effect of regulations that limit banking 
activities (Van den Heuvel (2008) and Tchana (2012)).  Yet, due to the many financial 
crises over the last few decades, especially in light of the 2007-2008 global financial 
crisis and the important role of banks in the financial system, there remains a need for 
banks regulation (see Dow (1996)).  Further, Barrell et al (2009) and Davis et al (2018) 
noted that the benefits of regulation especially if limiting the cost of financial crises 
outweigh the cost of the loss of economic output (see above, Section 5.3). 
 
Accordingly, with the introduction of macroprudential policy as an essential financial 
regulatory policy tool to forestall crises or at least offer a buffer to soften the impact of 
them, there is a need to understand the detailed effect on banks activities.  In the 
macroprudential policy research literature, there is empirical evidence which suggest 
that macroprudential policy is effective in reducing the build-up of financial system 
imbalances, whereas there tends to be a focus on the housing and credit market 
measures such as credit growth, house prices and the credit-to-GDP gap (see 
Chapter 3).  On account of this, macroprudential policy tends to affect credit activities 
in the domestic banking sector mostly.  Beside banks remaining central in the financing 
of economic activity, they are also the dominant (as measure by asset size or market 
share) financial institution in the financial system in many countries.  Furthermore, 
Chapter 4 shows that macroprudential policy (regulation) has a stronger effect on 
domestic credit, lending originating in the domestic financial system rather than cross-
border lending from international banking firms. 
 
Note also that Chapter 3 gave modelling results suggesting that macroprudential 
policy is effective in reducing financial imbalances, where the focus tends to be mostly 
on the aggregate banking sector.   The empirical analysis in Chapter 1 found  that 
debt-to-income ratio (DTI), loans-to-value ratios (LTV and LTVCAP) and concentration 
limits (CONC) are the most effective macroprudential instruments, being statistically 
significant and negative related to the credit-to-GDP gap (the measure of financial 




Secondly, given that in Chapter 4, the modelling results indicate that the effects of 
macroprudential policy are mostly on the domestic banking sector, then one of the 
premises of this Chapter 5 is to study the direct effect of macroprudential policy on 
domestic banks performance, using individual banking data from 92 countries,  and 
this is tested by examining the effect on bank profitability.  We have seen earlier in this 
chapter that a sound and profitable banking sector is important for the effective 
functioning of the economy and it is better able to withstand negative shocks from 
financial disruptions and contribute to financial stability.   
 
In this context, we contend that, if macroprudential policy reduces the ability of banks 
to lend via reducing the credit-to-GDP gap (Chapter 3), then there should be a 
significant and negative effect on banks’ profitability relative to what would be expected 
with standard control variables.  The hypothesis is therefore written as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: If macroprudential policy is effective in reducing financial system 
imbalances as measured by the credit-to-GDP gap, there should also be a 
significant and negative effect on banks’ profitability. 
 
Of course, hypothesis 1 may not hold and an alternative hypothesis 1 is that banks’ 
profitability may not be affected as banks are able to shift their activities from net 
interest income to non-traditional activities and increase fee-based income or passed 
on the cost of the policy to customers. etc. 
 
We note that there have been only a few studies which have focused and included a 
monetary policy or an interest rate variable in the study of the determinants of bank 
profitability.  The link between monetary policy and bank profitability has nonetheless 
been established in the research literature (see Alessandri and Nelson (2015) and 
Borio et al (2017)).  In addition, as we discussed in this Chapter Introduction above, 
there is arguments that there is a complementary relationship between 
macroprudential and monetary policies since macroprudential policy provides 
monetary policy with additional room for manoeuvre to better focus on ensuring price 
stability as well as it provides a stable platform (financial stability) for monetary policy 
to function effectively (see N’Diaye (2009) and Constâncio (2016)).  Yet, Beau et al 
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(2012) suggested that there are situations where both policies can contradict each 
other and their interactions call for coordinated implementation.   
 
In light of the relationship between monetary policy and bank profitability and the 
expected complementary relationship to macroprudential policy, the second 
hypothesis in this Chapter 3 looks at the relationship between monetary and 
macroprudential policies using a narrower bank profitability model, namely the Net 
Interest Margin profitability model.  This profitability model measures how successful 
a bank is in its portfolio investment decisions, that is maximising mostly the revenue 
from the bank’s interest spread, interest revenue received from investment (loans) and 
their interest expenses paid to lenders (depositors).  NIM is suggested to be the most 
appropriate profitability model to capture the relationship between bank profit and the 
interest rate environment (monetary policy).  
 
As such, if there is a significant relationship (positive/ negative) between bank 
profitability and monetary policy, then the aim of the second hypothesis is to examine 
whether there is an interactive (positive/ negative) relationship between 
macroprudential policy with monetary policy using the net interest margin profitability 
model.  The hypothesis is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2: If there is a significant (positive/ negative) relationship between 
interest rate (monetary policy) and banks’ profitability, then macroprudential 
policy also has a significant effect on the banks’ interest rate margin, thus 
offsetting or complementing monetary policy. 
 
Likewise, hypothesis 2 may be falsified and an alternative hypothesis 2 is 
macroprudential policy has no effect on the banks’ interest rate margin hence no effect 
on monetary policy. 
 
5.4.2. Datasets for modelling the effect of macroprudential policy on banks’ 
profitability 
 
Our data modelling uses two key datasets, the Fitch Connect database of banks 
financial statements and the IMF GMPI survey data on macroprudential instruments 
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(Cerutti et al (2015a)).  Additional macroeconomic data were collected from various 
sources such as the IMF, ECB, the World Bank and individual country central banks 
and statistical agencies. 
 
I. Fitch Connect banking data 
 
The main bank-specific data source is the Fitch Connect database, which provides 
annual financial information for banks in many countries around the world.   In our 
unbalanced panel banking data sample, we have banks from 92 countries, 34 
advanced countries and 58 emerging market economies, 6,010 banks (3,095 banks 
from advanced countries and 2,915 banks from emerging market economies) and 
84,140 observations.  The types of banks included are universal commercial banks, 
retail and consumer banks, banks, wholesale banks, and Islamic banks.  Investment 
banks and private banks are excluded due to different balance sheet and income 
structure as are bank holding companies, to avoid double counting.   
 
The number of banks for each country covers at least the top 100 banks based on 
total assets or less if fewer banks exists.  For most countries with more than 100 banks, 
at the tail end, the top 100 banks changes from year to year due to mergers and 
acquisitions and the closure of some banks.  These banks are included in the data for 
the years they existed in order to capture the top 100 banks each year as far as 
possible and to avoid the loss of data points.  To help avoid double counting, as 
indicated above, bank holding companies were excluded from the data and the 
banking data collected are unconsolidated, which also allow for the reporting of foreign 
bank subsidiaries in each country.   All financial statement data are annual and in US 
dollars.  The period of coverage for the banking data is 2000 to 2013.  See Appendix 
5A.1 and 5A.2 for the list of countries and number of banks for each country, as well 
as a regional breakdown.  
 
The structure of the banking dataset is in line with the work of Davis et al (2019) and 
Claessens et al (2015).  Davis et al (2019) studied the effectiveness of a leverage ratio 
relative to two measures of the RAR (total regulatory capital ratio and Tier 1 regulatory 
capital ratio) in predicting bank risk, given competition using over 1,000 banks in the 
US and Europe for the period 1998-2016.  Claessens et al (2015) paper analysed the 
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use of macroprudential policies aimed at reducing vulnerabilities in the banking system 
with the main dependent variable being asset growth using 2,820 banks in 48 
countries over the period 2000-2010.   
 
II. Macroprudential instruments dataset 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the IMF dataset on macroprudential instruments is one of 
the most comprehensive databases on the actual usage of macroprudential 
instruments by over 119 countries for the sample period 2000-2013, which is publicly 
available.  This database is used in Chapter 3 as well as many extant studies of 
macroprudential policy.  There are 12 macroprudential survey instruments and 2 
additional derived instruments and 3 groups summary instruments in the publicly 
available dataset.  The frequency in the dataset is yearly.  We used this data set since 
it covered all the countries that are included in the empirical analysis and it is based 
on survey data collected from official reporting agencies to the IMF such as central 
banks and financial sector regulatory authorities.   
 
Our main focus is on prudential measures that have a negative and significant effect 
on banks’ profitability, reducing banks’ profit (ROAA and ROAE) over the sample 
period.  We expect that prudential measures which target banks assets (credit 
activities) and reduce the credit-to-GDP gap to have the greatest effect on banks’ 
profitability as our results in Chapter 3 found that debt-to-income ratio (DTI), loans-to-
value measures (LTV and LTVCAP) and concentration limits (CONC) are the most 
effective macroprudential instruments, being statistically significant and negative 
related to the credit-to-GDP gap (the measure of financial imbalances).  This is also 
supported by empirical research by Cerutti et al (2017), Carreras et al (2018), Akinci 
and Olmstead-Rumsey’s (2015), etc.  See Chapter 2 for a discussion on the 
description and taxonomy of the macroprudential instruments.  Again, we show in 
Table 5.1 the list of instruments in the IMF dataset. 
 
Table 5.1: Macroprudential instruments dataset 
 
Instrument Abbreviation 
Survey Instruments   
Loan-to-Value Ratio LTV 
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Debt-to-Income Ratio DTI 
Time-Varying/Dynamic Loan-Loss Provisioning DP 
General Countercyclical Capital Buffer/Requirement  CTC 
Leverage Ratio LEV 
Capital Surcharges on SIFIs SIFI 
Limits on Interbank Exposures INTER 
Concentration Limits CONC 
Limits on Foreign Currency Loans FC 
Reserve Requirement Ratios RR 
Limits on Domestic Currency Loans CG 
Levy/Tax on Financial Institutions TAX 
Derived Instruments   
Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps LTVCAP 
FX and/or Countercyclical Reserve Requirements RRREV 
Groups of Instruments  
Total macroprudential instruments MPI 
Macroprudential instruments focused on the borrower MPIB 
Macroprudential instruments focused on the financial 
institution 
MPIF 
Source: Cerutti et al (2015a) (Version February 24th, 2015).  Notes: each variable is a dummy that takes 
on two values: 0 for no policy and 1 for policy in effect. The database covers a sample from 2000 to 
2013 with annual data.  The groups instruments are the aggregate of the survey instruments. 
 
5.4.3. Empirical analysis for testing the effect of macroprudential policy on 
banks profitability 
 
I. Research literature baseline model  
 
We use the research literature on the factors affecting banks’ profitability model, such 
as Korytowski (2018), Petria et al (2013), Goddard et al (2004), to investigate the effect 
of macroprudential policy on banks’ profitability.  We have selected to use the standard 
and common bank-specific, industry and macroeconomic variables (see Table 5.2 
below) in the research literature to explain the factors affecting banks’ profitability (see 
above Section 5.2.1 for further explanation of the variables and their effects on banks’ 
profitability).  Also, we include the interest rate factors, short-term interest rate 
(monetary policy rate) and yield curve as the link between monetary policy and bank 
profitability has been established in the research literature (see Alessandri and Nelson 
(2015) and Borio et al (2017)). 
 
Table 5.2 below shows the standard variables as discussed in the research literature 
to explain the factors affecting banks’ profitability.  We include in the table the literature 
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and our expected coefficient relation to the dependent variables (ROAA, ROAE and 
NIM).   
 
Table 5.2: Factors affecting banks’ profitability 
  




























Bank specific factors (internal) 
Bank size LNSIZE Logarithm of Total 
Assets 
+/- + 
Leverage  LEV Equity/ Total 
Assets 
+/- - 

















Banking system specific factor (external) 
Competition LINDEX Lerner Index + + 
Banking crisis BCRISIS Laeven and 
Valencia (2018) 
+/- - 
Macroeconomic factors (external) 
Economic growth RGDPGWR Real GDP growth 
rate (annual %) 
+/- + 











Yield curve term 
structure 
YDSLOPE 10 years 
government bond 




Data source: Fitch Connect, IMF, World Bank, Laeven and Valencia (2018) and author’s calculations. 
* We expect a negative effect in the net interest margin profitability model.  
 
The Lerner index is a measure of the price-cost margin.  It can be seen as a proxy for 
current and future profits stemming from pricing power, and it varies at the level of the 
individual bank.  Under perfect competition the index is zero as the output price 
(marginal revenue) equals marginal cost, and “normal” economic profits are zero. The 
Lerner index is positive as a firm’s market power increase and price rises above 
marginal cost in a quantity-setting oligopoly model, with the limiting case being 
monopoly. We derived the Lerner Index following Anginer et al. (2014), Beck et al. 
(2013), Weill (2013) and Davis et al (2019), see Appendix 5A.3 for further details. 
 
We expect bank specific factors such as bank size (LNSIZE) and diversification 
(DIVSIF) to have a positive effect on banks’ profitability.  Similarly, competition which 
is measured by the Lerner Index (LINDEX) to have a positive effect.  This suggests 
that the higher the LINDEX, the greater degree of market power by banks.  We expect 
all the macroeconomic factors - economic growth (RGDPGWR), the rate of inflation 
(INFLAT), short-term interest rate (3MTHRATE) and the yield curve term structure 
(YDSLOPE) to have a positive effect on banks’ profitability. 
 
We expect leverage (LEV), credit and liquidity risks (CRISK, LRISK) to have a negative 
effect on banks’ profitability since higher risks should affect banks negatively.  
Management efficiency (COSTINC), which capture banks’ costs to income level, 
should have a negative effect on profitability because as costs increase relative to 
income, this should lower banks’ profitability.  The banking crisis variable (BCRISIS) 
is expected to have a negative effect on banks’ profitability since during a crisis, banks 




For the analysis of the effect of the macroprudential policy on bank profitability, the 
focus will be ROAA and ROAE models.  In the next few sections, the focus will be 
ROAA and ROAE models.  The Net Interest Margin (NIM) model will be discussed in 
the analysis of the relationship between monetary and macroprudential policies later 
in the chapter. 
 
II. Descriptive statistics of the ROAA and ROAE baseline model variables 
 
a) All countries 
 
The following Table 5.3 shows some descriptive statistics of the variables in the model 
for all countries.  In line with typical practice in the empirical literature on individual 
bank behaviour (Davis and Karim (2018a), Davis et al (2019)).  The variables are 
winsorised at 99% and in level (not lagged).  ROAA has a mean of 1.048 per cent of 
total assets and a standard deviation (StdDev) of 2.784 per cent.  The mean for ROAE 
is 8.725 per cent but there is a more significant variation than with ROAA, as the 
standard deviation for ROAE is 17.76 per cent over the period 2000-2013.  Credit risk 
(CRISK), non-performing loans/ gross loans, is on average 9 per cent, with a small 
variation between the banks.  Management efficiency (COSTINC) averages 45 per 
cent of total income and non-interest income (DIVSIF) represents about 34 per cent 
of gross revenue.  Average GDP growth over the period is about 3.3 per cent and the 
inflation rate is 4.7 per cent.  Finally, the Lerner index (LINDEX) averages 0.203, 
suggesting some degree of market power by banks.  This is very much in line with 
other estimates of the Lerner Index in the literature such as 0.2 in Davis and Karim 
(2018a) for European banks. 
 
Table 5.3: ROAA and ROAE baseline model variables descriptive statistics for 
the period 2000-2013 (all countries) 
 
Variables Mean Median Max Min StdDev Obs 
Dependent variables 
ROAA (%) 1.048 0.880 12.035 -13.165 2.784 36,900 
ROAE (%) 8.725 8.810 59.053 -84.690 17.665 36,306 
LNSIZE (log) 21.348 21.320 27.211 15.843 2.420 45,015 
264 
 
LEV 0.149 0.091 1.267 0.001 0.207 41,273 
CRISK 0.091 0.033 1.162 0.002 0.174 25,137 
LRISK 2.370 0.890 152.950 0.010 9.090 36,555 
COSTINC 0.451 0.390 3.176 0.001 0.450 39,834 
DIVSIF (%) 34.270 29.500 142.620 -55.785 30.060 40,557 
LINDEX 0.203 0.207 0.998 -2.311 0.501 21,541 
BCRISIS  
RGDPGWR (%) 3.260 3.187 12.110 -6.600 3.450 83,892 
INFLAT (%) 4.718 2.903 38.470 -1.210 5.690 83,666 
3MTHRATE (%) 2.131 2.105 5.994 0.051 1.642 27,020 
YDSLOPE (%) 3.732 3.973 8.118 0.730 1.381 26,954 
Data Source: Fitch Connect, IMF and author calculations.  Banking Crisis (BCRISIS) is a dummy 
variable and it is coded one in the year the crisis starts until the year it was over and is otherwise zero.  
The values are a ratio unless otherwise stated.  Max – maximum, Min – minimum, StdDev - standard 
deviation.  The variables are winsorised at 99% and in level. 
 
b) Advanced countries 
 
Table 5.4 below shows some descriptive statistics of the variables in the baseline 
model for advanced countries.  Again, the variables are winsorised at 99% and in level 
(not lagged).  For advanced countries, the ROAA has a mean of 0.945 per cent of total 
assets and a standard deviation (StdDev) of 2.700 per cent.  The mean for ROAE is 
8.161 per cent.  Credit risk (CRISK), management efficiency (COSTINC) and non-
interest income (DIVSIF) values are similar to the all countries values (see Table 5.3 
above).  For advanced countries, average GDP growth over the period is about 2.0 
per cent and the inflation rate is 2.1 per cent, which is lower than emerging market 
economies average (see Table 5.5 below). 
   
Table 5.4: ROAA and ROAE baseline model variables descriptive statistics for 
the period 2000-2013 (advanced countries) 
 
Variables Mean Median Max Min StdDev Obs 
Dependent variables 
ROAA (%) 0.945 0.750 12.035 -13.165 2.700 18,853 
ROAE (%) 8.161 8.130 59.053 -84.687 17.635 18,512 
LNSIZE (log) 21.580 21.500 27.211 15.843 2.535 23,333 
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LEV 0.141 0.080 1.266 0.001 0.211 21,022 
CRISK 0.087 0.028 1.162 0.006 0.181 12,135 
LRISK 2.387 0.900 152.950 0.007 9.424 18,628 
COSTINC 0.438 0.375 3.176 0.002 0.453 20,295 
DIVSIF (%) 33.550 28.750 142.618 -55.785 30.073 20,670 
LINDEX 0.245 0.223 1.000 -2.312 0.536 11,151 
BCRISIS  
RGDPGWR (%) 1.960 2.074 12.190 -6.600 2.728 43,338 
INFLAT (%) 2.136 2.197 15.402 -1.207 1.527 43,358 
3MTHRATE (%) 2.131 2.105 5.994 0.052 1.642 27,020 
YDSLOPE (%) 3.732 3.973 8.118 0.730 1.381 26,954 
Data Source: Fitch Connect, IMF and author calculations.  Banking Crisis (BCRISIS) is a dummy 
variable and it is coded one in the year the crisis starts until the year it was over and is otherwise zero.  
The values are a ratio unless otherwise stated.  Max – maximum, Min – minimum, StdDev - standard 
deviation, Obs – number of observations.  The variables are winsorised at 99% and in level. 
 
c) Emerging market economies 
 
Table 5.5 below shows some descriptive statistics of the variables in the baseline 
model for emerging market economies.  The variables are again winsorised at 99% 
and in level (not lagged).  For emerging market economies, ROAA and ROAE are 
higher over the period 2000-2013 in comparison to advanced countries (Table 5.4), 
which suggest profitability is higher in emerging market economies.  Likewise, credit 
risk (CRISK) and management efficiency (COSTINC) are also higher than advanced 
countries.  Average GDP growth over the period is about 5.0 per cent and the inflation 
rate is 7.4 per cent, once again higher than advanced countries averages.   
 
Table 5.5: ROAA and ROAE baseline model variables descriptive statistics for 
the period 2000-2013 (emerging market economies) 
 
Variables Mean Median Max. Min. StdDev Obs 
Dependent variables 
ROAA (%) 1.158 1.040 12.035 -13.165 2.887 18,301 
ROAE (%) 9.330 9770 59.053 -84.688 17.694 18,038 
LNSIZE (log) 21.087 21.122 27.211 15.844 2.259 21,972 
LEV 0.159 0.100 1.266 0.001 0.202 20,541 
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CRISK 0.096 0.039 1.162 0.006 0.170 13,196 
LRISK 2.351 0.882 152.338 0.007 8.699 18,188 
COSTINC 0.465 0.398 3.176 0.002 0.440 19,818 
DIVSIF (%) 34.960 30.340 142.618 -55.786 30.062 20,173 
LINDEX 0.158 0.196 1.000 -2.312 0.454 10,539 
BCRISIS  
RGDPGWR (%) 4.609 4.797 12.109 -6.600 3.585 41,156 
INFLAT (%) 7.414 5.544 38.469 -1.208 7.038 40,910 
3MTHRATE (%) na na na na na na 
YDSLOPE (%) na na na na na na 
Data Source: Fitch Connect, IMF and author calculations.  Banking Crisis (BCRISIS) is a dummy 
variable and it is coded one in the year the crisis starts until the year it was over and is otherwise zero.  
The values are a ratio unless otherwise stated.  Max – maximum, Min – minimum, StdDev - standard 
deviation, Obs – number of observations, na – not available. The variables are winsorised at 99% and 
in level. 
 
III. Correlation matrix of the ROAA and ROAE baseline model variables 
 
a. Return on average assets correlation matrix (all countries) 
 
In table 5.6 below none of the variables are highly correlated except for the correlation 
between management efficiency (COSTINC) and Lerner Index (LINDEX) at -0.749, 
which is high negatively correlated (Pearson’s correlation coefficient) (see Hinkle et al 
(2003)).92   This is not surprising since the COSTINC data are also used to calculate 
the LINDEX.  We find a negative relationship between return on average asset (ROAA) 
and credit risk (CRISK) (-0.099) and management efficiency (COSTINC) (-0.260).  As 
well as, there is a negative correlation between ROAA and bank size (LNSIZE) (-
0.068) and banking crisis (BCRISIS) (-0.011).  There is a low negative correlation 
between banking crisis (BCRISIS) and real GDP growth (RGDPGWR) (-0.454).  As 
well as, low negative correlation between leverage (LEV) and Lerner Index (LINDEX) 
(-0.478).  There is a low positive correlation between leverage (LEV) and management 
 
92 The rule of thumb for interpreting the size of a correlation coefficient is the following: 0.90 to 1.00 (-
0.90 to –1.00) very high positive (negative) correlation; 0.70 to 0.90 (-0.70 to -0.90) high positive 
(negative) correlation; 0.50 to 0.70 (-0.50 to -0.70) moderate positive (negative) correlation; 0.30 to 0.50 
(-0.30 to -0.50) low positive (negative) correlation; 0.00 to 0.30 (0.00 to -0.30) little if any correlation. 
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efficiency (COSTINC) (0.490) and bank size (LNSIZE) and Lerner index (LINDEX) 
(0.414).  
 
Table 5.6: Correlation matrix for the return on average assets (ROAA) for the 
period 2000-2013 (all countries) 
 
 ROAA LNSIZE LEV CRISK LRISK 
COST 







ROAA 1.000             
LNSIZE -0.068 1.000            
LEV 0.089 -0.358 1.000           
CRISK -0.099 -0.110 0.027 1.000          
LRISK 0.024 -0.028 0.068 0.028 1.000         
COST 
INC -0.260 -0.376 0.490 0.086 0.004 1.000        
DIVSIF 0.029 -0.108 0.066 -0.011 0.003 0.224 1.000       
LINDEX 0.104 0.414 -0.478 0.011 0.000 -0.745 -0.314 1.000      
BCRISIS -0.011 0.016 0.060 -0.043 0.007 0.034 -0.065 -0.003 1.000     
RGDP 
GWR 0.036 0.062 -0.060 0.001 0.004 -0.073 0.024 0.080 -0.454 1.000    
INFLAT -0.011 0.127 -0.012 -0.040 0.002 -0.072 -0.048 0.103 0.046 0.293 1.000   
3MTH 
RATE 0.026 0.108 -0.050 0.030 -0.007 -0.071 0.011 0.089 -0.231 0.507 0.481 1.000  
YD 
SLOPE -0.045 0.104 -0.006 0.008 -0.003 -0.002 -0.012 0.031 0.021 0.048 0.460 0.547 1.000 
Data Source: Fitch Connect, IMF and author calculations.  Banking Crisis (BCRISIS) is a dummy 
variable.  The variables are winsorised at 99% and in level. 
 
b. Return on average assets correlation matrix (advanced countries) 
 
Similar to the all countries correlation matrix, none of the variables are highly 
correlated except for the correlation between management efficiency (COSTINC) and 
Lerner Index (LINDEX) at -0.745, which once again is high negatively correlated (see 
Table 5.7 below).  Once again, we find a negative relationship between return on 
average asset (ROAA) and credit risk (CRISK) (-0.100) and management efficiency 
(COSTINC) (-0.260).  As well as, there is a negative relationship between ROAA and 
bank size (LNSIZE) (-0.067).  For advanced countries there is a positive relationship 
between ROAA and interest rate (3MTHRATE) but there is a negative relationship 
between ROAA the yield curve (YDSLOPE). 
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Table 5.7: Correlation matrix for the return on average assets (ROAA) for the 
period 2000-2013 (advanced countries) 
 
 ROAA LNSIZE LEV CRISK LRISK 
COST 







ROAA 1.000             
LNSIZE -0.067 1.000            
LEV 0.090 -0.358 1.000           
CRISK -0.100 -0.110 0.270 1.000          
LRISK 0.023 -0.028 0.068 0.028 1.000         
COST 
INC -0.260 -0.376 0.490 0.086 0.004 1.000        
DIVSIF 0.030 -0.107 0.066 -0.010 0.003 0.224 1.000       
LINDEX 0.104 0.414 -0.478 0.011 -0.002 -0.745 -0.313 1.000      
BCRISIS -0.010 0.016 0.060 -0.043 0.007 0.034 -0.064 -0.003 1.000     
RGDP 
GWR 0.036 0.062 -0.060 0.001 0.004 -0.073 0.024 0.080 -0.454 1.000    
INFLAT -0.010 0.127 -0.012 -0.040 0.002 -0.072 -0.048 0.103 0.046 0.293 1.000   
3MTH 
RATE 0.025 0.108 -0.050 0.030 -0.007 -0.071 0.011 0.090 -0.231 0.507 0.481 1.000  
YD 
SLOPE -0.044 0.104 -0.006 0.008 -0.003 -0.002 -0.012 0.031 0.021 0.048 0.460 0.547 1.000 
Data Source: Fitch Connect, IMF and author calculations.  Banking Crisis (BCRISIS) is a dummy 
variable.  The variables are winsorised at 99% and in level. 
 
c. Return on average assets correlation matrix (emerging market economies) 
 
For emerging market economies, none of the variables are highly correlated (see 
Table 5.8 below).  Once again, we find a negative relationship between return on 
average asset (ROAA) and credit risk (CRISK) (-0.255) and management efficiency 
(COSTINC) (-0.450).  Yet, there is a positive relationship between ROAA and bank 
size (LNSIZE) (0.022).  The interest rate and yield curve variables are not included in 




Table 5.8: Correlation matrix for the return on average assets (ROAA) for the 
period 2000-2013 (emerging market economies) 
 
 ROAA LNSIZE LEV CRISK LRISK 
COST 
INC DIVSIF LINDEX BCRISIS 
RGDP 
GWR INFLAT 
ROAA 1.000           
LNSIZE 0.022 1.000          
LEV 0.154 -0.367 1.000         
CRISK -0.255 -0.194 0.066 1.000        
LRISK -0.003 -0.008 0.039 0.014 1.000       
COST 
INC -0.450 -0.254 0.252 0.236 -0.051 1.000      
DIVSIF -0.041 -0.050 0.012 0.071 -0.029 0.146 1.000     
LINDEX 0.273 0.132 -0.183 -0.112 0.086 -0.511 -0.286 1.000    
BCRISIS 0.006 -0.054 0.008 0.042 0.012 -0.014 0.025 -0.030 1.000   
RGDP 
GWR -0.004 0.101 -0.059 -0.059 -0.031 -0.045 -0.009 0.021 -0.247 1.000  
INFLAT -0.014 -0.085 0.017 0.011 0.027 0.012 0.044 -0.023 0.383 -0.085 1.000 
Data Source: Fitch Connect, IMF and author calculations.  Banking Crisis (BCRISIS) is a dummy 
variable.  Interest rate variables data are not available and therefore excluded from the table.  The 
variables are winsorised at 99% and in level.  Na – not available. 
 
d. Return on average equity correlation matrix (all countries) 
 
Table 5.9 below presents the correlation matrix for the return on average equity 
(ROAE) for all countries.  Similar to ROAA, none of the variables are highly correlated 
except the correlation between management efficiency (COSTINC) and Lerner Index 
at -0.749 which is moderately negatively correlated (Pearson’s correlation coefficient).  
Leverage (LEV) and liquidity risk (LRISK) have a negative relationship with ROAE, 
unlike ROAA, where the relationships are positive.  The rest of correlations are similar 
to the ROAA results since the independent variables are the same in both model of 





Table 5.9: Correlation matrix for the return on average equity (ROAE) the 
period 2000-2013 (all countries) 
 
 ROAE LNSIZE LEV CRISK LRISK 
COST 







ROAE 1.000             
LNSIZE -0.008 1.000            
LEV -0.008 -0.362 1.000           
CRISK -0.260 -0.256 0.106 1.000          
LRISK -0.029 -0.020 0.069 0.066 1.000         
COST 
INC -0.253 -0.364 0.513 0.229 -0.010 1.000        
DIVSIF 0.012 -0.096 0.061 0.160 0.004 0.211 1.000       
LINDEX 0.071 0.407 -0.486 -0.111 0.018 -0.749 -0.310 1.000      
BCRISIS -0.037 0.020 0.059 -0.017 0.001 0.023 -0.074 0.009 1.000     
RGDP 
GWR 0.057 0.062 -0.061 -0.027 0.012 -0.062 0.027 0.069 -0.452 1.000    
INFLAT -0.009 0.131 -0.014 -0.042 0.004 -0.076 -0.053 0.106 0.042 0.304 1.000   
3MTH 
RATE 0.030 0.104 -0.050 -0.020 -0.002 -0.062 0.018 0.079 -0.233 0.513 0.484 1.000  
YD 
SLOPE -0.056 0.104 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.012 0.036 0.017 0.062 0.457 0.550 1.000 
Data Source: Fitch Connect, IMF and author calculations.  Banking Crisis (BCRISIS) is a dummy 
variable.  The variables are winsorised at 99% and in level. 
 
e. Return on average equity correlation matrix (advanced countries) 
 
For advanced countries, Table 5.10 below presents the correlation matrix for the return 
on average equity (ROAE) for advanced countries.  Similar to ROAA, none of the 
variables are highly correlated except the correlation between management efficiency 
(COSTINC) and Lerner Index at -0.749 which once again is moderately negatively 
correlated (Pearson’s correlation coefficient).  Likewise, leverage (LEV) and liquidity 
risk (LRISK) have a negative relationship with ROAE, unlike ROAA, where the 
relationships are positive.  The rest of correlations are similar to the ROAA results 







Table 5.10: Correlation matrix for the return on average equity (ROAE) for the 
period 2000-2013 (advanced countries) 
 
 ROAE LNSIZE LEV CRISK LRISK 
COST 







ROAE 1.000             
LNSIZE -0.008 1.000            
LEV -0.008 -0.362 1.000           
CRISK -0.260 -0.256 0.106 1.000          
LRISK -0.029 -0.020 0.069 0.066 1.000         
COST 
INC -0.253 -0.364 0.513 0.229 -0.010 1.000        
DIVSIF 0.012 -0.096 0.061 0.160 0.004 0.211 1.000       
LINDEX 0.071 0.407 -0.486 -0.111 0.018 -0.749 -0.310 1.000      
BCRISIS -0.037 0.020 0.059 -0.017 0.001 0.023 -0.074 0.009 1.000     
RGDP 
GWR 0.057 0.062 -0.061 -0.027 0.012 -0.062 0.027 0.069 -0.452 1.000    
INFLAT -0.009 0.131 -0.014 -0.042 0.004 -0.076 -0.053 0.106 0.042 0.304 1.000   
3MTH 
RATE 0.030 0.104 -0.050 -0.020 -0.002 -0.062 0.018 0.079 -0.233 0.513 0.484 1.000  
YD 
SLOPE -0.056 0.104 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.012 0.036 0.017 0.062 0.457 0.550 1.000 
Data Source: Fitch Connect, IMF and author calculations.  Banking Crisis (BCRISIS) is a dummy 
variable.  The variables are winsorised at 99% and in level. 
 
f. Return on average equity correlation matrix (emerging market economies) 
 
For emerging market economies, none of the variables are highly correlated (see 
Table 5.11 below).  Once again, we find a negative relationship between return on 
average asset (ROAE) and credit risk (CRISK) (-0.293) and management efficiency 
(COSTINC) (-0.293).  As well as, there is a positive relationship between ROAE and 
bank size (LNSIZE) (0.152) similar to ROAA correlation matrix.  Leverage (LEV) and 
has a negative relationship with ROAE, unlike ROAA, where the relationship is 
positive.  Once again, the interest rate and yield curve variables are not included in 
the emerging market economies correlation matrix since the data is not available.  
Also, the rest of correlations are similar to the ROAA results since the independent 




Table 5.11: Correlation matrix for the return on average equity (ROAE) for the 
period 2000-2013 (emerging market economies) 
 
 ROAE LNSIZE LEV CRISK LRISK 
COST 
INC DIVSIF LINDEX BCRISIS 
RGDP 
GWR INFLAT 
ROAE 1.000           
LNSIZE 0.152 1.000          
LEV -0.042 -0.375 1.000         
CRISK -0.293 -0.218 0.121 1.000        
LRISK -0.100 -0.008 0.038 0.028 1.000       
COST 
INC -0.430 -0.242 0.281 0.240 -0.054 1.000      
DIVSIF -0.029 -0.047 0.010 0.121 -0.031 0.154 1.000     
LINDEX 0.210 0.120 -0.193 -0.137 0.088 -0.518 -0.276 1.000    
BCRISIS -0.041 -0.059 0.009 0.045 0.013 -0.008 0.029 -0.035 1.000   
RGDP 
GWR 0.039 0.100 -0.059 -0.069 -0.031 -0.050 -0.008 0.025 -0.246 1.000  
INFLAT -0.029 -0.088 0.019 -0.002 0.027 0.011 0.050 -0.026 0.382 -0.083 1.000 
Data Source: Fitch Connect, IMF and author calculations.  Banking Crisis (BCRISIS) is a dummy 
variable.  Interest rate variables data are not available and therefore excluded from the table.  The 
variables are winsorised at 99% and in level. 
 
IV. Analysis of the effect of the macroprudential policy on banks’ profitability 
baseline model (ROAA and ROAE) 
 
Using the information above (Table 5.2), we specify the following baseline ordinary 
least squares (OLS) model of the determinants of banks’ profitability for ROAA and 
ROAE. 
 
Yit = αit + ßInternalit + θIndustryiijt + ÞMacroijt  +  ɛit     (5.1) 
 
where i denotes the individual bank, j refers to the country in which bank i operates t 
indicates time period.  The dependent variable, Yit denotes the banks’ profitability 
(ROAA or ROAE).  Internal denotes the vector of bank specific factors (internal) which 
are bank size (LNSIZE), leverage (LEV), credit and liquidity risks (CRISK, LRISK), 
management efficiency (COSTINC) and diversification (DIVSIF).  Industry denotes the 
vector of banking system specific factors, which are the banking crisis (BCRISIS) and 
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Lerner Index (LINDEX) variables.  The banking crisis (BCRISIS) captures the 
presence of a banking crisis during the period a country experienced a banking crisis 
as defined by Laeven and Valencia (2018).  It is a dummy variable and it is coded one 
in the year the crisis starts until the year it was over and is otherwise zero.  The LINDEX 
is the industry competition variable, for which we use the Lerner index (see Section 
5.4.3 and Appendix 5A.3 for further discussion and calculation).  Finally, Macro 
denotes the vector of macroeconomic variables which are economic growth 
(RGDPGWR), the rate of inflation (INFLAT), short-term interest rate (3MTHRATE) and 
the yield curve term structure (YDSLOPE).       
 
V. Transformation of the baseline model and estimation methodology 
 
Due to the panel structure of the data, which is a cross sectional and time series 
information, we transformed OLS equation 5.1 and estimated the baseline model with 
lagged independent variables.  Lagging the variables by a year is to avoid the potential 
issues of endogeneity (see Davis et al (2019), de-Ramon et al (2018), Beck et al 
(2013)).  As noted above all variables are winsorised at 99% to avoid an impact of 
outliers, in line with common practice in the literature.  The estimated baseline OLS 
model (equation 5.1) is then formulated as follows. 
 
Yit = αit + ßInternalit-1 + θIndustryiijt-1 + ÞMacroijt-1 +  ɛit   (5.2) 
 
The main estimation model (equation 2) was then evaluated using the Hausman’s test 
to decide the appropriate model, that is between fixed and random effects model.  The 
results of the Hausman test suggested that fixed effects model is appropriate.  (ROAA 
- Hausman test, X2: 170.62, p-value: 0.00; ROAE - Hausman test, X2: 103.95, p-value: 
0.00).  Further, in order to examine the joint significance of the fixed effects (banks 
and/ with time effects), the fixed effect models are tested using the Likelihood Ratio 
test.  The results are supported by the highly statistical significance of the Likelihood 
Ratio test at 1%, 5% and 10%, which suggest banks and/ time fixed effected are 
significant in the models.  Accordingly, the models were estimated with bank level fixed 
effects with White’s cross-sectional standard errors and covariance (corrected for 
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degrees of freedom) as in Davis and Karim (2018a).93  In addition, a bank level model 
with time effects models were estimated as well.94   
 
5.4.4. Empirical results of the effects of macroprudential policy on banks’ 
profitability (ROAA and ROAE, all countries) 
 
I. Main estimation model results of the factors affecting banks’ profitability 
(all countries) for the period 2000-2013 
 
Table 5.12 reports the empirical results for banks’ profitability (bank level fixed effects) 
measured by ROAA and ROAE (equation 2 above).  The ROAA model is estimated 
using 2,471 banks with 11,308 observations whilst the ROAE model included 2,453 
banks and 11,159 observations.  Both models were estimated over 13 periods (years) 
as the independent variables were lagged by one period.  The F-test indicates that the 
variables included in the models are statistically significant for explanation changes in 
bank profitability.  We included the interest rate variables (short-term interest rate and 
term structure) in the ROAA and ROAE models and they were highly insignificant, as 
a result they were dropped.   These variables are not normally included in banks’ 
profitability models measured by ROAA and ROAE in the research literature. 
 
Table 5.12: Regression results for return on average assets (ROAA) and return 
on average equity (ROAE) as dependent variable for the period 2000-2013 (all 
countries) 
 
Dependent variable: ROAA and ROAE 
  ROAA ROAE 
 Our expected 
relation (+/-) 
Panel OLS with 
bank level fixed 
effects 
Panel OLS with 
bank level fixed 
effects 

















93 Country fixed effects models were estimated as robustness checks. 
94 Results for panel OLS with bank level and time fixed effects are available upon request. 
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R-squared 0.542 0.487 
R-squared (adj.) 0.414 0.341 
F-statistic 4.222 3.350 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.00 
Periods included 13 13 
Banks included 2,471 2,453 
Observations 11,308 11,159 
Note: Independent variables coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis below each estimated coefficient. Variables are winsorised at 99%. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  The interest rate factors were tested and highly insignificant in 
the models as a result they were dropped from the models.  Results for panel OLS with bank level and 
time fixed effects are available from the author.  The variables are winsorised at 99%. 
 
In terms of the bank-specific factors, the results confirm that bank size (LNSIZE), credit 
risk (CRISK), and management efficiency (COSTINC) have negative and significant 
effects on banks’ profitability measured by ROAA and ROAE.  We expected a positive 
relationship for bank size and negative signs for CRISK and COSTINC.  The literature 
suggests that larger banks can benefit from economies of scale to a point as they are 
able to raise capital at lower cost and benefit from economies of scale, thus increasing 
profit.  Yet, researchers such as Korytowski (2018), Dietrich and Wanzenried (2010), 
Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) found a significant and negative effect on banks’ 
profitability, which is in line with our results.  Our empirical results suggest indeed that 
bank size has a significant and negative effect on profits measured by ROAA and 
ROAE during the period, which indicate that banks did not benefit from their large size 
over 2000-2013.  Also, larger banks tend to higher loan loss provisions which affect 
profitability (see Dietrich and Wanzenried (2010)).  Our results are also in line with the 
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research of Berger et al (1987) and Berger and Humphrey (1997), who suggested that 
eventually large banks could face scale inefficiencies and there could be a negative 
relationship between bank size and banks’ profitability. 
 
Credit risk (CRISK), which is an integral part of banking, shows that our results are as 
expected, similar to the reported results of Petria et al (2013), Athanasoglou et al 
(2006), Miller and Noulas (1997).  This shows that the increase in poor asset quality 
will have a negative and significant effect on bank profitability.  Overall, managing risk, 
and in some aspect especially credit risk has become one of the most central issues 
in banking and for regulators (Basel Accord) as poor credit risk practises have been 
an underlying factor leading to many banking crises, such as the 2007-2008 subprime 
crisis in the US (FCIC (2011))95, and the banking crises and economic slowdown in 
Scandinavian countries over the period 1990-1991 ((Sandel (2004)).  On the other 
hand, liquidity risk (LRISK) as measured by the deposit/loan ratio has an insignificant 
effect on banks’ profitability in our sample.  
  
The cost/income ratio (COSTINC) which is an indicator of management efficiency, 
defined as total operating expenses/ total income (Goddard et al (2013)) had a 
significant and negative relationship to banks’ profitability.  Our result, which is in line 
with our expectation, is similar to the results reported by Goddard et al (2013) and 
Petria et al (2013).  Leverage (LEV) had a negative and significant effect on ROAE in 
the bank level fixed effects model at the 10% significant level but it is insignificant in 
the ROAA model over the period under review.  Our result shows that during the period 
higher leverage or capital leads to lower profitability similar to the results in Hoffmann 
(2011).  This could be due to the effect of the new Basel Accord capital requirements.  
Yet, Goddard et al (2004) suggested that higher capital ratios allow banks greater 
flexibility in taking advantage of new business opportunities which allow for improve 
profitability.   
 
 
95 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was created to examine the causes of the 2007-2008 
financial and economic crisis in the United States. The Commission was established as part of the 
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (Public Law 111-21) passed by Congress and signed by the 
President in May 2009. This independent, 10-member panel was composed of private citizens with 
experience in areas such as housing, economics, finance, market regulation, banking, and consumer 
protection.  Six members of the Commission were appointed by the Democratic leadership of Congress 
and four members by the Republican leadership. 
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In our estimations, diversification (DIVSIF) has a positive and significant effect on both 
ROAA and ROAE which is in line with our expectation.  Goddard et al (2013) 
suggested that banks which focused more on non-traditional lines of business were 
more profitable on average.  Similarly, Petria et al (2013) who found that business 
diversification had a positive and significant effect on banks’ profitability. 
 
Concerning the banking sector specific factors, the banking crisis (BCRISIS) variables 
is negative and significant as a determinant of banks’ profitability as measured by 
ROAA and ROAE, which is what we expected.  The BCRISIS variable is a time dummy 
variable which capture crisis by using zeros for no crisis and ones for a crisis.  
However, our result for the BCRISIS variable is contrary to some of the results in the 
research literature, see Bouzgarrou et al (2018) and Xioa (2009), where they indicated 
that the financial crisis had limited effects on banks, especially domestic banks.  The 
competition factor, Lerner Index (LINDEX), as a proxy to market power, had a positive 
and significant effect on ROAA, yet there is a negative and insignificant effect on 
ROAE.  This suggests that while banks were able to increase their ROAA on account 
of greater market power according to the literature (see Maudos and Solis (2009), 
Kasman et al (2010)), this may not be the case with ROAE.  Larger banks new capital 
requirements (Basel II/ III) may have more than offset any gains from market power 
and negatively affected banks’ profitability as measured by ROAE during the period.   
 
In term of the macroeconomic factors, our results are in line with the literature and our 
expectations for these variables.  Our results show that real GDP growth (RGDPGWR) 
and the rate of inflation (INFLAT) had a positive and significant effect on banks’ 
profitability over the empirical analysis period.  Growth in the economy should result 
in an increase in banks’ profitability as suggested by Korytowski (2018) and Petria et 
al (2013).  Saona (2016) suggested that if inflation is fully anticipated by bank 
managers, which cause earnings to increase faster than costs, this will have a positive 
effect on profitability.  Our result for the rate of inflation, with a positive and significant 
effect on banks’ profitability suggest that banks are not fully anticipating inflation during 
the period under review.  The relatively low coefficient value for the rate of inflation 
and with it being significant only at the 10% level may suggest that banks are not fully 
estimating anticipating inflation.  In the following section we move on to discuss the 
results of the macroprudential instruments. 
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II. Macroprudential instruments results for the effects on banks’ profitability 
(ROAA and ROAE, all countries) 
 
Similar to Chapter 3, the macroprudential instruments (see Table 5.1 above for further 
information) were tested one by one using the main estimation model (equation 5.2) 
for the full sample period, 2000-2013, and for all countries (see Table 5.12 above for 
the main estimation models results).  Likewise, to the independent variables in the 
model, the macroprudential instruments were lagged by one period.  The transformed 
main estimation model to include the vector of macroprudential instruments is shown 
below.   
 
Yit = αit + ßInternalit-1 + θIndustryiijt-1 + ÞMacroijt-1 + θMAPPi,t-1 +  ɛit  (5.3) 
 
MAPP denotes the vector of  macroprudential policy instruments, which is a zero-one 
variable with zero for policy off and one for policy on.  It thus captures the 
macroprudential effect on the credit-to-GDP gap from the beginning of the year they 
are actually in place and subsequently all quarters after that starting year until the 
period it is discontinued.     
 
As discussed above, we expect that prudential measures which target banks 
assets (credit activities) and reduce the credit-to-GDP gap to have the greatest 
effect on banks’ profitability as our results in Chapter 3 found that debt-to-income 
ratio (DTI), loans-to-value measures (LTV and LTVCAP) and concentration limits 
(CONC) are the most effective macroprudential instruments, being statistically 
significant and negative related to the credit-to-GDP gap (the measure of financial 
imbalances).  In addition, as we developed hypothesis 1 in Section 5.4.1, we contend 
that, if macroprudential policy reduces the ability of banks to lend, then there should 
be a significant and negative effect on banks’ profitability.   
 
a) Full sample period 2000-2013 results 
 
Overall in the period 2000-2013, the model results suggest that a policy limiting 
borrowings (asset measures) such as loan-to-value ratios (LTV and LTVCAP) and 
debt-to-income ratios (DTI), liquidity measure, domestic currency loans limits (CG) as 
279 
 
well as the capital measure, general countercyclical capital buffer (CTC) had the most 
consistent effect on banks’ profitability.  These instruments are statistically significant 
and negatively related to ROAA and ROAE.  Table 5.13 below outlines the effect of 
macroprudential instruments on banks’ profitability measured by ROAA and ROAE 
(bank level fixed effects models). 
 
Table 5.13: Macroprudential instruments results using main regression model 
for the period 2000-2013 (all countries) 
 
Dependent variable: ROAA and ROAE   
 ROAA ROAE 
Macroprudential instruments 
Panel OLS 
with bank level 
fixed effects 
Panel OLS with 
bank level 
fixed effects 










































































Macroprudential instruments focused on the 





Note: The macroprudential instruments coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%.  Results for panel OLS with bank level and time fixed effects are available from the author. 
 
Loan-to-value measures (LTV and LTVCAP) restrict the borrowing capacity of 
customers as it limits the amount of funds that can be lent relative to the value of the 
asset.  DTI has a direct effect on customers’ ability to borrow, as they are determined 
by one’s income level and debt outstanding, thus this will have an effect on bank ability 
to lend to highly leverage customers.  Similarly, limits on domestic currency loans (CG) 
affects banks’ capacity to lend by reducing the amount of domestic currency loans that 
can be issued.  CG is more restrictive on banks’ as this is a cap on banks’ total lending 
without regard to the debt-service ratio, loan-to-value ratio, or risk ratings of 
customers.   
 
General countercyclical capital buffer/ requirement (CTC) which requires banks to hold 
more capital during economic upturns, that is with growing credit.  CTC limits banks 
capacity to lend and invest, thus reducing banks’ capability to increase profits.  The 
overall macroprudential policy (MPI) and the aggregate borrowers-based (MPIB) 
indexes are statistically significant and negatively affect profits. 
 
These results are fully in line with our expectation as stated above.  Credit measures 
are the most effective in reducing credit activities in an economic upswing as 
supported by our results in Chapter 3, in reducing the credit-to-GDP gap and empirical 
research by Carreras et al (2018), Cerutti et al (2017), Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey’s 
(2015), etc.  In addition, as indicated in Chapter 3 most studies in analysing the 
effectiveness of macroprudential policy focus on credit growth and house prices and 
the mitigation of the build-up of imbalances in the housing market, the area of the 
financial sector, mostly the banking sector, where there is the most potential for 
systemic risk to develop (see Claessens et al (2014), Dell’Ariccia et al (2012) as well). 
 
In this context, since macroprudential policy (mostly asset measures) is effective in 
reducing the build-up of financial system imbalances (banks’ credit activities), our 
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empirical results confirm that macroprudential policy has a significant and negative 
effect on banks’ profitability as banks’ credit activities are restricted, which is the major 
source of banks’ interest income, thus their profitability.  This result has not to our 
knowledge been tested hitherto in the empirical literature on macroprudential policy. 
 
Therefore, we accept that Hypothesis 1 is verified, that is, banks’ profitability is 
negatively affected when macroprudential policy are effective in reducing 
financial system imbalances. 
 
b) Pre-crisis (2000-2006) and post-crisis (2007-2013) periods results 
 
As done in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we then tested the macroprudential instruments 
results of the full sample period, 2000-2013 (see Table 5.7 above) over two additional 
periods, the pre-crisis (2000-2006) and post-crisis (2007-2013) periods using the 
estimation model equation 5.3.  This is done, firstly, to test the effects of 
macroprudential policy on banks’ profitability before the 2007-2008 financial crisis as 
it seems macroprudential policy is designed to work in a period of relative financial 
stability.  We will note that macroprudential policy were used infrequently prior to the 
financial crisis (see Chapter 2).  Secondly, to test the strength and effectiveness 
during and after a financial crisis as to date macroprudential policy has limited effect 
during an actual financial crisis, as other policies objectives are given priority.  To date, 
most researchers and policy makers are still unsure on the strength and effectiveness 
of these prudential measures in their financial system and especially in a period of 
financial crisis.  Likewise to the full sample period, the macroprudential instruments 
were tested one by one using the main regression models (see Table 5.12 above) for 
the pre-crisis (2000-2006) and post-crisis periods (2007-2013) and consistent with the 
independent variables in the model, the macroprudential instruments were lagged by 
one period.   
 
Before, discussing the macroprudential instruments results for the pre-crisis (2000-
2006) and post-crisis periods (2007-2013), below we discuss the ROAA and ROAE 
main estimation models for the periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013.  Table 5.14 shows 
the summary results of the banks’ profitability models, measured by ROAA and ROAE 
(bank level fixed effects). 
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Table 5.14: Regression results for return on average assets (ROAA) and return 
on average equity (ROAE) as dependent variable for the pre-crisis 2000-2006 
and the post-crisis 2007-2013 periods (all countries) 
 
Dependent variable: ROAA and ROAE 

















































































































R-squared 0.673 0.607 0.623 0.580 
R-squared (adj.) 0.508 0.447 0.434 0.406 
F-statistic 4.100 3.803 3.294 3.360 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 
Periods included 6 7 6 7 
Banks included 1,640 1,826 1,626 1,813 
Observations 4,948 6,360 4,888 6,271 
Note: Independent variables coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis below each estimated coefficient. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 
10%. Results for panel OLS with bank level and time fixed effects are available from the author. The 




In the period 2000-2006, the specific factors which are significant and have the 
appropriate coefficient sign (positive/ negative) in the determinants of profitability, 
either ROAA or ROAE are leverage (LEV), credit risk (CRISK), bank size (LNSIZE), 
management efficiency (COSTINC) and the rate of inflation (INFLAT).  Of particular 
interest, CRISK has a significant impact on ROAA and not on ROAE.  This may require 
further analysis of the data.  For the 2007-2013 period, bank size is the most important 
determinant of bank profitability, which is negative and significant in both the ROAA 
and ROAE models.  In hindsight, this is not surprising since in the last decade there 
has been a keen interest in the size of bank and their important for understanding 
financial system interconnectedness and financial stability.  Also, special regulatory 
requirements have been introduced for these “too big to fail” systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs).  Diversification (DIVSIF) consistently has a positive and 
significant effect on ROAA and ROAE over the estimation periods, which suggest the 
growing important of non-interest income to profitability of the banking sector.   
 
The banking crisis (BCRISIS) variable is insignificant in both periods, which is not 
consistent with the full sample period modelling results (see Table 5.12 above).  
Overall, the results for the sub-periods in Table 5.4 may warrant further investigation 
as there are some variation in the results for the full sample period (see Table 5.12 
above).  Some factors such as LNSIZE, CRISK, COSTINC and INFLAT are significant 
either ROAA or ROAE only, which is not the case in the full sample period where these 
factors are significant for both ROAA and ROAE.   
 
Table 5.15 below shows the macroprudential instruments results effects on banks’ 
profitability for both periods.  In Table 5.9, the results for the pre-crisis period (2000-
2006) show that time-varying/dynamic loan-loss provisioning (DP) is statistically 
significant and has a negative impact on banks’ profitability, that is for both ROAA and 
ROAE.  DP acts as a countercyclical capital buffers tool, which help smooth credit 
supply cycles.  DP contracts credit availability (volume and cost) in good times but 
expand it in bad times (see Jiménez et al (2012)).  Yet, the result is not consistent with 
the results in Chapter 3 where DP was significant and had a positive effect on the 
credit-to-GDP gap in the corresponding period 2000-2006 as well as with the results 
in Table 5.7 above, as DP was insignificant although it has the correct coefficient sign.  
This may warrant further investigation.   
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Table 5.15: Macroprudential instruments results using the main regression 
model for the pre-crisis 2000-2006 and the post-crisis 2007-2013 periods (all 
countries) 
 
Dependent variable: ROAA and ROAE 























































































































































Note: The macroprudential instruments coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%. NA not applicable as the instrument has not been used by many countries.  Results for panel 
OLS with bank level and time fixed effects are available from the author. 
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Likewise, FX and/or countercyclical reserve requirements (RRREV) reported a 
significant and positive effect on banks’ profitability, which is not consistent with the 
effect on the credit-to-GDP gap in the period 2000-2006, where the effects are 
significant and negative.  In Table 5.13, RRREV coefficient signs are negative but the 
effect is insignificant.  As noted previously, reserve requirement measures generally 
have a dual role as an instrument of monetary policy and of macroprudential policy 
and as such it is difficult to interpret these results (see for example Izquerido et al 
(2013) on related issues in Latin America).  Also, debt-to-income ratio (DTI) has some 
significant and positive effect on ROAA and once again is not consistent with the result 
for credit-to-GDP gap in the 2000-2006 period, where it is highly significant and 
negative.  On the other hand, limits on interbank exposures (INTER) recorded a 
positive and significant effect on banks’ profitability, which is consistent with the effect 
on the credit-to-GDP gap for the corresponding period, where it has a positive and 
significant effect on the gap (see Chapter 3). 
 
Limits on domestic currency loans (CG) has a significant and negative effect on ROAE, 
similar to the result for CG in Table 5.13, but there is an insignificant effect on ROAA 
although the coefficient sign is correct, being negative.  Loan-to-value ratio 
instruments (LTV and LTVCAP) mostly have a negative effect on banks’ profitability 
but it is statistically insignificant.  Concentration limits (CONC) has a positive sign but 
it is insignificant in the period. 
  
Other instruments such as limits on interbank exposures (INTER), reserve 
requirement ratio (RR), levy/tax on financial Institutions (TAX) are statistically 
significant but have a positive impact on banks’ profitability, either ROAA or ROAE or 
both measures of profitability.  These results are in contrast to the results in Table 5.4, 
where most of the instrument coefficients signs are negative although being 
insignificant.  In term of the macroprudential indexes, financial institutions-based 
(MPIF) is statistically significant but the signs are positive.  The total macroprudential 
policy index (MPI) has a positive and mostly insignificant effect on ROAA and ROAE 
and with the general borrowers-based (MPIB) being insignificant. 
 
The many positive coefficients signs in the pre-crisis period (2000-2006) are not 
surprising as many countries, especially advanced countries were experiencing an 
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asset price boom with strong economic growth, which allow banks to make large 
profits (see Barrell and Davis (2008)) while banks could have passed on the potential 
cost associated with the macroprudential instruments to customers in form of higher 
interest rates (interest income) or banking fees (non-interest income) while provisions 
were low.  The results in the pre-crisis might reflect the imposition of macroprudential 
policies in a booming economy where the strength of the growing economy outweighs 
the cost associated with its employment.  Also, this could be due to the limited use of 
macroprudential policy prior to the financial crisis. 
 
In the post-crisis period 2007-2013, see Table 5.15 above, mostly it is capital and 
foreign exchange prudential measures that had a significant and negative effect on 
banks’ profitability.  This is not consistent with the results in Table 5.13, where the 
asset measures such as LTV and DTI had the greatest effect on banks’ profitability.  
Most of the asset measures have negative coefficients but are insignificant.  This 
suggest that other policies such as microprudential policy (Basel II and III) and non-
assets/ credit activities related measures which target banks’ capital and leverage as 
well as expansionary fiscal policy are taking precedence over macroprudential policy.  
With hindsight, expansionary credit measures such as quantitative easing, 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies were employed to stimulate credit growth 
and lending which could account for the ineffectiveness of the asset/ credit prudential 
measures.   
 
An underlying cause of the 2007-2008 financial crisis was the build-up of excessive 
on- and off- balance sheet leverage in the financial system, and as such there was a 
great deal of focus on banks’ leverage ratio by the BCBS (see Davis et al 2019a and 
b).  In the post-crisis period macroprudential use of the leverage ratio (LEV) is negative 
and statistically significant, which is consistent with the effect leverage had on the 
credit-to-GDP gap for the corresponding period (see Chapter 3).   On the other hand, 
an alternative capital measure, namely general countercyclical capital 
buffer/requirement (CTC), had a negative and significant effect on ROAE only. 
 
Limits on foreign currency loans (FC) had a negative and significant effect on banks’ 
profitability as measured by ROAA and ROAE.  This is consistent with Cerutti et al 
(2017) where they noted that emerging market focus on foreign exchange policies, 
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suggesting the dual objective of stabilising the country foreign exchange market.  
Debt-to-income ratio (DTI) and time-varying/dynamic loan-loss provisioning (DP) have 
a negative and significant effect on ROAA, which is somewhat in line with Table 5.4 
results.  Other measures such as limits on domestic (CG) and reserve requirement 
ratio (RR) had a negative and significant effect on ROAE only.  Loan-to-value ratio 
instruments (LTV and LTVCAP) were insignificant which is not consistent with the 
significant effect they have on the credit-to-GDP gap for the period 2007-2013. 
 
The summary macroprudential indexes have varying effects on banks’ profitability with 
the total macroprudential policy index (MPI) and financial institutions-based (MPIF) 
having a significant negative effect while the general borrowers-based (MPIB) are not 
significant, in line with the individual macroprudential instrument results. 
 
In the post-crisis period (2007-2013), with the increase in the usage of the 
macroprudential instruments, the macroprudential instruments results are favourable 
in that they show restraint of profits, in contrast to the pre-crisis period (2000-2006).  
Yet, asset measures targeting credit activities had limited effects on banks’ profitability 
post-crisis as capital and foreign exchange measures had the most effects during the 
2007-2013.  In effect, we cannot ignore the effects of other policies such as 
microprudential policy (Basel II and III) which focused on banking sector stability using 
capital and leverage measures as well as expansionary credit measures such as 
quantitative easing, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies being employed to 
stimulate credit growth and lending.  In addition, it seems that macroprudential policy 
is designed to work in periods of financial stability as a restraint on procyclical lending 
and asset prices. The results rather suggest that macroprudential policy has a greater 
impact in periods of instability.  However, this may warrant further future investigation. 
 
In this context, for the post-crisis period 2007-2013, we can accept that our 
Hypothesis 1 is verified, that is, if macroprudential policy reduces the ability of banks 
to lend mostly using capital and foreign exchange measures, then there should be a 
significant and negative effect on banks’ profitability as we can see from the results in 
Table 5.6.  For the period 2000-2006, we can’t make a definitive conclusion on 
Hypothesis 1,  rather we accept that it is inconclusive in the pre-crisis period, on 
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account of the many positive effect of the instruments on banks’ profitability in context 
of limited usage. 
 
III. Results for emerging market economies and advanced countries 
 
As a further analysis, we tested the macroprudential instruments according to country 
division that is emerging market economies (EME) and advanced countries (ADV). 
There are 58 emerging market economies and 34 advanced countries in the sample 
(see Appendix 5A.1. for a list of countries).   It is noted that emerging market 
economies have a longer history of using macroprudential than advanced countries 
(see Chapter 2).  Furthermore, as shown by Cerutti et al (2017), emerging markets 
focus on foreign exchange policies, suggesting the dual objective of stabilising the 
country foreign exchange market while advanced countries use more borrower-based 
policies which specifically target consumer spending and the real estate market.  
Further, they reported that there is a weaker effect in more developed and more 
financially open economies, suggesting some avoidance and/or disintermediation of 
the policy.  As for the full global sample, the macroprudential instruments were tested 
one by one using the main regression models (see Table 5.6 above) and consistent 
with the independent variables in the model, the macroprudential instruments were 
lagged by one period.   
 
Before, discussing the macroprudential instruments results according to country 
grouping that is emerging market economies (EME) and advanced countries (ADV), 
below we discuss the ROAA and ROAE main estimation models.  Table 5.16 below 
shows the summary results of the banks’ profitability models, measured by ROAA and 





Table 5.16: Regression results for return on average assets (ROAA) and return 
on average equity (ROAE) as dependent variable for emerging market 
economies and advanced countries for the period 2000-2013 
 
Dependent variable: ROAA and ROAE 



















































































































R-squared 0.561 0.483 0.527 0.491 
R-squared (adj.) 0.448 0.350 0.380 0.330 
F-statistic 4.955 3.605 3.572 3.060 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000 
Periods included 13 13 13 13 
Banks included 1,219 1,210 1,274 1,264 
Observations 5,985 5,925 5,397 5,304 
Note: Independent variables coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis below each estimated coefficient. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 
10%.  Results for panel OLS with bank level and time fixed effects as well as the sub periods are 
available from the author.  The variables are winsorised at 99%. 
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Briefly, in Table 16 above, the main regression model for emerging market economies 
(EME) shows that over the period 2000-2013 credit risk (CRISK - negative), 
management efficiency (COSTINC - negative), diversification (DIVSIF – positive) and 
GDP growth (RGDPGRW - positive) are significant, with appropriate coefficient signs 
and important determinants of bank profitability for both ROAA and ROAE.  In addition, 
leverage (LEV), bank size (LNSIZE) and to some extent inflation rate (INFLAT) are 
significant determinants for ROAE.  The competition Lerner Index (LERNER) is 
significant and positive as expected for ROAA but insignificant for ROAE.  In term of 
advanced countries (ADV), credit risk (CRISK), management efficiency (COSTINC), 
bank size (LNSIZE) and banking crisis (BCRISIS) are significant, with appropriate 
coefficient signs, important determinants of ROAA and ROAE over the period 2000-
2013.  These results are mostly in line with the results in Table 5.12, the full sample 
period, all countries models. 
 
IV. Macroprudential instruments results for emerging market economies and 
advanced countries 
 
The focus of the analysis for emerging market economies (EME) will cover all periods, 
2000-2006, 2007-2013 and 2000-2013 since as suggested from the macroprudential 
index database, EME have a longer history in using the macroprudential instruments 
(See Cerutti et al (2017), Lim et al (2011), etc.).  In terms of advanced countries (ADV), 
the analysis emphasis will look at the period 2007-2013 and 2000-2013 as most 
advanced countries used macroprudential policy after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
 
a) Emerging Market Economies. 
 
Table 5.17 below shows the macroprudential instruments results for emerging market 
economies over the following periods, pre-crisis 2000-2006, post-crisis 2007-2008 and 




Table 5.17: Macroprudential instruments results for emerging market 
economies 
 
Dependent variable: ROAA and ROAE 
 ROAA ROAE 
 Panel OLS with bank level 
fixed effects 



















































































































































































































Note: The macroprudential instruments coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%.  NA not applicable as the instrument has not been used by many countries.  Results for panel 
OLS with bank level and time fixed effects are available from the author. 
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Firstly, in the pre-crisis period 2000-2006, most of the macroprudential instruments 
that are significant such as interbank exposure (INTER), leverage (LEV) concentration 
limits (CONC) and reserve requirements measures (RR and RRREV) had a positive 
effect on banks’ profitability, either ROAA or ROAE or both measures of profitability.  
Time-varying/dynamic loan-loss provisioning (DP) had a negative and significant 
effect on ROAA and ROAE but this is consistent with the results in Chapter 3, where 
we found DP to be insignificant in lowering the credit-to-GDP gap for the 
corresponding period.  The aggregate indexes, total macroprudential instruments and 
financial based, macroprudential instruments also had a positive and significant on 
banks’ profitability.  These results are consistent with the full sample results for the 
corresponding period 2000-2006, see Table 5.15 above.  As mentioned previously, 
the many positive coefficients signs in the pre-crisis period (2000-2006) are not 
surprising as many countries were experiencing an asset price boom with strong 
economic growth, which allow banks to make large profits (see Barrell and Davis 
(2008)). 
 
Secondly, in the post-crisis period 2007-2013, there is a reversal of coefficient signs, 
as all of the significant macroprudential instruments as well as their corresponding 
aggregate macroprudential instruments indexes had a negative effect on banks’ 
profitability, either ROAA or ROAE or both measures of profitability.  Once again, these 
results are consistent with the full sample results in the corresponding post-crisis 
period 2007-2013, see Table 5.15 above.  The instruments that had a negative and 
significant effect on both profitability measures are limits on local and foreign currency 
loans (CG and FC) and reserve requirements measures (RR and RRREV).  Debt-to-
income ratio (DTI), time-varying/dynamic loan-loss provisioning (DP) and general 
Countercyclical Capital Buffer/ Requirement (CTC) had a negative and significant 
effect on ROAA, while leverage ratio (LEV) had a negative and significant effect on 
ROAE during the period. 
 
Thirdly, in the overall full sample period 2000-2013, asset limiting policy such as debt-
to-income ratios (DTI), liquidity measure, domestic currency loans limits (CG) as well 
as the capital measure, general countercyclical capital buffer (CTC) had the most 
consistent effect on banks’ profitability.  These instruments are statistically significant 
and negatively related to ROAA and ROAE.  These results are supported by the results 
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in Table 5.13 above for the full sample period 2000-2013 for the individual 
macroprudential instruments.  However, the results for the aggregate macroprudential 
instruments indexes are statistically insignificant although the coefficients are 
negative.  The macroprudential instruments indexes are an aggregate of the individual 
instrument as such it is difficult to tell which instrument is influencing the results.  Of 
interest, levy/tax on financial institutions (TAX) instrument had a positive and 
significant effect on both measures of profitability, which suggest banks are able to 
pass on the cost of the tax/ levy to customers.  
 
In summary, the results over the three periods suggest that emerging markets mostly 
focus on foreign exchange policies, which have a dual purpose of stabilising the 
country foreign exchange market (Cerutti et al (2017)).  Loan-to-value measures (LTV 
and LTVCAP) are statistically insignificant as having an effect on banks’ profitability 
although the coefficient signs are negative.  We note for comparison that in Chapter 
3, the results were inconclusive for emerging market economies in which 
macroprudential instruments had a statistically significant effect on the credit-to-GDP 
gap for the full sample period 2000-2013.  Although, we found loan-to-value ratio caps 
(LTVCAP) and MPIB, borrower-based instruments are negatively and statistically 
significant during the 2000-2006 period.  We note that emerging market economies 
sample size in Chapter 3 (16 countries) is smaller than the sample in this Chapter 5 
(58 countries), which could account for the inconclusive results of the effectiveness of 
the macroprudential instruments on the credit-to-GDP gap.  Therefore, we accept that 
Hypothesis 1 is inconclusive although our results show that macroprudential 
measures had a negative and significant effect on banks’ profitability, we are unable 
to confirm the impact of the instruments on our broad definition of credit as measured 
by credit-to-GDP gap for emerging market economies.  However, the results are 
consistent with the research literature such as Dell’Ariccia et al (2012), Jiménez et al 
(2012), Vandenbussche et al (2012), Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015), Cerutti et 
al (2017), etc. (see Chapter 3), who found that the instruments are effective in 
reducing the financial system imbalances as measured by their narrow definition of 




b) Advanced countries 
 
Table 5.18 below shows the macroprudential instruments results for advanced 
countries over the following periods, post-crisis 2007-2008 and full sample 2000-2013.  
The pre-crisis period 2000-2006 is not included as many advanced countries in the 
sample did not used macroprudential policy prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
 
Table 5.18: Macroprudential instruments results for advanced countries 
 
Dependent variable: ROAA and ROAE 
 ROAA ROAE 
 Panel OLS with bank level 
fixed effects 
Panel OLS with bank level 
fixed effects 
Instruments 2007-2013 2000-2013 2007-2013 2000-2013 
























CTC(-1) na na na na 














































































Note: The macroprudential instruments coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10. NA not applicable as the instrument has not been used by many countries.  Results for panel 
OLS with bank level and time fixed effects are available from the author. 
 
In the period 2007-2013, concentration limits (CONC) had significant and negative 
effect on ROAA and ROAE, while capital surcharges on SIFIs (SIFI) had a positive 
and significant effect on ROAA only, which suggested large systemic banks are able 
to pass on the cost of higher capital charges to customers.  Concentration limits 
(CONC) affects financial firms’ ability to lend to specific sectors, reducing their 
exposure to these sectors.  Capital surcharges on SIFIs (SIFI) requires systemically 
important financial institutions to hold a higher capital level than other financial 
institutions.  The aggregate macroprudential instruments indexes are statistically 
insignificant although the coefficient signs are negative during this period.  These 
results are not consistent with the results in Table 5.9 above for the corresponding 
period. 
 
In the full sample period 2000-2013, loan-to-value measures (LTV and LTVCAP) had 
the most effect on banks’ profitability as measured by ROAA and ROAE.  Other 
instruments such as debt-to-income (DTI), Capital surcharges on SIFIs (SIFI) and 
limits on foreign currency loans are statistically significant and affect ROAE negatively.  
The corresponding aggregate macroprudential instruments indexes, total (MPI) and 
borrowers-based (MPIB) are significant and affect banks’ profitability as measured by 
ROAA and ROAE.  These results are consistent with the results in Table 5.15 above 
for the corresponding period. 
 
As noted previously, loan-to-value measures (LTV and LTVCAP) have become one of 
the most common macroprudential instruments for reducing credit growth since the 
2007-2008 financial crisis, as cited by studies such as Carreras et al (2018), Cerutti et 
al (2017), Claessens et al (2014), Crowe et al (2011).  However, Jácome and Mitra 
(2015) suggested that although LTVCAP is effective in reducing loan-growth, it is not 
always the case in curbing house prices growth.  Further Cerutti et al (2017) noted 
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that advanced countries used borrowers-based instruments more.  Our results for 
advanced countries are consistent with Cerutti et al (2017). 
 
Similar to the results for emerging market economies, we were unable to ascertain 
which macroprudential instruments (see Chapter 3) had a statistically significant effect 
on the credit-to-GDP gap for the sample periods.  Therefore, we also accept that 
Hypothesis 1 is inconclusive although our results show that macroprudential 
measures had a negative and significant effect on banks’ profitability, we are unable 
to confirm the impact of the instruments on our broad definition of credit as measured 
by credit-to-GDP gap for advanced countries.  Once again, however, the results are 
consistent with the research literature such as Dell’Ariccia et al (2012), Jiménez et al 
(2012), Vandenbussche et al (2012), Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015), Cerutti et 
al (2017), etc. (see Chapter 3), who found that the instruments are effective in 
reducing the financial system imbalances as measured by their narrow definition of 
credit as well as house price growth. 
 
V. Summary of the results of the effects of macroprudential policy on banks’ 
profitability (ROAA and ROAE)  
 
In Table 5.19, we summarise the results of the effects of macroprudential policy on 
banks’ profitability (ROAA and ROAE) and compare the results with the research 
literature on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy in reducing financial system 
imbalances as measured by the credit-to-GDP gap (see Chapter 3), credit, house 
prices, etc., using the same IMF dataset of macroprudential instruments and time 
period, namely Carreras et al (2018) and Cerutti et al (2017).  As noted in Chapter 3, 
the Carreras et al paper used as a target variable the growth rate of real household 
credit, while the Cerutti et al work focused on the growth of real credit or real house 
prices growth in the country, although they noted that effects were greater for 
household credit.  The former paper was for advanced countries only, the latter for a 
much wider range of both advanced and emerging/developing countries.    
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Table 5.19: Summary table of the results of the effects of macroprudential policy on banks’ profitability 
 
 Table 5.13 Table 5.17 Table 5.18 Chapter 3 Research Literature 
 ROAA ROAE ROAA ROAE ROAA ROAE Credit-to-GDP gap Memo: Carreras et 

































LTV -** -***   -** -*** -***   -***  
DTI -*** -*** -*** -***  -*** -***  -**  -** 
SIFI        -***      
CTC -** -* -**         
DP         -**    -*** 
LEV              
INTER         +* -*** -** 
CONC         -***    -* 
CG -* -*** -* -***        
TAX   +* +***      -***  
RR              
FC      -*  +**   -* 
LTVCAP -** -**     -*** -*   -* 
RRREV             -* 
MPI -** -*   -* -*** -***   -*** -*** 
MPIB -* -*   -* -*** -*** -***   -** 
MPIF         -*** +***  -*** -* 
Notes: For macroprudential instruments definitions please see Chapter 2.  Signs of significant variables are shown where *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 
5% * significant at 10%.  IMF WEO country classification (April 2017), ADV - advanced countries, EME - emerging market economies.  Comparative ROAA and 




Table 5.19 above shows the summary table of the results of the effects of 
macroprudential policy on banks’ profitability for all countries (All), advanced countries 
(ADV) and emerging market economies (EME) over the period 2000-2013 and 
compare the results with the research literature on the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policy in reducing financial system imbalances, specifically Chapter 
3, Carreras et al (2018) and Cerutti et al (2017).  It is noteworthy that the tools that we 
find that have the most significant effect on banks’ profitability and consistently 
effective in reducing the credit-to-GDP gap or credit/ house prices related measures 
of financial imbalances are the credit/ housing-market focused instruments (asset 
measures) such as the loan-to-value ratios (LTV and LTVCAP) and the debt-to-income 
ratio (DTI).  There is a significant result for the limit on foreign currency loans (FC) in 
the full sample for advanced countries ROAE and Cerutti et al (2017), where the effect 
is negative.  However, for the credit-to-GDP gap for EME, the FC effect is positive for 
the period 2000-2006. 
 
We also show that there are some measures that have a significant and negative effect 
on banks’ profitability such as general countercyclical capital buffer/ requirement 
(CTC) and limits on domestic currency loans (CG) but no effects on credit-to-GDP gap 
and credit/ house prices related measures of financial imbalances especially in EME. 
Also, we found that levy/tax on financial institutions (TAX) instrument had a positive 
and significant effect on profitability in EME, which suggest banks are able to pass on 
the cost of the tax/ levy to customers.  Yet, Carreras et al (2018) found that TAX has 
a negative and significant effect on growth rate of real household credit in OECD 
countries. 
 
Finally, in term of the summary indexes, total macroprudential instruments (MPI) and 
borrowers-based index (MPIB) are statistically significant and have a negative effect 
on banks’ profitability and the credit-to-GDP gap and/or credit/ house prices related 
measures of financial imbalances.    
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5.4.5. Net Interest Margin, Macroprudential Policy and Interest Rates 
 
In the macroprudential policy literature, there have been considerable debates on the 
interaction of macroprudential policy with a range of other policies especially monetary 
policy (see Chapter 2).  Constâncio (2015) argued that macroprudential policy is 
essential in any economy as the business and financial cycles are not synchronised 
and monetary policy is not designed to deal with specific financial sector imbalances.  
This is supported by N’Diaye (2009), who, using a multi-country macroeconomic 
model for monetary policy analysis, saw that countercyclical prudential policy can help 
reduce output fluctuations and lessen the risk of financial instability.  However, Agur 
and Demertzis (2015), using a bank-based model (profitability and leverage), 
concluded that there are times when monetary policy (expansionary interest rate 
policy) and macroprudential policies can partial offset each other and at the same time, 
monetary policy can affect financial stability adversely.  They show that monetary 
policy rate affects the bank’s risk decisions through two channels, profit and leverage, 
with countervailing effects.  Hence, our Hypothesis 2 (see Section 5.4.1 above) in 
this chapter is based on looking at the interaction of monetary and macroprudential 
polices using the net interest margin profitability model.  We expect a positive/ negative 
interaction between interest rate and macroprudential policy.   
 
I. Analytical framework and model specification 
 
In order to test our Hypothesis 2, first, we need to establish the relationship between 
the interest rate and a bank profitability model.  In this empirical analysis, we estimate 
a bank-based model of profitability as measured by the net-interest margin (NIM) to 
test the interaction between macroprudential and monetary policies.96  Second, we 
test what effect macroprudential policy has on net-interest margin.   Third, we can 
analyse the interaction between the interest rate and the macroprudential instruments 
when macroprudential policy is employed.   
 
96 In the research literature analysing the relation between monetary policy and the financial sector, two 
types of models are used, 1) Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium macro models (DSGE) and 2) 




As noted, NIM is a measure of how successful a bank is in its portfolio investment 
decisions, that is the bank’s interest spread between interest revenue from investment 
(loans) and their interest expenses paid to lenders (depositors).  It can be seen as a 
subcomponent of ROAA and ROAE (which also allow for non-interest income, 
noninterest costs and provisions).  Interest rates are not normally included as 
independent variables in banks’ profitability models measured by ROAA and ROAE in 
the research literature (consistent with this, we tested and interest rates were not 
significant); as such NIM is the most appropriate model to use.  Fitch Connect 
calculates NIM as net interest income divided by average earning assets.  Average 
earning assets are assets that directly generate income.  
 
Our NIM model is based on the work of Alessandri and Nelson (2015) where we 
adopted their approach in using a short-term interest rate (3-month interbank rate) as 
proxy for monetary policy interest rate, as well as the yield curve is calculated as the 
difference between a 10-year government bond rate and the 3-month rate (Rate10y – 
Rate3mth).97  Also, we include the difference of the interest rate (DRate) and slope 
(DYSlope) factors in level and first lag as well as the lagged dependent variable (NIM(-
1)) in the model similar to Alessandri and Nelson (2015).  This permits a clear 
separation between short rate and yield curve slope effects (through the rate and slope 
terms, respectively.  The lagged dependent variable was not included in the ROAA 
and ROAE models, in line with the literature (see Korytowski (2018), Petria et al 
(2013)). 
 
We carry out the econometric analysis by expanding linear equation 5.2 above (see 
Section 5.4.3) to include interest rate and the term structure of interest (yield curve).  
All variables are winsorised at 99% to avoid an impact of outliers as is common in the 
literature on individual banks such as Davis and Karim (2018a).  We stipulate the 
following ordinary least squares (OLS) NIM model of the determinants of banks’ 
profitability as in Alessandri and Nelson (2015). 
 
Yit = αit + Yit-1 + ¥Rateir + §DRateir + §DRateir-1 + ҀYDSlopeir + ѰDYDSlopeir + 
ѰDYSlopeir-1 + ßInternalit-1 + θIndustryiijt-1 + ÞMacroijt-1 +  ɛit                     (5.4) 
 
97 Borio et al (2017) also used a similar approach. 
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where i denotes the individual bank, j refers to the country in which bank i operates t 
indicates time period.  The dependent variable, Yit denotes the banks’ profitability 
(NIM).  The monetary policy indicators are the 3-month interbank rate (3MTHRATE) 
and the slope of the yield curve (YDSLOPE), which is the difference between the 10-
year government bond yield and 3-month interbank rate (Rate10y – Rate3mth), which 
are in level.  And exactly as added before (equation 5.2 above), the variables denoted 
by Internal is the vector of bank specific factors, Industry is the banking system specific 
factors and Macro is the vector of macroeconomic variables as shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Empirical testing of the model was completed using banks in a relatively small sample 
of countries mostly from advanced countries due to data limitation. This is because for 
many countries the 3-month interbank interest rate and/ 10-year government bond 
yield is/are not readily available.  Other estimates/ approximations of monetary policy 
interest rates were used such as monetary authorities’ overnight rate, reserve 
requirements rate, money growth and bank interest rate spread but these models were 
either difficult to interpret or highly insignificant as well there were too many missing 
data points for some countries.  The countries included in the NIM model are 
accordingly Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United 
States.  These are all advanced countries.  We expect that both the level of interest 
rates and slope of the yield curve should be positively associated with higher net 
interest margin (see Alessandri and Nelson (2015), Borio et al (2017)) and Demirguç-
Kunt and Huizinga (1999)).  The NIM model was evaluated using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) over the period 2000-2013.   
 
II. Descriptive statistics of the net interest margin baseline model variables 
 
Table 5.20 below shows the descriptive statistics of the net interest margin baseline 
model variables for the advanced countries used in the model (listed above) for the 
period 2000-2013.  NIM has a mean of 4.750 per cent of total assets but there is 
increasing variation between the banks as the standard deviation is 8.80 per cent.  
Consistent with ROAA and ROAE (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4 above) descriptive 
statistics, credit risk (CRISK), non-performing loans/ gross loans, is on average 9 per 
cent, with a small variation between the banks.  Management efficiency (COSTINC) is 
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averaging 42 per cent of total income and with non-interest income (DIVSIF) 
representing about 34 per cent of gross revenue.  Average GDP growth over the period 
is about 1.4 per cent and the inflation rate is about 2.0 per cent.  Finally, the Lerner 
Index (LINDEX) is not zero, suggesting some degree of market power by banks. 
 
Table 5.20: NIM baseline model variables descriptive statistics for the period 
2000-2013 (NIM model countries) 
 
Variables Mean Median Max Min StdDev Obs 
Dependent variables 
NIM (%) 4.750 2.780 76.712 -2.885 8.800 11,730 
LNSIZE (log) 21.873 21.843 27.211 15.843 2.610 14,975 
LEV 0.137 0.071 1.266 0.001 0.220 13,160 
CRISK 0.087 0.028 1.162 0.006 0.189 7,543 
LRISK 2.415 0.900 152.947 0.007 9.372 11,625 
COSTINC 0.420 0.351 3.176 0.002 0.470 12,660 
DIVSIF (%) 33.627 28.465 142.618 -55.785 30.610 12,908 
LINDEX 0.290 0.260 0.998 -2.312 0.595 7,138 
BCRISIS  
RGDPGWR (%) 1.404 1.772 9.456 -6.600 2.290 26,670 
INFLAT (%) 1.957 2.097 5.591 -1.207 1.238 26,670 
3MTHRATE (%) 2.129 2.105 5.993 0.052 1.644 26,669 
YDSLOPE (%) 3.707 3.972 8.118 0.730 1.359 26,603 
Data Source: Fitch Connect, IMF and author calculations.  Banking Crisis (BCRISIS) is a dummy 
variable and it is coded one in the year the crisis starts until the year it was over and is otherwise zero.  
The values are a ratio unless otherwise stated.  Max – maximum, Min – minimum, StdDev - standard 
deviation.  The variables are winsorised at 99% and in level. 
 
III. Correlation matrix of the net interest margin baseline model variables 
 
Table 5.21 below shows the correlation matrix of the net interest margin model 
variables.  As with the ROAA and ROAE correlation matrices (see Tables 5.6-5.7 and 
5.9-5.10 above) none of the variables are highly correlated except for the correlation 
between management efficiency (COSTINC) and Lerner Index (LINDEX) at -0.745, 
which is high negatively correlated (Pearson’s correlation coefficient) (see Hinkle et al 
(2003)).  As indicated above for ROAA and ROAE, this is not surprising since the 
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COSTINC data are also used to calculate the LINDEX.  There is a negative 
relationship between NIM and bank size (LNSIZE) but there is a positive relationship 
between credit risk (CRISK) and management efficiency (COSTINC), which is not 
consistent with the ROAA and ROAE correlation matrices.  As well, there is a negative 
relationship between the NIM and GDP growth rate (RGDPGWR), interest rate 
(3MTHRATE) and the yield curve (YDSLOPE).  Banking crisis (BCRISIS) has a 
positive relationship with the NIM. 
 
Table 5.21: Correlation matrix for the net interest margin variables for the 
period 2000-2013 (NIM model countries) 
 
 NIM LNSIZE LEV CRISK LRISK 
COST 







NIM 1.000             
LNSIZE -0.377 1.000            
LEV 0.143 -0.358 1.000           
CRISK 0.073 -0.110 0.031 1.000          
LRISK 0.028 -0.023 0.071 0.019 1.000         
COST 
INC 0.123 -0.384 0.501 0.068 -0.001 1.000        
DIVSIF -0.116 -0.106 0.066 -0.006 0.006 0.235 1.000       
LINDEX -0.035 0.421 -0.488 0.026 0.012 -0.745 -0.322 1.000      
BCRISIS 0.026 0.010 0.060 -0.053 0.004 0.020 -0.059 0.006 1.000     
RGDP 
GWR -0.007 0.079 -0.062 0.022 0.009 -0.047 0.014 0.066 -0.436 1.000    
INFLAT -0.012 0.121 -0.002 -0.043 0.004 -0.079 -0.042 0.109 0.039 0.313 1.000   
3MTH 
RATE -0.033 0.108 -0.047 0.036 -0.005 -0.065 0.010 0.088 -0.227 0.510 0.484 1.000  
YD 
SLOPE -0.060 0.093 0.003 -0.008 -0.004 -0.025 0.000 0.050 -0.008 0.117 0.468 0.580 1.000 
Data Source: Fitch Connect, IMF and author calculations.  Banking Crisis (BCRISIS) is a dummy 
variable.  The variables are winsorised at 99% and in level. 
 
IV. Empirical testing of the net interest margin model 
 
Similar to the empirical testing of the all countries ROAA and ROAE profitability 
models, the NIM model was evaluated using the Hausman’s test to decide the 
appropriate model, that is between fixed and random effects model.  The results of the 
Hausman test suggested that fixed effects model is appropriate, (NIM - Hausman test, 
304 
 
X2: 74.687, p-value: 0.00).  Further, in order to examine the joint significance of the 
fixed effects (banks and/ with time effects), the fixed effect models are tested using 
the Likelihood Ratio test.  The results are supported by the high statistical significance 
of the Likelihood Ratio test at 1%, 5% and 10% for banks fixed effect but time fixed 
effects are insignificant.  Accordingly, the NIM model was estimated with bank level 
fixed effects with White’s cross-sectional standard errors and covariance (corrected 
for degrees of freedom) similar to the ROAA and ROAE models in Section 5.4.3 above 
for the period 2000-2013. 
  
V. Empirical results of the net interest margin model 
 
Table 5.22 reports the empirical results for banks’ profitability (banks level fixed 
effects) measured by NIM (see equation 3 above).  The NIM model is estimated using 
1,277 banks with 6,730 observations.  The model was estimated over the period 2000-
2013.  The F-test indicates that the variables included in the models are statistically 
significant for explaining changes in bank profitability.  Credit risk (CRISK), 
management efficiency (COSTINC), banking crisis (BCRISIS), Lerner Index (LINDEX) 
and the inflation rate variables (INFLAT) were tested and found to be insignificant in 
the model as such they are excluded and not reported. 
 
Table 5.22: Regression results for net interest margin as dependent variable 
for the period 2000-2013 
 
Dependent variable: Net Interest Margin 
  Literature/ our 
expected relation 
(+/-)a 
NIM Panel OLS 
with banks level 
fixed effects  
Constant  7.180*** 
(5.011) 
NIM(-1) + 0.267*** 
(4.726) 
3MTHRATE + 0.112* 
(1.790) 
D3MTHRATE - -0.043 
(-1.582) 
D3MTHRATE(-1) - -0.171*** 
(-3.785) 




DYDSLOPE - -0.134*** 
(-6.581) 
DYDSLOPE(-1) - -0.158*** 
(-3.687) 
LNSIZE(-1) + -0.202*** 
(-3.188) 
LEV(-1) +/- 0.635 
(0.921) 
LRISK(-1) +/- -0.001 
(-0.002) 
DIVSIF(-1) - -0.003 
(-1.310) 
RGDPGWR(-1) + -0.014 
(-0.696) 
R-squared 0.776 
R-squared (adj.) 0.723 
F-statistic 14.660 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Periods included 12 
Cross sections included 1,277 
Observations 6,730 
Note: Independent variables coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis below each estimated coefficient. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 
10%. a This is based on Alessandri and Nelson (2015), Borio et al (2017) as well as the research 
literature on the determinants of banks’ profitability and author interpretation.  The variables are 
winsorised at 99%. 
 
The results in Table 5.22 show that that the level of the short-term interest rate 
(3MTHRATE) and the yield curve (YSLOPE) are significant and contribute positively 
to banks’ net interest margin (NIM).  This is consistent with our expectation and the 
research literature of Alessandri and Nelson (2015) as well as Borio et al (2017) and 
Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999).  Also, the levels results imply that when short 
term rates are low, there is downward pressure on the net interest margin as banks 
lower loan rates and expand credit provision.  The significant and positive effect of the 
level of the yield curve slope (YDSLOPE) on NIM suggests the positive impact 
declines when the steepness of the curve decreases. 
 
There are also short-term dynamic effects when interest rates change (as in 
Alessandri and Nelson (2015)).  The effect of the difference in the short-term interest 
rate (D3MTHRATE) and yield slope (DYSLOPE) are both significant and negatively 
related to the NIM.  The negative short-run impact of interest rate changes suggests 
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the presence of repricing frictions.  This suggests that increases in short-term interest 
rates, initially compress banks’ margin and only in the long run, when repricing 
becomes possible, will higher interest rates contribute to higher NIM (Alessandri and 
Nelson (2015)).  Also, in an increasingly competitive banking market as banks 
competing on interest rate margin to attract customers may not move first especially 
when there is a change (increase/ decrease) in short-term interest rate. 
 
Similar to all countries ROAA and ROAE model results (see Table 5.6) bank size 
(LNSIZE) has a significant and negative effect on profit measured by NIM.  This is also 
consistent with the results of Alessandri and Nelson (2015) and Borio et al (2017).  
GDP growth had an insignificant effect on NIM, which is consistent with Alessandri 
and Nelson (2015) and Borio et al (2017) but not with the all countries ROAA and 
ROAE model results (see Table 5.3).  Leverage (LEV) had an insignificant effect on 
the net interest margin model although Alessandri and Nelson (2015) and Borio et al 
(2017) found some positive and significant effects.  Liquidity risk (LRISK) and 
diversification (DIVSIF) variables were not included in Alessandri and Nelson (2015) 
or Borio et al (2017) models; the effects of these variables on the NIM are insignificant.  
DIVSIF is expected to have a negative effect on the NIM as non-interest income is not 
included in the calculation of the NIM, unlike the ROAA and ROAE, where the impact 
is expected to be positive.  The lagged dependent variable (NIM(-1)) is positive and 
significant, which suggest the past net-interest margin affect current earnings. 
 
VI. Empirical results of the macroprudential instruments on net interest 
margin and interaction with monetary policy 
 
As in the case of the all countries ROAA and ROAE models, the macroprudential 
instruments (see Table 5.1 above for further information) were tested one by one using 
the NIM regression models (equation 5.4) over the period 2000-2013 for the countries 
in the sample (see Table 5.22 above for the NIM model results).  The transformed NIM 
estimation model to include the vector of macroprudential instruments is shown below.   
 
Yit = αit + Yit-1 + ¥Rateir + §DRateir + §DRateir-1 + ҀYDSlopeir + ѰDYDSlopeir + 




Likewise, to the ROAA and ROAE models, the macroprudential instruments (MAPP) 
were lagged by one period similar to the banks and country specific independent 
variables in the model.  The macroprudential instruments were also estimated in level 
and they were all found to be insignificant, which is explained further below.  
 
VII. Macroprudential policy effect on the net interest margin profitability 
model 
 
Table 5.23 below shows the effect of the macroprudential instruments on the net 
interest margin profitability model.   
 
Table 5.23: Macroprudential instruments results impact on net interest margin 
and interaction with monetary policy for the period 2000-2013 
 
Dependent variable: NIM  






















Note: The macroprudential instruments coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%. Debt-to-Income Ratio (DTI), Capital Surcharges on SIFIs (SIFI), General Countercyclical 
Capital Buffer/Requirement (CTC), Time-Varying/Dynamic Loan-Loss Provisioning (DP), Limits on 
Domestic Currency Loans (CG), and Reserve Requirement Measures (RR and RRREV) are excluded 
since they resulted in a near singular matrix which could be on account that they have not been used 




The results in Table 5.23 above suggest that the effect of all the macroprudential 
instruments on banks’ profitability measured by net interest margin (NIM) is 
insignificant over the full sample period.  Nevertheless, in some aspect the results for 
NIM for these selected advanced countries are consistent with the view of Cerutti et al 
(2017), who noted that there is a weaker effect of macroprudential policy in more 
developed and more financially open economies, suggesting some avoidance and/or 
disintermediation of the policy.  We will add also that these countries don’t have a long 
history of using macroprudential policy as such it could be difficult to interpret these 
results.  These results are not consistent with the macroprudential instruments results 
using the all countries ROAA and ROAE models (Table 5.13) as well as the advanced 
countries ROAA and ROAE models (Table 5.18).  This will require further 
investigation. 
 
VIII. Assessing macroprudential policy interaction with monetary policy 
 
Although, macroprudential policy had an insignificant effect on the net-interest margin 
when the interest rate is included, we will still look at the interaction between 
macroprudential and monetary policies as both are important for financial system 
stability.  It will also help to understand whether macroprudential policy is offsetting or 
complementing monetary policy.   
 
First, we look at the individual relationship between both policies and their effect on 
the NIM (see Table 5.24).  We look at the effect on net interest margin of monetary 
policy, represented by the three-month interest rate (3MTHRATE), when 
macroprudential policy is included/ excluded from the NIM model.  The estimations for 
the macroprudential instruments are in level to be consistent with the 3MTHRATE 
since it is included in the model in level.  As indicated above (see Table 5.23), the 
macroprudential instruments were estimated with lagged one period in the model but 
the effect on three-month interest rate is similar to the instruments results in level, as 
such it is not reported.  Tables 5.24 shows the summary results of the effects of 
monetary and macroprudential polices on net interest margin when macroprudential 




Table 5.24: Summary results of the effects of monetary and macroprudential 
polices on the net interest margin for the period 2000-2013 (in level)  
 
Variable Coefficients 
effect on NIM  
Baseline model estimation excluding macroprudential 
instrument  
 
3MTHRATE  0.112* 
(1.790) 











































        3MTHRATE 0.115* 
(1.707) 
Note: The macroprudential instruments*3MTHRATE coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics 
are reported in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
* significant at 10%.  The macroprudential instruments are in levels. 
 
Table 5.24 shows that when macroprudential instruments are included in the NIM 
model, there is some effect on the impact on the NIM of the three-month interest rate 
(3MTHRATE) as the coefficient value changes, either with small increases or 
decreases and also changes in significance.  The three-month interest rate remains 
significant and has a positive effect on net interest margin, consistent with the results 
in Table 5.22 above.  Also, TAX and LTVCAP increase the significant value of the 
interest rate over the period.  These results suggest that macroprudential policy is 
having some effect on short term interest rate impacts on banks’ net interest margin  
Once again, the effect of all the macroprudential instruments on banks’ profitability 
measured by net interest margin is insignificant over the full sample period. 
 
Second, we look at the combined relationship effect between short-term interest rate 
(3MTHRATE) and macroprudential policy (MAPP) and the impact it has on net interest 
margin.  We use a leveraged coefficient for the combined relationship (monetary and 
macroprudential polices) to see whether their effects differ from the mean.  We 
introduce the combined relationship of macroprudential policy and short-term interest 
rate as MAPP*3MTHRATE in the NIM model.  Once again, the leveraged coefficient 
was lagged and the effect on three-month interest rate is similar to the leveraged 
coefficient results in level, as such it is not reported.  We use the NIM model in Table 
5.22 to analyse the interaction between both policies.  The results are in following 
Table 5.25. 
 
Table 5.25: Summary results of the leveraged coefficients effect on net interest 
margin for the period 2000-2013  
 
Variable Coefficients 
effect on NIM  
Baseline model estimation excluding macroprudential 
instrument  
 
3MTHRATE  0.112* 
(1.790) 
Baseline model estimation including macroprudential 










































       3MTHRATE 0.080 
(1.262) 
Note: The macroprudential instruments*3MTHRATE coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics 
are reported in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
* significant at 10%. 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.25 above, there are indeed some significant results for 
combined effects of macroprudential instruments and interest rates in the advanced 
countries.  The leveraged coefficients concentration limits (CONC) and levy/tax on 
financial institutions (TAX) multiplied by the interest rate have positive and significant 
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effect on net interest margin.  Similar effects are reported by the macroprudential 
indexes general borrowers-based (MPIB) and financial institutions-based (MPIF) 
multiplied by the interest rate.  These results suggest that there is a greater positive 
effect of interest rate on the NIM when the instruments are in operation.   Loan-to-
value ratio (LTV) and limits on foreign currency loans (FC) multiplied by the interest 
rate have a significant and negative effect on net interest margin. These results 
suggest that there is a lesser effect of interest rate on the NIM when the instruments 
are in operation.  We suggest that the effect on the NIM is not zero as when credit is 
restricted by policies such as LTV and FC, net interest income declines relative to the 
positive effect of interest rate on net interest margin.  In terms of leverage (LEV) 
multiplied by the interest rate, which had a negative and significant effect on the NIM, 
this suggests a greater negative effect with the introduction of Basel III in the Advanced 
countries.    
 
Also, Table 5.25 results show that including the leveraged coefficient concentration 
limits (CONC) in the model resulted in the short-term interest rate (3MTHRATE) 
becoming insignificant in the model.  There is a substitution between the concentration 
leverage coefficient and the short-term interest rate positive effect on the banks’ net 
interest margin.  Similar results are noted for the leveraged coefficients 
macroprudential indexes general borrowers-based (MPIB) and financial institutions-
based (MPIF).  This suggests that the combined effects of macroprudential 
instruments and interest rates are significant determinant in banks’ net interest margin 
even if the individual effects of the macroprudential instruments are not significant. 
 
Third, we use Granger causality (panel) test (Granger (1969)) to assess the temporal 
relationship between macroprudential and monetary policies.  Panel Granger causality 
performs panel data specific causality testing between the variables in a panel dataset.  
Monetary policy is measured by the short-term interest rate (3MTHRATE).  We also 
test Granger causality using both the difference of interest rate (D3MTHSRATE) and 
the macroprudential instruments.  Macroprudential policy is tested via the instruments 
themselves (the time in operation) and their first difference (showing the changes in 
macroprudential policy stance).  Both variables are stationary.  We use a 2-lag 
specification for Granger causality as higher lag specifications were insignificant.  The 
following Table 5.26 shows the panel Granger causality test results.  
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Table 5.26: Summary results of the Granger causality test and panel VAR 















LEV does not 
Granger Cause 
3MTHSRATE 













FC does not 
Granger Cause 
D(3MTHSRATE) 



































2 6.922 0.001*** Reject 
Null 
Unidirectional - 
Note:  Only the significant results for panel Granger causality is shown in the table.  *** significant at 
1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  LTV, CONC, TAX, MPIB and MPIF Granger causality are 
insignificant at 1%, 5% and 10% and are excluded from the table.  + positive and significant effect; - 
negative and significant effect.  The frequency is yearly.  We report the directional sign for maximum 2 
periods (2 years).  The Panel VAR results are available from the author. 
 
The results in Table 5.26 show that the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted, meaning that there is a temporal relationship between the 
variables in the table.  First, we see that leverage (LEV) Granger cause short-term 
interest rate (3MTHRATE) and the type of causality is unidirectional.  We suggest that 
during the period under review, with a change in leverage, with the introduction of 
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Basel III in advanced countries, this had an effect on short-term interest rate.  This is 
supported by the results in Table 5.25, as the leverage (LEV) multiplied by the interest 
rate coefficient had a negative and significant effect on the NIM.  Loan-to-value cap 
(LTVCAP) and limits on foreign currency loans (FC) Granger cause the change in 
short-term interest rate (D3MHTRATE).  As well, the change in LTVCAP (DLTVCAP) 
Granger cause the change in short-term interest rate.   Once again, the type of 
causality is unidirectional.  This suggests that by placing restrictions on banks credit 
activities, this can affect short term interest rate.  As suggested above, restrictions on 
credit activities lower the net interest income of banks.   
 
In the term of short-term interest rate (3MTHRATE), Table 5.26 results show that the 
level 3MTHRATE Granger cause loan-to-value cap (LTVCAP) and the change in the 
loan-to-value ratio (DLTV).  The change in short term interest (D3MTHRATE) rate 
Granger cause the aggregate total macroprudential index (MPI).  For LTVCAP, the 
type of causality is bidirectional as LTVCAP Granger cause 3MTHRATE.  The type of 
causality for DLTV and MPI is unidirectional.  
 
Further, we ran a simple Panel VAR to assess the interrelations between the 
macroprudential instrument and the short-term interest rate (3MTHRATE).  We took 
two lags of each variable in the VAR.  The results of the impulse responses are in 
Table 5.26.  Impulse responses were run using generalised impulses and Choleski 
ordering based on the type of causality but we also tested with the reverse ordering.  
The results are based on a short-term impulse response that we report the directional 
sign for maximum 2 periods (2 years). 
 
We see that LEV and LTVCAP have a negative and significant interaction with short 
term interest rate which suggest there is an offsetting effect between macroprudential 
and monetary policy.  Meanwhile, FC and LTV have a positive and significant 
interaction with the short-term interest rate, suggesting that the interaction is 
complementary.   
 
In conclusion, we suggest that there is a positive/negative interaction between 
monetary and macroprudential policies.   Therefore, we accept that Hypothesis 2 is 
verified, that is, there could be an offsetting or complementing effect on 
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monetary policy as measured by short-term interest.  However, this needs further 
research and analysis. 
 
5.5. Robustness checks 
 
I. Country fixed effects 
 
First, we ran estimates on the above ROAA and ROAE models results (Section 5.4.4. 
above) using country fixed effects.  The main model (equation 2 – Section 5.4.3.) was 
adjusted to include country fixed effects instead of bank fixed effects (see Appendix 
5A.4 for the model results using country fixed effects).  Banks are exposed to different 
country risks (e.g. regulations and laws) and operate in different financial system 
structures and institutions, at different stages of development, etc.  Therefore, we 
verify whether country characteristics can affect the empirical results. 
 
Firstly, the country fixed effects model results (see Appendix 5A.4) show that banks’ 
profitability (both ROAA and ROAE) are determined by credit risk (CRISK, negative), 
management efficiency (COSTINC, negative), and GDP growth (RGDPGWR, 
positive).   In addition, bank size (LNSIZE) has negative and significant effect on 
ROAA, while leverage (LEV) and diversification (DIVSIF) has positive and significant 
effect on ROAA.  In some aspect these results are consistent with the results in Table 
5.12, ROAA and ROAE all countries models result with bank fixed effects except for 
the rate of inflation (INFLAT), Lerner Index (LINDEX) and banking crisis (BCRISIS), 
which are insignificant in the country fixed effects model.  This indicate that a country’s 
characteristics (which could include regulatory structure as discussed in Section 5.3 
above) having an effect on the determinants of banks’ profitability.  
 
Secondly, in term of the macroprudential instruments, Table 5.27 below, the debt-to-
income ratio (DTI) has the most significant effect on bank profitability, similar to the all 
countries with banks fixed effects macroprudential instruments results in Table 5.6.  
DTI is also significant and negatively affect the credit-to-GDP gap (Chapter 3).  Time-
varying/dynamic Loan-Loss Provisioning (DP) and general countercyclical capital 
buffer/requirement (CTC) have significant and negative effects on ROAA only which 
are not in line with all countries with banks fixed effects macroprudential instruments 
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results in Table 5.13 where CTC had a negative and significant effect on both ROAA 
and ROAE, while DP was insignificant.  Loan-to-value measures (LTV and LTVCAP) 
have a significant and negative effect on ROAE only, unlike the results in Table 5.4, 
where both ROAA and ROAE are negatively affected and significant.  Loan-to-value 
measures also have a significant and negative on the credit/GDP gap (see Chapter 
3).  Levy/tax on financial institutions (TAX) has a positive and significant effect on bank 
profitability suggesting that banks are able to pass on the cost of the tax to customer, 
as well as it is time limited yet it was insignificant in the all countries with banks fixed 
effects model for ROAA and ROAE (see Table 5.13).  These results suggest that, 
although some macroprudential instruments are significant and negatively affect 
banks’ profitability as in line with the results in Table 5.4, countries characteristics can 
influence which macroprudential instrument have the greater impact on banks’ 
profitability and extension the credit/GDP gap (see Chapter 3).  This will require further 
investigation. 
 
Table 5.27: Macroprudential instruments results with country fixed effects  for 
the period 2000-2013 (all countries) 
 
Dependent variable: ROAA and ROAE  
 ROAA ROAE 
 Panel OLS 
with country 
fixed effects 
Panel OLS with 
country fixed 
effects 
Macroprudential instruments   










































































Macroprudential instruments focused on the 





Note: The macroprudential instruments coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%.   
 
II. Bank types – retail and consumer banks and universal banks 
 
Second, using the ROAA and ROAE equation 2 (Section 5.4.3. above), we estimated  
ROAA and ROAE models with banks fixed effects based on the two most common 
type of banks in the Fitch Connect dataset.  These are retail and consumer banks and 
universal banks.  Retail and consumer banks are typical mass-market banking in 
which individual customers use local branches of larger commercial banks.  Retail 
and consumer banking aims to be the one-stop shop for as many financial services as 
possible on behalf of individual retail clients such as checking accounts, savings 
accounts, personal loans, lines of credit, mortgages, etc.  These banks are common 
in the US.  Universal bank is a system in which banks provide a wide variety of financial 
services, including commercial and investment services.  These banks are common 
in Europe (see Section 5.2.1.). 
   
The ROAA and ROAE models results based on retail and consumer banks (See 
Appendix 5A.5 for the model results based on bank types) show that banks’ 
profitability is determined by bank size (LNSIZE, negative) credit risk (CRISK, 
negative), management efficiency (COSTINC, negative), which is similar to the All 
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countries with banks fixed effects ROAA and ROAE model results (see Table 5.4).  
Liquidity risk (LRISK) had a negative and significant effect on ROAA and ROAE, which 
is difference from the results in the all countries models (see Table 5.4) where LRISK 
is insignificant.  In the research literature (see Section 5.2.1) Petria et al (2013) and 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) found that there is negative and significant relationship 
between level of liquidity and banks’ profitability.  On interest is the negative and 
significant effect of the Lerner Index which suggest that banks are unable to increase 
profit based on their market power.  In the literature, it is expected that Lerner Index 
has a positive and significant effect on profits.  The rate of inflation has positive and 
significant effect on ROAA only. 
 
For universal banks (see Appendix 5A.5), the ROAA and ROAE model results are 
the same as with the retail and consumer banks in respect to bank size (LNSIZE, 
negative) credit risk (CRISK, negative) and management efficiency (COSTINC, 
negative).  In addition, diversification (DIVSIF) and the rate of inflation had a positive 
and significant effect on ROAA and ROAE which is consistent with the result of all 
countries with banks fixed effects ROAA and ROAE models.  The banking crisis 
(BCRISIS) variable coefficient sign is negative and significant suggesting that the 
2007-2008 financial crisis affected universal banks more than retail and consumer 
banks.  Liquidity risk (LRISK) had a positive and significant effect on ROAA only similar 
to Korytowski (2018), who found that liquidity has positive and significant effect on 
bank profitability (ROAA) after the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  The Lerner Index is had 
a positive and significant effect on ROAA and with GDP growth having positive and 
significant effect on ROAE. 
 
In term of the macroprudential instruments, see Table 5.28 below, the results show 
that the effect of macroprudential instruments on universal banks are most in line with 
the results of the All countries with banks fixed effect results (Table 5.4 above).  The 
model results suggest that a policy limiting borrowings (asset measures) such as debt-
to-income ratios (DTI), liquidity measure, domestic currency loans limits (CG) as well 
as the capital measure, general countercyclical capital buffer (CTC) had the most 
consistent effect on banks’ profitability.  These instruments are statistically significant 
and negatively related to ROAA and ROAE.  These instruments also have a significant 
and negative on the credit/GDP gap (see Chapter 3).  Reserve requirements are also 
319 
 
significant and negatively related to the ROAA and ROAE.  Other instruments that 
have a significant and negative effect on banks profitability measured by either ROAA 
or ROAE are the loan-to-value measures (LTV and LTVCAP), limits on foreign 
currency loans (FC) and FX and/or countercyclical reserve requirements (RRREV).  
The aggregate indexes of total macroprudential and financial institution-based 
instruments are statistically significant and negatively related to ROAA and ROAE.  
The aggregate borrowers-based instruments index mostly affect ROAE. 
 
Table 5.28: Macroprudential instruments results based on bank types for the 
period 2000-2013 (all countries) 
 
Dependent variable: ROAA and ROAE  
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Note: The macroprudential instruments coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%.   
 
The results for retail and consumer banks (Table 5.28 above) shows that at time-
varying/dynamic loan-loss provisioning (DP) had the most effect on both ROAA and 
ROAE.  Other instruments that have a significant and negative effect on banks 
profitability measured by either ROAA or ROAE are the loan-to-value ratios (LTV) and 
levy/tax on financial institutions (TAX).  The aggregate macroprudential instruments 
indexes have the appropriate negative signs and significant. 
 
5.6. Chapter summary 
 
The purposes of the chapter are, firstly, to present empirical research of potential 
effects of macroprudential policies on banks’ profitability which will also help in the 
understanding of how banks react to macroprudential regulations.  To our knowledge 
this analysis has not been undertaken in the research literature.  Secondly, the chapter 
seek to examine macroprudential policy’s relationship with monetary policy in the 
context of bank profitability as there have been considerable debates on the interaction 
of macroprudential policy with a range of other policies especially monetary policy. 
   
The empirical results suggest in the sample period, 2000-2013, a number of measures 
of macroprudential policy such as assets measures, loan-to-value ratios measures 
(LTV and LTVCAP) and debt-to-income ratios (DTI), liquidity measure, domestic 
currency loans limits (CG) as well as the capital measure, general countercyclical 
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capital buffer (CTC) had a negative and significant effect on banks’ profitability as 
measured by return of average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity (ROAE).  
Since our Chapter 3 has shown that macroprudential policy (mostly assets measures) 
are effective in reducing the build-up of financial system imbalances (banks’ credit 
activities) as measured by the credit-to-GDP gap, our empirical results suggest that 
we accept that Hypothesis 1 is verified, that is,  banks’ profitability is negatively 
affected when macroprudential policy are effective in reducing financial system 
imbalances.  However, the results were inconclusive when we examine the effects by 
country characteristics, advanced countries and emerging market economies.  We 
found that macroprudential policy had a negative and significant effect on banks’ 
profitability advanced countries and emerging market economies but the 
macroprudential impact on the credit gap could not be determined (see Chapter 3), 
therefore Hypothesis 1 was accepted as being inconclusive for these country groups.    
 
Also, we found that country and bank characteristics have an influence on the effect 
of macroprudential policy on banks’ profitability.  The results show that, although some 
macroprudential instruments are significant and negatively affect banks’ profitability, 
country and bank characteristics can influence which macroprudential instrument have 
the greater impact on banks’ profitability and extension the credit/GDP gap. 
 
In term of macroprudential policy’s relationship with monetary policy, we found that 
there is positive/ negative interaction between macroprudential and monetary policies.  
We accept that Hypothesis 2 is true as there could be an offsetting or complementing 
effect on monetary policy as measured by short-term interest which could affect banks’ 
profitability 
 
Further research could be undertaken to analyse the impact macroprudential policy 
has on the real economy when banks’ credit activities are restricted.  A good starting 
to examine how large is the impact on economic growth as a result of macroprudential 
policy restricting banks’ credit.  In addition, research can be undertaken to understand 
the monetary and macroprudential policies nexus in how banks deposit and lending 
interest rates react to the employment of macroprudential policy.  Furthermore, there 
could be investigation whether there is a nonlinear relation of profitability to bank size.  
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5A. Appendix Chapter 5 
 
5A.1. The list of countries and banks used in the empirical analysis 
 
Appendix Table 5A.1 shows the list of countries and the number of banks in the 
empirical analysis.  The list includes all countries from Claessens et al (2014), where 
they used 48 countries, 1650 banks in 23 advanced countries and 1,170 banks in 25 
emerging markets and some 18,000 observations. 
 
We include 92 countries, 34 advanced countries and 58 emerging market economies, 
6,010 banks (3,095 banks from advanced countries and 2,915 banks from emerging 
market economies) and 84,140 observations.  The types of banks included are 
universal commercial banks, retail and consumer banks, banks, wholesale banks, and 
Islamic banks.  Investment banks and private banks are excluded due to different 
balance sheet and income structure as well as bank holding companies, to avoid 
double counting.   
 
Appendix Table 5A.1: List of countries and number of banks 
 
Country ISO Code 
IMF 
category 
No. of banks 
ADV EME 
Algeria DZA EME  16 
Angola AGO ADV  22 
Argentina ARG ADV  112 
Australia AUS EME 89  
Austria AUT EME 125  
Bahamas BHS ADV  41 
Bahrain BHR EME  40 
Barbados BRB EME  9 
Belgium BEL EME 102  
Belize BLZ ADV  2 
Bolivia BOL ADV  17 
Brazil BRA EME  100 
Bulgaria BGR EME  20 
Canada CAN EME 73  
Chile CHL EME  80 
China CHN EME  100 
Colombia COL ADV  77 
Costa Rica CRI ADV  81 
Cote D'Ivoire CIV ADV  18 
Croatia HRV EME  51 
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Cyprus CYP ADV 26  
Czech Republic CZE ADV 48  
Denmark DNK ADV 138  
Ecuador ECU ADV  53 
Egypt EGY ADV  37 
El Salvador SLV ADV  21 
Estonia EST EME 11  
Finland FIN ADV 68  
France FRA ADV 126  
Germany DEU EME 136  
Ghana GHA ADV  48 
Greece GRC EME 25  
Guatemala GTM EME  39 
Guyana GUY ADV  8 
Honduras HND ADV  30 
Hong Kong HKG ADV 123  
Hungary HUN EME  134 
Iceland ISL ADV 42  
India IND ADV  105 
Indonesia IDN ADV  103 
Ireland IRL EME 66  
Israel ISR EME 20  
Italy ITA ADV 188  
Jamaica JAM EME  12 
Japan JPN EME 141  
Jordan JOR ADV  18 
Kenya KEN ADV  60 
Korea KOR ADV 105  
Kuwait KWT ADV  24 
Latvia LVA EME 25  
Lithuania LTU ADV  12 
Luxembourg LUX EME 132  
Malaysia MYS EME  90 
Malta MLT EME 20  
Mexico MEX ADV  49 
Mongolia MNG ADV  13 
Morocco MAR ADV  25 
Mozambique MOZ EME  18 
Netherlands NLD ADV 87  
New Zealand NZL EME 30  
Nicaragua NIC EME  17 
Nigeria NGA EME  84 
Norway NOR ADV 135  
Oman OMN EME  14 
Panama PAN EME  114 
Paraguay PRY EME  32 
Peru PER EME  36 
Philippines PHL EME  46 
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Poland POL EME  103 
Portugal PRT ADV 121  
Qatar QAT EME  12 
Romania ROM EME  40 
Russia RUS EME  148 
Saudi Arabia SAU EME  14 
Serbia SRB EME  49 
Singapore SGP ADV 38  
Slovak Republic SVK ADV 26  
Slovenia SVN ADV 27  
South Africa ZAF EME  53 
Spain ESP ADV 218  
Suriname SUR EME  4 
Sweden SWE ADV 133  
Switzerland CHE ADV 136  
Tanzania TZA EME  42 
Thailand THA EME  32 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO EME  15 
Turkey TUR EME  103 
UK GBR ADV 159  
Ukraine UKR EME  174 
United Arab Emirates ARE EME  38 
Uruguay URY EME  60 
USA USA ADV 156  
Total 92  3,095 2,915 
Main data source: Fitch Connect, IMF and author calculation.  IMF WEO country classification (April 
2017), ADV - advanced countries, EME - emerging market economies. 
 
5A.2. Regional breakdown of countries 
 
Appendix Table 5A.2 below shows the regional analysis of the list of countries used in 
the empirical analysis.  The countries were included based GDP and the availability of 
data covering the sample period, 2000-2013.  
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5A.3. Lerner index 
 
In measuring competition, we use the Lerner index of Iwata (Bikker 2004), which is 
calculated using the approach in Davis et al (2019).  We note that in the research 
literature the banking sector concentration index (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index - HHI) 
is mostly use as the banking sector specific competition (monopolistic) factor. 
However, to measure concentration in the market, it is predicated upon the ability to 
define the market properly, which is a challenge for the banking sector since banks 
operate under different business models such commercial, retail, merchant, Islamic 
and investment banking and faced competition challenges. Further, can a highly 
concentrated market means that there are fewer number of firms and the price that is 
charged in the market is higher than a competitive market, which is not straight-forward 
to answer as a market with a few firms can still be very competitive (see Pepall et al 
(2014). 
 
The Lerner index is one way to measure market performance based on efficiency as 
such the competitive nature of the market.  The Lerner index is a measure of the price-
cost margin.  It can be seen as proxy for current and future profits stemming from 
pricing power and it varies that the level of the individual bank.     
 
The Lerner Index is measures in the following way. 
 
LI = (P – MC) / P         (5.6) 
 
The Lerner Index directly reflects the difference between price and marginal cost and 
it gives an indication of market power.  Under perfect competition the index is zero as 
the output price (marginal revenue) equals marginal cost and “normal” economic 
profits are zero.  The Lerner index is positive as a firm’s market power increase and 
price rises above marginal cost in a quantity-setting oligopoly model, with the limiting 
case being monopoly (see Shaffer and Spierdijk (2015)).  
 
We derived the Lerner index for banks in the sample following Anginer et al. (2014), 
Beck et al. (2013) and Weill (2013).  To obtain the Lerner index, we first estimate the 
following translog cost function: 
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log(Cit) = α + β1log(TAit) + β2(log(TAit))2 + β3log(W1,it) + β4log(W2,it) + β5log(W3,it) + 
β6log(TAit)log(W1,it) + β7log(TAit)log(W2,it) + β8log(TAit)log(W3,it) + β9(log(W1,it))2 + 
β10(log(W2,it))2 + β11(log(W3,it)) 2 + β12log(W1,it) log(W2,it) + β13log(W1,it) log(W3,it) + 
β14log(W2,it)log(W3,it) + ΘYear Dummies + εit      (5.7) 
 
where Cit is total costs and TAit is the quantity of output and is measured as total 
assets.  The input prices are W1,it, which is the ratio of interest expenses to the sum of 
total deposits and other deposits borrow (IED); W2,it, is measured as personnel 
expenses divided by total assets (PTA); and W3,it is the ratio of other operating 
expenses to fixed assets (OCF).  We include time fixed effects, in line with the existing 
literature. Having estimated this equation, we impose the following restrictions, again 
in line with earlier authors, to ensure homogeneity of degree one in input prices: 
 
β3 + β4 + β5 = 1; β6 + β7 + β8 = 0; β9 + β12 + β13 = 0; β10 + β12 + β14  
= 0; β11 + β13 + β14 = 0        (5.8) 
 
We then use the coefficient estimates from the previous regression to estimate the 
marginal costs for bank i in calendar year t: 
 
MCit = δCit/δTAit = Cit/TAit * [β1 + 2β2log(TAit) + β6log(W1,it) + β7log(W2,it) + 
β8log(W3,it)]           (5.9) 
 
The Lerner index for each bank–year is 
 
Lernerit = (Pit – MCit)/Pit                               (5.10) 
 
where Pit is the price of assets and is equal to the ratio of total revenue to total assets. 
 
The expected relation to banks’ profitability is positive, which suggest that more market 
power, less competitive should have a positive effect on profitability (Abel et al (2018), 
yet it is suggested that increase competition can lead to competition-fragility as banks 
take greater risk (Davis and Karim (2018a), Beck et al (2013), Keeley (1990), etc.).  
The literature on competition and risk is divided between those supporting 
“competition-fragility” (more competition leads to higher risk) and “competition-
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stability” which suggests more competition leads to lower risk. See Davis and Karim 
(2018a) and Zigraiova and Havranek (2016), etc. 
 
5A.4. Regression results for return on average assets (ROAA) and return on 
average equity (ROAE) as dependent variable (all countries) with country 
fixed effects 
 
Appendix Table 5A.3 shows the determinants of bank’s profitability using the main 
model (equation 2) adjusted to include country fixed effects instead of bank’s fixed 
effects.  The ROAA model is estimated using 2,471 banks with 11,308 observations 
whilst the ROAE model included 2,453 banks and 11,159 observations.  Both models 
were estimated over 13 periods (years) as the independent variables were lagged by 
one period.   
 
Appendix Table 5A.3: Regression results for return on average assets (ROAA) 
and return on average equity (ROAE) as dependent variable with country fixed 
effects for the period 2000-2013 (all countries) 
 
Dependent variable: ROAA and ROAE 
 ROAA ROAE 
 Panel OLS with 
country fixed 
effects 
Panel OLS with 
country fixed 
effects 











































R-squared 0.120 0.095 
R-squared (adj.) 0.112 0.086 
F-statistic 15.144 11.463 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 
Countries fixed effects Yes Yes 
Periods included 13 13 
Cross sections included 2,471 2,453 
Observations 11,308 11,159 
Note: Independent variables coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis below each estimated coefficient. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 
10%.  The interest rate factors were tested and highly insignificant in the models as a result they were 
dropped.  Results for panel OLS with country level and time fixed effects are available upon request 
and the results are similar to the results in the above table.  The variables are winsorised at 99%. 
 
5A.5. Regression results for return on average assets (ROAA) and return on 
average equity (ROAE) as dependent variable (all countries) based on 
bank types 
 
Appendix Table 5A.4 shows the determinants of bank’s profitability using the main 
model (equation 2) based on bank types.  The retail and consumer banks ROAA and 
ROAE models are estimated using just over 760 banks with 2,390 observations whilst 
universal banks ROAA and ROAE model included about 1,783 banks and 8,130 
observations.  Both models were estimated over 13 periods (years) as the 
independent variables were lagged by one period.   
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Appendix Table 5A.4: Regression results for return on average assets (ROAA) 
and return on average equity (ROAE) as dependent variable based on bank 
types for the period 2000-2013 (all countries) 
 
Dependent variable: ROAA and ROAE 
 Retail and Consumer 
Banks 
Universal Banks 
 ROAA ROAE ROAA ROAE 







































































































R-squared 0.717 0.607 0.541 0.506 
R-squared (adj.) 0.584 0.419 0.412 0.367 
F-statistic 5.400 3.229 4.186 3.628 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Periods included 13 13 13 13 
Cross sections 
included 
770 766 1,798 1,783 
Observations 2,435 2,393 8,219 8,130 
Note: Independent variables coefficient values are reported and the t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis below each estimated coefficient. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 
10%.  The interest rate factors were tested and highly insignificant in the models as a result they were 











The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 ushered in a new era of regulatory reform, 
updated microprudential regulations such as Basel III, a renewed focus on financial 
stability and financial market interconnectedness as well as contributing to the 
widespread introduction of macroprudential policy as an essential financial regulatory 
policy tool to forestall crises or at least offer a buffer to soften the impact of them.  
Although the literature on macroprudential policy is still evolving and policy has not 
been truly tested in a financial crisis, there is a consensus among most policymakers 
and researchers that macroprudential policy is an important tool for financial system 
stability.  However, the focus of research on macroprudential policy in has been 
narrowly focused on the area of the financial sector where financial imbalances are 
considered most likely by policymakers at present, which is the domestic credit and 
housing markets and the banking sector.  There is limited focus of both policy and 
research on macroprudential policy’s potential impact on the non-banking sector, 
commercial property market and in some aspect the real economy where potential 
imbalances can develop.  Furthermore, limited research has been completed on 
examining the cross-border effect of macroprudential policy and the impact on 
activities and profitability of deposit- and non-deposit- taking financial institutions.  In 
this context, the principal objective of the thesis is to contribute to the ongoing body of 
empirical research on the evolution of macroprudential policy, its objectives and effects 
in the financial sector specifically focusing on the differences between developed and 
developing countries.  
 
With these points as background, Chapter 1 introduced the thesis and provided an 
overview of its structure.  Chapter 2 discussed the evolution of macroprudential policy, 





6.2. Summary of findings 
 
Chapter 3 investigated the effectiveness of macroprudential policy and its instruments 
in reducing the build-up of financial system imbalances as measured by the credit-to-
GDP gap.  The gap is considered to be a good predictor of instability and it captures 
a wider definition of credit in the financial system unlike the research literature which 
tends to focus narrowly on household sector or at most non-financial sector credit.  To 
our knowledge the analysis we carried out has not been undertaken to date in the 
research literature.  Our empirical work seeks to achieve two purposes, 1) to determine 
whether macroprudential instruments are effective in reducing the credit-to-GDP gap, 
and 2) to identify which instrument(s) would be more effective in advanced countries 
versus emerging market economies.   
 
Our country sample included 43 countries, 27 advanced countries and 16 emerging 
market economies and the analysis was done over the period 2000-2013 using the 
Cerutti et al (2015a) IMF database of macroprudential instruments.  The empirical 
results from this Chapter 3 were also used in Chapter 5 to help evaluate the effect of 
macroprudential policy on banks’ profitability.  Our results show that, firstly, 
macroprudential policy is effective in reducing financial system imbalances as 
measured by the credit-to-GDP gap.  Secondly, we found that housing market related 
instruments, or instruments targeting borrowers, such as debt-to-income ratio (DTI), 
loans-to-value measures (LTV and LTVCAP) and concentration limits (CONC) are 
most effective in reducing the gap.   
 
In Chapter 4, we extended the analysis of macroprudential policy further by examining 
whether there are cross-border effects of macroprudential policies.  We looked at the 
interconnectedness of international financial markets via international banks claims 
(lending) and assessed whether domestic macroprudential policies can spill over into 
other countries.  Once again, this is a relatively new field as there is limited research 
on the issue as the focus of macroprudential policy; research tends to be on the 
domestic financial market, and with limited emphasis on the interconnectedness of 
international financial markets.  Also, the practise of using panel-vector autoregressive 
(PVAR) analysis in studying the effect of macroprudential policy is not common in the 
research literature.   
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Once again, our country sample included 43 countries, 27 advanced countries and 16 
emerging market economies.  The period of analysis was 2000-2014 using the 
International Banking Research Network (IBRN) macroprudential instruments 
database.  The empirical results suggest that macroprudential policy cross-border 
spillovers are generally insignificant although there was a positive result in emerging 
market economies for local currency reserve requirements.  We consider the impact 
to be negligible in term of affecting financial stability.  In addition, macroprudential 
instruments have a stronger effect on domestic credit and the macroeconomic 
variables. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 5, we investigated the potential effects of macroprudential policies 
on banks’ profitability as measured by return on average assets (ROAA) and return on 
average equity (ROAE), which will also help in the understanding how banks react to 
macroprudential regulations.  We contend that there is a further gap in the research 
literature on macroprudential policy, where the focus tends to be on the overall 
economy/system-wide benefits of such regulation and limited emphasis on the effects 
on individual banks as measured by the impact on their profitability, structure and 
activities, etc.  This despite the fact that the research literature indicates that bank 
profitability is important for the understanding of financial stability and it is significant 
for the effective functioning of the economy.  Weak bank profitability can have an 
adverse effect on lending activities and can reduce the impact of accommodative 
monetary policy measures.  We expected that macroprudential measures which target 
banks assets (credit activities) and reduce the credit-to-GDP gap (Chapter 3) will have 
the greatest effect on banks’ profitability.   
 
Our banking data sample included banks from 92 countries, 34 advanced countries 
and 58 emerging market economies.  There were 6,010 banks (3,095 banks from 
advanced countries and 2,915 banks from emerging market economies) and 84,140 
observations.  The period of analysis was 2000-2013 using the same instrument 
database as in Chapter 3.  In addition, the chapter examined how macroprudential 
policy interrelates with monetary policy, whether positively or negatively using the net 
interest margin profitability model as there have been considerable debates on the 
issue.  Only advanced countries were included in the data sample in analysing the 
macroprudential/ monetary policies interaction.  Our empirical results found, first, 
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macroprudential policy (mostly asset measures) had a negative and significant effect 
on banks’ profitability as measured by ROAA and ROAE broadly in line with the effect 
on the credit gap shown in Chapter 3.  Therefore Hypothesis 1 was accepted as 
being verified.  Also, we found that macroprudential policy had a negative and 
significant effect on banks’ profitability advanced countries and emerging market 
economies but the macroprudential instruments impact on the credit gap could not be 
determined (see Chapter 3), therefore Hypothesis 1 was accepted as being 
inconclusive for these country groups.  Second, we found that there is positive/ 
negative interaction between macroprudential and monetary policies.  We accept that 
Hypothesis 2 is verified as there could be an offsetting or complementing effect on 
monetary policy as measured by short-term interest which could affect banks’ 
profitability 
 
6.3. Major contributions and achievements 
 
In this thesis we have studied three areas of macroprudential policy where limited 
research has been undertaken.  In Chapter 3, we discussed the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policy on reducing the credit-to-GDP gap.  Our research in this 
chapter contributed to the literature in that, firstly, we extended the analysis of the 
effectiveness of macroprudential policy by looking at a wide measure of financial 
system imbalances.  We provided the first set of empirical research looking at the 
effect of macroprudential policy on the gap.  In the literature, the focus tends to be on 
a subset of the credit market (mainly the household sector) and with limited research 
in other areas of the financial system where potential imbalances can occur.  The 
2007-2008 financial crisis has shown that policymakers need to take a broad view of 
financial system regulation, hence the introduction of macroprudential policy.  
Likewise, policymakers need to look at the development of imbalances from a wide 
view not least in the light of experience is earlier crises where commercial property 
exposures have been crucial.  Secondly, we provided another robust check for 
confirming the effectiveness of macroprudential policy of reducing financial system 
imbalances as measured by the credit-to-GDP gap.  Our results are quite useful for 
policymakers because of the prominent role given to the credit-to-GDP gap in Basel 
III as a signalling tool (early warning indicator (EWI)) for policymakers in identifying 
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looming build-ups of imbalances in the financial market and in setting the 
countercyclical capital buffers. 
 
In Chapter 4, by examining the cross-border effects of macroprudential policy, our 
contributions to the literature are as follows.  First, we provided the first set of empirical 
research on the cross-border effect between countries using macro-level data from 
the BIS database.  We believe our macro-level analysis is useful as it is capturing the 
effects on the entire financial sector, thus allowing for macroeconomic analysis not 
feasible with individual banks.  Second, we adopted a Panel-vector Autoregressive 
(PVAR) approach in our empirical research, which has not been used commonly in 
the literature in the analysis of the cross-border effects of macroprudential policy.  As 
noted in the literature, the main advantage of using a panel approach is that it 
increases the efficiency of the statistical inference, which would otherwise suffer from 
a small number of degrees of freedom when the VAR is estimated at the country level.  
Further it is noted that PVAR can be a useful tool to address the transmission of shocks 
across borders and understanding the spill over effects between countries when a 
cross-sectional dimension is added since it can capture country level heterogeneity. 
Thirdly, we added to the literature on financial market interconnectedness and the 
transmission mechanism of financial system shocks.  In the literature there is limited 
emphasis on the interconnectedness of international financial markets and there is 
often a disregard for cross-border flows as a transmission mechanism of financial 
shock between countries.  The rapid spread of the 2007-2008 financial crisis confirmed 
the relevance of understanding the interconnectedness of financial markets, the spill 
over effects and the transmission mechanism of shocks.  
 
In Chapter 5, we explored the effects of macroprudential policy on banks’ profitability 
and assessed the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies.  Our 
research in this chapter added to the literature as follows.  First, to our knowledge we 
provided the first set of empirical research on examining the effect of macroprudential 
policy on individual banks as measured by profitability.  This research is important from 
four reasons.  These are, 1) banks continue to be a key player in the financial system 
yet their function, role and operation varies significantly between countries; 2) the 
importance of profits to banks’ growth, survival and the understanding of financial 
system stability and fragility; 3) the significance of the banking sector for the real 
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economy and the transmission of monetary policy; and in this context we 4) identified 
which macroprudential instruments have the most significant effect on banks’ 
profitability.  Our second contribution to the literature from the chapter is the link we 
made between the effect of macroprudential policy on the credit-to-GDP gap and 
banks’ profitability.  By making such link, we can understand better the transmission 
process from policy to credit issuance.  Also, in the literature there tends to be a focus 
on the system-wide benefit of financial regulation and limited focus on the effect on 
the individual banks.  The third contribution is the positive/ negative interaction 
between macroprudential and monetary policies using the net-interest margin 
profitability model.  Once again, limited research has been undertaken linking 
macroprudential and monetary policies via the banking sector using banks’ profitability 
model (NIM). 
 
Finally, throughout the thesis we have looked at the effect of macroprudential policy 
based on country characteristics, that is we provided research on the evolution and 
effects of macroprudential policy by focusing on the differences between developed 
and developing countries.  Furthermore, our research assessed separately for effects 
over three periods, pre-crisis period 2000-2006, post-crisis period 2007-2013/4 and 
the full sample period 2000-2013/4.  These are important contributions to the literature 
as they give crucial information on how country characteristics and time periods can 
affect macroprudential policy.  
 
6.4. Policy implications 
 
Although the findings of Chapter 3 provide policymakers with information on the 
effectiveness of macroprudential policy in reducing a wider definition of financial 
imbalances (credit-to-GDP gap), the nature of macroprudential policy to date is that it 
commonly affects mainly banks and the household sector.  Similarly, with the 
introduction of the counter cyclical buffer, the application of it is to banks.  Yet, one 
policy implication of the results is that policymakers need to be mindful that the growth 
in the credit-to-GDP gap may not be bank or household sector related.  As such, before 
the employment of macroprudential policy to address imbalances as measured by the 
credit-to-GDP gap, there needs to be a careful analysis of the causes of the rising gap 
and this should be complemented with other early warning indicators (see Bank of 
337 
 
England (2014), Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014)).  Also, another policy implication 
is that our results show that housing market related instruments, or instruments 
targeting borrowers, such as debt-to-income ratio (DTI), loans-to-value ratios (LTV and 
LTVCAP) and concentration limits (CONC) are the most effective on the gap.  
However, these instruments especially LTV and DTI are less likely to affect financial 
imbalances originating in sectors not relating to the household or housing sector such 
as the corporate sector or commercial property market. 
 
The findings in Chapter 4 suggest that the cross-border impact of macroprudential 
policy is negligible between countries which is also consistent with the International 
Banking Research Network (IBRN) results as discussed in the chapter.  However, a 
policy implication of this result is that, policymakers cannot interpret these results in 
isolation as there is not a very long history in the usage of macroprudential policy 
particularly in advanced countries.  Also, macroprudential policies are designed to 
operate in periods of sustain economic growth or the absence of any financial 
disturbance.  There needs to be further analysis of the transmission of the cross-
border effect of macroprudential policy between countries.   
 
As mentioned above, most of the research literature on macroprudential policy focus 
mainly on banks and the housing sector.  Chapter 3 also highlighted that growth in the 
credit-to-GDP gap may not be related to the banking sector.  Hence if there is the used 
of macroprudential policy to broadly address financial imbalances without 
understanding the source of the imbalances, a policy implication based on the 
empirical results in Chapter 5 suggests that banks’ profitability could be adversely 
affected even if growth in the gap is unrelated to the banking sector.  As such, the 
stability of banks with weak profitability can be affected.  Another policy implication is 
the potential cost of macroprudential policy to the banking sector and the real economy 
in term of lower profitability as well as reduced lending activities.  By weakening banks, 
the system-wide approach of macroprudential policy could have unintended 
consequences on limiting highly productive investment opportunities.  Finally, policy 
implication of the results on the macroprudential/ monetary policies interaction shows 
that macroprudential policy can complement/ substitute for monetary policy in lowering 




6.5. Topics for future research 
 
We believe that this thesis can act as a useful guide to future research.  In fact, the 
empirical evidence we have presented in the thesis suggests that further research is 
needed in order to understand the effectiveness and operational aspect of 
macroprudential policy in the financial system.  First, the research in the thesis can be 
conducted using more recent data especially for the information on the use of 
macroprudential policy.  The most widely used macroprudential instruments datasets 
provide information up to 2014.  Second, further research can be undertaken to 
analyse the impact of a financial disturbance on the effectiveness of the 
macroprudential instruments particularly in emerging market economies since they 
have a longer history of using macroprudential instruments.  It seems that 
macroprudential policy was designed to operate in periods of financial stability.  Third, 
research can be undertaken looking at the effect of macroprudential policy by including 
more market-based information, which constitutes a forward-looking approach.  Using 
historical accounting-based information constitutes a backward-looking approach 
which may not necessary predict the future.  Fourth, research can be undertaken to 
analyse the impact macroprudential policy has on the real economy since banks’ credit 
activities are restricted.  A good starting to examine how large is the impact on 
economic growth as a result of macroprudential policy restricting banks’ credit to 
particular sectors of the economy.  Fifth, further regional research on macroprudential 
policy can be done by focusing on particular areas such as Africa, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, etc.  Finally, the thesis did not analyse the impact of banks’ ownership, 
type of banks, and regulatory structure on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy.  
Research in these areas will be very useful.  As for example, several macroprudential 
policy governance structures have been discussed in the literature and understanding 
how the governance structure affect the implementation of macroprudential policy 






Broad credit channel, also referred as balance sheet channel, is the direct impact 
of monetary policy on aggregate demand and output, that is, the potential impact on 
borrowers’ balance sheets and income statements, including borrowers’ net worth, 
cash flow and liquid assets.  
  
CAMELS is a rating system that bank supervisory authorities use in order to rate 
financial institutions according to six factors.  The factors are Capital Adequacy, Asset 
quality, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk. 
  
Credit crunch is defined as an economic condition in which investment capital is 
hard to secure. Banks and investors become wary of lending funds to individuals and 
corporations, which drives up the price of debt products for borrowers. Often an 
extension of a recession, a credit crunch makes it nearly impossible for companies 
to borrow because lenders are scared of bankruptcies or defaults, resulting in higher 
rates. 
  
Decision tree is a schematic, tree-shaped diagram used to determine a course of 
action or show a statistical probability. Each branch of the decision tree represents a 
possible decision, occurrence or reaction. The tree is structured to show how and 
why one choice may lead to the next, with the use of the branches indicating each 
option is mutually exclusive. 
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a common measure of market 
concentration and is used to determine market competitiveness.  It is calculated as 
the sum of the squares of each participants’ market share. 
  
Interest rate channel is the mechanism where monetary policy can influence 
aggregate demand through interest changes. 
  
Interest rate mismatch occurs when a bank borrows at one interest rate but lends 
at another. 
  
Money-centre banks are banks that borrow from and lend to governments, large 
corporations, and other banks on national and international financial markets.  
  
Note issuance facility is a medium-term legally binding commitment under which a 
borrower can issue short-term paper in its own name, but where underwriting banks 
are committed either to purchase any notes which the borrower is unable to sell, or 
to provide standby credit. 
  
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) refers to the system of banking supervision 
in Europe. It comprises the ECB and the national supervisory authorities of the 
participating countries. 
   
Tail risk is the risk associated with an event with a very small possibility of occurring 
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